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ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to characterise what is particular about the style of 
management and the nature of management jobs in France. In essence, the 
research sets out to explore the following themes: 
- Is Crozier right - just how formal.. hierarchic and bureaucratic is French 
management? 
- To what extent is French management education responsible for the 
singularities of French management? 
- How do socio-cultural factors affect the French management style? 
- Is there a convergence of national management styles, a universal model 
which transcends national boundaries? 
- What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of French management? 
These questions are answered in part in terms of the 1i terature and in terms 
of the evidence from non-participant observation and direct interviewing. 
The study ties together several disciplines which have often been treated 
separately - management, sociology, anthropology - to give a better overall 
picture of the interaction between French management and society. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: AIM AND ORGANISATION OF RESEARO-I 
"When Peter talks about Paul, if you listen, you can learn more 
about Peter than about Paul. " 
This ancient aphorism seems to sum up the case of French management which 
tends to be somewhat maligned in the comparative literature. The cri ti ci sm 
is not unrelated to the fact that many of the more respected works have been 
by foreigners, and a fortiori, by Americans. Seen through their culturally- 
tinted spectacles, certain characteristics of French management are regarded 
as dysfunctional when all they really are is different. As Jean-Paul Larcon 
(head of HEC) pointed out in conversation with the researcher, 'bften what 
is seen as the only way, turns out merely to be the American way. " 
Taken out of context there is no denying that French management lends itself 
somewhat to caricature. Particular institutions or practices can easily be 
ridiculed as archaic or rigid. Yet, the evidence that France "must be doing 
something right" in managerial and/or educational terms is there for all to 
see: it has undergone a very rapid final phase of industrialisation (a la 
suedoi se); it is substantially richer than some of its European neighbours 
including Britain; and it boasts a qualitatively better interface between 
industry and government. 
So, to gain a proper appreciation of French management, its consti tuent 
parts must be examined in relation to each other, and the composite picture 
considered in the wider perspective of French culture and society. 
In order to tackle this characterisation of French management, the 
researcher has dismissed the idea of an all-out assault on the subject and 
opted instead for a series of. tactical ? raids' on strategic points, which 
encapsul ate a number of themes. Thus, the chapters are not really sequential 
and are intended to be virtually self-contained. This is also true of the 
literature review and the methodology chapters which aim to go beyond scene 
setting and take an interpretive position. 
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It is hoped that by providing a series of overlapping snapshots a more 
coherent and realistic picture will emerge than might have been achieved 
using comprehensive aerial photographs. 
Broadly speaking, the discussion chapters fall into three sections. Chapters 
4-6 (inclusive) explore the educational background, career progress and 
nature of the managerial population. Chapters 7-9 (inclusive) consider the 
attitudes of French managers and their relations with one another. Chapters 
10-12 (inclusive) examine French corporate leadership, including its labour 
relation aspects, and French corporate culture. Some of the recurrent themes 
are then discussed in an audit chapter and the thesis concludes by placing 
French management in some sort of social, economic and historical 
perspective - looking at where it has come from and where it is heading. 
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2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
"Now that you've seen what it's really like you can go back and 
clear about 50 feet of shelving. " Ted Marsh (Production Director, 
Brush Switchgear Ltd) after the author had spent an exploratory 
spell of non-participant observation. 
The present chapter is something of a reconnaissance exercise aimed at 
identifying the space which the thesis should furnish. Of course, it is not 
possible to appraise the literature on French management without some 
preliminary groundwork. Thus, the chapter begins with a discussion of a few 
selected texts which provide a scaffold for the research: starting with an 
examination of the nature of management work, followed by a close look at 
comparative management as a di sci pl i ne. And these 1 ead in to an i n-depth 
study of the literature on French management per se. 
The Nature 
-Q-f 
Management Work 
In order to engage in a characterisi ng study of French management it is 
necessary to have a 'point de reperel - that is, a clear idea of management 
work. Of course, the study of managerial work is, in itself, worthy of a 
doctoral thesis, so only the edited highlights can be set out here. And 
although this means sacrificing detail.. the advantage of an abridged account 
is that it brings out the substantial shift in our perception of management 
work - its portrayal having evolved considerably, whilst the core activity 
remains essentially unaltered. 
Views of managerial behaviour were, for a long time, coloured by Henri 
Fayol's ideas on executives. According to him, managerial work could be 
distilled into five activities namely, "planning, organising, commanding, 
co-ordinating and controlling" (1949; 6). At the time (1916), management was 
a fledgling discipline and in dire need of scientific credibility, so to 
couch it in these rational terms was to enhance its status and lend it a 
much-needed veneer of scientific respectability. 
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Management writers latched on to this enticing definition and touted it so 
that even practising managers began to perceive their work in these neat, 
academic terms. Indeed.. Fayol's legacy has been so enduring that some 
management texts still employ these words as chapter headings. The manager 
was presented as a rational information-handler and decision-maker operating 
in a well-regulated environment. 
Broadly speaking, this view of management as an imperious task went 
unchallenged for several decades until Sune Carlson (1951) exploded the myth 
by revealing a less cerebral side to managerial work. He reported that 
managers were not bureaucratic automatons engaged only in analytical 
decision-making - and nor did they display any real aspiration in that 
direction. Indeed, they seemed willing supporters of the chaos they 
outwardly deplored. Fayol's description was exposed as a case of wishful 
thinking, or at best a statement of objectives, but certainly not a 
description of the reality of managerial work. 
Having freed management from its classical and idealised shackles, the path 
was cleared for others to develop the arguments. Dalton focused upon the 
social and political aspects of managerial work. He offered an insight into 
the various forms of skulduggery and machination which take up a manager's 
time - and in doing so, contributed to our appreciation of the managerial 
underlife of organisations in which informal arrangements replace, impede 
and combine with official procedures. As far as he was concerned, the 
successful managers were those who felt most at ease in this ambivalent 
system : 
'Persons able to deal with confusion came to the fore as leaders, 
with or without the official title. They became the nucleus of 
cliques that work as interlocking action centres and as bridges 
between official and unofficial purposes. " (1959; 68) 
Dalton was clearly flying in the face of conventional wisdom. by suggesting 
that these managerial practices were conducive not detrimental to 'proper, 
managerial work - and that informal practices were the lubricant of 
organisational operation and preservative of managerial sanity. 
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In 1967 Wrapp reiterated Carl son's original analysis by denouncing the lack 
of authenticity in conventional accounts : 
"I guess I do some of the things descri bed in the books and 
articles, but the descriptions are lifeless, and my job isn't. " 
(1967; 8). 
However, Wrapp was not entirely in agreement with Carlson. Carl son's tone 
had been mildly exhortary - lamenting the fact that managers were victims of 
what he termed "administrative pathology" (that is, aware of their 
operational involvement but powerless to extricate themselves from it). 
Wrapp took a more pragmatic view of the situation, regarding everyday 
entanglements as an antidote to "the sterility so often found in those who 
isolate themselves from operations" (1967; 9). Implicitly, he was confirming 
Lawrences opinion of Carlson as "an academic looking at 'men of action' and 
seeking to order and constrain where this is not appropriate. " (1986c; 24). 
It was a measure of the lack of progress since Carl son's work that Wrapp's 
article was condemned as heretical, with many practising managers taking 
exception to his subversive argument that "good managers don't make policy 
decisions" (1967; 8). But it paved the way for Mintzberg's classic study. 
Mintzberg gave an added twist to the portrayal of management work by 
asserting that chaos was the work of managers. Like Wrapp, he did not bemoan 
this hectic disorder but instead proclaimed that this was what management 
work was all about since the essence of management is dealing with the 
unexpected, the routine being able to take care of itself - Consequently, 
management work was i ntri si cal ly interactive, not contemplative. He also 
drew attention to the unstructured nature of management work, encapsulating 
its disjointed and frenetic nature in the cl aim that management work is 
characterised by "brevity, variety and fragmentation" (1973). 
The foregoing studies tended to treat management in a rather monolithic way, 
as though managers were subject to the same constraints and animated by the 
same dynam-ics. Stewart took a tilt at this homogeneous view of mnanagement 
by pointing out the dimensions along which managerial work patterns vary 
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(1967,1976,1982) - in terms of work, behaviour, management styles, both 
between and within functional speci al i sms, economic sectors and hi erarchi cal 
1 evel s. She has drawn attention to the scope for personalising what are 
nomi nal ly i denti cal jobs. In poi nting out thi s el ement of di screti on (i n 
terms of content and method) in management work.. Stewart implicitly refuted 
the lingering "one best way" view of management. 
More recently, Kotter (1982) has further refined our understanding of how 
managerial work is depicted. Kotter goes further than his predecessors in 
acknowledging and stressing the central importance of social relationships 
and power in the routine acompl i shments of managerial work. Kotter has 
peddled the notion of managerial work as a kind of camouflaged planning - 
in other words.. Kotter rather cleverly reconciles contemporary and orthodox 
views on management work by saying that action management is merely a 
disguised version of contemplative management. He maintains that managers 
plan implicitly, "on their feet", and reactive behaviour is.. in fact, an 
opportunistic way of achieving much in a short time. Similarly, disjointed 
i nteractions are not a si gn of impul siveness but a means of scanning a range 
of probl ems rapidly. 
Lawrence too, has been instrumental in legitimising the erati c, verbal and 
apparently non-decisional aspects of management. However, his interpretation 
is rather different from Kotter's "efficiency hypothesis". Kotter justifies 
action-oriented management by maintaining that deep down, it is a more 
efficient means of getting the job done - the implication being that 
managers act in this way by necessity. Lawrence does not deny the existence 
of method in the madness, but is unsatisfied by the explanation. 
He prefers to invoke humanistic reasons for the 'chaos'. Lawrence refers, on 
the one hand, to the basic need for contact and managerial predilection for 
other humans as sources of information, inspiration and support (1986c; 81); 
and on the other hand, he points to the need for the intellectual stimulus 
of social and political confusion. According to Lawrence, chaos is sustained 
for primarily selfish reasons - as confirmed by the-old quip that "action is 
the opiate of the manager. " Thus, Lawrence's critical contribution to our 
understanding of management work is in highlighting the significance of the 
process as well as the product -a fire-fighting approach is chosen by 
inclination as well as imposed by necessity. Given the option, managers 
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favour the oral medium to the written medium. Not only is flitting about 
more efficient, it is also more enjoyable. In this respect, Kotter may be 
guilty of the same crime as Carl son in trying to foist logical reasoning on 
emotive processes. 
What emerges then is a picture of management work as technical, tactical, 
reactive and frenetic. These are recurring themes in the literature. Many 
managers spend little time on planning or abstract formulation, are subject 
to constant interruptions, hold short face-to-face meetings which flit from 
topic to topic and respond to the initiatives of others far more than they 
initiate themselves. 
Taking a historical perspective, a clear progression emerges in the 
portrayal of management work - from idealised to realistic. Initially, 
managers were depicted as strategists, planners and thinkers. Carlson 
exploded that myth but left us with the nagging feeling that managers were 
allowing themselves to be diverted from their 'real' work by constant 
interruption and capricious interpersonal contact. Mintzberg rehabilitated 
their i mage by saying that this was their real work. And the pendulum has 
swung to its limit with Kotter maintaining that management involves no 
identifiable reflection - since it is incorporated into the action itself. 
The shift is strangely reminiscent of the American post-mortem on Vietnam. 
The war has been the subject of a fundamental reappraisal. An initial 
unwillingness to face up to the truth has given way to a frantic search for 
it - the War is currently the most popular history course in US colleges. 
This about-turn in portrayal, and acceptance of shortcomings, is paralleled 
by what has happened to management. Whilst the substance remai ned unchanged, 
our perception of it underwent a radical turnaround - something which should 
not be dismissed as a quirk of fate. 
The increasing boldness of the case for action and away from reflection no 
doubt mirrored the growing confidence of management the discipline. As an 
emerging discipline; it was in dire need of the scientific kudos of its 
constituent disciplines. But having established itself as a respectable 
discipline, with its own body of knowledge and praxis (not simply 
derivative), it has been able to discard the crutches of pseudo-scientific 
legitimacy. 
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Comparative Management 
An examination of the past research in comparative management is an 
essential preliminary on two grounds. Firstly, it serves to determine 
whether there is any sense in undertaking a study of French management. In 
other words, is there su ch a thing as a national style of management within 
compa ni es, or do the principles of management cut across national 
boundaries? 
Secondly, assuming there is something to investigate, the literature review 
will familiarise the reseacher with the dimensions along which cultures can 
be compared. This is important, since exi sting differences are 1 ikel y to be 
of degree rather than kind. Few of the distinctive characteristics of French 
management would be unique - they would simply be more or less pronounced 
versions of traits present in other countries. The researcher must therefore 
equip himself with w hat amounts to a photofit kit, in order to i denti fy th e 
distinguishing features of French management. 
It is worth adding, as a prel ude to the next chapter on methodology, that 
the literature will provide an insight into the various research tools and 
their uses, as well as ideas on innovative research designs. Similarly, it 
may alert the researcher to some of the methodological pitfalls in the area. 
Universal or culture bound? 
Researchers, in their attempts to examine the implications of culture for 
management practices and organisation structures have, in the past, arrived 
at contradictory conclusions. There are those who argue for universal, 
culture-free management, and there are those who argue that culture is the 
determinant of management styles. 
Systematic cross-cultural research on organisations and those they harbour 
is of relatively recent origin. The topic attracted very little attention 
before 1960, but flourished with the, development of multi-national companies 
around the world - and the inevitable blunders resulting from foisting 
American management theory and practice onto existing approaches. 
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One of the first attempts to test out the universality of management was by 
Harbison & Myers. They came to the comforting concl usion that, "there is a 
general logic of management development which has applicability both to 
advanced and industrialising countries in the modern world" (1959; 117). The 
notion of convergence was endorsed by Kerr et al. (1960), who argued that 
the organisational and institutional patterns of industrial societies were 
destined to follow a common life cycle. Indeed, Farmer and Richman (1965; 
400), went as far as to suggest that the immutable logic of technology and 
management were destined to render studies in comparative management 
obsolete. 
Haire et al. (1966), in their extensive cross-cul tural study, also gave thei r 
qualified support to the standardising effect of industrialism, believing 
that it had considerable impact on managerial attitudes. They substantiated 
their argument by pointing out the similarity of managerial responses in 
three countries whose cultural traditions were disparate namely, Argentina- 
Chile-India. According to cultural logic, managerial attitudes in these 
three countri es shoul d have resembled those in the Latin or Angl o-Saxon 
clusters. Again the emphasis was on convergence: "the imperatives of the 
business si tuati on and its val ues and traditions seem to bring about a 
uniform response to probl ems of management" (1966; 178). And whilst the 
authors acknowledged the influence of cultural heritage on a person's 
attitudes, they dismissed it as subordinate to the occupational input (1966; 
9). 
Hickson and his colleagues were less reserved in revoking the cultural 
explanation. They had no qualms in postulating that "relationships between 
the structural characteristics of work organisations and variables of 
organi sation context will be stable across societies. " (1974; 63). Their 
findings corroborated the notion of orderly progress along a single 
industrial track. 
The universal school of management reigned supreme for along time. Even 
those who acknowledged managements need for cultural contingencies tended 
to play them down and portray them negatively. Negandhi, for instance, was 
aware of widely different management philosophies in the countries he 
studied yet expressed "hope for future convergence" (Lammers 1979; 332). In 
other words.. Negandhi was prepared to recognise that cultural factors could 
impinge on the industrialisation process, but regarded these as a brake 
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which would eventual ly be worn away: 
"... the logic of technology is taking over man's differing beliefs 
and val ue orientations. Increasingly, the road is becoming one". 
(Lammers 1979; 332) 
What lay behind this reticence to recognise, and then to accept the culture- 
bound approach? A number of underlying causes can be invoked: 
Firstly, as a derivative of economic theory, management was deemed to 
possess an inherent logic, based on economic imperatives like profit. There 
was a belief in what Sorge calls "a natural way of managing" (Lawrence, 
1985; 243) an da consequent assumption that management could/should not 
adopt different cultural guises. 
Secondly, universality conferred scientific legitimacy upon the discipline 
of management. Therefore, to suggest that management was in some way 
multiform was to deny it scientific status - or, as far as management 
writers were concerned, to bite the hand that fed them. 
Thirdly, there must have been a measure of self-doubt among potential 
critics. Brought up on a staple diet of Taylor and Fayol there may have been 
some reticence to challenge their classical precepts. Thus, it was not until 
Mintzberg had pronounced his momentous "there is no science in managerial 
work" (1973), that the floodgates for alternative visions were opened. 
Fourthly, the universalist lobby had the implicit backing of organisational 
writers who simply ignored societal determinants. By their 'conspiracy of 
silence', they i nadvertantly pl edged their support for the universalist 
model . 
Finally, along with excessive faith in the global isation of markets, the 
convergence theory may have been a reflection of the times (post-war 
optimism and unadulturated consumerism). Peter Lawrence (HES Journal; 1981) 
has posited that the convergence theory was the product of assured economic 
growth. Stagnation led to a questioning of the 'great truths' which seemed 
to hold true during the expansionist phase. 
Given these factors it is perhaps easier to understand why opposition to the 
convergence theory was muted. Yet there were isolated attempts to promote a 
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countervi ew. 
Among the precursors of divergence theory, it is worth drawing attention to 
Crozier's contribution. He rounded off his case studies of a clerical agency 
in Paris and three plants of the French tobacco monopoly by comparing 
"l'organi sation ä la francai se" with organisational systems in the USA and 
Soviet Russia (1964; Chapter 8). Crozier was quite explicit in his support 
for a culture-bound approach, stating, "As soon as one embarks on the study 
of the pathology of organisations, cultural analysis becomes an 
indispensable tool which permits the delimitation of the global theory and 
its applications in different cul tural contexts" (1964; 7). 
Later, he reiterated the point, "Intuitively, people have always assumed 
that bureaucratic structures and patterns of action differ in the different 
countries of the Western world and even more markedly between East and West" 
(1964; 210). Unfortunately, in spite of Crozier's pioneering lead, social 
scientists failed to take the cue. Perhaps, as Crozier himself points out, 
authors believed " too easily in the universalistic value of American 
experiences" (1964; 211). 
In actual fact, it was not until the mid-70s that the gauntlet of 
universality was finally picked up. It was conspicuous that many of the 
proponents of a culture-bound approach were European in origin. Perhaps, it 
had taken them a few decades to find the courage to square up to American 
managerial imperial ism. 
Among the challengers to the mainstream view were Marc Maurice and his 
colleagues (1976). They ascribed the differences between matched companies 
in West Germany and France to socio-cultural factors. Maurice cl earl y 
believed in a high level of consistency between people's attitudes and 
behaviour 'outside' and 'inside' work organisations. He maintained that 
companies were firmly entrenched in their national cultures, and that 
managerial ideology was a product of the prevailing educational system and 
degree of social stratification. (Lammers 1979; 56). 
Child and Kieser (Lammers 1979) were also inclined towards cultural 
interpretations. In their comparison of British and German companies, they 
affirmed the influence of culture upon organisational form and regime. The 
differences in form included levels of centralisation, whilst those in 
regime concerned aspects such as managerial discretion. The authors 
11 
concluded that, "a sociologically valid theory of organisation must take 
cultural settings into account" (Lammers 1979; 267). 
More recently, Hofstede has proved the staunchest advocate of the culture- 
bound approach. His book, "Culture's consequences" has become a classic in 
the field and isolates four dimensions which serve to classify national 
cultures. Hofstede categorically relates the international differences found 
between subsi dua ries of a1 arge M NC. - to thei r soci etal envi ronments. 
Inspite of Hof stede's influential work, support for the culure-bound 
approach is still far from wholehearted. The problem lies with the fact that 
cultural explanations have too often been employed as a 'cop-out' -a sort 
of 'catch-all? category which accounts for all the unexplained differences. 
Inevitably, the cultural thesis has been discredited through overuse. 
Perhaps the pendulum has swung back too far. 
The implications for the researcher is that he should proceed with caution 
and avoid using culture as a 'fail safe' category, in the absence of 
alternative causal factors. 
Dimensions 
Having ascertained, with certain qualifications, that the endeavour is 
worthwhile, the researcher is faced with the question of dimension - not in 
specific terms of content, but rather in thei r form. 
Two basic approaches emerge - one quantitative and objective, the other more 
qualitative and personal. Hai re and Hofstede tend to favour the former, 
based on questionnaires and statistical analysis; whil st the latter is 
represented by the likes of Wei nshal 1 (1977) or Law rence (1980,1986a, 
1986b), who opt for a more interactive approach. 
The former approach, which has characterised most of the comparative 
research to date, rests on abstract dimensions such as masculinity, need 
fulfilment, authority' or uncertainty avoi dance. In marked contrast to this, 
Weinshall or Lawrence opt for arguably more meaningful phenomena such as 
mobility, conflict, careerism, status differentiation or degree of 
managerial interaction - inferring values and attitudes from behavioural 
manifestations rather than responses to broad general questions, not 
relating to specific identifiable current behaviour. 
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Of course, the differences in dimensions stem from fundamental differences 
in approach. By using the statistical approach the sample can be much larger 
and the scope for international comparisons is enhanced, since di rect 
contact is not required. What is more, the results are quantitative and 
therefore irreproachable. But there are serious drawbacks too. An obvious 
one is referred to by Haire et al : "though many managers subscri be to such 
beliefs in responding to an attitude questionnaire such as ours, they seldom 
put them into practice when dealing with subordinates in actual job 
situations" (1966; 24). 
It is far harder to pull the wool over the researcher's eyes when he is in a 
position to verify the answer. So, based on the premise that "actions speak 
louder than words", some researchers have opted an approach based on actual 
rather than perceived behaviour. 
Taking their cue from organisational theory, Wei nshal 1 and Graves have 
followed Sune Carlson's lead and applied the diary method to executives in 
different countries. Similarly, Lawrence has borrowed Mi ntzberg's shadowing 
technique and applied it to different cultures. In transferring their study 
of management work to an international setti ng, they have helped to bridge 
the perceived gap between the conventional study of management/management 
studies and comparative management - and put an end to articles which refer 
to "... linking the two" (Nath; 1974/75) and "... a marriage needed" 
(Negandhi; 1975). 
Of course, this qualitative approach is more complex in execution - it makes 
contradictory demands of intimate knowledge of management work, and an 
absence of managerial preconceptions. It also requires sound linguistic 
skills and an ability to pinpoint the significant detail - as well as a good 
dose of imagination and audacity. 
Notwithstanding this rather improbable mix of skills, the researcher is 
attracted by the approach described in the previous paragraph which seems 
better suited to an in-depth and pragmatic study. An all-out quantitative 
assault smacks of taking a sledgehammer to a nut, _ 
since cultural subtleties 
are likely to be forfeited in the process. After all, the researcher is not 
anticipating Darwinian revelations - he is merely attempting to tease out 
evidence of what Sorge neatly descri bed as "ingenious and judicious 
tinkering. " (Lawrence; 1985; 244). 
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Finch management 
A characterisation of French management cannot confine itself to a study of 
the strictly managerial since this would only reveal a small, albeit 
central.. detail in the jigsaw. The net has to be cast wider to embrace 
related disciplines such as economics, sociology and anthropology which 
provide an explanation of the soci o-cul tural underpinnings of French 
management. The literature review should resemble a Venn diagram whose 
common denominator is French management. 
Given the mass of literature explored it would be easy to submerge the 
reader under a plethora of ti tl es, which would be suitably impressive and 
inaccessible. It seemed preferable to opt for a more restricted look at the 
key findings. For this reason the review is laid out thematically, starting 
with the more peripheral disciplines or studies and gradually honing in on 
the target area - in other words, moving from the general to the specific. 
Background texts 
There is no shortage of characterisations of French society and culture 
since the French seem to enjoy looking in their collective mirror. This 
penchant is confirmed by the regularity with which the media have recourse 
to "sondages" (opinion polls). Indeed, two firms of survey consultants 
regularly publish a selection of the opinion polls conducted that year. 
"L'Etat de l'o pi ni on" (S. O. F. R. E. S. ) and "Les Francai s tel sq u' il s sont" 
(I. F. O. P. ) provide interesting snapshots of the prevailing mood within the 
French public. The figures are accompanied by commentaries by journalists 
who try to interpret the findings. A more in-depth., if less up-to-the-minute 
look at the French psyche and society comes in a series of essays edited by 
Jean-Daniel Reynaud, "Franpi s, qui etes-vous? ': 
Three books, which share the same imaginative title ("The French") have also 
provided rapid brushstroke insight into French culture and civilisation. All 
three are at. l east in part anecdotal in style, but present. a consistent 
picture of the national character. Franoi s Nouri ssi er (1968), delves into 
the dilemma of being French; Sanche de Gramont tries to isolate what is 
specific about the French and their val ues; and Theodore Zel din gives a very 
reveal li ng outsider's view of the attitudes and behaviour of the French. 
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Perhaps the most comprehensive study of French society is John Ardagh's 
"France in the 1980s", justifiably sub-titled, "the definitive book". It is 
a fascinating examination of French society in transition since the war. 
Another engaging analysis is Georges Santoni's edited volume, "Societe et 
culture de la France contemporai ne" : It contains transcripts of a series of 
seminars conducted at the State University of New York - and probably 
because it was originally intended for the oral not the written medium, it 
is a very readable description of French culture and society. 
What in very broad terms emerges from these books is a portrait of a nation 
which is simultaneously looking into the future and turning back to some of 
its deepest traditions - essentially, a people of contradictions. This same 
tension between past and present is also a theme in our characterisation of 
French management. 
A stalemate society 
Alongside these multi-disciplinary characterisations, there are a series of 
works, generally by French authors, which are equally wide-ranging but 
rather more critical in outlook. For the researcher these works are of 
considerable interest since their authors tend to be less cautious. They 
range audaciously across the centuries, and are concerned with deep 
underlying causes rather than superficial phenomena. They venture wide (and 
someti mes wil d) general isations and their work rel ies more on secondary 
sources than on detailed research. Yet their readi ness to be opinionated 
provi des greater intellectual stimulus. 
These critiques of French society are perhaps epitomised by Alain 
Pey ref itte's ''Le mal francai s': The author tries to identify the reasons for 
a 'French malaise' whose symptoms are the inertia, divisions and confusion 
"d'une nation reputee intelligente" (of a people renowned for its 
intellect). Likewise, Franjois de Closets' "Toujours plus! " criticises the 
cumulative inequalities and ossification of French society. Another 
dissident author is Michel Crozier who grinds his axe in the books "La 
soci ete bl oquee" and more recently in "On ne change pas la soci ete par 
decret". Crozier is sceptical as to whether social change in France is 
possible with a people attached to privileges, hierarchy and job security. 
The thrust of these popular books is that French society is a victim of its 
religious background, administrative centralisation and flagrant elitism. 
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Elitism 
The last theme, elitism, is in itself the subject of a substantial body of 
literature. It is an area which has fascinated French and foreign 
sociologists alike. Among the 1 atter, Ezra N. Sul ei man's, "Elites in French 
society: the politics of survival", Jolyon Howorth's "Elites in France" and 
Jane Marceau's ', Class and status in France" are fascinating accounts of the 
mechanics of keeping power 'in the family'. 
In di gi neous writers have also analysed the phenomenon, but their stance has 
tended to be more begrudging, as indicated by the titles used - "Les 
heri ti ers" and 'ta reproduction" (both by Pierre Bourdieu); "Tel pere, tel 
f il s" (Cl au de Thel ot); "La cl asse di ri geante en France" (Pierre Birnbaum) or 
"Le gaspi l1 age des elites" (Sai nt Guil 1 aume). The main argument of these 
authors is that the ruling class is perpetuated and legitimised by the 
accumulation of various types of capital - financial, social and 
educational. A more popular version of the same argument is presented by 
Alexandre Wickham who likens the French elite to the soviet ruling caste in 
"La nomenkatura francai se". The book is more a catalogue of the powers and 
privileges of the elites than an academic analysis of its foundations, but 
it contains a wealth of interesting anecdotal evidence. 
An institution wich comes in for particular attention in its perpetuation of 
elites is the body of grandes ecol es. Typically these are criticised on an 
individual basis by former pupils. Jacques Mandrin set the ball rolling by 
attacking his old school in "L'Enarchie". In 1973, Jacques-Antoi ne 
Kosciusko- Morizet repeated the trick of biting the hand that fed him with 
"La mafia polytechnicienne". Since then, several other books have been 
written condemning the very top grandes ecol es and the privileges they 
confer upon their alumni. Needless to say, these vitriolic attacks tend to 
reinforce the image of the schools which, in a roundabout way, merely adds 
to their prestige. 
Macro-Economic & Industrial Analyses 
A useful introduction to this area is Charles P. Kindleberger's "Economic 
growth in France and Britain". It fills in the background of French economic 
history as well as taking a serious look at the social and cultural 
determinants of economic growth. 
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Analyses of French industry have changed considerably over the last two 
decades - not so much in thrust, as in outlook. In the late 60s there were a 
spate of books condemning French industry for its backwardness in relation 
to the US. Octave Gel eni er set the tone in "Le moral de l'entrepri se et le 
desti n de 1a nation" by decl ari ng that French management's atti tudes and 
culture were out of step with modern industrial requirements. Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiver ("Le def i ameri cai n") took a similar stance by pointing out 
that Europe's lag had less to do with a deficiency in industrial or 
financial resources than with a1 ack of intellectual ones, namely managerial 
effectiveness. 
The analysis was confirmed by researchers from the other side of the 
Atlantic, such as MacArthur and Scott ("Industrial planning in France")who 
saw weaknesses in strategic planning and organisational structure ly i ng 
behind French underperformance. But beyond this they also corroborated 
Gel eni er's analysis -a lack of explicit economic objectives, tolerance of 
poor performance and inadequate management education. 
Since the mid-seventies, the tone has been more positive with less emphasis 
on the weaknesses of French industry than on what it should do to improve. 
This change is reflected in the choice of titles which are infused with 
rampant optimism: "La reforme de l'entreprise" (Pierre Sudreau); "La 
nouvelle economie f ranpi se" (Jacques Attali); "Le pari franýai s" (Michel 
Albert); or "llapres-cri se est commence" (Alain Mi nc). The thrust of these 
books is that France 'can do better' in matters industrial - and the authors 
try to lay down a blueprint for action (what amounts to an industrial 
manifesto). 
Industrial sociology 
Again, this area is best subdivided thematically, since the books themselves 
fall rather neatly into socio-occupational categories - perhaps a sign of 
the stratification of French organisations. There is one study however, 
which is worth singling out. Renaud Sai nsaul ieu's "L'i dentite au travail" is 
a thorough examination of each occupational category as well as the dynamics 
of the relations between them. The author makes an attempt to transcend the 
hierarchical barriers, unlike the other texts in this section. 
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Workers 
Perhaps the most useful contribution to the researcher's understanding of 
French workers is the work done by L. E. S. T. Marc Maurice and his team have 
produced several comparative studies of French and German workers. The 
recently published "The social foundations of industrial power" reveals that 
French training i s more firm-specific th an its German equivalent, that 
promotion is more dependent on seniority, and that workers tend to stay 
longer with their firms. 
"Cadres" 
The most a uth or i ti ti ve account of the cadre in French society is Luc 
Bol tanski's "Les cadres". It describes the making of the social class, the 
space it has taken up in the industrial and social landscape and its 
cohesion. This was supplemented by Gerard Grunberg's "L'Univers pol i tique et 
syndical des cadres" which helped to refine the sociological profile of the 
"cadre" and further confirmed the idea of the "cadre" having a very definite 
image in society. 
Another study of particular interest is "Recherche sur la fonction 
dlencadrement" by G. Bengui gui et al. The researchers examine the work of 
French managers and attempt to identify what distinguishes their activities 
from the rest of the organi sational population. 
As regards the managerial apprenticeship of the cadre, a very clear 
description of their educational progress is provided by the recently 
published NEDO report, "The making of managers". A more interpretive account 
(though narrower in focus) is that of Whitley et al., "Masters of business" 
which compares the links between educational backgrounds and career paths 
for French and British business school graduates. And if we take managerial 
apprenticeship in its largest sense, it is worth mentioning Alexandre 
Wickham's, "Les carrieri stes" -a tongue-in-cheek inventory of the 
machinations and ploys used by ambitious cadres to get to the top. The 
political games they play turn out to be quite different from those" favoured 
by their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. 
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Employers 
Andre Harris presents a series of interviews with actual bosses in his book 
"Les patrons". Their testimonies are fascinating for the recurrence of 
certain themes, notably the contradictory themes of a dislike for bosses as 
a class and a certain paternalism on the part of individual bosses - which 
is probably best explained by Harris' opening phrase, "Les Francai s n'ai ment 
pas Iles patrons', mais il s aiment pl utot bien le leur" (the French do not 
like 'bosses', but rather like their own). 
Of course, since the bosses are part of the ruling class there is a certain 
amount of overl ap between the body of w ri ti ng discussed here and that on the 
theme of elitism. This overlap is exemplified by three books in particular, 
whose titles acknowledge the reproductive element in the higher reaches of 
French busi ness; they are 1) "Tu seras president., mon f il s" (Gaillard), 2) 
"Patron de droit divin" (Roger Martin) and 3) "Les 200" (Michel Bauer). The 
last title deliberately evokes the 200 noble families which have dominated 
France - even though in this case it refers to the bosses of France's 200 
largest companies. 
Management style 
As mentioned in the thesis introduction, many of the most respected accounts 
of French management are the work of non-French writers. A notable example 
is David Landes? "French business and the businessman: a social and cultural 
analysis" (in "Modern France" by E. M. Earle). This oft-quoted work portrays 
French management as dominated by family firms and essentially cautious, 
introverted and unconvinced by American managerial values. 
One of the earliest i ndi gi neous contributions to our understanding of French 
management was Michel Crozier's "Le phenomene bureaucratique". Crozier 
painted an enlightening picture of the power relationships between groups 
and individuals - but over and beyond that, he showed that. bureaucratic 
organisations need to be understood in terms of the cultural context in 
which they operate. Crozier posited that French management tended to be 
'bureaucratic' because that was what the mode with which the actors felt 
most comfortable. 
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Theodore Wei nshal l's "Managerial communication" uses communication patterns 
as a basis for making wider assumptions about French attitudes to authority 
and responsability. He tends to support Crozier's view of the French manager 
as keen to avoid conflict, face to face relations and responsibility where 
it is not attached to the office held. 
David Granick's "Managerial comparisons of four developed countries" also 
concurs with Crozi er's view of French management as undynami c and attri butes 
this inertia to a closed promotion system. Grani ck maintains that with pre- 
selection based on academic achievements, career horizons and initiative 
suffer accordingly. The author al so consi ders the impact of central i sati on, 
which is another theme discussed by Crozier in terms of the preference for 
resolution of conflicts by higher (and unseen) authority. The centralisation 
of authority theme is also covered by Jacques Horovitz in "Top management 
control in Europe". Horovitz concludes that French corporate management is 
often a 'one man show'. 
Future 
In the 80s, with the emergence of a new enterprise culture, there have been 
many home-grown spin-offs (cynics might suggest 'rip-offs) of the Tom 
Peters' "Excellence" books. One of the better examples is "Service com pri s" 
(Philippe Bloch et al. ); or "L'entrepri se du 3e type" by Georges Archier and 
Herve Serieyx which tries to identify the keys to corporate success. 
More pragmatic examples are books such as "Le management pratique de 
l'entrepri se" (Max Moreau) which gives recipes for successful management 
from a practitioner; or compilations of management success stories 
eulogising the new breed of manager such as "Les heros de l'economie" 
(Autrement) and "Ces patrons qui gagnent" (Jean Baumier). Such is the 
enthusiasm for these success stories a new genre has emerged. Business 
biographies which have long been accepted in other countries are now finding 
their way onto the best-seller lists in France - the most striking success 
being 'Gagner" (Bernard Tapie). 
Arti cl es 
It is worth devoting a short paragraph to the peri odi cal s and new spa pers 
which have enhanced the researcher's understanding of management in France. 
At the top of the 1 ist come the emminently readable "Gerer et comprendre" 
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and the more academic "Revue f rancai se de gesti on". More topi cal information 
has been found in "L'Expansion", "Le Monde" and "L'Etudiant" - as well as 
the more general journals, "L'Express", "Le Nouvel Observateur" and "Le 
Point" which were regularly panned and relieved of their managerial nuggets. 
Concl usi on 
The review of the evidence in the previous section has taken, so far as is 
possible, a neutral and non-evaluative line. I have endeavoured to address 
the evidence with one question - what do we know about French management? - 
in mind. The aim was to be reasonably comprehensive in breadth, if not in 
depth - si nce the particular arguments taken selectively from the literature 
will be developed as and when they are relevant in the main body of the 
thesi s. 
As is clear from the literature review, the character of French management 
is not uncharted territory, but what the researcher hopes to do is to tackle 
the subject in the round rather than in the partial way it has been treated 
by many writers and, if possible, to emphasise the connections rather than 
the divisions between the issues involved - in short, to set French 
management in some sort of social and cultural context. 
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3. NETNHODOLOGY 
"I1 faut reconnattre 1es aspects al eatoires dune demarche de 
recherche: chercher, c'est tätonner. " Conversation with Michel 
Berry, Directeur du Centre de recherche en gestion de l'Ecole 
polytechnique. 
(We should not forget the essential randomness of the research 
process: to investigate is to fumble). 
Most doctoral methodologies give the impression that the research was the 
culmination of a deliberative decision-making process. Researchers are 
reluctant to admit that they were not fully in control of the process. Yet 
personal experience has shown that the researcher has only partial say over 
the choice of subjects. Similarly, what information is gleaned from those 
subjects depends on their co-operation, not just careful preparation. 
Generally, management research has some difficulty in emulating the 
controlled conditions of scientific research. This is particularly true of 
non-participant observation as a method which is the flagship of the present 
research and also of interviewing, a component of this study. These generate 
broad propositions rather than testing identifiable hypotheses. 
The observational approach is in keeping with the exploratory nature of this 
research. It is a method likely to throw up unexpected insights and whose 
unpredictability and intensity provide a wealth of evidence. This idea is 
supported by, for example.. Kotter who states that "real progress" in the 
study of managerial work depends upon the use of unstructured observation 
methods (1982; 153). These, Kotter indicates, are essential if the 
researcher is to gain real appreciation of how managers construct and 
maintain their relationships with others. In adopting this approach I would 
allow the findings, rather than predetermined dimensions, to structure the 
thesis. 
Of course, the approach al so has its draw backs. For instance, the influence 
of judgment can lead to circularity - the researcher finding what he set out 
to find. What is more, the method relies upon the researcher's ability to 
decode what is happening in an interaction between participants in the 
managerial communication process. This is of particular concern when 
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observing managers abroad since the pace of the action precludes "slow 
motion repl ays". 
It is sometimes suggested that observational research lacks 'scientific' 
credibility. The environment is too uncertain, the findings haphasard and 
the interpretation personal . There may be an el ement of truth in this but 
putative disadvantages can in fact be attenuated through practice. In order 
to gain this experience, the researcher underwent an intensive training 
period aimed at eradicating certain inconsistencies. 
Pilot Studies 
The dress rehearsals were undertaken locally in order to familiarise the 
researcher with the intricacies of shadowing and interviewing. The 'guinea 
pigs' included several senior managers and an assortment of middle managers 
following the Institute of Personnel Managers course at Trent Polytechnic. A 
number of vital lessons were learnt regarding both interview technique and 
non-participant observation: 
Interorievi ng: 
When looking for subjects to interview, it is worth looking for a captive 
audience (at a course or conference) thereby economising effort rather than 
squandering it in the pursuit of individuals. 
There are some points of etiquette which seem to affect the success of a 
meeting. Arriving 1 ate can have an al most di sastrous impact (from 
observation rather than experience). Top managers believe that time is their 
most precious commodity, and to waste it may be taken as something of a 
personal insult, al though their attitude is not always reciprocal - such is 
the nature of social inequality. Patience is the only viable response. It is 
wise to aim at arriving at the organisation perhaps twenty minutes early, 
and to ask for the subject at reception about ten minutes before the 
appointment time. This allows for security arrangements such as signing of 
books and putting on of badges to be undertaken, -as well as giving subjects 
time to finish whatever they may be doing. It al so gives one a moment to 
compose oneself and fam il iarise oneself with the company literature. 
I 
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When getting the interview under way it was found useful to commence with a 
few direct, factual questions to break the ice which the subject could 
answer from memory. Hopefully this will encourage brief, accurate and 
specific responses and will set the tone of the session with the researcher 
leading the way rather than the manager running away with the interview and 
more mindful of image than reality. 
In conducti ng the interview, it is important not be afraid to di gress from 
a schedule, even at the expense of continuity. The researcher should be 
prepared to pursue asides which are thrown up by the discussion. On a 
psychological level it can prove disastrous to cut off interviewees in full 
flow since they may interpret this as a sign of disinterest - when the real 
cause is lack of confidence on the researcher's part. 
On the other hand, there is al ways the threat of managers giving an 
idealised version of their job. The subject may be more interested in 
conveying some organisational or personal image than in answering the 
researcher's questions. It is possible to curtail this wishful thinking and 
whimsy by referring to concrete activities, for instance, "I bel ieve that 
managers are often at a loss to enumerate their daily achievements. If I 
asked you what you did yesterday, what would you answer? " 
It is essential to know how to handle reluctance to make discrediting 
admissions. Politically charged issues such as departmental rivalries can be 
introduced by suggesting that friction is commonplace elsewhere. By 
prefixing the questions in this way the threshold of defensiveness is 
lowered - what harm can there be in simply confirming the researcher's 
suspicions? Another possible counter is to resort to abstraction. By 
offering a hypothetical situation it is possible for the respondent to be 
frank yet avoid self-incrimination. 
During early interviews- structured standardised questionnaires were used, 
but it soon became clear that the standardisation of the questions elicited 
equally standardised answers, and that the articulateness of the respondents 
simply disappeared behind uniform cliches - thereby falling into the trap of 
the "ci rcul ar response". It was decided to change tack and opt instead for 
an fas de memos rel approach to interview planning. A topic would be 
introduced and subjects invited to describe their experience in relation to 
it. The interview took different paths according to responses to early 
questions. Where subjects made interesting or cryptic points they would be 
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asked to clarify or expand on them. The sequence of topics would then be 
dictated by the flow of the conversation which allowed managers to digress 
and give full vent to their ideas. Finally, the researcher would refer to 
the check-list to ensure that the desired topics had been covered. 
At its best this method resulted in an excellent rapport with the subject 
providing clear and reflective material. At its worst, it could degenerate 
into a vague monologue which was difficult to stem. 
Having experimented with a tape recorder, it was found that note-taking 
could be just as effective since it avoided problems of microphone shyness, 
particularly on sensitive organisational or personal issues. It also enables 
the subject's responses to be pre-analysed to some extent by the nature of 
the note-taking process. The disadvantage is of course that some subjects 
talk rapidly but this is gradually overcome as the researcher learns to 
anticipate responses, allowing concentration on significant or exceptional 
items. 
Observation: 
It is important to start on the right foot at the beginning of the 
assignment. At the moment of greeting the subject, the researcher is 
momentarily in charge of the situation. Some subjects acknowledge this 
dominance with such comments as "What can I do for you? " This is an 
opportunity to be seized and the moment for the reseacher to outline the 
purpose of the visit and to state what will happen next. Timidity at this 
stage can prove detrimental to the course of that research and to one's 
control over it. 
As with interviewing, it is essential to have a battery of arguments to 
defuse potential objections to the researcher's presence. For instance, 
sitting in on the dressing down of a third party might be considered 
inappropriate voyeurism. The researcher can always claim precedence. It may 
reassure the manager to know that the researcher's presence in similar 
situations has not caused undue embarrassement. 
During the course of the observation, opportunities arise to make the 
research an enjoyable or beneficial process for the subject - these should 
be grasped. For instance, managers may seek a sympathetic ear for their woes 
or the informal feedback of a neutral observer. They may also wel come the 
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opportunity to discuss the day's events in a reflective way, to philosophise 
about their managerial experiences or to demonstrate manipulative geni us. 
The researcher should indulge them in these asides since they represent a 
useful reward for the manager's time expenditure and help build up a 
rapport. 
Experience also showed that there are means of attenuating the play-acting 
which is often considered detrimental to observation studies. The first is 
to opt for prolonged shadowing periods with a single person, rather than 
short stays with different people. As with a bad smell, managers soon 
become oblivious to the researcher's presence and drop their guards. 
Another means of minimising one's impact on proceedings is by judicious 
positioning in the office. It is essential to be as unobtrusive as possible 
since sitting opposite the subject will suggest a meeting and may put off 
casual intruders. The same is true when the researcher sits in on meetings - 
it is important to remain outside the fray or else unfamiliar parties will 
try to involve the researcher out of politeness. 
Difficult as it is, the researcher aims to play no part in the dynamics of 
managerial communication. This requires self-control in terms of non-verbal 
communication such as eye contact or facial expression which can encourage 
individuals to appeal to the researcher as an arbitrator rather than an 
observer. Not only would this provoke distortions of interaction but it 
might al so irritate the chosen subject who sees the researcher stealing the 
limelight. For these reasons placing oneself in a corner of the room should 
help minimise the researcher's latent influence on the process. 
Seth yQ l ha fieldwork and access 
Having digressed to describe the research apprenticeship, we return to the 
main thrust of the research. Perhaps the greatest difficulty in a study of 
this sort (that iss, where contacts have to be manufactured ab i ni ti o) lies 
in gaining access to target subjects within a reasonable time scale, and at 
a reasonable cost. Fortunately, the present research benefitted from 
ambassadorial backing and the number of positive responses actually exceeded 
expectations, with a fifty per cent success rate on recommended contacts. 
Approbation from a company's President Directeur General (PDG, CEO) prompted 
the drafting of another letter, destined to give additional information to 
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the nominated managers - and to arrange at least one ? phone call (and on 
many occasions several) to set a firm date for the visit. 
As regards negative responses, these were systematically "rel ancees" 
(recycled). Persistence is essential since, as one PDG later admitted, it 
can be an integral part of the sifting process, a means of distinguishing 
mail which is worthy of serious attention. Incidentally, it is also a trick 
used by di rect mailing prospectors in France who fal sely allude to previous 
correspondence simply to grab the reader's attention. 
B-reakina Down Barriers 
Having gained an agreement in principle from the head of the company or the 
actual subject, the researcher is almost home and dry. But a few hurdles 
remai n. 
Often managers will seek a reassuring preliminary interview which requires a 
special trip to the company. In such cases audacity has been found to pay 
off. The researcher should schedule the vi si tli ke any observation period 
and hope that the shadowing can take effect on completion of the interview. 
Usually the manager in question is taken by surprise and having boasted his 
openness, is at a loss for excuses. 
A formidable barrier is the secretary, who is guardian to the appointments, 
diary. Many managers use the diary to structure their working lives. Indeed 
Lawrence tells us, "If you want a senior manager to do something, make sure 
it goes in his diary. " (1986c; 23). So getting the researcher's name into an 
appointment slot is a crucial event. The secretary's role often includes 
that of gatekeeper and this involves staving off undesirables who wish to 
waste the manager's time. 
Needless to say, the researcher falls into this category and is therefore a 
prime target for the "no pasaran" (thou shalt not pass) manoeuvres of a 
direct or indirect nature. An indirect manoeuvre may take the form of an 
offer to 'co-ordinate' the researcher's interviews with other managers; the 
net result being that the researcher never sees the senior manager. Or, it 
may be an offer to make an appointment to see somebody else who is an 
'expert' on the researcher's subject. A direct manoeuvre may involve the 
researcher being told: "Well of course you can see him, but certainly not 
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this year, and next year looks difficult. "When faced with such attempts, 
the researcher can only remain politely firm in his resolve to see the 
subject, keep patient and negotiate the best possible outcome. 
It may al so be necessary to tell a white 1 ie when a secretary asks what 
length of appointment is needed when observation is at stake. The researcher 
should plum for a one hour interview in the hope that the manager will 
acquiesce when faced with the "fait accompli': If the secretary is unaware 
of the exact nature of the research, there is no point in arousing her 
protective instincts by alluding to day-long observation. 
On the up side, the researcher will often find that the more protective the 
gatekeeper, the more valuable the subject. There are signs in this 
partnership at least, that opposites attract. It stands to reason that the 
manager and the secretary should, for sound practical reasons, constitute an 
antithetic entity - an affable manager needs a hard secretary; a chaotic 
one, an organised secretary. One manager was quite explicit in his 
acknowledgement of this complementary relationship: "Elle a les forces de 
mes defauts". So one can expect that the greater the resistance to one's 
advances the more worthwhile the eventual prize. 
As mentioned earlier with regard to correspondence an essential requi rement 
is persistence. It often pays off to possess, or pretend to possess, a 
thick skin. Researchers should construe everything said in the most 
optimistic light and not respond too readily to hints that they should 
discretely go away and leave people in peace. Should the manager directly 
request the researcher to leave a delicate situation, the latter should 
promptly suggest alternatives to whatever obstacles are put in the way. 
Caution must be taken however where the subject risks losing face. It may be 
wise, under these circumstances to negotiate subsequent discussion of the 
issue than render the meeting a sham by one's presence. 
The Sample 
The sample population is almost certainly skewed in favour of successful 
companies and towards senior managers. The rationale behind this is that top 
level personnel can provide greater insight into events and processes within 
the organisation since they are privy to confidential information, and are 
in a position to synthesize various sources of information. What is more, 
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they usually make excellent interview subjects. They are generally 
knowledgeable, intelligent and highly articulate and are often prepared to 
discuss important issues with a freedom and openness which may not be found 
at other levels of the organisation 
As regards company type, the sample i ncl udes a disproportionate number of 
large companies. This overrepresentation is based on the notion that large 
companies tend to act as opinion leaders - it is they which are regularly 
featured in the media. They therefore offer greater insight, diagnostic and 
predictive power than responses from more numerous small companies. 
In general, the process of gaining access to senior managers may be 
difficult and time consuming and one over which the researcher clearly does 
not have complete control. The choice of subjects was partly dictated by 
circumstances. But the fact that the sample was not set in tablets of stone 
has enabled the researcher to make the most of spontaneous inputs and 
include them in the findings. Around the core of subjects from well-known 
companies, there are managers from lesser-known companies as well as views 
solicited from individuals not in industry - informed observers such as 
journalists, management consultants and academics. 
Having dealt with the major faults during the pilot study, only fine tuning 
was required in between the three phases of actual fieldwork. 
Fieldwork fir. France 
French companies are notoriously rel uctant to expose their inner workings. 
As one manager put it, "Monsieur, les entreprises francaises sont fermees 
comme des huttres" (French companies are as shut tight as clams). Under 
these circumstances, observation research was perhaps risky since it 
involved introducing a total stranger to a company and hoping for i mmedi ate 
'chemistry'. The idea of trying to convey the subtleties of this delicate 
process is difficult and describing it in rational terms seems flatteringly 
scientific. 
Because non-participant observation as a research method was more of a 
novelty in France than in say North America or Great Britain, several 
companies had organised what were little more than glorified factory visits 
whereby the researcher would be shunted around carefully by-passing the more 
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'col ourf ul' aspects of the organisation. This happened once. Subsequent 
attempts to programme my visits were politely refused and my own preferences 
offered up instead. These did not receive universal acceptance. 
Indeed one manager openly confessed (after denying me the access approved by 
the PDG) that he did not think that French companies were ready for that 
sort of research: "Je n'y crois pas ä votre methode - on est pas mür pour ca 
en France" (I don't really like your method - we are not ripe for it in 
France). He felt that subordinates would be suspicious of me - even if he 
explained my presence (vive la conf iance I). 
In general though, after i ni ti al apprehension the managers warmed to the 
nature of the research and seemed only too happy to have an 'ally' alongside 
to act as an apolitical sounding board for their ideas. It seems that the 
mere fact that someone was interested enough to come from England to learn 
about their jobs was reason enough to co-operate with the endeavour. Though 
some took more time to get used to my presence: "J'ai l'impression que je 
devrais mloccuper de vous" ("I feel I should be looking after you") - which 
tends to corroborate the novelty of the situation. In any event, most 
enjoyed talking about themselves and their jobs and the prospect of 
contributing to an academic research project constituted the icing on the 
cake. 
It is worth returni ng to the issue of pl ay-acting, mentioned earlier in the 
lessons from the pilot study, when under observation. As with the presence 
of the documentary camera, there is no way the subject will act enti rely 
naturally. It takes the training of a gifted actor (or a child) to appear 
natural on TV. Managers will be out to prove how likeable, cynical.. 
politically aware or, in the case of French managers, how intellectual or 
cultivated they are. But this does not unduly tarnish observational research 
since the nature of the distortion will, in itself, tell us something about 
the population examined. The image the manager seeks to put across is 
revelatory - does it bring out the showman in him or does he lay his claim 
to ultimate rational man. The way managers react to the researcher's 
presence is also loaded with information to be decoded. 
Yet, try as they might, managers will be unable to keep up a show for long. 
They will be thwarted in their attempts to put across an idealised image, by 
the very nature of management work. Lawrence points out that the interactive 
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nature of management, together with its unpredictability make it impossible 
to keep up a show for a sustained period. "How can you 'put on the style' if 
the supporting cast do not go along with the performance? " (Lawrence; 1988). 
Further Leads 
Having found a willing subject, it is worth adopting a 'foot-in-the-door' 
approach and asking the interviewee for the names of colleagues who might be 
of interest to the researcher. This is particularly important with subjects 
on whom the researcher has made a good impression - goodwill should be 
capitalised. The researcher should ensure that the interviewee's name can be 
used as a reference in order to smooth the way with the prospective contact. 
By systematically asking for the name of other persons the researcher is 
able to establish a pyramid of contacts which may contribute substantially 
to the research project. The present research benefited from a number of 
knock-on interviews and observation periods, not least with the heads of two 
prestigious grandes 6coles (l'Ecol e Nationale d'Administration and 1'Ecole 
des Hautes Etudes Commerciales), the general secretary of the Fondation 
Nationale de 1'Ensei gnement de Gestion des Entrepri ses, a prominent head- 
hunter and the heads of several management development centers. 
With a modicum of initiative and awareness of what is going on, it was 
possible to use even weekends to attend conferences and job fairs. The 
latter proved a researcher's dream in that they were brimming with people 
just itching to engage in sensible conversation rather than repeat corporate 
spiel to uninterested students. And with their compulsory presence on the 
stands they were sitting ducks for the researcher - the lack of time 
constraint meaning that discussions could follow their natural life cycle. 
At the end of each day of interviewing or observational fieldwork a detailed 
transcri ption of the events was made - with data partially analysed into 
common themes and categories. In parallel with this a journal was kept which 
acted as a repository for thoughts and ideas which did not fit anywhere else 
in the research records. 
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Follow-up Oorrespondence 
Thank you letters were particularly important since the researcher has 
nothing concrete to offer as a mark of appreciation for the manager's co- 
operation. The letter makes it is possible to offer some psychological 
recompense to individuals, so that the exchange is not so one-si ded. 
Firstly, a simple letter of thanks to the observed manager's superior may 
enhance the participants' standing within the company a little. Secondly, a 
letter to the subjects themselves, expressing one's gratitude and their 
vital contribution to the research will generally provide some recompense to 
make the investment of effort seem worthwhile. But over and beyond the 
matter of protocol - the letters should be worded so as to leave open the 
chance of another visit should it become necessary - either for follow-up 
studies or for help on the draft. 
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4. ThE FRENCH WAAGER 
"'Les' cadres, grammatical ement, passent encore. Mais 'let cadre, 
c'est plus i ntri guant. Cette personalisation, cette 
singularisation du terme, et puis des expressions telles que 
'cadre moyen, superieur', 'petit cadre', 'il est passe cadre', 
correspond au besoin de designer une categori e soci al e nouvelle. " 
(Jean-FranTi s Revel, l'Express, 12/06/67) 
(The plural "cadres" is just about acceptable gramatically. But in 
the singular, it is far more intriguing since the term is 
personalised. Moreover, the emergence of phrases like "middle 
manager", "senior manager", "junior manager", "he has been named 
'cadre"" indicate the need to identify a new social group). 
*- Literally speaking, "cadre" isa noun meaning frame (of a pai nti ng or 
mirror). In the industrial setting, Harrap's gives the definition, "salaried 
staff"; Larousse suggests, "officials"; whilst Collins opts for, 
"executives, managers and managerial staff". Over time the noun has extended 
its application and can now be employed as an adjective. For instance, "un 
emploi cadre" (a management level job), "une femme cadre" (a woman manager). 
What 
.ad 
re? 
The term "cadre" is one which has no equivalent in other languages (other 
than Italian where the word ' uadri" was adopted by business in the 1970's). 
Basically, it corresponds to "manager" in English, though with rather 
different legal and sociological connotations, which will be explored in 
this chapter. 
The origins of the term in a business setting date back to the 1930's. Prior 
to that, the only references to it are in the military context, where it was 
used to denote the ensemble of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. 
In 1937, the word made its first appearance in the title of a professional 
organisation -1a Confederation general e des Cadres de 1'Economie 
(Grunberg; 11). 
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The emergence of the term coincided with the industrial unrest of the mid- 
thirties (le Front Pop ul ai re & the 1936 strikes) and the consequent desire 
on the part of graduate engineers to distinguish themselves from the 
empl oyers, on the one hand, and the workers on the other. Ini ti ally then, 
this new socio- professional category was composed essentially of graduate 
engineers, and to assert their position and status in negociations. But over 
time, it has attracted disparate groups (Bol tanski ; 52) in search of status 
and representation and has extended its boundaries to include "others 
enjoying some level of authority" (NEDO; 63). 
The thirties therefore represent a critical stage in France's managerial 
evolution. This is the point at which historical forces pushed France into 
creating a buffer group between workers and employers, rather than 
attempting to reduce the fissure between the two factions, and treating them 
as mere strata within a unit. The LEST studies point to the German model as 
an expression of the unitary approach (Bengui gui ; 466). The West Germans 
di stingui sh only between "Angestellter" and "Arbeiter", and endeavour to 
minimise organisational hierarchies, and to reconcile differences through 
consultation (Lawrence; 1980; 42-49). The French, on the other hand seem to 
have opted for a tri-partite solution which includes a fleshy intermediary 
class: "l es cadres". 
o to become one 
There are basically two ways of achieving cadre status; either by virtue of 
educational credentials or else through loyalty to a given company. 
Those fortunate enough to graduate from a "grande ecol e" (bac + 5*) can 1 ook 
forward to immediate "cadre" status on entering professional life. A person 
with only two years post-baccalaur6at education (vocational course such as 
DUT or BTS) is1i kely to have to wait 5 or 10 years. As for an "autodi dacte" 
(self-taught person), the only real chance of turning "cadre" is to prove 
himself over several years*2 in a company and hope to be named 
*1 - Higher qualifications are generally designated by the number of years 
the course lasts after the baccalaureat eg. Bac +2 for DUT, BTS, DEUG & 
DEUST; bac-+4 for a mai tri se or some busi ness school di pl omas; and bac +5 
for engineering schools and DESS. 
*2 - Decades even, since it is often a nominal s, end-of-career gesture to 
reward "bons et loyaux services". 
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an "i ngeni eur-mai son" -a title which is company specific. In other words, 
by changing companies the "cadre" of this second type is likely to 
relinquish his status. 
Qualifications are clearly the favoured currency, and 'time' is the price 
paid for those who are in short supply of this currency. This trade-off 
between time and qualifications gives rise to a remarkably stable continuum, 
with particular qualifications corresponding to an implicit "apprenticeship" 
(socialisation and selection) period, before one can have pretentions to 
"cadre" status. 
Needl ess to say, this produces two di sti nct populations of "cadres" - those 
with educational legitimation, and those without. This divergence gives rise 
to mild disdain on both sides: those ? with' will secretly deplore "l e manque 
de culture general e" (that is, the lack of intellectual refinement based on 
superior education); whilst those 'without' bemoan the automatic handing out 
of "cadre" status. One "autodi dacte" hal f-jokingly confided, "Soon they'l l 
be naming them "cadre" on admission to the "grandes ecoles". " 
Defining the population 
Exactly what defines a "cadre", rather like, what constitutes a "grande 
ecole", is a subject of some debate. No account of the French managerial 
class seems to be complete unless it opens with a long and confusing 
synthesis of the alternative definitions. Most authors seek support from the 
official texts, but even these offer no standard definition (Grunberg; 212) 
-a most unsatisfactory situation from the stance of Cartesian logic. What 
is more, the static nature of the texts makes them particularly 
inappropriate for defining what has always been a changing category. The 
only practical solution is to take an evolutionary perspective. 
In attempting to single out the "cadre" population, we can immediately set 
aside the categories of shopfl oor ("ouvri ers") and office workers 
("employes"*). However, a more contentious issue, is whether the foremen 
("1 a mattri se") and di rectors ("1 es di ri geants") belong to the cl ass. Thi s 
*- The term 'employe" only incl udes office workers, not "cadres". 50 years 
ago a cadre would have been "un employe superieur" but they have managed to 
discard that association & distinguish themselves from the rest of the 
office personnel. 
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depends on different industrial sectors and even individual firms - some 
choose to distinguish these categories even though the nature of their work 
is comparable to that of the "cadres". Certainly, it is more or less 
impossible to identify the differentia specifica of their work as distinct 
from the foreman or directeur - and any differences in activity are 
differences of degree rather than kind. 
Attempts at self-definition elicited various responses. Some cadres saw 
their collective identity in terms of general responsibility - vis-a-vis the 
personnel or in terms of completing a task. Others felt that the common 
denominator was a state of mind rather than a type of activity - as one 
cadre put i t, "a bl end of adaptability, 'esprit de synthbse' and 
initiative". However valid these answers, they proved rather unsatifactory 
criteria for distinguishing "cadre" from "non-cadre" : So the term "cadre" 
starts to look like a status and a state of mind rather than a set of 
distinctive and usefully identifiable tasks. 
Collectively, the various stabs at definition by French authors are perhaps 
more interesting for what they tell us about themselves than what they 
reveal about the "cadre". In effect, this preoccupation with delimiting the 
contours is perhaps a manifestation of, "the French obsession with labels, 
and the mania for confining people to airtight social categories"*. In fact, 
this national propensity to dissect, compartmentalise and classify is 
something which Zel din (p. 336) also observes, "the government's 
sociologists, not frightened of being schematic, have divided French people 
up into five different species" . Reynaud (p. 13) too, comments on this 
penchant for taxomoni es: "on cel ebre vol onti ers 1e cul to dune rai son 
deductive et cl assif i catoi re pl utot que le respect de l'experi ence et de ses 
diversi tes" (we are far more impressed by deductive reasoning than empirical 
evidence). 
There can be no formal definition since the precise frontiers of the group 
are vague. Everyone knows where it starts, but no-one can tell where it 
ends. One is reminded of Lord Denning's celebrated judgment: "like many 
other beings, a banker is easier to recogni se than to define" (Dominions 
Trust v. Ki rkwood, House of Lords, 1966). Thus, the scope of the term 
"cadre" must be ascertained through its connotations - by examining the 
meaning it has acquired over ti me. 
*- Fabienne Pascaud reviewing Francoise Dorin's play "1'Etiquette". 
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Homogeneous body_ 
Given the diverse backgrounds of the "cadre" population and the confusion 
over requirements for eligibility, it would seem fair to assert that they 
form a heterogeneous mass. Certainly, this is the verdict most French 
authors seem to return (Doublet; 121). They point out for instance, that the 
national statistical service (INSEE)*1, places "cadres superieurs" in the 
same socio-professional category as "profession liberales", whilst "cadres 
moyens" are al l oted a separate category, alongside school teachers and 
qualified nurses. 
The diversity of the population embodied is largely the result of a massive 
increase in the number of "autodidactes" (self-taught cadres) throughout the 
1960's (Boltanski; 48) - and the consequent drift away from a neatly defined 
population of "grandes ecol es" graduates. This in turn has provoked an 
inevitable "v ul ga ri sa ti o n" (devaluation) of the title. 
But, by drawing attention to the internal subdivisions, between commercial 
and engineering graduates, between ? divine right' cadres and non-graduate 
cadres, i ndi geneous observers give a one-sided view of the situation. Rather 
like Chinamen boasting Chinese heterogeneity, their case sounds rather 
hollow to the outsider who perceives a unity not apparent from within. The 
fact is.. that their attempts to dissect the population tend to detract from 
the underlying cohesiveness of a common appel ati on. 
The definition is perhaps vague from a researcher's point of view - but out 
in the field all plant managers questioned were able to provide an exact 
1 ist of their "cadres': So the definitional problem which poses itself at a 
macro-level is largely academic from a micro-perspective - even if the only 
practical working definition has to be a tautology: a "cadre" is anyone 
belonging to the "iencadrement"*2. 
The probl em for the researcher stems from the fact that al 1 companies do not 
use the same criteria for admittance to the group. But this should not 
detract from the strong sense of belonging, associated with the category - 
as well as the difficulties involved in gaining access. The barriers to 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*1 - INSEE - Institut National des Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques. 
*2 - Though as Sorge (1986; 78) rightly points out "encadrement" can be used 
more loosely than cadre, to describe anyone in a position of authority. 
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entry, mean that for many employees "passer cadre" is a real achievement or 
aspiration. To cross the threshold involves sacrifice and enhances status. 
The title therefore has a motivational aspect - and for employers.. 
represents a means of duplicating available rewards/repri man ds. The system 
of material rewards and sanctions doubles up with a system of symbolic 
rewards and sanctions. In effect, the "passage-cadre" (transition) is the 
critical transition in the French hierarchy since it represents a change of 
status (unlike UK where the manager has no legal status) and allegiances - 
from union to company (Maurice; 1977; 770-771). 
This notion of "cadres" as an entity is endorsed by newspapers which are 
quick to bestow a collective identity upon the group: "l es cadres sont... ". - 
'Iles cadres font... ", 'Iles cadres veulent... " (Boltanski; 407). A selection 
of recent headlines should help appreciate this sense of cohesiveness: 
- "Ce q ui fait marcher 1 es cadres" (The cadres, what makes them 
tick) - Le Point; 18/05/87; 32. 
- "Pouvoi r d'achat: oui, 1 es cadres ont perdu" (Purchasing power: 
yes, the cadres have lost out) - Le Point; 13/04/87; 60. 
- "Les cadres f rancai s? Des autocratesl" (The cadres? True 
autocrats! ) - L'Expansion; 20/09/79; 81. 
- "La verite sur la retraite des cadres" (The real retirement 
prospects of cadres) - Le Nouvel Economi ste; 7/11/86; 48. 
- "Sal ai res des cadres: 1987" (their sal aries) - L? Expansion; 
14/05/87; 113. 
- "Cadres: comment reussi r sa carriere" (Cadres: tips for career 
success) - Le Nouvel Economi ste; 29/05/87; 81. 
- "La gran de tentati on des cadres: de' crocher" 
(The great 
temptation - opting out) - L'Expansion; 18/10/79; 121. 
- 'U n al l egement de la fiscal i to pour 
l es cadres" (A lightening of 
their tax burden) - Le Monde; 2 2/ 06/ 87; 13. 
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The preceeding clearly convey a degree of homogeneity unparalleled in the 
Anglo-Saxon context. The word "manager" would be an uneasy substitute for 
"cadre" in the chosen headlines. This suggests that French "cadres" have a 
much more focused identity than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. Newspapers 
talk of them in a way more befitting of a far more restricted group - 
executives, for instance. 
It appears that in spite of their dispersal in terms of social and 
educational backgrounds, and revenue, "cadres" do share a number of core 
characteristics which unite them - in much the same way as the modern 
agri busi nessman shares an underlying cohesiveness with the small time 
farmer. These distinguishing features are primarily legalistic - their own 
status, retirement scheme and placement service (APEC*), different 
probationary periods, and fixed monthly income. But there is also an 
intangible element - the much-vaunted, yet indefinable "etat d'esprit", as 
well as an undeniable sense of pride and "belonging". 
Consumer group 
Seen from outside, "cadres" are clearly perceived as a homogeneous group, 
and referring to them as such enhances their unity. Politicians for 
instance, wil 1 angle for the "cadre" vote "en masse", in a way which woul d 
be totally ineffectual inB ri tai n. AB ri ti sh politician would never 1 ook 
upon managers as some sort of "block vote". Indeed, if the cadre has a 
British equivalent, it is more likely to be the 'y uppy'. British politicians 
may try to attract the Yuppy vote. 
The notion of the "cadre" as the original yuppy is not without interest. 
Both, after all, are manufactured social groups, with their own particular 
identity and values. It was the "cadres", in the mid-501s, who hel ped 
introduce and legitimise acquisitive American values in France: 
'Vattachement au bi ens materiels qui s9exprimait chez le 
bourgeois par le desi r de la conservation, se manifeste chez l ui 
par 1e pl ai sir de 1a consommati on. " (B1 eton; 1956; 200). 
*- APEC - Association pour 1'empl of 
unemployed cadres. 
des cadres -a placement service for 
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(The bourgeois demonstrated his fasci nation for material 
possessions by his eagerness to save; the cadre shows his, by his 
desire to spend). 
Cadres became a prime target for advertisers, who created an image and 
ascri bed a specific lifestyle to them: 'Ile mode de vie des cadres" (thei r 
way of life) became a stock phrase which conjured up visions of a voracious 
consumer of goods and services: 
"L al ogi q ue du sy stem e de co nsom m ati on tend a1 ui f ai re croi re 
qu'il exi ste un style de vie, un 'standing' qui 1 ui est propre, et 
que ce serait le dechoi r que de ne pas 1 'attei ndre. " (Doublet; 
111) 
(The cadre has been hyped up into thinking that there is a certain 
lifestyle and standing which befits him and which must be attained 
at all costs). 
The socio- professional identity of this group was shaped and reinforced by 
specialist journals inspired by the American journal Fortune. Thus, 
l'Express (1957) dubbed itself "1 e journal des cadres" (the magazine for 
cadres) - and was followed in 1967 by l'Expansion which also specified the 
"cadre" as its target reader. These journals signalled a change of tack for 
the French economic press, which until then had provided financial 
information for owners and shareholders - from the late 50's onwards it 
focused on the "cadre", and on encouraging a new busi ness-1 iterate 
generation of managers (Bol tanski ; 184). 
These journals show no sign of stemming - only during the researcher's last 
visit to France (1987), the first issue of "C comme Cadre" ('MI as in 
Manager) was launched, showing that there is still a large, untapped 
readership. 
A latent malaise? 
Ironically, the unity of the group is further enhanced by the existence of a 
much-vaunted 'malaise'. Virtually every text dealing with the managerial 
population devotes a section to this notion (notably, Grunberg, Doublet, 
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Bol tanski) - indeed, the phrase "1 e malaise des cadres" has become something 
of a cliche. 
Ever since their first appearance in 1936, cadres have been presented as a 
population that is "misunderstood, humiliated, unpopular ... caught in a 
pincers between patronat and prol etariat" (Bol tanski; 244; Eng. trans. ). 
Obviously, this has a lot to do with the nature of the group which is, by 
definition, a buffer group. It was precisely because engineers did not fully 
identify with either employers or workers, that the notion of the cadre 
emerged. The sense of being shut out, experienced by graduate engineers at 
that time, was described by Georges Lamirand: 
"Abandoned by both sides, engineers discovered that they were 
neither fish nor fowl, that they constituted a third party 
imperilled on two fronts, in the sad position of an i ron caught 
between hammer and anvil" (Boltanski; 1987; 40; Eng. trans. ). 
To some extent, the situation has still not been resol ved. The ambiguity of 
the cadre's position manifested itself most clearly in the events of 1968. 
Some cadres sided with the workers by striking while others were held 
'hostage' by angry workers. This simple antithesis reveals the rival 
pressures exerted on cadres - their divided loyalties were a sign that they 
still did not know where they stood. The same predicament continues to haunt 
the cadre today - and in a roundabout way, it is this uncertainty which 
defines membership of the group (see Exhibit 1). 
Besides this rather abstract reason for unease, concrete reasons, relating 
to the prevailing economic environment, were also invoked by the managers 
interviewed. Some referred to the loss of purchasing power, the loss of job 
security and, more particular to the French context, the loss of social 
standing of the cadre. 
It appears however, that the problem may be overstated. One cadre from the 
interview sample suggested to the researcher that the cadre has little to 
grumble about, in relation say, to the foreman. After all, the cadre still 
enjoys a privileged social position, albeit slightly tarnished by the 
'prol etari sati on' of the group ("privilege" is a word which appears 
frequently in advertising directed at cadres). This leads one to wonder 
whether we should we pay heed to this alleged malaise - is it not stronger 
in people's imagination than in reality? There is a case for speculating 
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that the said malaise is little more than a defensive mechanism aimed at 
shielding the group from potential intruders who would swell the numbers, 
leading to further 'prol etari sati on' - or perhaps a means of promoting group 
solidarity among a fairly disparate mass of salaried workers. 
. 
S-oci1 esteem 
Notwithstanding the existential uncertainties which have led many 
commentators to speak of a 'malaise? (previous section) at a more 
straightforward level the term cadre has been viewed as status enhancing. 
The collective identity of the "cadres" has spilt over from its professional 
confines, and taken up a social position. The "cadres" have become the 
social group to emulate.. French society's trendsetters. The creation of the 
category offered an unprecedented degree of social mobility in France. 
Previously, the only bridges between the "petite" and the "grande 
bourgeoisie" had been via "1'arti sangt" and commerce. The new category 
offered possibilities of upward mobility on a massive scale, in what remains 
a notoriously "viscous" social environment (Santoni; 134). 
At the top end of the scale the "cadres superieurs" enjoy a social status 
which is on a par with the professions - doctors, lawyers, architects. This 
can be attributed to their education levels which are not very far removed 
from thei r professional counterparts. The "cadre" is the latter-day 
bourgeois - well-off, known and respected in his neighbourhood: 
'4ieri ti er du bourgeois, le cadre recherche la di sti ncti on, il 
acme le luxe, il est obsede par le "standing", et il recherche 
le cl assi ci sme. Un certain snobisme ca racteri se son com portement. " 
(B1 azot; 157) 
(As a descendant of the bourgeois, the cadre is obsessed by 
distinction, luxury, standing and he yearns for refinement. His 
behaviour is typically snobbish). 
Of course, the social esteem enjoyed by "cadres" is also a product of the 
education system and the general standing of management. The "grandes 
ecol es", which supply graduates to the blue chip companies, are able to 
attract the brightest students, since their label is vi rtual ly an "open- 
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sesame" to all careers. But this requires the collusion of French companies 
which tacitly guarantee immediate cadre status and early responsibility. As 
long as this complicity works, "we'll select them, you buy them", the 
"grandes ecoles" will continue to attract a very high calibre of 
undergraduate recruit - thereby contributing to a virtuous circle in the 
status of the "cadre" (Ardagh; 1982; 43). 
Role . thy' 
'cad rý 
Just as the manager must manage, so the cadre is there to "encadrer". Yet, 
the accepted translation of "to manage" is "gerer". Benguigui (p. IX) refers 
to "une mission specifique: gerer - et plus precisement encore encadrer" ("a 
specific mission: Igererl - but even more precisely 'encadrerl"). It is 
possible to infer from this nuance that there is a difference in the 
conception of French and Anglo-Saxon managers. 
The fact that the French term was borrowed from military circles is not 
without significance in this respect. The verb "encadrer" has a notion of 
policing, which Horovitz (p. 86) suggests is reflected in the French approach 
to management control. And if we trace back the word, its literal meaning 
(as a frame) also reflects the constraining role of the "cadre" which is 
implicit in the following quotation from a practising manager: 
"Nous avons beaucoup de mal ä nous faire ä l'idee que la 
resolution de confl i ts, la condui te, la correction, voire la 
contrainte des autres, font pa rti ei ntegrante de la fonction de 
cadre. " (Emilio Fontana; Points de Vente; no 316) 
(We have great difficulty in coming to terms with the less savoury 
aspects of our work - namely, conflict resolution, leadership, 
punishment and even -constraint). 
But setting semanti cs asi de, the role of the French 'cadre" has al ways been 
different from that of the Anglo-Saxon manager. From the outset "cadres" 
have had a specific mission which went beyond corporate expectations. 
Initially, in 1936, their role was to act as a stabilising force in the 
increasingly confrontational worker/employer discussions. Then, when de 
Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he put the onus squarely on "l es cadres de 
la nation" to rebuild the French economy, thereby restoring France to her 
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former glory. Justifiably, they have come to be regarded as the prime 
architects (and beneficiaries) of France's economic success and the rise in 
living standards over the 3 decades known as 'p1 es Trentes Glorieuses" (the 
thirty years of glory - 1945-75). 
Of late the national socio-economic responsibility of the cadre is less 
explicit, but lives on: 
- "La vocation des cadres est de guider la classe ouvri ere dans la 
voie du progres. " (to act as a beacon for the working classes in 
their journey down the road of progress) - (Blazot; 12) 
- "C'e st lui qui fait le ni vea u de vie de la nation. " (it is they 
who maintain the nation's standard of living) - (Blazot; 13) 
- 'Les cadres sont l es artisans de la mutation soci al e en cours. " 
(the cadres are the facilitators of on-going social change) - (Le 
Monde; 23/ 06/ 87; p. 44) 
The "cadres" see themselves as privileged partners of the economic and 
political powers that be. Their union (CFE-CGC) prides itself on its clout 
in high circles and recently stated that: 
"La confederation s'est toujours fait entendre et, dans bien des 
cas, a oblige patronat et gouvernement ä tens r compte de ses 
options. " (Le Monde; 23/06/87; p. 44) 
(One way or another, the employers and the state are forced to 
take account of the preferences of this management confederation). 
An even more explicit description of the "cadre's" socio-economic mission is 
encountered in a report by the Federation Nationale des Syndicats 
d'Ingeni eurs et Cadres (National Federation of Managers' Unions): 
"Il ne suffit pas d'exi ster; il faut v ivre et pl us encore avoi r 
des raisons de vivre. Ce sera demain le role des i ngeni eurs et 
cadres de fournir ces raisons, de parts ci per ä leur mise en place 
dans 1a soci ete, d'ani mer et d'entrainer 1 es autres, de 
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transmettre connai ssance et i deal , de s'engager resol ument dans 
ltaction civique et soci ale of in que 1e progres se confonde avec 
la civilisation dans le coeur des hommes. " (Blazot; 94) 
(Mere existence is not enough. We must l ive and have a reason for 
living. And the onus falls upon the cadres to provide these 
reasons, to implement them, to motivate others and show them the 
way, to communicate, and to take an active part in society, so 
that progress and civilisation may become one in the hearts of 
men). 
This mixture of management role and philosophy might appear excessive by 
Anglo-Saxon standards, but corresponds to the quasi-divine mission with 
which the "cadre" has been entrusted (self-appointed? ). The French seem to 
regard their managers as the moral, as well as economic saviours of the 
nation. They have a responsi bil ity as role model s, which others seek to 
emulate. It is difficult to know to what extent this is merely rhetoric, but 
there does seem to be a di sti nct awareness of their soci al responsi bil ty as 
an example to the workforce, and their contribution to the nation's wealth. 
This was clearly expressed at a conference by the Confederation francaise de 
l'encadrement (formerly the CGC), which described its members as: 
'Ile moteur eco nom iq ue, le promoteur social et le garant de 
1'aveni r du pays. " (Le Monde; 23/06/87; p. 44) 
(The social and economic force which guarantees France's future). 
The likelihood is that their future role will be boosted by the need to 
prepare for the unified European market planned for 1992. The same article 
in Le Monde refers to : 
"une convergence sur certaines preoccupations essentielles, comme 
1'echeance de 1992 et le role et la place de l'encadrement. " 
(The role of the cadre in the success of a unified European 
market). 
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Masculine aura 
There are a number of factors which contrive to give the term "cadre" a 
masculine connotation. Historically of course, the term was borrowed from 
the military - the male preserve par excellence. Inevitably, this has had 
repercussions on popular perception of the cadre. The macho a priori was 
reinforced by the fact that the category was initially composed al most 
exclusively of graduate engineers, and with even the most prestigious 
engineering school (l'Ecol e Polytechnique) remaining single-sex until 1972, 
male engineers have left their "virile" imprint on it. Finally, the term is 
lumbered with a masculine tag - le cadre - which merely exacerbates the 
problem, acting as a perceptual barrier to the inclusion of both male and 
female in that category. Incidentally, this is a problem not encountered in 
Anglo-Saxon countries where the neuter gender has swept all before it. 
Many books and journals are now addressing the issue with a token section 
rather clumsily enti tl ed "cadre au feminin". In addition, as noted earlier, 
the noun "cadre" has actually been deformed so that it can now be employed 
as an adjective. This makes it marginally easier to include women in the 
appel ati on - "une femme cadre". However, it w il 1 be some ti me before the 
historical preconceptions surrounding the term are overcome. 
Restatement: 
In this chapter, I have attempted to convey the meaning of the word cadre 
and to point out the divergence which exi sts between its abstract and its 
practical usage. Like an elephant, a "cadre" is difficult to describe but 
easy to recognise. 
Whilst French researchers seem obsessed with the diversity of the category, 
the outsi der is struck by the degree of psychological and sociological 
homogeneity exhibited -a cohesiveness corroborated by journalistic 
references to "cadres" as an entity and further characteri sed by a common 
sense of mal ai se. One is also struck by the way they have been entrusted 
with a wider mission - or are they self-appointed ?- as the nation's 
economic and social figureheads, especially in terms of legitimising 
materialistic values. They are held up as the model for the nation to 
emulate - and as such are perhaps fore-runners of the Anglo-Saxon Yuppy. The 
chapter also alludes to the gender colouration of the term, a product of its 
historical antecedents. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
The cadre as 'pig in the middle'. 
7 
Extract from Lauzier's album "Les cadres" (Dargaud, 1981). 
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S. "THE MAKING OF FRENCH MAWERS 
"Les grandes ecoles sont rendues abusivement responsables de tous 
1 es maux dont 1a France est affectee et en meme temps credi tees 
tout aussi abusivement de tous ses succes. " Conversation with 
Roger Fauroux, former head of 1'Ecol e Nationale d'Adm i ni strati on. 
(The grandes ecoles are falsely blamed for all France's vices and 
just as wrongly, credited with all its virtues). 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the nature and influence of French 
management education. The chapter begins with a brief look at the importance 
of education in France. This is followed by an in-depth examination of 
management education which includes two sections: the first is devoted to 
pre-entry management education and considers the dynamic relationship 
between student, educational establishment and employer; the second part 
looks at the relative importance of post-entry management education. To 
round off the chapter we will discuss how well the French system prepares 
would-be managers to fulfill their function. 
Education jn France* 
A long-standing feature of French society is the high premium it places on 
intellect. Where America extols money, West Germany work and Great Britain 
blood.. France has nailed its flag to the post of cleverness. It is 
achievement in the educational field which determines inclusion among the 
decision-makers of French society. The nation is governed by its star 
pupils, and the higher reaches of management are no exception. Brains are 
deemed an acceptable means of procuring social eminence - and as Vaughan 
poi nts out, they are certainly "a less invidious ground to invoke in a 
democracy than either hereditary privilege or the acquisition of wealth" 
(1980; 99). 
*- Readers who are not familiar with the French education system may find 
it helpful to read the descriptive section at the end of this chapter before 
confronting the particular interpretation presented here. 
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Educational credentials are ideal props for authority since they are 
verifiable discriminators of the organisational hierarchy. In France, they 
indicate status and competence in much the same way as an individual's 
salary situates a person in the US. The graduate of a prestigious "grande 
ecol e" is demonstrably 'better' than his organisational subordinates and 
this justifies inequalities of power. Thus, elitism and the French 
preoccupation with egalitarianism are reconciled, since the systematic 
testing of intellectual merit gives everyone (in theory) the same 
opportunity of access to the elite. 
In keeping with this desire for objectivity, mathematics is the central 
feature of French selection methods in education. From secondary school 
onwards, a priority is given to the mastery of mathematical tools and to the 
quality of logical inference. The maths input provides the basis for the 
pecking order in baccal our(6at options and determines admission to the top 
flight "grandes col es" - both in engineering ... and management. 
French higher education is based on a two tier system which is rooted in 
France's hi story and distinguishes the exclusive "grandes ecol es" and the 
sprawling universities. 
The appel ati on, "grande ecol e", is a general and not an official term. The 
"grandes 6coles" are a diversified ensemble of small or medium-sized 
autonomous establishments, which were created outside the traditional 
university stream in response to precise sectoral needs - notably in 
engineering, applied science and management studies. The precise criteria 
for acqui ring the precious label are not at all clear. For the same reasons, 
it is hard to specify the exact number of these school s, though about 160 
lay cl aim to the rank, with an average of a mere 400 students each. 
In comparison to the "grandes ecoles", the universities have a distinctly 
lacklustre image. Part of the reason for this lies in the need to cater for 
too many students of differing abilities. This is primarily due to the fact 
that universities have no control over the quality of intakes. A 
"baccal aureat" gives automatic entry to university - as opposed to the 
highly selective regime operated by the "grandes ecol es". The contrasting 
systems will be discussed more extensively in the following section. 
52 
Management education t France 
Paradoxically, whil st education in general has been exalted, management 
education has had some trouble in gaining legitimacy. The universities, 
which specialised in classical education were, until recently (1955), 
particularly reluctant to embrace this vocational discipline. The 1980s 
however, have witnessed the belated emergence of an enterprise culture, in 
a society which has traditionally been hostile to the ethos of wealth 
creation - and nowhere is this turnaround more apparent than in the 
attitudes of students. In 1968, they were busy trying to burn down the 
Bourse (French stock exchange); today, every sel f-respecting business school 
has its own investment club. There is a new-found willingness to treat 
business as socially acceptable, and essential to the life of the country. 
Pre-career management education: Games people play 
There is something distinctly mercenary about pre-experience management 
education. Each party involved seems more concerned with beating the system 
than achieving a common end. Students seem to repress their sense of 
vocation, schools are obsessed with pecking orders and companies pay 
inflated salaries for raw graduates. The whole edifice seems founded on 
abstract values which are only tenuously linked to the production of well- 
adjusted managers. 
The extent to which the system has assumed a logic of its own is perhaps 
best illustrated by the saga of lengthening scot ari ty. In order to ward off 
fears of unemployment, there is a student demand, which schools and 
universities are meeting, for longer courses. But the value of protracted 
studies is relative, and because the tendency is generalised, companies have 
merely responded by adding two years to their recruitment benchmark. Posts 
which were filled by "baccalaureat" entrants are now reserved for people 
with two years higher education, typically from an institute of advanced 
technology (IUT). Consequently, students delay their entry into active life 
and companies recruit individuals who have no desire to undergo a further 
period of induction training - it seems like a no-win situation. 
Yet the games in which they engage, have a sense of coherence and 
compatabil ity - the system works because the parties complement one another 
and play by the same rules. 
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Games Students Play 
Devil take the hindmost: 
Effectively, management education begins when pupils choose their 
baccal aureat options. Al though there is a management option, pupils with 
real managerial aspi rations will steer cl ear of it. They wil 1 choose i nstPa(i 
the maths & physical sciences option (commonly termed 'Ile bac C") which 
affords the best chances of admission (entrance exam permitting), two years 
after baccal aureat, into both engineering and commercial grandes ecol es. The 
irony that the management option leads to anything but a high powered 
managerial position is compounded by the fact that there are over 20 
baccal aureat options but only one which really counts. This situation has 
been condemned as the dictatorship of the "bac C'. 
On completing the baccal aureat, it is accepted that those who can, will 
proceed to the "prepas" (preparatory schools) to be coached through the 
"concours" (entrance exam) to the grandes ecoles. Competition to enter the 
most successful Parisian "prepa" (Louis-le-Grand) is said to be tougher than 
the subsequent entry into one of the prestigious trio of management schools 
(HEC-ESSEC-ESCP), collectively known as "les Brandes parisiennes". Students 
are kept informed of relative success rates of the various "prepas" by 
annual 'hit parades' published by the journals 1'Etudiant and Le Monde de 
1'Educati on , thereby instilling an early notion of career strategy. 
In the preparatory schools, the students are subjected to an intense work 
rate, based essentially on maths, which can make the subsequent pace at the 
grande ecole seem decidedly slack*1. For most students "l'enfer 
prepa rati onnai re" (the hell of the preparatory school) represents the peak 
effort since, having reached the inner sanctum of the grande ecol e, the 
diploma is de facto guaranteed*2. 
*1 - In fact, the high pressure experienced during this training period 
prompted the Guardian to dub preparatory schooling, "the cram de la creme" 
(Ardagh; 1982; 511). 
*2 - It is worth pointing out the contrasti ng situation of the universities 
which have to carry out substantial reductions at the end of the first and 
second years to compensate for the impossibility of selection at entry. At 
some universities, less than 50% of those admitted will actually graduate 
(L'Expansion; 7/3/85; 81). 
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As one 'Polytechnique' student put it: 
"De toute fawn, il faut avoi r tue pare et mere pour sorti r sans 
diplöme. " (L'Expansion; 11/11/82; 121). 
(Anyhow, in order to fail one would have to commit patricide). 
In other words, the gains stemming from admission to a grande ecole are so 
automatic that students are wont to perceive entry as a landing point rather 
than a launch pad. 
The notion of career strategy manifests itself again in the choice of gran de 
ecol e. Students display precocious awareness of their own limitations, so 
they will only enter exams they feel capable of passing. Evidence of this 
can be seen in the fact that it is not necessarily the top grandes ecol es 
which attract the most candidates. The students engage in a large measure of 
self-selection to avoid paying costly exam fees where there is a low 
likelihood of success. They are sensitised early into optimising thei r 
chances and cutting their losses. 
Charades: 
W hat is more, students w il 1 renounce vocational preferences in favour of 
instrumental disciplines. In order to keep their options open, students are 
best advised to pursue maths to the limits of their potential. The route to 
the top is clearly signposted which minimises the risks of losing potential 
talent through misinformation. But the price paid is a snubbing of 
vocational courses and a sheeplike procession towards the same grandes 
ecol es because of the tremendous career advantages they confer. This 
reaffirms a calculating approach to education which seems especially 
pronounced among French students. Indeed, the student magazine, l'Etudiant, 
constantly reinforces this notion - with references to tips, short-cuts. - 
success rates and tactics in gaining access to the various establishments 
(for instance, dec. 86 issue, p. 120). 
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Games Educational Establishments Play 
For nigh on two centuries, the top engineering grandes ecol es, spearheaded 
by l'Ecol e Polytechnique, have groomed their alumni to take up positions as 
"l es cadres de la nation" (the nation's organisers), in spheres as diverse 
as business, politics and public service. Not surprisingly, the schools' 
legitimacy as suppliers of the nation's business elite does not rest on the 
curriculum (albeit generalist in content) but on the type of education they 
impart. The French graduate engineer is not only knowledgeable or well 
versed in engineering; he is, first and foremost, the product of a mind- 
stretching system which has nurtured him for leadership positions in 
industry. More than in other countries.. French engineers enjoy a priviledged 
social status, which can be seen by their widespread presence in upper 
management. 
The seal of approval from a prestigious engineering school endorses its 
holder's capacity for rapid learning and intellectual virtuosity. The 
quality of the raw material is guaranteed by a highly sel ective recruitment 
process, which requires two years additional schooling beyond secondary 
education - and the finished product has the added feature of three years of 
intensive study. In short, the graduate engineer is endowed with the 
necessary resolve and analytical ability to tackle any problem. 
On top of this, the schools bestow on their students the social wherewithal 
and an influential old boy network to enhance their career chances (the 
insitutional i cation of school links is discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter). For instance, by the time he graduates, a "polytechni ci en" 
(student of PEcole Polytechnique), has assembled a battery of real or 
assumed advantages that ensure speedy professional ascent. To add to that. 
he will have inherited a network of contacts which transcends all sectors. 
Indeed, the engineering schools have been so convincing in promoting 
themselves as 'surrogate management schools' that one can understand in part 
the belated emergence of American-style business schools in France. The 
success of the engineering schools also explains the tendency for commercial 
grandes ecol es to emulate them. 
Follow the Leader: 
The first signs of emulation were seen in the explicit attempts by l'Ecole 
des Hautes Etudes Commerci al es (HEC), the foremost commercial school, to don 
the apparel of the engineering schools at its inception. The school was set 
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up in 1881 with the express intention of breaking the engineers' 
stranglehold over large sectors of business in the expanding industrial 
climate of the late 19th Century. From the outset.. HEC espoused what were 
considered the most prestigious aspects of the state-sponsored engineering 
school s, notably a soci ally biased, po st-baccal aureat recruitment pol icy. 
Furthermore.. HEC's curriculum rested fi rmly on the cornerstone of law, a 
noble discipline which lent commercial education a veneer of academic 
respectability. In terms of image it looked to l'Ecol e Central e for guidance 
since this was the only private engineering school which had managed to 
stamp its identity among the state grandes ecoles (the very first head of 
HEC was in fact a "central ien"). 
Naturally enough, HEC spawned its own imitators, a network of provincial 
commercial schools (ESCAE*) which, by association, tended towards the nec 
plus ultra, l'Ecol e Polytechnique. Perhaps the most striking legacy from the 
engineering schools was the widespread adoption of maths as the critical 
entry determinant. This tribute to engineering influence is justifiable as 
an objective measure of merit for selection, but it woul d appear that the 
elements of scholastic success are poorly matched with those of 
professional success. 
The less prestigious commercial schools (mostly private rather than 
sponsored by the Chambers of Commerce like HEC and the ESCAE network) are 
also faithful to the HEC model. These lesser schools are forced into 
reducing the maths input (concession) in order to recuperate those who fail 
the "concours" (entrance exam) owing to a weakness in maths. But, in other 
respects they do their best to imitate the more prestigious establishments. 
The prime manifestation of this lies in their names which are reminiscent, 
not to say replicas, of the more venerable establishments. They are abetted 
in this, by the French penchant for acronyms which lends itself to abuse. 
Lesser schools capitalise on the confusion in order to imply similar status 
to the provincial commercial schools (ESCHE). One personnel manager from the 
interview sample speculated that new commercial schools were named by 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*- ESCAE - Ecole(s) Superieure(s) de Commerce et d'Admi ni stration des 
Entrepri ses, more prosaically referred to as the "Sup-de-Co". 
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picking out three of the following at random: "ecole, institut, superieur, 
hautes etudes, gestion, finance, direction des entrepri ses, affai res", and 
translating the result into English if needs be. There is undoubtedly an 
element of deliberate 'trompe l'oeil' in many appelations - to dupe 
potential students, their parents and employers alike. The profusion of 
acronyms can prove quite bewildering, even to the initiated. 
The same goes for the popular confusion surrounding the various degrees of 
state accreditation. Some of the less scrupulous schools shrewdly exploit 
the billing "homologue par l'etat" (state registered) knowing that the 
uninitiated will equate it with the more excl usive, "di pl ome reconnu par 
1'etat" (state approved qualification). The former merely indicates the 
level of the qualification, whilst the latter is an attestation of quality. 
It implies that the Ministry of Education has some say in the syllabus and 
teaching methods as well as naming the Chairman of the Admissions and 
Exam i ne rs' Board. 
Further evidence of mimicry can be seen in the necessity for the most 
embryonic business school, whose future still hangs in the balance, to set 
an entrance exam. This is intended to set them apart from the universities 
and, by implication, identify them with the grandes ecol es. Generally, the 
said exam is more than a touch symbolic since meeting entrance requirements 
has less to do with exam marks than parental funds. The schools demand high 
tuition fees since they do not have the same ability as the grandes ecoles 
to attract financial support from companies ("taxe prof essionnel 1 e"*). These 
private schools also have some difficulty in attracting permanent academic 
staff and generally resort to a mixture of part-time teachers and visiting 
staff. But that is not to say they do not know how to market themselves. On 
the contrary, their less prestigious position makes it essential to maintain 
a high profile. Guaranteed selling points like an international perspective, 
old boy networks, sporting associations and "juni or-entrepri se" (student-run 
consultancy) invariably feature prominently in their seductive literature. 
*- Established in 1925, "taxe prof essionnel 1 e" is a1 evy on companies (0.6% 
of the payroll) which they may donate to any pre-entry training 
establishment. Responsibility for prospection and collection of the funds is 
left to the students themselves who act on behalf of their institute. 
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Universities are limited as to the extent they can copy the grandes ecol es. 
For instance, the universities must operate an open door policy whereby any 
holder of the baccalaureat is eligible for admission. The fact remains that 
the most successful universities are precisely those which have found a way 
round these constraints. Foremost among these universities is the management 
university of Paris IX-Dauphine created in 1968 in response to student 
discontent and housed in the recently vacated NATO headquarters. 
Dauphine's selection, competition and professionalism give it all the 
hallmarks of a grande ecole. By law it should not practise selection - yet, 
in reality, only people with a "bac C" (maths) need apply and 95% of the 
intake in fact obtained a distinction in their baccal aureat. This is deemed 
preferable to selection "par la file Blattente" or "par la regte de 
l'autobus" (first come first served). As a result Dauphine's reputation 
among employers is enhanced and its students can expect increasing numbers 
of unsol l ici ted job offers. Although the university clearly flouts the 
principle of non-selection, the state is prepared to turn a blind eye to 
uphold the reputation of this jewel in a lacklustre university system. 
Dauphine also pays the same attention as the grandes ecol es to industrial 
placements - demonstrating full awareness of the importance of these 
initial contacts between students and companies. In the same vein, Dauphine 
has followed the example of the grandes ecol es and organised annual job 
fairs, as well as a yatch race whose teams are composed of students and 
executives, and which amounts to a floating job fair. The teaching methods 
too, are reminiscent of the grandes ecol es in that they are based on group 
work rather than the staple university diet of lectures. Thus, it has taken 
on many of the accoutrements of a grande ecole education, as regards length 
and format of studies, but most importantly in terms of recruitment. It 
would seem that any university which seeks to emulate this success is 
destined to follow Dauphines l ead and renounce its university origins in 
order to gain credibility in the business community. 
What appears to be universal convergence towards the Polytechnique blueprint 
even extends to the Institutes of Technology (IUT) which were desti ned to 
replenish the ranks of middle managers by providing a short and practical 
apprenticeship to management. Like certain universities, the institutes have 
resorted to selection by introducing a mini-"contours" which, according to 
a head teacher interviewed, has turned them into scaled down grandes ecol es. 
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Moreover, with the top commercial schools extending the period of 
preparatory schooling to an obligatory 2 years in order to align themselves 
with engineering studies, the institutes have found their vocational two- 
year courses devalued in relative terms. Once again the influence of the top 
engineering schools has prompted emulation with each educational 
establishment lengthening its curriculum - partly for image purposes and 
partly to attenuate student fears of unemployment. 
Rather than trying to respond to demand in a pluralist fashion, each 
establishment strives more or less consciously to attain the Polytechnique 
ideal. They seem undeterred by its relation to a bygone age and its oblique 
approach to the acquisition of management skills. L'Ecol e Polytechnique 
remains the archi ty pal model, the universal 'point de repere' which renders 
comparison between the various establishments easy and apparently 
legitimate. This gives rise to another game. 
King of the Castle: 
The predilection for hierarchies is a familiar feature of French culture and 
the facile ranking of educational establishments provides the press with an 
eager readership (incorporating students and their parents, teachers and 
empl oyers). Each category of establishments is regularly scruti ni sed and 
cl assi f ied in1 eague tabl es compiled by l'Etudi ant or Le Monde de 
1'Education. There are even cross-category (all-comers) surveys conducted by 
l'Expansion based on starting salaries offered to graduates. The higher the 
league position, the higher the signing on fee commanded by its graduates. 
Irrespective of their initial accuracy, these comparisons tend to prove 
self-fulfilling since employers use them to align their salaries on market 
trends thereby reinforcing findings presented as neutral. 
Of course, conventional bases of comparison always favour the same schools, 
so the lesser schools endeavour to find new criteria which will upset the 
traditional pecking order and put them to the fore. Certain schools will 
point to the number of ti mes they are oversubscribed as an indication of 
exclusiveness. They will publicise the low chances of admission and on this 
basis will claim to rival the top schools - carefully neglecting to 
acknowledge the perspicacious self-selection in which prospective students 
engage. 
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However spurious, such comparisons fuel intense rivalry among the various 
establishments. Some student interviewees suggested that the heads of the 
schools were actually more attentive to the starting salaries of thei r 
students (as quoted, for instance, in ltExpansion's, "Combien gagnent les 
debutants", 18/6/87) than to the contents of the curricul um. Indeed, one 
observer of the system was of the opinion that: 
'Les responsabl es de 1'ecol e surveil l ent 1a moyenne des sal ai res 
d'embauche avec une passion comparable ä celle du petit porteur 
sur l es cours de la Bourse. " (Le Nouvel Observateur; 21/01/83; 
16). 
(Those who run the school scrutinise the going rate for graduates 
with the zest of a small sharehol der checking the prices of stocks 
and shares). 
This concern for image has implications for the extent to which schools can 
afford to err from the path cut by HEC/Polytechnique. Schools are reluctant 
to take initiatives which diverge excessively from the accepted norms. In 
short, form outweighs substance. 
In spite of the jockeying for position, the level of consensus surrounding 
the intricate pecking order is high and counter-jumping is minimal. Some 
measure of the immutable nature of the hierarchy can be illustrated by the 
fact that, when the Barre government (1976-81) deci ded to upgrade French 
technical education, the only policy it could come up with was to make it 
easier for the best pupils in the technical high schools to enter the 
grandes ecol es. The point iss, that there is only one hierarchy in France. 
The leading three commercial schools.. HEC-ESSEC-ESCP, are closely followed 
by the regional 'lEcol es S upe ri eures de Commerce" (led by Lyon) mingled with 
a few of the private schools mentioned earlier. The attraction of these 
prestigious schools is that their label is a guarantee for life. In 
particular, the stamp HEC-ESSEC-ESCP is a passport to a prosperous career. 
But the stakes are not negligible. The failure rates in reaching these 
schools is high and the preparatory system 1 eaves many people bitter or 
demotivated after two years of sustained effort and not even a 
concrete 
qualification to show for it - their only consolation being direct access to 
the second year of university courses. 
0 
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Furthermore, the schools are not only intellectually elitist, they are also 
socially discriminating. Based on a traditionally hierarchic society, 
management education in France is a distinctly class-bound affai r. The 
pattern of socially biased recruitment was set by the engineering schools in 
the 18th century using Latin as a social fil ter. The discipline has since 
changed, but the mechanism lingers on even in the business schools. 
Marceau's analysis of the socio- professional origins of the alumni at the 
business school.. INSEAD, revealed that the higher social strata are strongly 
over- represented, suggesting "a high degree of inheritance of occupational 
aspirations" (Whitley; 1984; 86). This concurs with Gerard Vincent's view of 
France as a 'high-viscocity' society, where upward mobility is a generally 
slow process - notwithstanding the much publicised rise of exceptional 
individuals like Pompidou whose humble backgounds serve to diffuse criticism 
of elitism. 
Certainly the top schools are reluctant to divulge statistics on the socio- 
professional composition of intakes. At HEC, the offspring of employers, 
senior executives and the liberal professions, account for 70% of those 
admitted (L'Etu di ant; dec. 1986; 112). A number of sociologists maintain 
that the educational achievements (power merited) of the "classe dirigeante" 
(ruling class) simply serve as a smokescreen to mask its origins (power 
inherited). Bourdieu and Passeron (1964) in particular, contend that by 
requi ring managers to be supernumerate, access is biased towards well-to-do 
students who benefit from an earlier and easier apprenticeship to 
abstraction. 
Whatever the exact mechanism, management education remains heavily biased 
towards the higher social classes and does not appear to be making any great 
contribution to the democratisation of management. Nor are there any signs 
of change, with the grandes ecol es jealously guarding their prestige by 
limiting the growth of successive intakes*. The barely perceptible rise in 
output of grandes ecol es graduates is in stark contrast to the continual 
increases in 
, 
university subscriptions. The elitist tradition. shows no real 
signs of weakening. 
*- The total numbers in the grandes ecol es are less than 5% of all those in 
higher education, but their influence is large out of all proportion. 
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Games Employers Play 
Baiting: 
On the face of it, empl oyers would appear to be the prime victims of the 
'trivial pursuits' of schools and students alike. But they appear willing 
victims since they pull out all the stops to lure in the top candidates. 
IBM-France for instance has a section specifically concerned with the 
schools, "Relations grandes ecoles" (a title which consciously omits the 
universities). The blue chip companies will start their pursuit of the best 
tal ents early by visiting the schools and conducting 'dog and pony shows' - 
presentations by senior people who outline career path opportunities. It is 
not uncommon for the best graduates to receive more than ten offers of 
employment which enables them to play hard to get (and raise the bids). 
Whilst the salaries demanded are often exhorbi tant, companies tend to play 
along, dangling guilt-edged carrots to attract the brightest available 
talent. Companies are apt to look upon the grandes ecol es as elaborate 
sifting systems rather than purveyors of knowledge - and some make no secret 
of the fact that they are primarily purchasing the "concours" (entrance 
exam) : 
"La qual ite des el eves n'est pas un produit de l'ensei gnement mais 
de la selection. " (L'Expansion; 11/11/82; 121). 
(The quality of the graduates is due to the selection process not 
the teaching). 
Al though the salary gap between commercial and engineering graduates is 
constantly being eroded, companies still continue to favour the engineering 
schools which are entrusted with the making of French managers, even if they 
no longer hold a monopoly. There is no shortage of companies ready to pay 
back (to the state) the fees of a "polytechnicien" in order to capture him 
immediately on graduation and spare him 10 years forced labour in state 
service. 
Company in-difference regarding the transmission of occupationally relevant 
management skills, merely endorses the view of qualifications as 'entry 
tickets?. Access to business is not associated with qualifications embodying 
a job-specific content, in the same way as access to architecture, medicine, 
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or law *. But French companies seem to push this argument to excess. Most 
employers would still favour products of Polytechnique (engineers) or l'ENA 
(civil servants) to their HEC counterparts (managers). Strictly speaking, 
the former were not designed to train managers for private enterprise, but 
both students and employers treat them as such. Students intent on a career 
in industry will have no qualms about heading for these schools, whose label 
is an open sesame to al 1 careers. Moreover, their 1 egi ti macy is enhanced by 
the philosophical viewpoint that the practice of management (as opposed to 
its theoretical concepts) cannot be taught. 
To develop this last idea, there is a deep rooted belief in France that 
managers are born not made. As Dominique Xardel, the head of 1'ESSEC (part 
of top trio of management schools), put it: 
"Let's be cl ear; in a school one acquires information, one can 
develop aptitudes already existing in an embryonic state, but one 
can hardly create them. " (Whitley; 1984; 67) 
Training can only bring out innate talent, it cannot generate it 
spontaneously. A grande 6cole education of any sort is regarded as a useful 
apprenticeship to management. What the products lack in technique they make 
up for in intellect and application. Inspite of a slight erosion of the gap 
between engineering and commercial schools, the former remain dominant on 
employers' hit lists - and have shown their intentions of retaining pole 
position by including business options in their curricula. 
It has al ready been noted that universities, with the notable exception of 
Dauphi ne, suffer the brunt of company mistrust because of the alleged 
Inapplicability of their teaching or research. In spite of attempts to 
become more vocationally relevant, the university system is still tainted by 
a reputation for authoritarian, non-interactive teaching, which does not 
lend itself to the teaching exigencies of management education. As far as 
many employers are concerned, the products of the universities are still 
synonymous with the teaching profession and the dole queues. 
*- The importance and relevance of management qualifications was neatly 
summed up in the epigram, 'With one you can do nothing, without one you can 
get nowhere" (L'Expansion; July/August 1977; p. 66). 
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There is a slightly brighter picture for the IUTs (Instituts Universitai res 
de Technologie which are roughly equivalent to British polytechnics) with 
their vocational two year management courses. Their reputations are rising 
as witnessed by shortening lead times for their students to reach "cadre" 
status. Yet, the IUTs remain "Cinderella' establishments. This makes them a 
favourite hunting ground for the large retail stores (like Auchan or 
Carrefour) which are themselves snubbed as "vendeurs de sardines" (sardine 
sellers) by grandes ecoles graduates. One might say that the large retailers 
get their recruits at a discount. 
Post-experience management education 
This section will firstly consider the state influence on the demand for 
management education and will then explore the supply and demand aspects of 
the equation. 
State Influence 
State intervention in the field of management education was fairly limited 
until, in ty pi cal French style, it was deci ded that management trai ni ng 
warranted formal national commitment. A levy was imposed on companies with 
more than ten employees, whereby expenditure on training had to be 
equivalent to 1.1% of the payroll. Companies were left with enti re 
discretion as to how, and on whom, the money should be spent ("cadres" are 
typically allocated 30% of the budget). Setting compulsory spending levels 
has underlined state enthusiasm for training, as well as providing it with 
annual statements of progress and a database to fuel the long term thinking 
of government, corporations and educational institutions. However, creating 
a legal requi rement to spend was hardly a declaration of faith vis-a-vis the 
companies, since it implied that they would not undertake training on a 
vol untary basis. 
Companies were forced to pay more attention to training since they had to 
draw up a training plan to be submitted to and discussed with the "comite 
d'entrepri se" (works council ). If a company falls short of the statutory 
requirement, the balance is forfeited to the Treasury. For this reason, the 
levy was initially perceived as an extension of the tax burden. But 
gradually firms have started to look upon it as an investment which can be 
integrated into the firm's strategy. Needless to say this legislation, 
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provoked an immediate rash of consul tancy firms hoping to cash in on 
obligatory spending. 
Gbapany Approach: 
National commitment to adult education inaugurated in 1971 is starting to 
bear f rui t. Initially, companies were prone to treat thi s as an unwelcome 
chore because of the difficulties associated with application, not least the 
compilation of statistics for the government. Small firms, in particular, 
are unable to detach someone full-time to deal with the administration, so 
the PDG (general dogsbody in small companies) is obliged to take the task 
upon himself. 
Deciding who should attend which course and when, is quite onerous as well 
as politically explosive, and must be reconciled with conflicting pressures 
on the PDG's time. Trying to please everyone is not easy especially without 
full information about available courses. Consequently, in one of the small 
companies vi si ted, the training budget had become a slush fund used to 
i ndul ge meritorious or restless cadres by sending them off on courses. A 
provincial cadre will look upon a few days in Paris as a perk and 
notification that he is on the fast track. Alternatively, the training 
budget may be used as a panacea for a longstanding problem - an individual 
may be sent off on what is termed "un stage alibi".. whereby subsequent foul- 
ups will not be attributable to inadequate training. So training becomes a 
piecemeal affair destined to and keep individuals and the works' council 
happy. 
The problem is compounded for smaller companies by the fact that they can 
ill afford to be deprived of their top cadres for lengthy spells. What is 
more, training represents a danger for the company since it puts its prime 
talent on display and at the mercy of potential poachers. The reaction of 
one PDG interviewed was why release a cadre into tempting environment where 
he will sound out opportunities and more importantly, gain a qualification 
negotiable on the open market? Worse still, those sent on courses might 
return in a position to challenge existing practices and either cause 
upheaval or feel frustrated at not being given free reign to apply what they 
have learnt. For sound practical reasons therefore, many small companies 
have dispensed with the burden in the most expeditious way, by paying the 
balance to a recognised training body or, as a last resort, to the Treasury. 
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Increasingly though, even small companies are beginning to come to grips 
with the training levy. Gone is the era of folkloric courses (improve your 
memory or faster reading) which conveniently satisfied the legal obligation. 
Companies are starting to realise that practical gain can be derived from 
incorporating training into their long-term strategies. This is corroborated 
by the appointment of training personnel, to prepare statements of intent 
(submitted for works' council approval) and make more efficient use of the 
budget through better information of training opportunities. 
A professional association (Groupement des Agents Responsables de la 
Formation) has even been created to lend weight to the function. 
Nonetheless, the title "responsable" (as opposed to "di recteur") betrays the 
fact that this remains a low prestige function - one to be avoided by 
bu ddi ng directors. 
Provision of po st expe rt ende courses 
It had been anticipated that the MBA would become as big in Europe as it was 
in America. In fact, its popularity was overestimated, and the business 
school o IN SEAD, has had to diversify in order to subsidise its ailing MBA 
programme. Originally set up in 1958 specifically to provide MBA courses, 
INSEAD now devotes two-thirds of its faculty time to short courses for in 
service managers. INSEAD has had to respond to company demand for more 
specialised programmes. It has done so by offering a wide range of short 
courses for actual or prospective senior managers. Increasingly, INSEAD is 
liaising with the companies which support it, and designing tailor-made 
programmes destined to sort out specific corporate problems - presumably a 
reflection of the desire to use the compulsory expenditure more 
strategi cal ly. 
This is a general trend in French management development programmes. More 
and more establishments are finding they have to move closer to the work 
place, both intellectually and physically - not l east because customised 
courses are highly profitable. The taylor-made course is a booming business. 
Even the large consultancy organisations (CEGOS, CNOF) have been forced into 
providing intra-company programmes since demand for standardised programmes 
is waning. Needless to say, this fast-developing activity has engendered a 
new rash of small firms whose speed and versatility is well suited to 
tackling company-specific problems. 
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The schools too, are keeping up with fashion, by being more attentive to the 
needs of their customers, the companies. They are developing more creative 
links with local companies; primarily through well-honed executive 
development programmes and by encouraging staff to engage in consultancy 
work. Most of the leading grandes ecol es boast some sort of centre for 
management development. For the schools this is a lucrative activity which 
hel ps to supplement income from undergraduate fees and the "taxe 
prof essionnel le" from the companies. It only represents a marginal cost 
since they have the facilities and staff at their disposal, not to mention a 
ready-made reputation. The school's renown will be exploited to attract 
executives to it - sometimes in search of a label they missed out on earlier 
in their education. 
Wel1-prepared managers? 
Does the French system manufacture a good product? In answer to that 
question, it is worth reviewing a number of the points touched upon in the 
preceedi ng discussion. 
Firstly, we must consider the basis for selection. Maths, as a culturally 
neutral and precisely quantifiable criterion, is used as an objective 
measure of merit for entry into the gran des ecol es - including the top 
flight business schools*. This raises questions about compatibility of means 
and ends. Does France really need supernumerate managers? In terms of 
subject matter the answer is probably, no. But if we consider the depth and 
rigour of the study process, the apprenticeship looks more appropriate. 
To start with, maths is deemed a faithful indicator of the ability to 
synthesize and to engage in complex abstract reasoning, qualities which are 
highly prized in all spheres of professional life. The mind has been trained 
to grasp complex problems and assimilate new knowledge quickly. Thus, 
employers are confident that the specific expertise needed for the job and 
the graduate's potential as a manager can be brought out by the company's 
own training and development programme. 
*- In 1985, only 4% of the ESSEC (business school) intake had taken a non- 
maths baccal aureat option. 
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In addition to this, the intensity and duration of the grande ecol e training 
equips the would-be manager with essential mental and physical capacities: 
the ability to cope with pressure and to work long hours, a lengthy span of 
concentration, an analytical mind and a tried and tested work method. To 
fully appreciate the qualities and mentality of the grandes ecol es 
graduates, one must consider the obstacles they have overcome , the 
uncertainty and competition they have faced, and the sacrifices they have 
made. Their odyssey will also have brought out their tactical awareness and 
their single-mindedness which will serve them well in the cut and thrust of 
the business world. 
But perhaps the most important psychological asset which the grandes ecol es 
confer upon their students, is confidence. The atmosphere within the schools 
prepares its incumbents for leadership. Secure in the knowledge of where 
they are heading, anticipatory socialisation tends to operate. Individuals 
assume the values, outlook and poise of the "ruling class" from an early 
age. They may not be au fait with the technicalities and jargon of 
management, but they have the social wherewithal and psychological authority 
to take up positions of power. 
In terms of concrete advantages, the schools provide their proteges with a 
ready made network of contacts which can prove especially supportive in 
times of trouble (unemployment). Career minded students can start to 
establish links before even entering the fray of the business world, safe in 
the knowledge that their cohorts are also bound for the nation's executive 
suites. To a greater extent than most nations, France pools its elites from 
an early age which fosters the solidarity born of a common educational 
experience. 
It would seem that despite the fact that the grandes ecol es were not 
specifically designed to train managers, that is the role they have assumed. 
Indeed, it is a role they have successfully fulfilled, though this success 
is largely a product of their, unique evol ution in parallel to the great 
economic surge of the 19th century. The l ikehood is that they could not be 
replicated outside the peculiar French context. For instance, if the schools 
did not benefit from such historically-based esteem, they would no longer 
attract their proper proportion of the cleverest people in each age group. 
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Perhaps the best testimony to the quality of their products is that 
employers will frantically outbid each other to secure the services of a 
grande ecol e graduate. It could of course be argued that a popular product 
is not necessarily a good product and that the i nfl uence of networks might 
be artificially boosting the continued demand. However, if the schools 
really were failing to enhance the raw material then employers could easily 
acquire the same talent by recruiting at the preparatory stage. The fact 
that this is unheard of, suggests that the schools do provide added value of 
some sort. 
The real problem is that the supply does not sati sfy the demand. One 
interviewee from the sample likened it to the picking of wild fruits which, 
though tastier, could not satisfy universal demand in the same way as large 
scale agriculture. Consequently, the top firms have no recruitment 
difficulties, but the smaller ones which offer less ? traced out' career 
opportunities are deprived of what is presumed to be the top talent. 
Of course, by keeping supply low, the grandes ecol es are ensuring the 
marketability of their products. But this can prove detrimental to the 
graduates themselves who are guaranteed preferential career advancements and 
can, if they choose, treat their diploma as "une rente educative" (an 
educational annuity). For this reason, there is a tendency to look upon 
admission to the grande ecole as a swan song rather than a 'point de 
depart. The net result is that grandes ecol es graduates are generally not 
inclined to risk their talents in an entrepreneurial way to stimulate new 
business, but exploit them instead to gain authority in bureaucratic 
hierarchies (the theme is treated in more detail in the following chapter). 
Needless to say, if the system puts a brake on the motivation of the 
successful, it is doubly the case for those it rejects. The nation is 
deprived of the individuals whose talents or disposition are not suited to 
the strict regime of preparatory schools, notably the late developers, the 
pragmatic or the artistically-inclined who are eliminated from the running 
at an early stage. Later, they are joined by all those embittered by their 
failure to meet the exacting requirements of the "concours" (entrance exam 
for the grandes ecoles). This combined population of potentially excellent 
managers must resign itself to impoverished salary and promotional 
expectations since the top places are virtually reserved to grandes ecol es 
graduates - and sometimes to graduates from a particular school. 
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It is presumably to counteract the negative effects of this 'irreversible' 
selection system that the state chose to instigate compulsory expenditure on 
training. However, it will take more than that to seriously open up access 
to the nation's boardrooms. 
Restatement 
The French system of management production, has traditionally relied on a 
small number of highly-educated individuals to provide the large companies 
with a core of senior managers. There isl ittl e doubting the intellectual 
quality of the output, though aspertions can be cast on their managerial 
aptitudes. Still, the French system is an alternative to the American vision 
of what constitutes a suitable managerial apprenticeship. 
More worrying however, is the wastage of talent resulting from this 
by persel ective system. In the last two decades, there has been a 
recognition that there needs to be more than one route to top management. It 
is this realisation which has prompted the state to enforce corporate 
spending on management education, to provide opportunities for those who may 
have 'missed the boat' first time round. 
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Note o French Education System 
This brief descriptive section sets out to fill in the basic details for 
readers unfamiliar with the French education system. The reason it is not 
incorporated into the main body of the chapter is stylistic, since it would 
have disrupted the intended argumentation. 
Baccal aureat 
There are nearly thirty baccal aureat options, which are sets of pre-packaged 
subject combinations. For instance, the "bac C" is the highly rated maths 
and physical sciences option, the "bac D" the maths and natural sciences 
option, the "bac G" the management option, the "bac H" the computing option. 
Whilst each option has a particular focus, each also carries traces of all 
the other subjects - the aim of the baccal aureat being to provide a high 
1 evel of "culture general e". For instance, the main arts option ("bac A") 
includes maths but the subject is given a lower weighting. 
The formal i sed groupi ng of subjects has made it easy to make comparisons - 
and a hierarchy of prestige has emerged which is essentially determined by 
the maths content of each option with the "bac C" ruling the roost. Such is 
the importance attached to some combinations of subjects that parents may 
prefer to see their children repeat a year, or pay for private tuition in 
their weaker subjects, rather than encourage them to follow less demanding 
courses, for which they may be better suited. 
Taken at eighteen or so, 'Ile bac" is far more rigorous and brain-taxing an 
exam than its its English equivalent, A-level GCE, and even more essential 
as a passport to higher education. 
Higher education 
Higher education is provided in institutes of advanced technology, 
universities, grandes ecol es (see Exhibit 2). A -baccal aureat gives automatic 
entry to university where courses comprise three cycles. The first lasting 
two years, leads to a general university studies diploma, the Diplome 
d'Etudes Universitai res General es (DEUG) which covers both compulsory and 
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optional subjects. After this students may leave or stay on for the second 
cycle. This also lasts two years, the first of which leads to the 'licence' 
(equivalent of a BA) and the second to the 'mat tri se' (MA). The third cycle 
involves either three years leading to a doctorate or a one year Diplome 
d'Etudes Superieures Speci al i sees (DESS) in a highly specialised area. 
In an attempt to ease the overcrowding and remedy the absence of vocational 
training in the universities, the government created Insti tuts 
Universitaires de Technologie (IUT) in 1966. These were intended to provide 
a more practical grounding and fill a manpower gap at middle management 
level. Like the universities the IUTs recruit baccal aureat holders; but 
unlike the universities, they offer intensive vocational training over a two 
year period, they include industrial placements and the failure rates are 
lower. 
I 
For many years industry did not recognise the qualifications gained in the 
IUTs because of a traditional bias against technical education, still 
consi dered the poor relation in the French educational system. After initial 
prejudice against technical education, the IUT diploma has since gained 
recognition in industry. Many employers now prefer it to a DEUG or even a 
'licence' whose teaching, even in science subjects is perceived as too 
theoreti cal . 
The grandes 6coles are a feature of the French educational landscape which 
has no equivalent in any comparable Western country. Students are selected 
by competitive entrance examinations, having been subjected to two or three 
years of intense preparation in special post-baccal aureat classes. Some of 
the grandes ecol es are under the control of the Ministry of Education, for 
example the Ecole Nationale d'Admi ni strati on (ENA). Others are sponsored by 
bodies such as the chambers of commerce, for example the Ecol e des Hautes 
Etudes Commerci al es (HEC), while others are controlled by different 
ministries, for example the Ecol e Polytechnique by the Ministry of Armed 
Forces. 
Not all the Brandes ecol es enjoy the same prestige. Perhaps the most sought 
after places are at 1'ENA which is neither an engineering or a business 
school t but a civil service training college. 
Entrance to l'ENA is extremely 
competitive, and most candidates have undergone training at the Paris 
Institut d'Etudes Politiques (commonly known as Sciences-Po), a private 
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institution created in 1871 and superseded in practice by 1'ENA. The 
position achieved in the final examination at l'ENA determines the choice of 
appointment, and the spirit of rivalry is maintained throughout the course, 
as an individual's whole career may be determined by a quarter of a mark in 
the final assessment. 
While the number of students at the universities has been increasing in an 
uncontrollable way since the war, the intakes of the grandes ecol es have 
remai ned al most static, and their students have continued, albeit perhaps 
not so easily as in the past, to find satisfying employment. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
The higher education system. 
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6. DESTINY 
"La concurrence ne joue qu'une foi s, au moment des concours, a 
l 'entree des grandes ecol es, vers 22 ans. " Conversation with 
Nicole Bastrentaz, Fondation Nationale pour 1'Enseignement de la 
Gestion des Entreprises. 
(Competition occurs just once, when students take the entrance 
exams which determines admission to the grandes ecol es, at about 
22 years of age). 
Careers are a subject of tremendous interest for cadres, as witnessed by the 
popularity of salary surveys and 'career pull-outs' published by the likes 
of 1'Expansion, 1'Express and Le Point. This chapter sets out to examine the 
various influences on a managerial career in France. Of course, the 
differences which exist between France and, say, Britain are of degree 
rather than kind. Themes like education, performance and functional choice 
automatically affect an individual's career, but their relative weightings 
vary between corporate and national cultures. 
Recruitment procedures 
By way of introduction, it may be worth taking a look at the French 
recruitment process which contains a number of tell-tale signs regarding 
ways to the top in France. The form and substance of careers adverts, 
curriculum vitae and covering letters all provide insights into the critical 
influences on career success. 
A cursory glance at managerial job advertisements reveals a low emphasis on 
drive or initiative, by Anglo-Saxon standards at least. On the other hand, 
advertisements typically refer to more cerebral qualities, "l 'esprit 
critique, la rigueur, la capacite de Synthese" (analytical mind, 
application, perceptiveness). ' To caricature the situation, the French seem 
to focus on qualities of reception (a*nalysi s, synthesis, agility of the 
mind) at the expense of qualities of emission (charisma, pugnacity, capacity 
to communicate and motivate). 
77 
The adverti sement is al so likely to specify a particular type of education 
identified by the number of years the course lasts after the baccalaureat: 
for instance, "bac + 2" for DUT, BTS, DEUG (short vocational courses); "bac 
+ 4" for a "mai tri se" (masters) or some business school di pl omas 
(increasingly "bac + 5); and "bac + 5" for engineering schools and the 
university-based Di pl öme d'Etudes Superieures Speci al i sees. All this is in 
stark contrast to the rather vague call for "graduates" which prevail sin 
the UK. French companies are precise in their requirements and at least give 
the impression that they will get what they are asking for, typically 
demanding "a degree in ... " not simply, "a degree". 
Sometimes the adverti sement even goes as far as to mention a particular set 
of school s* (see Exhibit 3). This is associated with the fact that each 
school is regarded as producing a very identifiable product with 
stereotypical qualities and defects. L'Expansion (August 1977; 66), actually 
published a list of the spontaneous impressions of busi nessmen about the 
graduates of individual schools. Among the shortcomings, graduates of 
Polytechnique were deemed too el iti st, those of Central e uni magi native, 
those of HEC overambitious, those of Sciences-Po superficial and those of 
1 'ENA too theoretical. Clearly, the French indulge in a high degree of type- 
ca sti ng. 
The tone of the advertisements is generally subdued by Anglo-Saxon 
standards. Salaries are rarely quoted or perks brandished as part of the 
headline (see Exhibit 4). Rather the advert will speak coyly of "appropriate 
salary" and although there may be general references to fringe benefits, 
they are not likely to be itemised. Possibly this is a manifestation of the 
Catholic reticence to talk about money (see chapter on management ethos) or 
may reflect the fact that the salary depends on the incumbent rather than 
the post. In effect, remuneration tends to be based on criteria which relate 
to the person - age, trai ni ng, experience, contacts even - rather than the 
f unctions assigned or the. results obtai ned. 
The adverts generally close with a request for, "lettre manuscrite, CV, 
photo". These too, are highly revealing on closer inspection. The fact that 
a hand-written letter is often requested implies that it will probably be 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*- Challenges (mars 87; 32) reports the chief of a large company telling a 
head hunter, "This post is wide open ... any candidate is eligible ... 
provided he is a Polytechnicien". 
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subjected to the scrutiny of a graphol ogi st. This is surpri singly 
commonplace and even one of the small firms visited had recourse to such an 
expert. The implement used, the style and spontaneity of the writing are all 
analysed to determine the suitability of a candidate - and as one 
graphologist explained to the researcher, neatness, application and 
conformity are not always interpreted favourably. The hand-written letter 
also indicates moderate commitment to the company in question since it 
precludes the 'leaflet drop' approach to job hunting. 
The style of the covering letter is generally more deferential and indirect 
than is the case in Anglo-Saxon countries. According to Ti xi er in an article 
in La Revue Francai se de Gestion (Oct. 87; 63), candidates tend to refrain 
from using action oriented verbs 'organi sing', 'leading', deciding ' and so 
forth. Instead they opt for verbs which are passive in their form or 
meaning: "etre em bauche comme ... " (to be placed as); "chercher un emploi de 
... " (to seek employment as); "col l aborer, ai de r" 
(to be i nvol ved, to 
assist). This linguistic bias is also noted by Laurence Wylie who maintains 
that it is instilled very early on in childhood. He suggests that if we look 
at the table of contents of a French geography textbook, we will find that 
all the chapters have nouns as titles (the soil, the vegetation, the climate 
and so on). In contrast to this, an American social studies book uses 
participles, indicating some kind of action, for its headings: growing rice, 
mining coal, etc. (Santoni; 1981; 30). 
Requiring a photo betrays the fact that the French have no equivalent of the 
label "equal opportunity employer". This is in contrast to typical job 
adverts in Britain or the US which generally refrain from asking for photos 
for fear of accusations of discrimination. 
As for the curriculum vitae itself, its content and format provide further 
clues. To start with, facts are stated in chronological order, unlike the 
American-style CV which starts with the career objective, then states 
current situation and works backwards. This difference is important in that 
one presentation emphasises current achievement and motivation, irrespective 
of origins, whereas the other is concerned with the individual's background 
and verification of passage through ? obligatory' check-points. In other 
words, the French approach is l ess concerned with where you are now, than 
where you have been. 
79 
Another feature of the French CV is the relative absence of personal 
information. The contents are fairly dry and impersonal, stating 
qualifications, training and work experience but dispensing with the 
paragraphs of personal notes or details on sporting and social activities 
which are deemed so essential in Britain. Nor are referees included, 
presumably because the school attended is reference enough. As a result, the 
whole document need not exceed a single side of A4 paper (see Exhibit 5). 
Education 
The most striking feature of French management is the way in which one's 
education impinges, either directly or indirectly upon one's entire career. 
As Alain Pey ref i tte put it: 
"I1 n'y a sans doute pas de pays au monde oü l es di pl times soient 
mieux respectes, leur validite aussi persistante" (1976; 320). 
(I cannot think of any country in the world where qualifications 
have greater power or longevity). 
Th e royal toad 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, getting on the right track Ma voie 
royale") is something which starts with baccalaureat options at secondary 
school. The "bac C" (maths option) is the first vital step in one's bid to 
reach a gran de ecol e. However, having reached the sanctum of one of these 
venerated establishments, lifelong career success is virtually guaranteed. 
In most countries, educational pedigree is simply an entry ticket into a 
company. But in France it is an employment passport which often constitutes 
an assurance for life (a so-called "rente educative"). Grandes ecoles 
graduates can look forward, not only to a "golden hello", but to rapid 
promotion, not always based on. results. As Peyrefitte explained: 
"En France, le di pl öme est une fusee longue portee qui, sauf 
accident, vous propulse j usqu'ä la retraite" (1976; 320). 
(In France, the diploma is an open-sesame which, barring mishaps, 
will see an individual through to retirement). 
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France's top executives are reputedly the best educated in Europe. Students 
with high level managerial aspirations as executives or administrators, know 
they are best advised to attend the most prestigious grandes ecol es for, 
even if they intend to set up business alone, it will enhance their 
credibility. 
The generalist education provided by these schools is deemed to equip the 
graduates with the overall view to make it to the top, and that is 
reinforced by the companies themselves. Far from attenuating educational 
differences, companies accentuate them with elitist practices, notably high 
flyer schemes and promotional ceilings related to qualifications, which help 
perpetuate the established order. Many of the cadres interviewed revealed 
that, with hindsight, they could quite easily have predicted their current 
situation simply on the basis of their educational luggage. By the same 
reckoning, they felt they could forecast the way their ca reers would unfold 
from now until their retirement. This suggests an unusually stable 
relationship between academic credentials and promotional ceiling - or as 
one cadre rather poetically explained to the researcher, "stellar 
trajectories are rare". 
This extensive (not to say exclusive) reliance on pre-experience education 
as an indicator of management potential, allows the brightest prospects to 
be creamed off early and no doubt facilitates the apprenticeship to general 
management. "Fast trackers" can be cosseted and given a secure setting in 
which to acquire the necessary skills, as personal assistant ("attache de 
direction") to a senior manager. They are given training missions, 
encouraged to visits plants in the provinces or abroad - all this under the 
tutelage of a mentor who will help them make contacts and oversee their leap 
from special ist to general management. So, whilst educati onal capital may 
yield its best return early on in the career, it is used to beget other 
forms of capital, such as rapid experience. This skilful conversion strategy 
enables the hol der to cast aside the crutch of education and point to an 
'authentic' track record. 
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Graduation from the 'right' school also has repercussions on behaviour. Pre- 
conditioned into believing that they are bound for the boardroom, the would- 
be 1 eaders start to act accordingly. Anticipatory socialisation ensures that 
they acquire the demeanour and outlook of leadership. This self-belief is 
merely reinforced by firms which are eager to give them preferential career 
advancements, thereby establishing a well-padded CV and legitimising their 
leadership positions. The implication is that bright young executives are 
perhaps encouraged to look good and keep their noses clean rather than 
fulfill their creative and intellectual potential. Critics might develop the 
view that those who reach the top are perhaps better at getting promoted 
than they are at running organisations. 
From a positive viewpoint.. the policy of using the grandes ecol es to form 
pools of versatile talent obviously promotes healthy mobility and 
facilitates dialogue between educational, busi ness, financial, and public 
sectors. Indeed, the pervasive influence of the grandes ecol es can be gauged 
by the comment of the Vice-President of Centrale's alumni association: 
"Si Pon regroupait tous l es anciens el eves des grandes ecol es, on 
aurait devant soi la classe di ri geante de ce pays" (Le Monde de 
1'Educati on; April 1986; 10). 
(A list of all grandes ecoles alumni would read like a roll call 
of France's ruling class). 
The institutionalisation of grande ecol e links 
Another way in which education affects career progress is through old boy 
networks. In many schools the durability of school 1 inks is 
institutionalised. At l'Ecole Polytechnique for instance, all graduates high 
and low call each other "camarade" whether they have met before or not, and 
the lowliest 'X' can write out of the blue to a famous colleague and be sure 
of help and sympathy. Having such an extensive network of contacts from the 
very start of one's active life is an immeasurable advantage. 
Simil arl y, at l'Ecol e des Arts et M6ti ers, which reputedly has the most 
efficient old boy association, to which graduates are automatically 
affiliated. Members receive regular journals and newsletters on salaries or 
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career paths, to supplement the annual directory listing alumni by name, 
region and company. One consultant in the interview sample admitted that 
before visiting any company he would check the association directory for a 
fellow "Gadztarts"* in that firm to fill him in on the prevailing situation. 
One production manager from the observation sample even confessed to having 
illicitly invited a colleague from a rival firm into the plant to show him 
how to solve a recurrent production problem. The graduates' freemasonry can 
clearly transcend corporate al l egi ences. 
The purpose of al um ni associations is basically three-fold: to promote th e 
school's reputation, to help out in the search for a first job, and to 
facilitate mobility. Each association therefore runs a careers service which 
offers jobs to new graduates and restless old boys alike. The HEC 
association allegedly offers 2 500 posts to the 300 or so students who 
graduate each year. More impressive still are the efforts made when alumni 
fall upon hard times. The association will pull out all the stops to find a 
job for ("recaser") an unemployed member. 
Likewise when it comes to promoting the school's name the associations can 
prove very helpful. For instance, the INSA (Institut Nationale des Sciences 
Appl iq uees) association put pressure on the French electricity corporation 
(EDF) so that the company would recognise in its recruitment salaries, the 
fact that the school had lengthened its curriculum to 5 years. Similarly, 
the Arts et Metiers association managed to persuade the French railways 
(SNCF) to open up certain posts previously reserved to the highest rated 
schools. On a less savoury note, the old boys' association may also have 
some impact on the schools' own admissions policy. The head of a small 
business school actually confessed to setting a 30% ceiling on the number of 
girls admitted to the school (Challenges; May 87; 32). The reasoning behind 
this policy was that girls were a poor investment for the association since 
they were more likely to stop working which would dilute the school's active 
network. 
*- "Gadzlarts" isa contraction of "gars des arts et metiers" (alumni of 
1'Ecole des arts et metiers). 
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Bereft of these close knit ties, university graduates in particular, find it 
difficult to infiltrate the higher reaches of business. As the head of one 
university put it: 
"Souvent, dans 1 es grandes entrepri ses, 1 es m of i as d'anci ens des 
ecoles sont pour nous un mur infranchissable" (L'Expansion; 
7/03/85; 83). 
(The old boy networks in the large companies often represent an 
insurmountable obstacle for us). 
Their lack of contacts in high places works against the university students 
when they seek industrial placements which means they fail to gain an 
initial foothold. Thereafter, their absence from positions of authority in 
the more traditional companies becomes pathological. In contrast to this, 
the "gadz1arts", say, are renowned for their stranglehold over the 
automobile industry: Peugeot harbours 461 "gadziarts" out of 5 000 cadres 
according to figures published in Challenges (March 87; 34) - something 
which cannot be explained away by distinctive competence. These collegiate 
ghettoes are regularly condemned in the press, but the criticism has the 
unwitting effect of boosting the popularity of schools which guarantee 
em pl oy men t. 
What is more, the situation seems destined to deteriorate since emulation is 
perceived as the only way forward. As a university head explained: 
'Nos formations etant recentes, nous n'avons pas encore nos 
propres mafias" (L'Expansion; 7/03/85; 83). 
(Our courses are recent so we don't yet possess our own mafias). 
One can understand the desire to fight fire with fire, but the situation 
seems rather hypocritical : on the one hand, the universities condemn 
neighbouring networks, and on the other they try to constitute their own. 
Adult education 
As an adjunct to the present section, it is worth mentioning the area of 
adult education. Since 1971, companies have been compelled by law to devote 
just over one per cent of total wage bills to training. The motivation 
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behind this legislation seems to have been a desire to introduce some leeway 
into the rigid relationship between pre-experience educational credentials 
and jobs. However, the anticipated impact on careers has not really 
materialised. More often than not, it is the senior management which decides 
who to send on management development courses, which means that lack of 
training provides ready justification for lack of promotion. So, post- 
experience education has done as much to reinforce the educational pecking 
order, as it has to break it down. 
Of course, many cadres do upgrade their skills by attending management 
training courses, but these have little impact on career progress. In 
France, no label earned at post-entry level wil 1 really make up for 
inadequacies in pre-entry education. Even the most prestigious 
establishments for senior executives such as the CPA, IN SEAD, ISA, ISSEC, 
CRC or CEDEP will only partly compensate a "second rate" education. A post- 
entry diploma has a remedial aspect to it. It may give an engineer a 
managerial veneer but it will do nothing to augment the marketability of a 
graduate from the top grandes ecol es. This is not an indictment of the 
pedagogy of these executive development centres but is a sign of the 
deference accorded to the top schools. It is also indicative of the attitude 
towards perfectabil i ty in France. 
In contrast with the US, the acceptance of perfectabil ity in France, is low. 
French education is directed towards the acquisition of a well-establ i shed 
body of knowledge and attitudes. This finite view of knowledge carries over 
into management education where, to burlesque the situation, the best 
grandes ecol es impart comprehensive knowledge which need never be up-dated. 
Those who attend these schools are deemed "formes a vie" (trained for life) 
which renders further training superfluous. This attitude perhaps explains 
the pre-eminence of pre-experience education in relation to post-experience 
education. 
Performance 
In terms of career influences, the constant counterpoint to education is of 
course, job performance. Any managerial selection system involves an 
implicit trade-off between performance in professional life and performance 
pri or to entry (as measured by qualifications). The aim here is to try to 
assess the wei ght accorded to each element in the French context. 
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Track record 
Most corporate recruiters genuinely believe that the value of a 
qualification is quickly eclipsed after initial admission to the company. 
One personnel manager from the interview sample explicitly stated: 
"Franchi le cap du dema rra ge, le role du di pl öme tom be vi to ä 
zero". 
(Having cleared the first hurdle, the power of the diploma soon 
disappears). 
Many of the cadres interviewed corroborated that idea, the general consensus 
being that a qualification could not be relied upon for support for more 
than five years. That is probably true insofar as the formal knowledge 
enshrined by the diploma becomes obsolete. However, what remains is a high 
level start and the acquisition of a rapid and varied experience which the 
di pl oma has hel ped procure. This supersedes educational credentials as a 
promotion criterion but serves to promote the same population. What is more, 
should the grande ecol e graduate find himself unemployed, he can count on an 
old boy network to minimise the period of 'cold turkey' between jobs. So, 
the claim that diplomas count for nothing, after initial recruitment, 
appears tenuous to say the least. 
That is not to say that qualifications allow their holders simply to 
freewheel to power. Educational credentials must be allied to effort, to 
produce their full effect. But assuming that grandes ecol es graduates can 
successfully negotiate the early stages, they will have the edge over less 
qualified colleagues, in making the transition to general management. The 
reason for this is that the responsability for high level appointments falls 
in the hands of those al ready in power, rather than the personnel 
department. So, ceteris pari bus, a chief will elect to surround himself with 
like-minded individuals who have emerged from the same mould, who speak the 
same language and have the same work methods. That way, the adaptation 
period is curtailed and the working relationship is more efficient. Co- 
optation in such cases probably has less to do with conscious discrimination 
than a feeling of intellectual empathy. 
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Social or technical competence? 
As mentioned above, it is argued that after five or so years of professional 
experience, the diploma becomes irrelevant. This points to a shift in 
performance criteria whereby social competence gradually takes over from 
technical competence. 
The relative importance of technical and social competence varies between 
firms - and more importantly, between strata within a firm. Consequently, 
the type of competence expected of individuals will depend upon the 
particular stage they have reached in their managerial career. The value of 
technical knowledge, know-how and energy tend to diminish with age. 
Conversely, the socially acquired skills needed not to produce per se but to 
administer the production processes (such as the ability to delegate, 
resolve conflicts and motivate) increase as the cadre climbs up the 
organisation. 
It is in the latter half of one's career that the effects of attending the 
'right' school come to fruition, as some individuals move from line jobs 
into positions of power that put a premium on such qualities as 
distinguished appearance, good manners, tact, and good taste. Emphasis on 
social competence tends to favour the products of the grandes ecol es who 
possess the necessary self-confidence and social wherewithal. So while 
companies ostensibly drop educational credentials as a means of selection, 
they replace them with credentials which elevate members of the same 
popul ati on. 
In truth, the criteria for recruitment and promotion are easy to fudge. 
Companies can easily shroud qualification-based promotion in terms of 
'behavioural' traits. The relative emphasis on technical or social 
competence is in the hands of the company and, in France, companies 
generally put a premium on social skills. This is most visible in the 
treatment of certain high flyers who are nursed through the obligatory 
period of operational effectiveness,. skating over the surface until they are 
sucked up to the boardroom. 
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The acid test: 'sel f-made' men 
Having ascertained that educational credentials will help establ i sh an 
accelerated track record, how do those without qualifications fare? Or, to 
put the null hypothesis, is it possible to succeed without educational 
credenti als? 
The new, action-orientated mood in French busi ness makes much of the fact 
that it is possible to do well without educational credentials. The more 
progressive journals have featured articles publicising the successes of so- 
called "autodidactes" ('self-made' individuals). Recent issues of Le Point 
and Challenges have each devoted substantial pieces to those who have 'made 
it' without qualifications. But, since both articles trot out the same set 
of success-stories, one is left with the impression that these are merely 
exceptions which confirm the rule - and serve as alibis for a premature and 
hyperselective system. 
In truth, a person's schooling (or lack of it) will always overshadow 
subsequent achievements. The primacy of the diploma is easily corroborated 
by taking a look at the appointments' sections in newspapers or magazines. 
Newly appointed chiefs w il l place a diploma gained several decades past, 
ahead of their penultimate posting in a prestigious company. The cry pti c 
triumverate of details, "Jean Dupont, X, 53" tells initiated observers all 
they need to know about the individual, namely sex, school (X represents the 
crossed cannons of l'Ecol e Polytechnique) and class (i e. year of 
graduation). 
It would seem that "la diplomite" (qualification-itis), as it is popularly 
known, is more acute than ever. Perhaps the greatest testimony to the pre- 
eminence of education comes from autodidactes themselves who, having 'made 
good', are still reluctant to admit to the appal ati on. Even in the wake of a 
new pro-business climate (see chapter on top management), the tag 'self- 
made' is a skeleton to be concealed rather than a source of pride. 
An example from the observation sample makes the point exquisitely. The head 
of public relations had prepared a short resume describing his chief. On 
reading it, the PDG in question remonstrated quite violently with its 
composer for mentioning his lack of higher education. The PR man explained 
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in all sincerity that nowadays 'self-made men? elicit nothing but respect 
and admiration. To which the worldly PDG replied: 
' 'en croyez rien. On ne 1 eur pardonne jamai s de n'avoi r ete que 
des pri mai res I" 
(Don't you believe it. You're never forgiven for failing to go 
beyond primary education! ). 
The experience of Rene Monory, the former education minister who tried 
(unsuccessfully) to introduce selection prior to entry into the 
universities, is also revealing. He used to show off about not having passed 
his baccalaur6at ... until the day, last December, when disrespectful 
students starting chanting a set phrase borrowed from anxious parents, 
"Monory, passe ton bac d'abordI" (first pass the exam - then we'll see). 
The sti gma associated with a1 ack of education clearly persi sts irrespective 
of fashions - and there are perhaps good reasons (other than snobbery) for 
wishing to hide the fact in France. A 26 year old, self-taught chief 
outlined two particular handicaps: 
'tluand on va voi r pour 1a premiere foi s des banqui ers, 11 s 
trouvent qu'on est pas credible. De meme, on ne peut pas embaucher 
i mmedi atement des di pl omes, ca r, souvent, il s se mef cent dune 
entrepri se di ri gee par un autodi dacte" (Le Poi nt; 24/08/87; 26). 
(The first ti me you go to see bankers, they feel you 1 ack 
credibility. The same goes for taking on graduates who are wary of 
companies headed by a non-graduate). 
On the other hand, autodi dactes perhaps have the drive and courage w hi chi, 
according to one headhunter, their graduate counterparts tend to lack: 
"Ne reussi ssent q ue 1 es el eves un peu pl aci des, tenaces, attaches 
a un seul obj ecti f: obteni r1e di pl ome. Les grandes ecol es forment 
des gens doues dune formidable force de travail et de 
concentration, mai s peu prepares ä prendre des ri sques" 
(L'Express; 24/01/86; 27). 
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(Those who succeed are generally calm, tenacious and hell bent on 
obtai ni ng a degree. The grandes ecol es produce i ndivi duals with a 
tremendous work rate and concentration, but ill-prepared to take 
risks). 
This view of grandes ecol es graduates as rather timorous i ndivi duals was 
supported by a cadre interviewed who believed that, in France, competition 
was not seen as an end in itself, in the Ameri can tradition - but rather a 
means to an end. Competition, as he saw it, was essentially aimed at 
achieving security. He explained that the French are prepared to expose 
themselves to great risks provided that the reward is guaranteed security 
and cited admission to the grandes ecoles as a prime example. 
Whil st autodi dactes have certain advantages over graduates, primarily as a 
result of having nothing to lose, it was generally acknowledged that success 
would increasingly require a formal framework of theoretical knowledge. As 
one self-taught PDG explained to the researcher: 
"A l1aveni r, il ne suffira plus d'avoi r du bon sens dans l1analyse 
et de 1'audace dans 1'acti on. " 
(In future, analysis will require more than basic common sense and 
action more than mere daring). 
This view of autodi dactes as a dying breed was corroborated by a recent 
survey of company directors in Le Point. The article heralded, 'Il a fin du 
regne des autodi dactes" (the era of the sel f-made man is past - 5/10/87; 
54) which implies, perhaps misleadingly, that the autodidacte was previously 
in favour. The piece revealled that higher education, especially in a grande 
ecol e, is vi rtual ly a sine qua non for rising to the top of large fi rms. Of 
the 200 top managers sampled 90% were the products of higher education and 
of the remaining 10% all had acquired some sort of legitimising 
qualification in their professional life. 
As regards the initial question about the possibility of success without 
qual ifications, the answer has to be a qualified "no". It is unusual for 
individuals to make headway in traditional French companies without the 
official seal of higher education. On the other hand, in the less viscous 
environment of small or provincial companies, it is possible to climb by 
proving one's worth (company types are discussed later in this chapter). 
90 
Career strategy 
The notion of career strategy seems fairly weak in France. The managers 
interviewed tended to be vague about what they hoped to achieve by what age. 
No doubt this has something to do with a certain reticence to 'count one's 
chickens' or to appear overtly ambitious. To give some idea of the attitude, 
professional aspi rations would generally be couched in terms of intellectual 
satisfaction or increased independence rather than more money, power or 
prestige. The few who did reveal specific goals and time-scales had to be 
prompted to do so. It could be posited that this toned down view of 
careerism is related to the rather predictable nature of career progression 
- and the fact that one's education holds sway over all other possible 
variables. This said, there are still a number of choices which will 
determine how quickly individuals reach their alloted station. 
Company type 
One of the prime decisions facing a new graduate concerns the sort of 
company to join - and depending on the school attended the choice can be 
quite vast. The lowliest of grandes ecol es engineers is likely to receive an 
average of two offers of employment on graduating, whilst a product of 
Central e can expect up to fourteen (L'Express; 24/01/86; 26). 
Different companies offer different salaries, different career tracks and 
different responsibilities. Some promote on seniority, others on profits 
recorded. Ambitious young graduates therefore have to pick their way through 
a complex field of proferred opportunities. They have to judge which are the 
real opportunities and which are 'voies de garage? (si dings). The 
fundamental question for new graduates is whether to opt for the safety of a 
large corporation or chance their hand in a smaller company where they may 
be given wider responsabil iti es. 
There is a distinct sense of separate circuits in the managerial job market. 
On the one hand, there are the small companies, based in the provinces, with 
a higher incidence of autodidactes and an older age range. On the other 
hand, there are the larger companies, with their Parisian headquarters and a 
high concentration of young graduate personnel. This idea of a dual job 
market for cadres was confirmed by a production manager interviewed who 
suggested that joining a small company was virtually an irreversible move. 
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He claimed that opting out of the race for top positions in major 
corporations was tantamount to admitting that one was not cut out to work in 
an overtly structured and competitive environment. Consequently, large 
companies may have a few qualms about taking on someone with a small company 
background. Needless to say, the reverse is not true since small companies 
will be only too glad to hire people with experience of the way things are 
done in the major corporations. 
One possible career sequence was summed up by one of Jane Marceau's INSEAD 
i ntervi ewees as: 
"One must make one's mistakes in a big company, prove one's 
efficiency in a medium-sized one and finish by earning a lot of 
money in one's own business" (1980; 126). 
There is a general consensus regarding the companies which provide the best 
springboard into the business world as well as a blacklist of companies to 
avoid. At the top of the heap according to a survey in Le Nouvel Economiste 
(29/05/87; 87), is IBM; though a number of other companies are rated higher 
in particular fields. For instance, Arthur Andersen or other consultancy 
firms are consi dered ideal for acqui ring the coveted 'generalist' label 
without having to manoeuvre between functions, for computing or management 
specialists; 1'0real for research and marketing; Procter and Gamble for 
marketing; Rank Xerox for sales; Rhone Poulenc for production and research. 
The high ratings of these blue chip companies is largely related either to 
security of employment within the company itself or the security of 
employment they confer upon those who pass through them. Colgate-Palmolive 
for instance, is renowned for its high turnover of cadres, 50% of which 
leave the company within 5 years (L'Expansion; 18/06/87; 127). However, 
those who acquire its "etiquette" (label) emerge with a valuable "carte de 
vi sa te" (calling card) which they can use anywhere. Accor is another such 
firm. A commercial director interviewed at the company was quite candid with 
the researcher about the reasons that young graduates chose Accor: 
"Ce ne sont pas l es sal ai res q ui l es atti rent - il s viennent ici 
pour fai re 1 eurs armes. " 
(They don't come here for the money, but to gain their wings). 
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Either way, the real appeal of these firms lies directly or indirectly in 
the security of employment. The primordial importance of security was 
corroborated by the findings of a recent survey in I'Usine nouvelle 
(19/03/87) which revealed an overwhelming desire by young engineers to join 
a large group which would provide well traced out career possibilities. In 
many respects these preferences are latter-day manifestations of the French 
obsession with the security of civil service employment. The dream of many 
French parents, until quite recently, was to see their offspring enter state 
service - and even as l ate as 1982, a survey revealed that 40% of the youths 
themselves hoped to become civil servants (de Closets; 1982; 328). 
In two of the small companies visited the heads were highly critical of this 
security-consciousness. The attitude of the grandes ecoles graduates was 
condemned on two scores: firstly, for its sheer snobbishness and secondly, 
for the lack of adventure. They saw the graduates as conformists, unwilling 
to try their 1 uck ina po st which would grow with them - opting instead for 
a future which was clearly mapped out from the outset. 
What the small companies offer is a chance of wider responsibility. They are 
of course less concerned with qualifications, though that is probably 
through force rather than choice. One of the company heads visited was 
particularly pleased to have attracted a graduate engineer (albeit from one 
of the l ess prestigious schools) on to his staff. And this snob factor was 
noted by l'Expansion: 
Tans 1 es PME, pl us d'un patron est tout fier de se payer 'son' 
HEC ou 'son' polytechni cien, comme il se paierait une Rolls" 
(L'Expansi on; August 1977; 69). 
(In many small companies, the boss will take on a Polytechnique or 
HEC graduate, in the same way as he would treat himself to a 
Rol1s). 
Mobility 
The importance of manager mobility in France is largely dependent upon the 
prevailing norms within the sector or company. Personal mobility will be 
interpreted unfavourably in sectors such as heavy industry, banking or 
nationalised companies. On the other hand it is generally viewed positively 
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by PR firms, consultancy, computing, 'Americanised' companies and, generally 
speaking in the sales function. Whilst this pattern is ostensibly the same 
as in Britain, there is perhaps an underlying difference between the 
countries. The UK attitude, coloured by American views, is favourable in 
principle to mobility - whilst in France it is generally frowned upon. 
In France mobility isa not a universal si gn of professional success and 
ambition. Indeed itis just as 1i kel y to be construed as the result of 
successive fail ures, or even instability as suggested by the rather 
disparaging reference of one headhunter interviewed to "l es pa pi ll ons aux CV 
tourbillonants" (butterflies with whirlwind CVs). Indeed, bright young 
graduates are warned not to be too anxious to respond to the offers of 
headhunters since they may get a reputation for instability. In the words of 
one headhunter: 
"Je me mbfie beaucoup des gens qui collectionnent les employeurs. 
Cel ui qui change trop souvent d'employeur fait nattre d'horri bl es 
soupcons, ou tout au moms soul eve des questions bi en legitimes. " 
(Challenge; January 87; 50). 
(I am extremely wary of people who 'collect' employers. Changing 
jobs too often is bound to arouse suspicion, or at the very least 
1 egi ti mate queries). 
Even where mobility is known to be motivated by ambition rather 
"flightiness", it may be regarded negatively. For instance, the career- 
minded financial director at one large company visited was described to the 
researcher as "un escargot" (a snail). The implication was that he had 'no 
fixed abode? which made him slightly suspect and placed a question mark over 
his corporate loyalty. 
Of course, the light in which mobility is interpreted depends to some extent 
on the age of the manager. Early on in a career, playing the field will 
probably be viewed positively, particularly since a young cadre may be 
anxious to-shed the new graduate image by changing companies. However, later 
on (after 35), mobility is likely to be frowned upon. 
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Few of the cadres spoken to, envisaged a change of company as part of thei r 
career strategy. Mobility wa s regarded as a1 ast resort, when there is no 
other way out, rather than a positive me ans of gai ning promotion or greater 
responsibility. They seemed unwilling to take a risk and relinquish the 
protection afforded by length of service in a company. Many cadres pass up 
salary or promotion opportunities for the security of immobility. 
The desi re to stay put was even more acute among autodi dactes for whom 
changing company was synonymous with loss of responsibility, salary and 
status. The reason for this is that they lack an officially sanctioned 
degree to certify their value to prospective employers. The fate of the 
autodidacte is basically tied in with his employer's and promotion relies on 
the fi rm's growth. This is in contrast with, say, Britain where the self- 
taught individual would, firstly, get credit for having done the job, and 
secondly, be less disadvantaged in a culture which is not so self- 
consciously intellectual. 
By the same token, grandes ecoles graduates possess the official seal of 
approval which allows them to roam freely in the job market. Again we see 
the ubiquitous effect of qualifications which enable their holders to 
accumulate experience in different companies. This, in turn, provides 
justifiable grounds for discrimination when they apply for senior positions 
- something which is confirmed by a report in Le Point (5/10/87; 54) citing 
a diversified career as a common trait among those who reach the top. 
Ironically, the widespread immobility at middle management level serves to 
legitimise the right to power of the few who are mobile. So, whilst French 
managers cannot make a career out of mobility alone, mobility can assume the 
role of distinctive competence which justifies a senior position. 
If French companies do not place a very high premium on mobility in general, 
there is one form of mobility which can prove particularly 'rewarding' 
namely, mid-career transfers from the public to the private sector. Of 
course, this form of mobility is not exclusive to France. Similar migration 
patterns occur in Japan from government to government related industry and 
in Israel where transfers from military to business circles prevail. 
However, there is a sharp contrast between France and her two biggest 
neighbours, Britain and West Germany, neither of which really indulges in 
this practi ce - with the possible exception of the Bri ti sh penchant for 
appointing status lenders to non-executive positions on boards. 
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In France then, added value may be obtained from entering public service*1 
and using one's privileged knowledge of its workings as a springboard for a 
second career in industry, and the donning of 'golden slippers' 
("pantouflage"). It is a sign of their relatively smooth transition that the 
extent of the phenomenon is so little known. The one-way irrigation of the 
business elite by civil servants is eased by the social and educational 
proximity of the two groups. The passage amounts to professional mobility, 
but within the same social field - hence its success. 
The headline-grabbing instances of "pantouflage", associated with 
nationalised companies and changes of government are simply the tip of the 
iceberg. Beneath the surface there is a steady, osmotic flow from the public 
sector (including the armed forces) to the private sector. The pattern is a 
classic one: transfer usually takes place in the mid-thirties, by which time 
the cadre has ample public sector experience to offer, as well as an 
appreciation of career limitations (in public service), yet sufficient drive 
left to make an impact in the private sector. 
The circumstances for leaving vary. Some respond to an offer, others take 
the initiative, having carefully cul tivated contacts when in office (see 
Exhibit 6). Customer firms often save posts for those who have placed state 
orders with them*2. Either way, ex-civil servants have numerous trumps to 
play with a prospective employer. They possess intimate knowledge of the 
rules and regulations. They have friends in high places and can facilitate 
dialogue with those who administer - and even if they cannot play on 
personal contacts, they are "au fait" with the way political and 
governmental networks operate; they know how to lobby and, having themselves 
been on the receiving end, know when and where to apply pressure. What is 
more, their high level training permits a rapid grasp of complex problems. 
In the French context then, perhaps as a result of state involvement in 
company affai rs, ex-civil servants clearly have something to offer most 
anpl oyers. 
*1 -A civil service- career is still prestigious but increasingly it is 
regarded as a short-cut to senior positions in the private or nationalised 
sectors, rather than an end in itself. 
*2 - This in spite of legislation (art. 175 of the Penal Code) prohibiting 
entry into client companies within five years of resignation (L'Expansion; 
8/10/87; 153). 
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The most sought after specialists are the "inspecteurs des finances" who 
virtually monopolise the higher reaches of the banking sector (Societe 
General e, Credit Lyonnais) and nationalised insurance groups WAR. GAN). - not 
to mention political spheres. The reason for their popularity has less to do 
with the skills they have acquired from verifying public accounts (to ensure 
that State funds are not misspent), than with thei r intellectual and social 
attributes. Each year the top five graduates of l 'ENA invariably opt for the 
"Inspection des Finances" which is considered the best of the elite 'Grands 
corps de 1'Etat" (senior branches of the civil service). It therefore has a 
prestige without parallel in the UK - even entering the foreign service can 
not hold a light to it. So, to bag an "inspecteur" is considered a real coup 
for any company which manages to do so. 
At a somewhat lower level, the foremost "pantoufleurs" in terms of number, 
are ex-service personnel, who can foresee their likely "baton de mar6chal " 
(promotional ceiling) and find an escape hatch in the armaments or 
electronics sectors. A few large companies can even boast their own clan of 
"St Cy riens"* to go alongside groups from Polytechnique, Central e or Arts et 
Metiers. Occasionally, civil servants will equip themselves with a 
legitimising managerial qualification prior to making the transition. 
Functions 
Social prestige ("noblesse") is an important notion in French industry. On a 
sectoral scale, the noble domains are those with a high capital intensity in 
which the problems of manufacture are secondary to those of conception such 
as aviation, space, nuclear energy, telecommunications. 
The same attitude manifests itself at functional level where the perceived 
nobility of an activity, its interest and its variety often outweigh 
remuneration factors. Conception functions, which are cerebral rather than 
manual, have higher status than execution functions. But the level of 
differentiation goes further than that. Perhaps the most striking example is 
the technical domain with its ambivalent antecedents. On the one hand, there 
is the scientific tradition and the pure and disinterested quest for 
knowledge where mastery of the world is based on the power of the mind. And 
*- St Cyr - French equivalent of West Point or Sandhurst. 
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on the other hand, it is rooted in the world of labour, of work which makes 
man subservient to machines, which dirties the hands and wears out the body. 
The distinction between these two traditions even materialises with 
mechanical engineers developing hard, cal l oussed hands while electrical 
engineers develop fine fingers for dexterous work -a real th row back to 
peasants and aristocrats (La Revue Francai se de Gestion; Oct. 87; 45). 
The essential criterion in determining prestige seems to be the degree of 
immateriality of the task. In engineering, electronics has an element of 
abstraction and therefore purity and nobility, which places it above 
electrical engineering with its high currents, and way ahead of mechanical 
engineering which requi res brute force l The same goes for other functions. 
In the commercial function for instance, dealing with immaterial flows of 
funds is more prestigious than dealing with tangibles. As one student from 
the renowned business school INSEAD, put it to Jane Marceau: 
"It is nobler to sell money than socks" (1980; 113). 
The degree of immateriality also appears to be the foundation for the 
functional hierarchy. The more ethereal specialities like finance, marketing 
or the current vogue function, communications*, are deemed more uplifting 
than the utilitarian functions like purchasing or production. In fact th e 
greater the physical, as well as intellectual, distance from the shop floor, 
the higher the prestige of the function. The point is reinforced by 
Boltanski: 
"The highest positions are those in which one need not be aware 
of labour, labourers, or production but only of such abstractions 
as comodity and cash flows, high technology processes, and 
investments. " (249; Eng. trans. ). 
British readers might justifiably question whether France is any different 
from the UK in this respect - after all, the view of production as low 
status and finance as high status is by no means exclusive to France. This 
is true, but we may posit that different causes lie behind the same 
*- The communications function in France is responsible for internal and 
external corporate communications - functions discharged in Britain by PR 
and personnel departments. 
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reality. What is valorised in France is abstractness as a concomitant of 
intellectuality. Thus, finance has high standing because it is associated 
with maths and cleverness whilst production is a victim of its perceived 
lack of intellectual challenge. In Britain on the other hand, a similar 
pecking order has a very different basis. The pecking order is determined by 
traditional anti-industrialism. It follows that the the most prototypical 
industrial functions such as production, evoking the 'dark satanic mills, of 
the industrial North, are devalued. And at the other end of the spectrum, 
functions like finance, with their professional affiliations, are high 
presti ge. 
Unfortunately, in the French context, this rather neat intellectual 
stratification of f unctions has been upset by two recent trends. One is the 
ambiguous position of computing. Computing is not considered a particularly 
noble area, not least because experts in the field tend to be products of 
the university system (data processi ng is one of the very few areas along 
with, say, law and taxation in which recruiters might specifically seek out 
a university, as opposed to a grande ecol e graduate). On the other hand, the 
introduction of computing into departments like engineering design and 
operations management has rendered these more abstract and has helped to 
raise their status. 
The other influence is the action-orientated mood which has emerged in the 
last decade (see section on the new breed of managers in chapter on "Those 
who set the tone") and seeks to promote results, performance and ability in 
the field. This has raised the profile of functions like sales and 
production in which young graduates square up to practical problems and show 
concrete results. It has become fashionable among young pretenders to show 
that their Brande ecol e background has not impaired their pragmaticism. So, 
although a function like production is not the way to the top, a spell in 
production can be a useful career move. The only problem is when to break 
out of the production function in order to pursue one's ambitions. As one 
engineer explained in 1'Express: 
"Si vous restez a la fabrication trop longtemps, on vous enferme 
dans un ghetto. Aucune chance de fai re partie un jour de 116tat- 
major de l'entrepri se" (24/01/86; 26). 
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(If you stay too long in production, you get locked in to a ghetto 
and you can kiss goodbye to your chances of ever reaching the 
higher echelons of the company). 
Or as one production manager from the sample explained: 
'Quand on al es mains sales on al es poches vides". 
(Dirty hands go with empty pockets). 
This view of production as fai rl y low status is of course not excl usive to 
France -a similar case has been made in Britain. However, we may posit that 
different influences lie behind the same reality. In the UK, production is 
tarnished by the low status of industry. In France, production suffers from 
its lack of intellectual standing. This pattern seems to prevail throughout 
French organisations wi th a devaluation of functions not associated with 
cleverness or intellectualism. 
There are other functions which are best avoided if one hopes to make rapid 
progress. Until recently, these included the management of human resources 
(or personnel) as it was known, which came low on the list of priorities in 
a firm. This could be seen in the quality of recruits to the f uncti on (often 
ex-NCOs). The subsequent rise of this function is mirrored in the titular 
evolution of those in charge, starting with "chef du personnel", moving on 
to "responsabl e des relations soci ales" and latterly I'directeur des 
ressources humai nes". 
Purchasing, on the other hand, still appears to be the Cinderella function 
in French organisations. It is often left to non-qualified technicians and 
occasionally serves as a final resting place for 'old retainers' for "loyal 
and faithful service". The same used to be true of the training function, 
which benefits in France from obligatory expenditure (just over 1% of the 
payroll - see section on adult education in chapter on "Destiny"). As with 
personnel, there are signs of a realisation of the strategic value of these 
functions (particularly in the large' companies) but their heads remain 
rel atively underqual ified. 
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The best paid functions, according to Le Nouvel Economiste survey (29/05/87; 
83) are still finance and marketing. In the late 1960's marketing was 
considered the up-and-coming function. Today, communications has taken up 
that mantle and is regarded as a useful professional springboard since it 
offers a global perspective of the company and privileged relations with the 
PDG. 
Sales too is well-paid but lacks prestige because it is the domain 'par 
excellence? of the autodi dactes. Sales, in France, is one of the more 'open' 
functions in which personal qualities and performance outweigh educational 
references. The problem for those who choose this function is to switch to 
another function before they reach forty and lose the energy and ambition 
which sales demands. 
The main priority for anyone who goes into manufacturing (or, for grandes 
ecoles graduates, research*) is to look for complementary functions to try 
to gain a 'global' view of the company and help them make the transition to 
top management. This brings us on to the question of whether it is it best 
to stick to one function or to zig-zag - in other words, whether to be a 
specialist or a generalist. 
The foremost engineering schools like Polytechnique and Central e have always 
prided themselves on their breadth of teaching. Indeed, the training 
received at Polytechnique is so broad that its graduates generally go on to 
more specialised post-graduate "ecol es d'appl i cation" of which the most 
superior are the Ecole des Mines and the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees. Even 
in the face of increasing knowledge, the engineering schools have resolutely 
avoided focusing on particular specialties. As one head of personnel from 
the interview sample put it, "moi ns un di pl ome sert, plus il est recherche" 
(the less use the qualification, the greater its market value). 
And Weiss confirmed that notion in his description of 1'Ecole Centrale: 
"In the generality and comprehensiveness of his curriculum lay the 
basis of the Central e engineers' cl aim to industrial 
*- The paraty pi cal career path, according to Ben gui gui (1970) is: grande 
ecol e-R&D- general management. 
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aristocracy, the right to di rect large enterprises, the possession 
of qualities radically different from the 'skills in certain 
specialties' taught in the less exclusive schools. " (Weiss; 1982; 
255). 
To this day, the intricate grande ecol e hierarchy (as witnessed by starting 
salaries or job offers), still ranks the most general scientific schools 
ahead of their more specialised counterparts. The distinction even extends 
to the top commercial schools which pride themselves on their generalist 
ethos. Their curricula are geared to giving the students an overall 
appreciation of company matters, and the bias towards general management 
features prominently in their literature. They aim to produce polyvalent 
products capable of filling posts in any sector - leaders for every 
occasion. 
Cl early, the tradition of generalist engineers who oversaw France's early 
industrial expansion in the latter half of the nineteenth century still 
taints French corporate perceptions. The cadres interviewed were fairly 
unanimous in their belief that it is the ? generalists' who make it to the 
top. This means that at some point in their career, ambitious young cadres 
must make a break from the specialist niche which they occupy and 
demonstrate their skil 1sin other areas. Of course, not just anyone is 
deemed capable of switching functions at the drop of a hat. It requires the 
sort of adaptability instilled by the top schools. 
This raises an interesting point concerning the French perception of the 
universality of management. On the face of it.. the French notion that i is 
grandes ecol es produce a universal elite shares something with the American 
notion of managerial man, who can manage any industrial or commercial 
undertaking. Both approaches claim universality - however, on closer 
examination the foundations for managerial polyvalence differ radically. 
For the Americans, universality resides in the training. Conventional wisdom 
in the United States is that management is a discipline that can be taught 
and learned and has principles which are generally applicable. For the 
French, on-the other hand, it is the man who, by virtue of his intellectual 
quality, can adapt to any situation. Polyvalence stems from the person as an 
'intellectually-finished product', not the imparting of particular skills 
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and techniques. In some ways, the French manager is closer to a professional 
version of the Bri ti sh tradition of the 'gifted all-rounder' who can turn 
his hand to anything - but in France the raison d'etre is measured 
intellectual performance, and in Britain a diffuse notion of leadership. 
Overview 
From the preceding description of career influences, it is apparent that 
education is the li nch-pin. Without qualifications, horizons will be 
limited; but with them, other trump cards such as wide experience and 
healthy mobility, are easily accumulated. So, while companies maintain that 
a qualification counts for little after initial admission, it in fact 
provides an unassailable head-start which becomes self-perpetuating. The 
intention of this section, is to look at some of the consequences of such a 
sy stem. 
Grandes ecol es graduates are expected to be competent when joining a company 
and are often appointed directly to a positon of cadre. Ironically, this 
rather premature allocation of responsibilities can be just as demotivating 
for the lucky few as for those excluded. The former see little need to prove 
themselves since they are already guaranteed preferential career 
advancements; whilst the latter must resign themselves to an atrophied 
career. As Pierre Mannoni, himself an autodi dacte, put it: 
"Pendant encore des decennies, ce Moyen-Age scol ai re dans 1 equel 
nous vivonsva etouffer des personnal ites, des potential ites de 
fa4on irreversible. " (Challenges; avril 1987; 36). 
(We are sti 111 iv i ng in the educational Dark Ages. For how many 
more decades are we going to sit idly by while great talents and 
potential are permanently. stifled? ) 
A mul titude of candi dates are discouraged from applying for posts simply 
because they come from 'inappropriate' backgrounds. The discrimination 
becomes self-fulfilling, with autodi dactes not applying for jobs formally 
open to them but, de facto, reserved for grandes ecol es graduates. They 
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learn to tailor their expectations to organisational realities. As Bol tanski 
expl ai ned: 
"Self-taught cadres, especially those of middle- or lower class 
background, have almost no hope of obtaining positions of power, 
which are monopolised by graduates of the grandes ecol es and/or 
cadres of upper class background with inside contacts" (Bol tanski ; 
261; Eng. trans. ). 
This lack of career opportunities may also help to account for the 
longstanding malaise, often refered to in the press, among middle managers 
(see discussion in the final chapter). Deprived of career aspirations, one 
would expect this postulated lack of motivation (or damage to morale). 
What is more, not much has come from management 'catch-up' programmes which 
have been used to justify promotions rather than encourage managers to 
improve their skills with the incentive of promotion. Irrespective of the 
way companies try to sell management training, the general feeling is that 
access to the corridors of power is on a one-shot basis. If one misses the 
boat as an adolescent, the chances of recovery later are remote. Whilst it 
appears unfair, this practice is more or less accepted because the criteria 
used are unequivocal and known to all. The road to the top is well sign- 
posted which means that dispersal of talent through misinformation is 
minimised. 
On the upside of course, the notion of predetermined career paths probably 
limits unproductive political rivalry since only a few can have pretensions 
of power. What is the point of jockeying for position when the race is a 
foregone conclusion? It also renders promotion of autodidactes a 
particularly powerful signal. 
There are obvious social and political advantages to promoting autodi dactes 
in a country where they are generally kept down. For a start it advertises 
effort as the way up. Secondly, the risk involved is minimal since loyalty 
and conformity to company norms have been ensured by a lengthy process of 
socialisation and selection. 
The few autodidactes who rise through the ranks are unlikely to condemn the 
workings of a system from which they have emerged with more than they could 
have expected. Furthermore, they may have gained access to their position at 
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a high cost to their private lives - those who have more obstacles to 
overcome tend to overinvest in their new roles and positions. They are 
likely to be hyper-sensitive to withdrawal of the trappings of cadre status 
which they have worked hard to acquire - so dissent will not come from this 
quarter. 
This brings us onto another point. It could be posited that it is the very 
paucity of career opportunities for the vast majority of middle managers 
which causes the excessive attachment to status symbols and acquired rights. 
Bereft of real career aspirations, the cadre finds surrogate 'achievements' 
to motivate him. 
The attachment to status symbols is revealed by Boltanski in his description 
of the way companies coerce an individual into resigning. He suggests that 
this can be achieved simply by withdrawing some of the previously granted 
privileges but without touching the salary. For instance, not being invited 
to meetings or informed about events are exclusionary processes which soon 
become unbearable. Ostracism will render the cadre paranoid and his belief 
in his worth will be undermined to such an extent that he will either resign 
or end up making mistakes which justify the attempt to get rid of him. 
Boltanski quotes a cadre who outlines the procedure: 
"Theyll l transfer you from one department to another. Or they'll 
assign you work below your level. You're supposed to be an 
executive and they'll treat you 1i ke an errand boy. If the man's 
got a weak character, he'll resign. To hold on you've got to be 
tough. They don't invite you to meetings and conferences, they 
don't tell you what's going on, so you look like a jerk. " (264; 
Eng. trans. ). 
Instances of this kind would seem to point to an underlying flaw in the 
French management selection process which condemns the majority of the 
population to the ? scrap heap' before entering active life, whilst 
guaranteeing the 'lucky few' uninterrupted career progress. In fact, there 
is growing concern voiced about the psychological effects on French society 
of such a system. It leaves a. disillusioned and frustrated majority with the 
demotivating prospect of limited advancement, since the upward limits on 
promotion are basi cal ly determi ned by the di pl omas hel d at the start of a 
ca reer. 
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As one personnel di rector explained to the researcher, a more diversified 
management recruitment base seems desi rable on two grounds. Firstly., to 
recapture those talents which have somehow strayed from the "porte 
pri nci pal e"; and secondly, to introduce a little more rivalry into 
competition for the top posts. 
The dangers of the existing system which sets excessive store by 
qualifications were perhaps best exemplified by another personnel director 
from the sampl e of companies visi ted. He explained to the researcher that 
the number of cadres recruited last year fell almost evenly into three 
categories: those taken on by the personnel department, those poached from 
other companies by headhunters and those recruited "par relations" (on 
personal recommendation). Of the three categories, the highest turnover was 
among executives recruited by headhunters (75% of whom had already left); 
next came those recruited through recommendations (30% had left); finally 
came the managers recruited by the personnel department itself, of which 
none had left. 
Although there was undoubtedly an element of bragging about these 
revelations, the varying success rates underlined a very important fact: the 
best qualified people, who corresponded ideally to the headhunter's spec 
(based on academic qualifications), were not the best suited to the 
company's needs. In other words, educational credentials may not be the best 
means of testing managerial potential, or as the personnel manager put it: 
"On ne doit pas chercher l es mei ll eurs, mais l es mieux adaptes". 
(Our aim is not to find the very best, but the best suited). 
This chapter has attempted to show how, in France, pre-career education 
holds sway over subsequent training or achievements. Most large companies, 
officially or officiously, use educational credentials as a selection 
mechanism governing entry to different posts and vary the salaries offered 
to successful candidates accordingly - and, although other influences 
impinge on career progress, they are invariably tied to educational 
credentials. 
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The highly selective educational system earmarks high flyers for early 
responsibility and rapid promotion. This facilitates their learning process 
but leaves those excluded with the prospect of limited advancement. The 
grandes ecoles have therefore contributed to the academisation of management 
at the expense of a broader recruiting base. 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Comparative qualification requirements in job advertisements. 
JEUNE DIPLOME 
Grande ecole de gestion 
La Socibtd Franraise EXXON CHEMICAL qA E)(0 N empk)ie 1250 personnel et rgalse un CA de 5,5 
mifiards de F dort 50 %A rexpon bb *m et 
commercialise des produits chimiques de base at CH EMI CA LS des speciaiites petrochimiques. Be recherche pour 
son siege A la Defense un jsur oor öeuc do 
Wbon- 
Au sein de la Division Ctiirnie do specialites, il sera charge do la prbpa- 
ration et de ('analyse des r>suftats financiers et cammvrpaux st aesurwa h 
liaison dans ce domain aver EXXON CHEMICAL INTERNATIONAL A 
Bruxelles. II eflectuera aussi diverses etudes ßconomiques et statlsäqtm 
en collaboration aver ('administration des ventes. A terms, d pouts pour- 
suivre une carriere dans Is groupe en France ou ä retrarqw. 
Nous souhaitons rencontrer un dip4&n6 dune grande Ecolo do Gastion 
(HEC, ESSEC, ESCP, Dauphine) debutant, ayant do solides connais- 
0 
sances en informabque et mattrisant partaftement to Iangue angiaiss. 
Merci dadresser Iettre do candidahxe, C. V. co" et photo St r6rnu - 
ration act mAle sous refßrenoe M 11 /507 CY A: 
EGOR GESTPON ET FINANCE EGOR 
8, rue de Berri " 75008 PARIS 
PARIS BOBEAUX LYON WM STRAS801U W. V 
I 
BELGKXJE DEUTSCH A. ND ESPANA GREAT$RfTAIN hTAh A PORTUW MW CNML* 
Le Monde - 
8/3/88 
If you are a high calibre, commercially orientated 
graduate detennined to succeed in a highly competitive 
marketing environment, our client is offering the 
challenge to match your ambition. 
A subsidiary of a leading multi-national oil company, 
they have openings for a number of young and highly 
numerate graduates. Those appointed, initially to under- 
take a broad range of marketing-related roles, will be 
expected to possess the outstanding ability that is a 
pre-requisite of progress into key managerial positions. 
Your degree discipline will have a business or 
scientific bias and you will already have gained 2-3 
years' commercial experience. A high level of computer 
literacy is essential, as are well developed analytical 
and communication skills. 
The rewards begin with a salary of c. £15,000, 
together with excellent company benefits. The future? 
Your own drive and determination will set the pace 
and direction of your progress. 
If you believe you have the potential to meet the 
challenge of this demanding environment, please write 
with full career details, quoting reference 632/NJB/88, 
to: Nigel Bastow, Consultant, Austin Knight Selection, 
17 St. Helen's Place, London EC3A 6AS. Alternatively 
you can telephone for an application form on 
01437 9261 (01-256 6925 evenings/weekends). 
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Austin 
ýKnightý 
'Sunday Times Selection 
- 17/4/88 
EXHIBIT 4 
Comparative emphasis on remuneration in job advertisements. 
Responsable 
production 
Integree ä un groupe important et performant, cette societe 
(130 personnes - 80 millions de francs de chiffre d'affaires) est 
specialisee dans la fabrication en tres grande serie de petits com- 
posants mecaniques. Sa competence technique, ses innovations 
permanentes et ses nombreux brevets lui permettent de repon- 
dre d'une maniere tres adaptee aux exigences de ses marches et 
de jouir d'une excellente image de marque. Elle recherche le 
responsable de son unite de production. Sous l'autorite de la 
direction generale, il encadrera plusieurs ateliers regroupant 
une centaine de personnel et sera charge de toute la gestion et 
1'organisation de la production, des services connexes et de 
1'anunation des hommes. Ce poste s'adresse ä un candidat äge 
d'au moins 30 ans, ingenieur mecanicien diplöme d'une grande 
ecole (Arts & Metiers ou equivalence). Homme de terrain, il 
aura dejä reussi une premiere experience d'encadrement d'une 
unite de production et maitrisera bien les problemes lies aux 
grandes series. La remuneration proposee, fonction de 1'expe- 
rience ainsi que l'evolution ä l'interieur dugroupe, sont moti- 
vantes pour un candidat de valeur. Poste base en banlieue Ouest 
de Paris. Ecrire A B. COULANGE en precisant la reference 
A/2643UN. 
PA 
3, rue des Graviers - 92521 NEUILLY Cedex - Tel. 747.11.04 
Lille - Lyon - Nantes - Paris - Strasbourg - Toulouse 
U 
co 
L'Usine Nouvelle - 
28/2/88 
Production 
Executive 
North Midlands 
To £22,000 
Ln ---- V"'T, INK 
An autonomous member of a major 
multinational Group, this very successful 
company manufactures high quality 
products for industry on a continuous 
basis in a modern plant at a pleasant 
North Midlands location. 
A major expansion programme aimed 
at maintaining the company's position at 
the forefront of manufacturing technology 
is taking place and a talented Production 
Executive is required to lead and motivate 
a team of production supervisors. 
You will play a leading role in 
improving productivity and further 
enhancing the company's automated 
manufacturing processes. 
Aged 28/48, you will be a graduate in 
a Mechanical/Production/Materials Science 
discipline with comprehensive knowledge 
and experience of the latest Industrial 
Engineering and Manufacturing 
techniques-gained in a modern 
continuous process environment. Above 
all, you must possess drive, determination 
and total commitment to achieving targets 
and goals. If you can make an early 
impact, the job will provide a springboard 
to higher management. 
Please send a comprehensive C. V. to 
J. N. B., Link Management Selection, P. O. 
Box 7, Neston, South Wirral, L64 7UG. 
Sunday 
Times - 
17/4/88 
\ Hl 
.. " _THIBIT 5 
BOULNOIS Karine 
12 rue Edouard Lefebvre 
78000 Versailles 
tel : 953.96.96 
Nee le 21 mars 1965 a Soulac (33) 
7 
24 ans 
Celibataire 
Etudiante 
1983 Baccalaureat C- Versailles 
1985 : Admise a 1'Ecole superieure de commerce de Paris 
- Anglais : courant 
- Allemand : tonnes notions 
- Juillet 1985 - Monitrice d' enfants 
- Aoüt 1986 - traductrice a Thomson-CSF Cooperation. 
- Mai a septembre 1987 - Assistante Export chez L'Oreal. 
- Frequents sejours en Angleterre 
2 sej ours d'un mois en Allemagne 
- Presidente du Bureau des eleves (1986/87) 
- Pennis de oanduire B 
- Dans 1' immediat, assistante au service du personnel, 
pour evoluer, a moyen termer vers les responsabilites 
dans nette fonction. 
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EXHIBIT 6 
Alternative strategies for the 'pantoufleur'. 
/ 
La strategie du pantoufleur 
Vole Voie 
tranquille risquöe 
1234 
_= 5 
aller dans les aller dans des ('ideal 6 defaut 
chasses gardees territoires proteges chercher un patron aller dann une jeune socibt& 
EK, CEA, Suez, CGE, Saint-Gobain, d'environ 55 ans, ä forte crotssance, ou i n'y a 
Societe generate etc... Peugeot, Renauft, etc... sans daLpyn, dort 
r t &f 
pas er-Knre de grandsoorps 
et ou on eat enser ue la esp e on peu 
t E i ' 
p q p 
f it def tte tC tt er. iI her t deven re gase ma a au o a 
Vade-mecum vole ciammence ä Otre tres 
1 at 2: Faire attention A cue qu il n'y ait pas de concurrence inutile, c'estý-+re 
prise. 
s'assurer qu'if nya pas de card dun Age equivalent on pwe. 
3 et 4: user au mieux los contacts po ss+ vieis notes au cabrnet et dare I'adrT*isba6on. 
Le Monde Affaires - 19/3/88 
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7. THE NAIURE OF WORK RELATIONS 
"C'est stir qu'ä l'egard des rapports de travail 1 es Francai s sont 
pl utot consti pes. " Conversation with Pierre Sal bai ng, Vice- 
Presi dent, Conseil d'Admi ni strati on, L'Ai r Liquide. 
(There's no doubt that in terms of work relations, the French are 
pretty tense). 
Although much of this thesis is indirectly concerned with work relations in 
French companies, we felt it would be h el pf ul to devote a short chapter to 
restating and summarising some of the distinguishing features. 
The chapter takes its cue from the seminal work of Michel Crozier on work 
relations in a bureaucratic context. He identified a number of themes which 
characterised French organisational interaction, notably the isolation of 
the individual, the avoidance of face-to-face relationships, the 
compartmentalisation of the organisation, the struggle for privileges and 
the lack of constructive solidarity. The aim of this chapter is to put our 
view side by side with that of Crozier. 
ImDersonal 
An immediate impression of the ambiance of the traditional French office is 
that it is less chummy and relaxed than the equivalent in Britain. An 
obvious manifestation is the relative absence of joking around (ribbing, 
running jokes, sel f-deprecation), probably because humour exposes one's 
personality. Or again, 'slouching' (sitting on or putting one's feet up on 
desks) is uncommon. Interestingly, the only individual who actually provided 
evidence to the contrary was a trainee store manager at Carrefour, who 
happened to be an English ex-patriate and readily rested his feet on the 
nearest available surface. The theme of non-verbal expression is explored in 
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much detail by the American sociologist Lawrence Wylie who maintains that 
the French are far more upright in their posture and controlled in their 
movements than the Americans: 
"The French have a sense of vulnerability about their bodies that 
is greater than that of Americans who are less worried about their 
body boundaries. " (1981; 38) 
Social interaction in France makes a clear distinction between personal and 
professional relations. The role played in the office can easily be kept 
distinct from the person occupying the role through the use of a battery of 
props (explored in the chapter on rituals). At its extreme French cadres can 
exhibit astonishing awareness of their own 'split personality'. For 
instance, a production manager from the observational study who explained 
his actions to the researcher by saying, "qu'est-ce que vous voul ez, je sui s 
b6te et discipline - je fass ce qu'on me dit" (what do you expect? I'm well 
disciplined but unthinking -I do as I'm told). In this assertion the cadre 
was demonstrating an ability to pull away from, and judge, his professional 
actions. An even more striking example of this distinction between the 
individual and his function was provided by Lawrence Wylie who quotes 
Montaigne's approach: "Montaigne et le maire de Bordeaux sont deux" 
(Montaigne and the mayor of Bordeaux are separate) - which provided 
convenient justification for his leaving Bordeaux at the time of the plague 
(Santoni; 1981; 61). 
The notion of impersonality is developed by Desmond Graves who suggests that 
the French tend to regard authority as residing in the role not the person. 
According to Graves, it is by the power of his position that a French 
manager gets things done (what Chester Barnard termed structural authority). 
This is in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon view that authority is vested in the 
person (personal, charismatic or moral authority). The distinction between 
the two cul tures implies that a Frenchman will accept responsibility so long 
as it is attached to his röl e but will not actively seek responsibility, as 
a British manager might, for it adds nothing to his stature. As Graves puts 
it: 
"He is Ile responsa bl of - but not, as in our culture, 'the person 
responsible?. " (1973; 293). 
115 
The desire to keep function and personality separate has repercussions upon 
the nature of social contact. It is not possible to reconcile cordial 
relations and formal (as opposed to personal) authority. Consequently, 
office colleagues do not often try to meet each other socially, and there 
are few signs of fraternisation between staff of differing grades. This is 
corroborated by Renaud Sainsaulieu who states: 
"En ce q ui concerne l es relations i nterperso nnel l es d'am iti b, 
elles sont assez faibles et fragiles, en ce sens quelles ne 
debordent pas l es li mites des categories formelles des rangs et 
des statuts offs ci el s. " (1977; 245) 
(Interpersonal friendship ties are fai rl y weak insofar as they 
rarely transcend the formal boundaries of rank and status). 
It is noteworthy that even in the more homely environment of a firm "ä 
dimension humaine" (of human proportions), the boss still insisted his staff 
call him "Monsieur'. 
The low social openness finds spatial expression in the office layout where 
personal space seems to be a matter of some importance. Open-plan offices 
are scarce at cadre level and can cause quite a stir if they are imposed. 
Again the only exception encountered was an American subsidiary whose 
corporate culture is based on egalitarianism, an integral part of this being 
the total absence of personal offices. The French like to have a 'territory' 
to call their own - and the impregnability of the sanctuary tends to 
increase with organisational status. Three of the PDGs observed had 
soundproofed doors, great unwieldy things which were almost permanently 
closed and which simply encouraged people to seek access via the secretary's 
office. At lower levels glass partitions tended to be blocked out with 
posters and doors were generally closed - and one maintenance manager even 
had a spring-loaded door which shut automatically. Such clues tend to 
indicate low emphasis on dialogue, teamwork, confrontation of opinions as 
well as a negative view of conflict. 
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The pattern of interpersonal relations is formal. The French seem to adhere 
to a classical conception of management which favours work in isolation, 
punctuated by formal meetings. Such an approach restricts exchanges to a 
highly codified framework which precludes the need for personal involvement. 
This is in contrast, say, to the Ameri can approach, highlighted by Kotter 
(1982; 88) which is more interactive and unstructured. 
A number of cadres in the sample commented on their preference for getting 
things done through formal meetings. One PDG went as far as to say, "c'est 
1a seul e facson de fai re avancer 1 es choses" (it's the only way to accomplish 
anything). Meetings were seen as an opportunity to bring conflicts to a head 
("decl encher forage" - to start the storm) or to obtain firm commitments 
from individuals thanks to peer group pressure. Meetings also constitute an 
economy of effort in that they allow information to be given quickly and 
clearly - particularly messages which are not transmissible in an office or 
casually. 
There is therefore a case for suggesting that the French cadre is a meeting 
specialist, in much the same way as his Anglo-Saxon counterpart might be 
considered an adept troubl e- shooter. Certainly, meetings provide the cadre 
with a stage on which to display his oratory skills (see chapter on 
management ethos). The whole event is a sort of microcosm of organisational 
life where status can be enhanced by skilful advocacy and stylish expression 
or lost by poor eloquence. The agenda is known in advance as are the people 
attending and the procedings are formalised - this reduces uncertainty and 
provides a perfect occasion for furthering personal aims or doing down 
opponents. 
In some companies, there were oompl ai nts that the number of meetings was in 
fact becoming excessive - these companies were deemed to be suffering from 
19a reuni oni te" (meeting-itis). One PDG, whose American MBA gave him 
different terms of reference, posited that meetings were in fact status- 
lenders since they reduced access to the person in question. There were also 
hints that meetings were a means of self-justification - as one cadre 
explained, "ca meuble une journbe" (it fills up the day). In this respect, 
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meetings are comfortingly tangi bl e and make what one has done at the end of 
the day easy to recall. This view of meetings as showy rather than 
functional was put more forcefully by a cynical production manager who 
revealed, "parfois on parle pour le compte rendu" (sometimes we tal k in 
order to have something to record in the minutes). In such cases the 
importance of the meeting may lie elsewhere, for instance in terms of who 
has not been invited. 
Another si gn of the attachment to cl assi cal pri nci pl es can be seen in the 
continued distinction between thinkers and executors. Corroboration of the 
lingering influence of Taylorism is perhaps seen in the way the French have 
embraced quality circles and discussion groups - working groups outside the 
normal 'hierarchical channels'. The alleged intention of these new means of 
participation was to tap the resources of the entire personnel. 
Unfortunately, these groups have not provided the anticipated antidote- 
they have reinforced existing hierarchical relationships rather than opened 
up the way for wider involvement. Instead of using these informal work 
groups to designate their own spokesmen, many companies have imposed 
hierarchical heads - thus, underlining from the start a lack of faith in the 
personnel to elect sensible leaders and the fear that it would give rise to 
"une hierarchie parallele" which might undermine the so-called "hierarchie 
naturelle" (chosen by the 1 aws of nature? ). 
Furthermore, management still appears unconvinced by the capacity of those 
at the base to think for themselves. The entire management group at one 
company attended an expose on quality ci rcl es. The organiser started by 
detailing a handful of 'irrefutable' principles, along the lines "we can 
improve productivity if we increase worker commitment". When he reached the 
principle about each worker being an expert in his own work, the meeting hit 
a sticking point. A protracted discussion ensued about the validity of the 
statement, and the outcome was a redefinition which did away with the word 
'expert'. What is more, this could not be dismissed as a one-off case of 
linguistic 'nit picking'. It represented a serious lack of faith in worker 
aptitudes - something which was reiterated by the reaction to a subsequent 
statement: "Il existe des reserves d'i ntel li Bence i nempl oyees" (there are 
untapped intellectual seams). Once again, the cadres felt they could not let 
the proposition pass unchallenged and suggested that "intelligence" be 
replaced by "ressources". 
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Thanks in part to Taylor, the popular conception of an organisation is that 
of a human pyramid, rather than, say, a well-oiled machine, a market or a 
beehive. This layered view of the organisation can be seen in the nature of 
work contacts which are faithful reflectors of rank. For instance, one cadre 
explained to the researcher that, as a rul e, he woul d telephone a 
subordinate, but go and see a superior. Another manifestation of this desire 
to avoid contact with lesser mortals can be seen in the widespread use of 
secretaries to set up calls in other companies. In this way embarrassing 
rejections and lengthy explanations can be avoided. This practice is 
generally justified by the preciousness of the boss' time, though as one PDG 
rightly pointed out, no sooner has he resumed work than his secretary will 
interrupt him. What is more, the use of an intervening filter to save time 
begins to look dubious when one considers the following exchange between a 
cadre and secretary: 
"It's Mr. Smith on the 1 ine. " - "Not now, I'm busy. " - "He says 
its urgent - something to do with tomorrow's trip. " - "What does 
he want to know? " - "If Mr. Jones will be coming along too" - 
"Tell him no! ". 
The duplication of effort together with the possible mistinterpretation 
given the intervention of a third party makes the use of a secretarial 
barrier look less than necessary. But as one PDG from the sample explained: 
"C'est pour l es gens un peu peteux q ui veulent se faire annoncer. " 
(It's for people who are a bit full of themselves). 
This keen sense of hierarchy militates against the mixing of various strata. 
For instance, the decision by a senior cadre from the observation sample to 
take his son ski-ing on a works council holiday, was greeted with much 
surprise by colleagues and subordinates alike. Such trips are for the 
benefit of all personnel but hitherto no senior managers had ever ? deigned' 
to mix with subordinates on such an intimate exercise. 
Status consciousness was also visible at a company visited which refused to 
send senior and intermediary cadres on the same training courses. The logic 
behind that decision was that the benefits of training might be lost if the 
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participants felt inhibited by the presence of superiors or subordinates - 
particularly in view of the potential loss of face which accompanies the 
learning situation. 
In-house training can prove particularly disruptive with the trainers moving 
about between hierarchical levels and upsetting the established order. 
Computing is a notable example of an area which has thoroughly confused the 
neat 'intellectual/manual' boundary. Indeed, it has caused so much trouble 
that, as the head of a computing department explained to the researcher, it 
was the subject of rare consensus among the departments: 
"I1 s peuvent tous se mettre d'accord pour di re du mal de 
111 of ormatiq ue. 91 
(Slagging off computing is about the one thing they can all agree 
on). 
At a group level, status consciousness is made explicit by the collective 
designation of the management ensemble as 'Il a hierarchie". It is a term 
which is borrowed from the bureaucratically organised hierarchy of the 
church. An example of its usage in business is: 
"En France c'est l'appartenance äla hierarchie qui 1 egiti me 
1'autorite de l'agent de mattri se. Il commande parce qu'il a ete 
choi si par 1a di recti on ä cette fin, choi xq ui 1e di sti ngue et 
1161 of gne des ouvriers. " (Revue Internationale du Travail; Jan/Feb 
1985: 1-16) 
(In France a first line supervisor derives his authority by virtue 
of belonging to the management group. He gives the orders because 
he has been chosen to do so, a choice which sets him apart from 
the workers). 
Segregation could al so be seen in the existence at most companies of 
separate canteens for workers and management - and even where there was a 
single dining hall, it was not uncommon to see unofficial 'territories'. 
This 'intellectual apartheid' was sometimes cloaked in practical 
considerations - for instance, one company had a notice which designated one 
canteen for "people in civilian clothes", the aim being to avoid mixing 
overalls and suits. Yet, it transpired that production managers would change 
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out of their overalls whilst secretaries would eat with the workers. Perhaps 
more striking was the fact that in the cantines people would generally eat 
in small groups rather than fill up tables with spare seats - again with 
very obvious layering by rank. 
This awareness of hierarchy is reinforced by constant references to "la voie 
hierarchique" (the formal chain of command). Individuals were discouraged 
from by-passing intermediary levels when communicating since it undermined 
the authority of intermediary levels and in some cases robbed them of their 
raison d'etre (information passers). Confirmation that French managers 
actually adhere to formal channels of communication is provided by Desmond 
Graves. He noted that the actual contacts of the French manager were very 
much inli ne with what one would expect after examining the organi sation 
chart. This, incidentally, was in stark contrast to British managers who 
showed few qualms about breaching organisational protocol and whose 
"patterns of communication bore no relation to the 'official' organisation 
chart" (1973; 296). 
In France, circumventing is only permissible if the person who should have 
been informed does not hear - or else it constitutes a loss of face. This 
notion is confirmed by Boltanski (1987; 263 Eng. trans) who maintains that 
one of the prime means of ? encouraging' a cadre to resign is to deprive him 
of information. 
In effect, the hierarchy is as much supported from the base as it is 
maintained from the summit. Those on the bottom see emulation of those above 
as the only way up - so they mimick the attitudes of those at the top and 
unwittingly bolster the existing system. The notion of a professional 
pecking order permeates every stratum right down to the base. Even workers 
think in terms of more or less honourable professions. Skilled workers are 
referred to as "1'aristocratie ouvriere" (the manual aristocracy) in 
relation to unskilled workers. Thus, the workers are merely echoing the 
distinction higher up in the hierarchy between say, graduate engineers in 
the noble specialty of electronics and graduate engineers in the 'common' 
field of mechanics. 
Of course this stratification rests upon more than the historical 
distinction between what is 'noble' and what is not. Maurice drew particular 
attention to the qualification hierarchies and wage structure with the 
evocative "grilles de classification" (classification matrices) which pit 
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manual versus non manual, skilled versus unskilled, supervisory versus non- 
supervisory and line versus staff cadres (Maurice; 1986; 252). 
Segregation within French firms is not merely horizontal but also vertical. 
This is perhaps a collective manifestation of the way individuals seek a 
personal 'territory'. There were numerous allusions to "le cl of sonnement" 
(partitioning) at the firms visited. The clannish nature of interpersonal 
relations is partly due to the alumni of prestigious grandes 6coles who tend 
to congregate in particular companies. But the practice is not restricted to 
the elite. Indeed, Franpi s de Closets names taxi drivers, bakers and 
pharmacists as three of the prime offenders in the perpetuation of Inumerus 
cl aus us' (closed shops - 1982; 280). And Crozier supports this view when he 
says : 
"At all levels of society the French, once they gain entry into an 
i nf1 uenti al group, instinctively try to keep others out" (1982; 
26). 
The French propensity for forming cliques was mentioned spontaneously by a 
number of interviewees. They alluded to "llesprit de clan" (clannish 
mentality), 'Iles chasses guardeees" (preserves), 'Iles petites bastilles" 
(small fortresses), "l es q uerel1 es de chapel1 es" (warring factions), "l es 
castes" (casts), "l es fiefs"(feudal estates). The head of one small company 
in the survey explained how he was forced to continually reshuffle the 
personnel around the offices in order to break down cliques. 
The essential function of the above-mentioned cliques is to protect and 
empower their members. It was noticeable, for instance, that once a right 
had been gained by a group, there was no way it could be abolished - it 
became "un droit acquis" (an acquired right). Two examples from the sample 
involving bonus payments illustrate the point: 
One PDG was trying to find a new appal ati on for. a "prime de periode de 
pointe" (a bonus for rush jobs) since the title no longer corresponded to 
reality. Another head was tackling a si mil ar misnomer - "une prime 
qualitative" (a quality bonus) which had become institutionalised and had 
lost its exceptional nature. In both cases, suppressing the bonus was out of 
the question since it would be equated to a drop in salary. They had become 
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acq ui red rights, and the only option was to rename them in order to show 
awareness of the situation. 
So in spite of the much-vaunted egalitarianism associated with the French 
Revolution and the First French Republic, the French are deeply attached to 
the accumulation of privileges and distinctions which divide them. As Rene 
Remond put it: 
't'attachement ä 1'6gal ite et la course aux privileges" (Reynaud; 
1982; 37) 
(A passion for equality and a race for distinction). 
Functional differentiation too is strong, as reflected by interdepartmental 
relations. The following complaints are culled from observation and 
interviews: 
- "Le siege ne connatt pas nos probt times" (they don't understand our 
situation at head office). 
- 11-a filiale cache tout et fait n'importe quoi" (they put up a smokescreen 
and do what they like at our subsidiary). 
- "La production s'en fout" (production doesn't give a damn). 
- "Le personnel fait du social sans mesure" (the personnel department is 
obsessed with social considerations). 
- "Les ventes ne pensent qu'a fai re du volume" (the sales department only 
think about their sales figures). 
- "Le marketing cr6e ses produits sans 6couter l'avi s du terrain" (marketing 
doesn't pay a blind bit of noti ce to those in the field when it dreams up 
i is products). 
These i nformal compl ai nts are not all that di fferent from w hat Kei th Locky er 
identified in British industry. He established a sort of functional 'who 
hates whom' which mapped out interdepartmental friction in British 
companies. What is surprising then, is the apparent absence of corresponding 
French research into i nterf uncti onal conflict. The only real exception to 
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this is probably the well-documented division between production and 
maintenance which Crozier first depicted in his classic study of a cigarette 
company. More recently, Maurice produced similar findings when comparing 
France and Germany. He quotes a cadre who explains: 
"At informational meetings for all personnel you have to be very 
careful when you mention either maintenance or production, 
because you get the feeling that one false step can arouse two 
hostile armies. (1982; 264). 
From the present research too, there were signs that the conflicting 
interests of the two departments have not yet been resolved - and with the 
gradual takeover by production of routine maintenance the situation was 
sometimes aggravated - "chacun tire la couverture de son cote" (everyone's 
pulling the covers their side). 
At one particular production plant in our sample efforts were being made to 
integrate the two f unctions in order to ease authority problems. These 
problems stemmed from the fact that maintenance men were geographically 
isolated from their boss, and unaccountable to the production supervisors - 
which meant they did very much as they pleased. As one neutral cadre 
explained to the researcher, '9 e medecin se fait attendre" (everyone awaits 
the doctor). The production manager in that plant reiterated the point by 
refering to the maintenance department as "1'6tat dans 116tat" (a state 
within a state) - suggesting that little had changed since Crozier's classic 
study from the 1960s. 
Manifestations of political behaviour were less overt than in Britain and 
French managers did not seem to derive the same sort of pride in divulging 
their political manouverings as their British counterparts. However, there 
were signs that political games were being played. 
If we take written communications as an example, we can see that the coded 
nature of the interaction need not impair political thrust. To start with, 
opting for the written form, particularly in companies with a mainly oral 
culture, is in itself a powerful signal - it can be seen as "une agressi on" 
(an attack). One administrative di rector from the sample sent the purchasing 
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manager a memo expressing ns annoyance over some misdemeanour - this 
in spite of the close proximity of their offices and the fact that they saw 
each other regularly. The note was obviously motivated by the desi re to 
register displeasure without overt confrontation. The administrative 
di rector knew he had made his point ("marque 1e coup"), but by restricting 
the communication to the two parties (no other copies), the receiver knew 
there was no real malice. 
In terms of contents, it would seem that almost anything is a good enough 
pretext for a memo, even if it is not adapted to the nature or the value of 
the information. The researcher came across an interesting example at one of 
the large companies visited. The memo, which every single cadre had 
received, urged all personnel to cut down on the number of unnecessary 
photocopies (there's nothing like leading by example) - this in spite of 
the f act that the boss in question saw the enti re m ana gem ent staff each 
morning for a meeting. Here the aim had been "de l ai sser une trace" (to 
leave a trace) so that no-one could claim they had not been informed. In 
view of such excesses, it is hardly surprising that one cadre complained of 
"incontinence en mati ere scri ptural e". The resulting inflation of archives 
is tremendous because no one dares throw anything away - to wit, a manager 
who, on cleaning out his new office found four drawers - each one packed 
with the archives of one of his four predecessors, like prehistoric strata. 
Besides the contents, hidden messages can be transmitted in lanodi ne, form 
in the 1i st of recipients or date - details which the French manipulate with 
subtlety. One cadre explained to the researcher that in certain cases, the 
importance of a memo lies in its timing rather than its content. The author 
may be trying to prove speedy reactions to events or a recent development. 
As regards who the memo is dispatched to, there are a number of categories. 
Firstly, there are the immediate recipients ("desti natai res") who are meant 
to act upon the information. Secondly, there are those who are not intended 
to take action but simply need to be informed, covered ("une note- 
parapluie") or flattered. Finally, there are the unofficial recipients who 
receive an extra copy, sometimes termed a 'blind copy'. Whil st these 
categories appear fairly clear-cut, one cadre explained that it may well be 
that the key recipient is in fact camouflaged in the category headed 
"copies". Another important point about the list of reci pients is that it 
should reflect organisational status. Woebetide a cadre who places the PDG 
below a head of department, even his own, in the list of "copies". 
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Further evidence of political behaviour in communications were the rumours 
which seemed to preoccupy several bosses. There were several references to 
'l es bruits de coul of rs" (rumours) or "l e telephone arabe" (the grapevine). 
Indeed a survey in Le Nouvel Economiste (12/5/80) placed rumours ahead of 
one's immediate superior as a means of gaining information. 
The importance of this form of information in the French context may be a 
reflection of the rel ative inefficiency or rigidity of normal channels of 
communication. It is only natural for rumours to flourish when there is an 
imbalance between the supply and demand of information. The rumour in France 
perhaps has a democrati sing i nfl uence in an otherwise el i ti st system of 
communications - as one cadre put it, "crest le marche not r de 
l'information" (it's the information black market). The speed of propagation 
easily outstrips official channels and responds to dual needs of the 
personnel : to be informed early and to make out one is privy to linst del 
information. It is from these needs that rumours derive their efficiency - 
they are sucked up by avid receivers and immediately re-emitted, though not 
always intact. 
The managers interviewed were aware of the possibilities of deliberately 
starting rumours but they showed wariness about indulging in a practice over 
which they had no control and which could easily backfire. The head of one 
production plant was particularly annoyed that every piece of unofficial 
information released, however positive, was somehow twisted to sound 
negative by the time it reached grass roots level. He surmised that people 
heard what they wanted to hear, not what they were told - though he conceded 
that they (the cadres) did not always make things clear when they had 
something unpleasant to say. So any complaint that messages were not being 
received properly was partly "une autocri tiq ue". What is more, the speed 
with which the message spreads depends on its content - as one cadre 
explained it is one thing intimating there may be a pay rise; it is quite 
another trying to get safety procedures respected. 
The fact remains that beneath a formal exterior, French work relations make 
way for more supple practices - which probably serve to make the formal 
system workable and therefore contribute to its persitence. 
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Work versus social retaz on5 
One might be tempted to say that the above description shows a rel ati v el y 
low carry-over in France from the social to the business setting - with 
individuals maintaining a permanent facade at work. This assumes that the 
professional persona is something which is donned before going to work in 
the morning. That is not the case. The rel ative impersonality and formalism 
found in organisational relations is echoed in French social life. If one 
looks at the traditional pattern of interpersonal relations inculcated in 
the basic associative life of a village, one can see the roots of the work 
relations described above. 
The principle that indiscriminate friendship exposes one to manipulations, 
that property should be enclosed, that outsiders are not to be trusted, the 
defensive solidarity are all legacies of the village mentality which sti ll 
has a strong hold over French social relations. As Wylie points out, the 
basic social arrangement in France is the ci rcl e-a person is responsible 
only to people in his own 'cercl e' and indifferent to people outside it. 
French dislike for people outside their own 'cercl e' is epitomised by 
Sartre's phrase, "llenfer c'est l es autres" (Hell is other people - "Hui s 
cl os", scene V). 
Whilst it would be foolish to suggest that the above description is 
universal, it certainly prevails in French companies. French work relations 
are, on the whole, more highly structured and more detached. From a Anglo- 
Saxon stance this may appear like a tremendous indictment of the French 
organisational model. How ever, in the French mind this lesser investment of 
the self is consi dered a means of preserving personal choice, independence 
and individual dignity. 
It is noticeable in France, that those companies which do try to impose a 
more informal style of work relations are often un popul ar. There is a 
widespread belief that cordial relations merely serve as a means of 
motivating (and manipulating) cadres, of dismantling hierarchical and 
functional cleavages, and of encouraging a certain freedom of expression 
which facilitates decision making - in other words, as an instrument which 
cleverly subordinates the interests of the individual to the interests of 
the fi rm. 
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This resentment towards informality as a manipulative device may expl ai n 
the relative flop of Kenneth Blanchard's "One minute manager" in France. The 
transparency of his proposals was rather too much for French managers. 
Indeed, one cadre explained: "I would not take kindly to being patted on the 
shoul der - not in the professional context at least" - which rei nforces the 
idea put forward earlier in the chapter that the French do not like their 
body space violated. 
Clearly, in the French context, the desire to avoid conflict and to be 
protected from arbitrary decisions and manipulation are more important than 
the immediate gratification provided by social contact. The idea is 
supported by Wylie who studied a French village in the Vaucl u se. He 
describes a boy who wasn't bright, never got into trouble and worked very 
hard. Why? "Pour quIon me laisse tranquille" (so I'll be left in peace - 
Santoni ; 1981; 60). The desire for independence, even at the expense of not 
doing what you want, seems important in France. 
This chapter basically concurs with Crozier's view of French work relations 
as impersonal, formal, compartmentalised ... in short, predictable. There is 
certainly an undercurrent of informal circles which help to toil the wheels' 
but that influence is better concealed than itisinB ri tai n or America. 
Finally, it is posited that the dual rol es played by French managers do not 
reflect a split between social and professional circles - but rather a 
broader distinction between public and private life. 
This chapter helps to set the scene for the ensuing chapter on business 
rituals - the desire for ritual i sati on being a manifestation of the desire 
to preserve distance and independence. 
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8. RIIUAI. S IN FRaia BISS] ESS 
"L'informalite est un aspect du management a l'americaine qui n'a 
pas acheve la traversee de 1 'Atl anti q ue. " Conversation with 
Philippe Lori dan, PDG of Treifus-France S. A. 
(Informality is one aspect of the American managerial model which 
has not completed the Atlantic crossing). 
Any attempt to characters se French management woul d be i ncompl ete without an 
examination of the country's business rituals. For the researcher, they are 
reassuringly conspicuous, often physiological, manifestations of differences 
between cultures. They are concrete not abstract, and do not rely on value- 
laden interpretation but on simple observation. This adds to their intrigue; 
they go unquestioned by the initiated - only an outsider is likely to be 
struck by their existence or draw attention to them. Indeed, the inclination 
to dismiss business rituals as anodyne trivia (unworthy of serious study) is 
perhaps another motive for delving deeper. 
Closer examination suggests that these ceremonial singularities of French 
management in fact represent the visible part of the proverbial iceberg - 
and, as such, are inextricably linked to the submerged part which supports 
them. They are more than benign symptoms. They actually serve to reinforce 
many of the deeply-rooted traits of French management - and can only be 
interpreted in the light of wider issues such as hierarchy, networks and 
cliques, formality, respect of the individual and the role of women in 
organisations. In this respect, the investigation of rituals acts as a focus 
for some of the themes already discussed. 
Perhaps the most striking ritual for the business visitor to France is the 
shaking of hands on meeting and parting. This gesture, together with kissing 
as a form of greeting* are renowned as typically French customs. In the 
formal business setting the procedures regulating handshaking are fairly 
rigid and institutionalised. 
*- Occasionally kissing is seen in organisations - primarily between women, 
but sometimes mixed sex and more rarely involving 'cadres'. 
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Etiquette demands that the superior stretch out his hand first*, or if a 
woman is involved, that the initiative come from her (even if she is the 
junior party) since it might be construed as forward for the superior to 
offer his hand. If the individuals are of equal hierarchic status, the onus 
is on the entrant to approach the others and they are required to make some 
semblance of rising to greet or bid farewell. In practice, individuals only 
rise when confronted by a superior (or visitor) - colleagues are treated to 
a summary lean forward or nod of the head, and a token hand on the arm of 
the chair (as if to rise). 
According to Sanche de Gramont: 
"The hand should not be squeezed, brandished or slackly dropped; 
nor should the shake be too brief (discourteous) or prolonged 
(familiar). It must be straightforward and without brusqueness. " 
(1969; 295). 
Ostensibly a plain dichotomous (either performed or not) gesture, 
handshaking in fact offers managers considerable scope for passing on 
messages - whether reflecting moods or relationships. Consider the following 
examples all taken from the observational periods of study: 
-A maintenance manager offered his hand to one of his foremen. 
The latter responded by holding out his wrist, indicating that he 
had a dirty hand. The maintenance manager symbolically insisted on 
shaking his hand irrespectively. In doing so he earned respect and 
enhanced his image as a robust manager who, in spite of his 
'grande ecol e' education, was not too proud to dirty his hands 
alongside his subordinates. An interesting twist on the theme was 
witnessed at another factory where a disgruntled worker displayed 
a subtle lack of respect for his superior (and the visiting 
researcher) by stretching out a dirty hand, which the manager 
(having instigated the salutation) was committed to take. 
- After losing face in front of his boss because of a peer's 
criticism, a head of department marked his anger the following day 
by delaying his handshake with the "provocateur". The rules 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------* 
-A Idi recteurv refused to acknowledge a subordinate who had the affrontery 
to extend his hand un sol li ci ted -a cardinal sin. 
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governing salutation are so compelling that a minor transgression 
is highly significant; and by momentarily wi thol di ng 
acknowledgement upon entering the office, the offended party had 
clearly registered his displeasure - ostracism in France is not to 
be shaken by the hand. Boltanski quotes a graduate engineer who 
engaged in political activity embarrassing to the firm. His 
colleagues made their feelings known to him through exclusion: 
"After a while some guys refuse to shake your hand" (1982; 262 
English trans. ). All this seems to reflect a wider cultural need 
to acknowledge the existence of people around you -a mark of 
respect for their individuality. 
-A popular 'cadre' (executive) returning to see old colleagues 
following a promotion to another sector was greeted with an 
'augmented' handshake; in other words, a double-handed clasp which 
went beyond the expected formality of a simple handshake, thereby 
expressing closeness after a lengthy separation. 
-A production manager carried out systematic tours of the works 
three times a day with the ? sole? purpose of shaking hands with 
every foreman on each of the three shifts. He did not have to 
concoct some pretext for dropping in on them since "pour faire un 
tour de mains" (to shake their hands in turn) was reason enough. 
Needless to say, it also helped him to manage pro-actively since 
it both all owed him to "prendre 1a temperature" (test the water) 
and to pass on messages "entre quatre yeux" (man to man). 
Ina similar vein, Theodore Zeldin cites a teacher who complains, "In my 
lycee the headmaster shakes the hands of the "agreges' (highest qualified 
teachers), hol ds out two fingers to the "certifies" and merely nods 
distractedly to al 1 the other teachers" (1980; 386). Less ca ri catural 
versions of this "physiological segregation" were witnessed with people 
greeted more or less cordially depending on their rank. Favouritism based on 
intellectual accomplishments or longstanding association, was explicit in 
terms of the people a top manager would deign to acknowledge. 
Clearly, the handshake acts as a channel for expressing moods or reinforcing 
authority relationships which go far beyond the basic signal of lack of 
hostility - though it has retained this essential aspect of partnership or 
conciliation at the end of a tempestuous day. It also signifies respect for 
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colleagues and enables the superior to boost morale among workers who rarely 
get a chance to see him and set much store by "la poignee de main du chef" 
(the boss' handshake). It is a psychological stroke (literally) which has 
shades of Ken B1 anchard's "hand-on-the-shoulder" recommendation (1983; 41) - 
but even this gesture is not a viable substitute since it can seem 
patronising or out-of-place. In fact, managers in cultures where handshaking 
is not the norm have to resort to other, less tactile means (such as tone of 
voice) to convey the same messages. 
In this respect, French managers are blessed with what amounts to an 
uncontrived point of contact. Unlike their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, they do 
not have to engineer a convoluted excuse to see someone, or wait vigilantly 
to "catch them doing something right" (Blanchard; 1983; 41). The French 
manager can legitimately go and see a colleague simply "pour l ui donner le 
bonjour" (to bid him good day) - the handshake needs no ulterior 
justification. What is more, because it requires the participants to invade 
each other's personal space and look each other in the eyes, it provides an 
ideal opportunity to pass on confidential messages, and to pick up early- 
warning signals. One PDG from the sample looked upon it as a fairly accurate 
psychological barometer. He recalled an occasion when he had gone to 
introduce himself to the staff of a newly acquired company: on shaking hands 
with the personnel he had consciously noted two individuals who did not look 
him straight in the eye. He later learned that they had been the most 
vociferous opponents of the take-over. 
Used wisely, the handshake can prove an invaluable tool for pro-active 
management. The production manager is perhaps its foremost beneficiary in 
that he is able to glean information early, thereby allowing him to pre-empt 
future problems; and the benefits are not entirely one-way in that the 
manager is also making himself accessible to workers and can anticipate 
their needs before these lead to problems. 
Yet the handshake is also a channel for less Isal utory? messages. For 
instance, it reflects and perpetuates that distinctive feature of French 
management, the hierarchy. Touch is traditionally related to dominance, 
whether between sexes, generations or classes. Paradoxically, whilst 
handshaking reduces the physical distance between individuals, it reinforces 
the organisational di stance between them. The distinct set of rules which 
govern the salutation display, leave those involved in no doubt as to who is 
boss. It is a power gesture insofar as it is instigated by the superior and, 
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if carried to extremes, can be a faithful guide to the rank of the 
interlocutors. 
This phy si ol ogi cal manifestation of inequal ity is compounded 1 inguistically 
by the "tu/vous" distinction. The combination of these power signals leave 
the participants under no misapprehension as to which of them is the senior. 
Thus, French managers neatly sidestep the problem of asserting their 
authority. They are provided with the means of doing so without having to 
invest their personality - simply by displaying the trappings of authority. 
form 
-Qf address 
For all its egalitarian claims, even the French revolution had no lasting 
impact on formalism. The "vous" form of address was briefly abolished 
(along with Monsieur and Madame which were collectively replaced by the 
androgenous "Citoyen") but soon reinstated. This was inevitable - "vous" 
and "tu" are power pronouns that situate class status and reflect a society 
which accepts social inequality as natural ;a structured society by general 
Euro-American standards in which each individual has his appointed station 
and says "vous" to his superior. 
Of the countries which retain the formal/informal distinction, France is 
perhaps the most 'miserly' with its "tu" - in contrast say with Sweden where 
the polite form is virtually obsolete. Certainly in France, the "vous" form 
of address is "de rigueur" in business circles. Like the handshake it is 
subject to a number of rules - the basic one being that it is up to the 
superior to determine which form of address to use, since this defines the 
relationship. As with the handshake, the researcher has actually witnessed 
an instance of an 'irreverent' subordinate (who foolishly tried to instigate 
a more familiar relationship) receive a firm put-down with an emphatic 
'Wous" in the superior's response, to accentuate the social and hierarchical 
distance between them. 
A more subtle, but equally effective snub is attributed to Francoi s 
Mitterrand (reported in PExpress; 1/03/85; 33). On emerging from a 
particularly successful party congress, a fellow Socialist ventured, "On se 
tutoie? " (shall we drop the formalities? ), to which the President replied 
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distantly, "Si vous voulez" (if we must) - or, to put it another way, No! ". 
Mitterrand is in fact renowned for his aloofness and one of the claims to 
fame of FranCoi s Dalle (the PDG of 1 1Oreal) is that he is one of the very 
few people to use the familiar form of address with the President. 
Fortunately, most subordinates know their place and would no more dream "de 
tutoyer le chef" (of being familiar with the boss) than refuse to shake his 
extended hand. Many of the 'cadres' spoken to, confessed "J'ai du mal ä 
tutoyer" (familiarity does not come easily to me), notably with regard to 
older or more senior colleagues. The resilience of this norm can be gauged 
from the reaction of one secretary to the researcher's hypothetical 
suggestion that she employ the familiar form with her boss. She was adamant 
that even with his blessing, she could not "bring herself" to do so (as 
though mortified at the very thought). Her boss in fact corroborated this by 
admitting that he would not address her as "tu" for fear of undermining his 
power. He felt that familiar relationship would leave him vulnerable because 
'people' (impersonal) were prone to take advantage of it - and use it as a 
lever for favours. The French believe that friendship obliges, exposes the 
"friend" to manipulation, and makes him dependent -a fundamentally 
intolerable situation, if we are to accept Crozier's theories on the subject 
(see the chapter "Those who set the tone"). 
Basically, there is a profound apprehension that a relationship will 
degenerate if one reveals too much of oneself, so distance is artificially 
maintained using the polite form. Many 'cadres' made it a rule never to use 
the "tu" form. This was particularly so among the older 'cadres' for whom 
'tutoi ment' was tantamount to "sleeping together" - the allusion is not so 
far-fetched when one considers the revelation of one of the bosses 
interviewed, a 58 year of d, who admitted that he had never once addressed 
his parents as 'tu'. He added that 'vows' could, quite easily, be 
reconciled with f ri en ds. h ip but that familiarity made reprimand difficult. 
The use of the 'vous' form was primarily motivated by the future need to 
sanction or, worse still, make a subordinate redundant. Censure is regarded 
as far more "sanglant" (scathing) in the 'vous' form. 
Thus, to use the "tu" form one had to be fairly confident of not needing 
subsequent recourse to the 'voust form since back-peddling is out of the 
question. It is a one-way move, though there were rare exceptions: for 
instance, two cadres on familiar terms reverted back to the "vous" form when 
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one of them was promoted to be the other's boss - though in private they 
remained on "tu" terms. This use of "vous" as a face-saving device was also 
witnessed with a cadre during one of the interviews. We were interrupted by 
another 'cadre' who addressed his colleague as "vous". It later transpired 
that the two were on familiar terms but that the ? intruder' had refrained 
from showing this out of respect for his colleague in front of an unknown 
party. 
As a rule, people of the same generation or organisational /educational 
status are likely to use 'tu' more readily with one another. One cadre 
listed those colleagues with whom he was on familiar terms and mentioned one 
'kaue tout le monde tutoie" (that everyone calls by his first name). This at 
once implied a certain lack of authority (you do not say 'tu' to someone you 
respect) and a congenial disposition (or to someone you dislike). From his 
own experiences the 'cadre' recalled that the turning point had often been 
an event (long car journey, shared hotel room... ) whose relative intimacy 
rendered the 'vous' form absurd - this would prompt an anxious (for fear of 
rejection), "C'est bete quand meme... " (it's a bit silly after all) and a 
transi ti on to the familiar form. It is striking that the watershed for 
relaxing these formalities was frequently when those concerned were away 
from the rigid setting of the workplace. 
The widespread use of 'vous' means that any derogation of the practice is 
all the more significant. In other words, the 'tu' form of address derives 
its political power precisely from the fact that 'vous' is the norm in 
buss ness*, Thus, the accelerated, or in some cases obligatory, use of 'tu' 
is a powerful weapon in forming a clique and warding off unwelcome 
intruders. Mutual "tutoiment" effectively seals a clique in a highly 
'visible' way - and numerous old boys associations, as well as less formal 
networks employ this device to their advantage. 
France's top grandes ecol es (1'ENA, Polytechnique, HEC, Arts & Metiers... ) 
are particularly fond of the ruling that their alumni should address their 
cohorts as ttul. This, according to one cynic, in spite of the fact that 
they did not know one another at school and would probably have despised one 
*- To invert the old adage "It is the rule which reinforces the exception" 
- were it not for the widespread use of "vous", the familiar form would not 
have so much impact. 
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another heartily if they had*. "Le fait dfavoi r pose ses fessel sur les 
memes bancs" (the mere fact that they sat on the same seats) is regarded as 
reason enough for familiarity. 
It is said that ex-Polytechnique students must 11tutoi e" anyone who was up to 
seven years above or below them -a ruling presumably designed to spare the 
sensibilities of senior members. In other schools the exigency is less 
restrictive but equally binding, even at official functions. For instance, 
at one international conference attended by the researcher, the guest 
speaker, Yvon Gattaz, acknowledged the chairman's introduction with "Je to 
rem erci e... " (thanks a lot). Many of the forei gn guests were vi si bl y taken 
aback at this sudden injection of informality - little did they know that 
the two protagonists were both graduates of l 'Ecol e Central e. 
Directories lend weight to this peculiar form of exclusion rite by listing 
alumni according to occupation, company and position. Every self-respecting 
association publishes a directory, thereby reinforcing the popular image of 
old boy networks as "l es maf i as". The di rectory of the Ecol e des Arts et 
Metiers actually includes a book marker-cum-advertisement which addresses 
members informally: "As-tu pays to cots sati on? " (have you paid-up your 
subscription fees? ). The cl ubbi sh ness of this approach is replicated in a 
recruitment poster for the communist-based union, the Confederation Generale 
du Travail (CGT). The poster urges workers to renew their membership: 
'Qrends to carte CGT" (see Exhibit 7). 
All this reflects the exploitation of the familiar form of address as a 
utilitarian device rather than to denote friendship - but its 'misuse, is 
not confined to institutionalised solidarity. There are informal examples in 
most organisations of politically motivated cliques. 
These coalitions co nsti tute privileged arenas in which people al ready 
possessing social capital (connections) congregate in an attempt to make 
that capital fructify - by making useful contacts. On these occasions, the 
'tu/vous' distinction acts as 4t powerful barrier to entry . 
N--- --- -- - -- - ---- --------------- --- ----- -- ---- -- --~ ----------------------- 
*- This comment has a ring of truth about it insofar as French enducation 
in general, and the elite "grandes ecol es" in particular, are notorious for 
promoting individual effort (symbolised by the dreaded final year rankings) 
over joint effort - an approach not particularly conducive to developing 
friendship ties. 
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A typical example of "tutol ement politique" (political familiarity) was 
experienced by a PDG in the observation sample who was invited to a product 
launch by a company manufacturing a complementary product. He accepted the 
invitation as a useful opportunity to make a few new contacts but was 
disappointed to find that everyone knew (or pretended to know) everyone 
el se. He was made to feel awkward, an outcast, simply because "ca se 
tutoyait a tours de bras" (they were all 'in' with each other). The 
conspi rators had rendered the clique 'impregnable' simply by using the 'tu' 
form. Their familiarity with one another, whether genuine or (as he 
suspected) cosmetic, barred his entry. The familiar approach acts as an 
expression of group membership - and as such constitutes one of the pillars 
of French tribalism (this propensity for forming clans and "cl of sonnement" 
is discussed in the previous chapter on work relations). 
Having seen what it is like to be on the outside looking in, it may be 
interesting to quote a boss who happened to be plugged in with the people 
that mattered. He took great pride in explaining to the researcher: 
"Je suis personnellement ami a tu et ä toi avec tous les 
presi dents de 11 gue. Aucun de nos concurrents n'a ca. Aucun. I1 s 
viennent la en spectateur. " 
(I am on familiar terms with every single president in the 
confederation. There's not one of our competitors who can make 
that claim. Not one. They all attend as spectators). 
An interesting twist on the protective use of 'tu' was provided by the 
senior management at a car plant from the sample. The personnel manager, who 
was part of a so-called "organi gramme en Tateau" (i e. where all heads of 
department are on the same level )j, was de facto the boss' right hand man. 
Now this was probably fully justified in so far as his detachment from 
operational problems made him a valuable advisor. However, it was 
reinforced by a psychological barrier which set him apart from his 'peers' - 
he shrewdly insisted on remaining on formal terms (like the boss) with his 
colleagues (who all -addressed one another as 'tu'), thereby asserting his 
'authority' over them and keeping potential usurpers at bay. 
Another amusing variation on the political use of 'vous' was revealed to the 
researcher by a young cadre who envisaged rapid promotion and took the 
precaution of addressing everyone as "vous". This was a conscious decision 
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based on the reasoning that subsequent promotion might prove embarrassing 
for people with whom he had previously been on familiar terms. The 
anticipated promotion materialised and the transition was smooth, thus 
confirming this useful tip for potential high flyers. As already mentioned, 
a rather less elegant solution to the same problem resulted from the 
promotion of one cadre as boss of his previous colleague. In order to avoid 
embarrassement to the senior cadre, they conspired to revert to the formal 
"vous" - in public at least. 
Further nuances in relationships are revealed by the way in which people are 
addressed - such as the title used. The French seem very keen on formality: 
the referee is "Monsieur l'Arbitre", just as the policeman is "Monsieur 
l'Agent" and any ex-chairman expects to be addressed till his death as 
"Monsieur le President". Even graduate engineers will be referred to in jest 
as "Monsieur l'i ngenieur". Older people especially like being called by 
their ti tl es both in 1 etters and speech. This may be a si gn (as suggested by 
a cadre with twenty years experience in America) that, 'bn se prend trop au 
serieux" (we take ourselves too seriously). Others regard this deference, 
not so much as a sign of acceptance of the hierarchy, as a mark of respect 
for individual dignity. Whatever the motivation behind it, formality seems 
to result in a bolstering of the traditional hierarchy. 
French managers certainly appear socially reserved by Angl o-Sa»n standards 
- especially in comparison to their American counterparts who value 
informality and at least the appearance of equality in human relations and 
are quick to seize upon Christian names. This difference in approach was 
quite striking when companies visited received incoming 'phonecalls from 
abroad. The direct manner of Americans in particular, often jars in France. 
On a number of occasions the caller provoked a stir at the reception by 
asking for "Philippe" or "Pascal"*. Some French cadres have taken this as a 
cue to modify their own communications with other countries - by making the 
awesome concession of including their first names when signing letters. 
*- This may be a learning point for foreign callers who, in their myopic 
attempt to play down status distinctions such as titles by eliminating 
"unnecessary" formalities, succeed only in making themselves comfortable, 
whilst thei r French colleagues become uneasy or even annoyed. 
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In France, close relations between cadres are indicated by use of the 
surname - without "Monsieur". The secondary importance of the forename can 
be seen on envelopes where addresses bear the surname followed by the 
initial (or name), rather than vi ce versa -a habit which is ingrained at 
school and perpetuated by the administration. The relative redundancy of 
the first name was emphasised by the difficulties faced by secretaries when 
attempting to fill out forms requiring the forename. On more than one 
occasion colleagues of the cadre in question were unable to help the 
secretary. This French preference was made explicit by one cadre who was 
unable to respond to an American request for full names (to fill out hotel 
reservations) and could only offer a sheepish, "in France people do not call 
themselves by their first name "*1. 
As with the predominance of the 'vous' mode, the almost exclusive use of 
surnames loads the use of forenames with significance - they can even become 
prized rewards if used sparingly. According to one cadre, his PDG called 
only five or six people by thei rfi rst names*2 - they did not reci procate, 
but it was nonetheless considered "une marque d'estime extraordinai re" (a 
real honour). One of the priviledged few was Pierre who was more important 
in the company when the current PDG had started out 22 years ago; in this 
case it was a mark of affection for a senior employee. 
A fascinating reversal of this trait is practised by workers who prefix the 
PDG's first name with "Monsieur". This is particularly the case in 
traditional family firms which harbour several family members bearing the 
same surname, such as Michelin where the current patron is endearingly 
known as "Monsieur Franooi s". Whilst this signifies a certain closeness, it 
also smacks of paternalism. 
The qualifying prefix "Monsieur" is reserved for superiors or visitors and 
is generally abandoned with colleagues and subordinates. However, it will 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*1 - The fact that formality is the rule may be inferred from the surprised 
reaction of an experienced cadre on entering a new company: "I was kind of 
surprised, because in business you don't see people clapping each other on 
the back very often and calling each other by thei rfi rst names, at 1 east 
not for long" (Boltanski; 1982; 301 English trans. ). 
*2 - This does not imply he also use d the Itu t form with them - vous and the 
first name are perfectly com pati bl e - they denote affinity wh il st preserving 
distance. The permutations are numerous. 
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be used if the superior seeks to emphasi se a point (usually negative). For 
instance, "J'ai quelque chose a vous di re, Monsieur Dupont" (which is 
reminiscent of the way a mother might signal disapproval by calling out her 
child's full name). It can also be used to indicate role reversal as 
demonstrated by a PDG who had to reprimand aj uni or cadre. On their next 
encounter the PDG made a point of showing there were 'no hard feelings' by 
mimicking subservience, "Tres bi en Monsieur, je m'en occupe" (very good Sir, 
I'll take care of it). The essence of this joke-cum-reconciliation lay in 
the inversion of the formality expected in hierarchical relations. 
Another nuance in the art of interpersonal one-upmanship is provided by the 
use of the whole name and the omission of Monsieur. Strictly speaking, th is 
is a breach of business protocol but it can provide a significant 
psychological edge. For instance, a request to speak to Jean Dupont has a 
touch of Anglo-Saxon irreverence about it - implying that the person asked 
for does not impress the inquirer. 
The French organisational context provides its players with the means to 
assert their authority without having to reveal their personalities. Th ey 
have at their disposal numerous phy si of ogi cal and linguistic signals which 
provide a ready-made delineation of authority. Their British counterparts 
are bereft of such messages and have to project authority in their tone of 
voice or attitude - both of which are more open to misinterpretation. 
This finding also seems to fit in with Theodore Wei nshal l's theory (1977; 
248) that French managers see authority vested in the role as opposed to 
British managers who see it vested in the person. In France then, authority 
requires a lesser investment of the 'sel f' - the handshake, the title and 
the form of address are stage props which help maintain authority whilst 
simultaneously protecting the real individual. In short, business etiquette 
equips the cadre with the weaponary to assert his authority, whether or not 
he has the personal attributes to back it up. This perhaps corroborates 
Crozier's belief that the French are uncomfortable in face-to-face 
relationships since they have organised rituals to cover the anxiety. 
It would seem that the French have concocted a system of authority relations 
which minimises the personality element - and makes it possible for those 
without experience to exercise authority. To distort the motto of Winchester 
school (coi ned nearly six centuries ago), in France, "manners makyth the 
manager". 
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On presenting an English secretary with a draft copy of a letter to be typed 
up in French, she gave it a cursory glance and immediately remarked on the 
apparent absence of a closing salutation. I had to point out to her that 
the whole of the last paragraph, beseeching the receiver to accept the 
assurance of my most distinguished sentiments, was the French equivalent of 
"Yours faithful ly". 
Furthermore, there are infinite possi bil iti es for signing out depending on 
the impression one seeks to make on the receiver. For instance, a senior 
civil servant will send a lowly colleague, ''l'expression de ma consideration 
distingu6e"; an equal his, "haute consideration" and a high ranking superior 
his, "tres haute consideration". In the business world, the formalities are 
not quite so strictly defined, but similar rules operate. The sender can 
bestow anything ranging from the basic "vive consideration" to the more 
lavish "sentiments respectueux" or even "entier devouement", depending upon 
the perceived relationship with the receiver. The permutations are full of 
nuance and secretaries generally need an etiquette guide at hand to avoid a 
regretable "faux pas" - in other words, to ensure that the signing out 
phrase conveys sufficient deference given the relative status of sender and 
recipient. What is more, the courtesy and status-consciousness bear up even 
under the utmost pressure of deteriorating relations. This can can lead to a 
signing out phrase which is in striking contrast to the tone of the letter 
(see Exhibit 8). 
Another feature of French business correspondence is its impersonal nature. 
Letters open rather stiffly with "Monsieur" (even if the recipient is known 
to be a woman) or "Monsieur 1e... (p1 us a ti tl e)", and end with th e 
stylised formality mentioned above - there is no presumption of 
acquaintanceship. By convention, even the content is disconcertingly cold 
from an Anglo-Saxon standpoint. The aim seems to be to preserve anonimity. 
There is no sign of the familiar approach which characterises Anglo-Saxon 
correspondence. Even if the individuals parted on the warmest of personal 
terms, the follow-up correspondence is unlikely to make reference to that 
cordial meeting. In fact, the only discernible evidence of individuality is 
the written style of the letter. The letter is an opportunity to parade 
one's education and impress both secretary and recipient(s), by one's 
"tournure" (expression). 
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The French clearly indulge in what, by Anglo-Saxon standards, is excessive 
formality. French business correspondence seems to prize inordinately 
complex set phrases such as those quoted by Zeldin (1980; 352), "J'ai 
11honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir" (=please) or "I1 ne saurait etre 
question d'apporter a cette demande une suite favorable" (=no). These 
"formules" do not add to the core message and if anything, actually serve to 
conceal it. Thus, for example, on one occasion in my own correspondence 
with a French firm I was led to expect a favourable response until, upon 
reaching the tw el th line of the letter (see Exhibit 9).. it was finally 
stated that I would not be allowed to visit that company. 
It would seem that the French someti mes indulge in vol untary long- 
windedness. One cadre admitted as much by saying "on prend pl ai si ra tourner 
autour du pot" (we relish beating about the bush). Certai nly, they do not 
always seem anxious to get to the heart of the matter. This would seem to 
bear out the traditional portrayal of the French as a people overly 
concerned with style; sometimes attaching more importance to means than 
ends, to form than content. It would appear that the American managerial 
values of practical utility, efficiency and performance have not been fully 
integrated into the French managerial model. 
Yet this lack of directness is also an indication of French humanitarianism. 
Their el egant meanderi ngs di spl ay respect for the i ndi vi dual and a desi re to 
avoid inflicting unnecessary loss of face. The coded nature of French 
business correspondence gives it a sense of abstraction - which renders the 
most virulent attack, impersonal. Similarly, a request which is turned down 
is made far more palatable if the sender takes the trouble to compose a 
courteous and personalised refusal - the brusqueness of the negative message 
is attenuated by a veneer of grace and humility which provides both sender 
and recipient with a certain psychological refuge. 
This preoccupation with form has additional implications. Most importantly, 
it serves to uphold the distinction between those who know the rules and 
those who do not. Since the former are generally the products of higher 
education it helps to reinforce educational elitism in business. 
Admittedly, awareness of written protocol is only one barrier among others; 
but it supports the claim of the educated to hold high positions in 
organisations. Simultaneously, sel f-taught individuals are discouraged in 
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their bids to infiltrate this graduate preserve simply because they are not 
"au fait" with the written niceties of business etiquette. Emphasis on the 
need for correct written expression in business communication mirrors and 
lends weight to the French conviction that educational credentials are the 
proper means for determining managerial eligibility. 
The power of written expression as a means of weeding out ? undesirables' was 
suggested by the decision of an "autodi dacte" (self-taught) PDG to install 
telex machines throughout the group - on the basis that such a system would 
help to cut through the verbosity which impeded intra-group communications. 
A different interpretation of this decision was provided by a less than 
charitable graduate cadre. He confidentially suggested to the researcher 
that it was in fact motivated by the PDG's desire to conceal his inability 
to compose a good business letter. 
Further evidence of the importance of educational qualifications for 
business legitimacy can be found in the business card. These bear the name 
of the "grande ecole" attended (notoriety permitting) and are therefore 
vital in establishing the status relationships, since there is widespread 
concensus on the implicit pecking order of schools. Thus, the ritual 
exchange of business cards enables each party to know which role to play and 
leaves them in no doubt as to who has the upper hand. 
Meals 
According to the Financial Times (21/5/86; 20), in Fi nl and, the focal point 
of informal business discussion is the sauna. Its French equivalent is the 
restaurant. The two have a great deal in common. Bot h are ambivalent 
public/private places. Both serve to diminish hostility whilst fostering 
intimacy by increased physical proximity. Moreover, inhibitions are 
lowered; in the one case by absence of clothes and in the other by the 
consumption of alcohol. 
_, 
The importance of business lunches as an arena for extended business 
discussion was emphasi sed by a free gui de (resembling a travel brochure) 
received unsolicited by a commercial director in the observational sample. 
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This brochure listed all the hotels and restaurants available for seminars 
and "repas d'aff ai res" both in France and in France's more exotic overseas 
territories. Confirmation of the French expectations regarding hospitality 
can be seen in the way British managers shudder at the costs of entertaining 
in France. 
Eating is a convivial affair; the French enjoy talking about food in much 
the same way as the British find diversion in the weather - these are topics 
which unify a nation. People with nothing else in common can quite happily 
rhapsodise about what has been eaten, what is being eaten and what will be 
eaten. And this preoccupation with food has infiltrated the organisational 
setting, so that business expressions are replete with gastronomic 
references. 
Every business language borrows food imagery to some extent; most have some 
sort of equivalent of ? bringing home the bacon' (gagner son pain/defendre 
son bi f tec k). But what is distinctive about French managers is the degree 
to which they plunder the gastronomic world for imagery. They do not 
confine themselves to set phrases but invent their own variations and 
frequently have spontaneous recourse to food vocabulary in their 
expressions. Take for instance, the PDG who contemplates introducing merit- 
based salaries with the justification, "I1 y aurait davantage de biscuits 
pour ceux qui les meritent" (there'll be more cookies for those who deserve 
them) - this is by no means a set expression, but he uses "biscuits"* as a 
variation on the recognised association between confectionery ("le gateau, 
le nougat, la taxte, le mi el ") and rewards ("just deserts"). 
Some of the better known expressions include: 
- The top brass are "l es grosses legumes" (big vegetables) or "le 
gratin" (cheese topping) and a sinecure is "un bon fromage" (a 
mature cheese). 
-A contract which clears a healthy profit "fait des choux gras" 
(yields large cabbages) and one which sustains losses "bouffe de 
l'argent" (gobbles up money). 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*- The euphemistic allusion to biscuits is indicative of the lingering 
reticence to talk of money per se. 
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- Likewise, a cadre involved in negotiations rounded off his sales 
pitch with the asi de, "J'ai vendu ma soupe" (I've sold my soup) - 
it only remai ned to see if they were interested, "si la mayonnaise 
prend" (if the mayonnaise was setting). 
- On the other hand a favourable situation which deteriorates is 
said to "tourney au vi nai grell (turning sour) or "se gäter" (going 
off). Or, if negotiations appear to be leading nowhere (paying 
'homage' to German cuisine), "ca patine dans la choucroute" (we're 
pedalling in sauerkraut) - possibly a sign thata compromise is 
needed and that the time has come to "mettre de 1 'eau dans son 
vin" (di1 ute one's wine). 
- Finally, an interesting example of linguistic imagery 
'materialising' was provided by a group of cadres celebrating the 
early retirement of a colleague. Among the departure gifts they 
included a squeezed out lemon mounted on a stand -a visual joke 
evoking the popular reference to a 'washed out' cadre as "un 
citron presse" (a squeezed lemon). 
This 'appetite' for gastronomic expressions is a mark of the central role of 
food in business negotiations - so synonymous are they, that it becomes 
almost inconceivable to talk business outside the meal times. As one sales 
di rector explained to the researcher: 
"I1 arrive q u'un rendez-vous soi t remis de pl usi eurs sem ai nes 
faute dlavoi r pu trouver un dejeuner de 1i bre avant. " 
(It is not unknown for a meeting to be postponed for several weeks 
simply because of a failure to find a free 1 unch hour). 
In France, "l a tabl e" is regarded as the best means of promoting heal thy 
relations since it has a number of obvious advantages over the more formal 
organisational setting. For a start, business can be conducted graciously, 
at a1 eisurely pace, and dil uted with social conversation to ensure both 
parties are at ease - and by getting away from operational pressures one be 
more attentive. After all, it is not easy to conduct a discussion in an 
office where one's attention can be distracted by the sight of some 
unanswered telex; or else one can be interrupted by a secretary needing an 
urgent signature; and however much one insists on no disturbances, some 
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calls or individuals invariably find their way through. Even without these 
unforeseen interruptions, the background bustle of organi sational life can 
prove unconducive to negotiation. So the prime advantage of eating out is 
peace and tranquility it affords. 
By distancing themselves from the immediate pressures of work the 
protagonists are able to think more clearly. Managers who may have some 
inhibitions about negotiating in front of their peers (even behind sound- 
proof glass), will find it easier to adopt a bol der persona outside the 
confines of the organisation. Self-presentation is easier and anxiety is 
lowered by eating. The atmosphere which reigns in a restaurant is more 
propitious to reflection and creativity. 
What is more, moving away from the organisational setting means leaving 
behind all the files relating to the case - without his 'heavy artillery' to 
fall back on, the manager requires a perfect understanding of the case. This 
means that preparation will have to be better resulting in better informed 
and more coherent argumentation. 
As mentioned earlier, the physical proximity in the restaurant facilitates 
psychological proximity. In a restaurant the two parties shift from a desk- 
width apart to within touching distance - in other words, from a work 
relationship to a social relationship. This facilitates communication, both 
psychologically and physically. The actors can see and hear each other 
perfectly and non-verbal communication is less 'showy' and stylised. 
The restaurant can also be used to achieve an early psychological edge. The 
host cadre can give an inflated impression of his organisational standing by 
choosing a restaurant noted for its fine cuisine (rather than its d6cor, in 
France). This impression of status can be reinforced by a cordial greeting 
from the proprietor and by the means of payment (the more discreet, the 
better - the epitome being to leave casually immediately on finishing thus 
indicating an open table). All these signals suggest that the cadre is a 
'regular' and enhance his social and organisational kudos. 
Since business lunches are so important, "le savoi r manger" (knowing how and 
what to eat) is deemed an indispensable string to the manager's bow. This 
implies an awareness of etiquette; a French meal should be composed of well- 
delineated parts and ingested with well defined liquids at specific points. 
The host is expected to determine the structure and contents of the meal - 
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and this influence over meal format can be used in such a way as to spring 
surprises on his unsuspecting guest. The host is able to induce drowsiness 
and sap the adversary's intellectual facul ties, leaving him open to attack. 
The mere reaction to the "plate arrival" gives some measure of the level of 
vulnerability. The attention becomes rivetted on the dish; even if emerged 
in deep conversation everything becomes secondary as the dish is sighted 
(reminiscent of a cat sighting a mouse). To avoid dropping one's guard at 
this point requires considerable willpower. 
Of course "l e savoi r manger" also demands a capacity to cope with alcohol 
and to stave off its debilitating effects. This was supported by a 
commercial director; he confessed to occasionally resorting to consuming a 
tin of sardines prior to important negotiations in order to delay the 
absorption of alcohol. French managers are not averse to using their 
international reputation as "bons vivants" as a means of 'softening up? 
their adversaries - particularly when dealing with foreign visitors. 
Interestingly, it is not only the after-effects of the meal which facilitate 
acquiescence - the very prospect of a meal can provoke a similar reaction. 
One store manager from the sample used hunger as a device to curtail 
protracted meeti ngs. Being rather partial to "1 es petits dej euners ä 
l'angl ai se" (English as opposed to continental-style breakfasts), he would 
timetable awkward meti ngs for late morning and would programme particularly 
contentious issues at the end of the agenda. By the time it came to 
discussing them, the i nterested parties could rarely muster much support 
from peckish colleagues. Having thus gained the upper hand, the polemic 
issue of working on a Bank holiday was passed relatively unhindered. He was 
i nadvertantly putting into practice Masi ow's hierarchy of needs whereby 
satisfaction of low order (physiological) needs takes priority over more 
ethereal needs. 
A lavish "repas d'af fai res" (business meal) will last anything up to two or 
three hours and al though 1 unch hours are supposedly shortening, getting in 
touch with French managers between 12h00 and 14h30 is still problematic. In 
fact, the French are conditioned into taking a long lunch hour from school 
days when a two hour break means that they stay relatively late in the 
afternoon to compensate. (A trend which carries over into adulthood and 
will be examined in the following section). 
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Business 1 unches are oaaea with soci al and pol iti cal si gni f icance. For 
instance, lunching with the boss is regarded as a real priviledge. It was 
regularly used as a bone to toss to meritorious subordinates for whom 
alternative forms of recompense (namely financial or promotional) were 
inappropriate or unavailable. This reward drew its value from the prestige 
of being seen with the boss. One cadre went as far as to suggest that the 
length of the meal was critical since competing cadres would compare the 
time accorded to one another. Although such claims may be exaggerated, they 
do suggest a sycophantic mentality. 
The superior whose attention is so sought after must be cautious in 
distributing his favours. Accessability must be limited in such a way as to 
give subordinates the impression of being priviledged to be in attendance. 
Used sparingly, private lunches can be a powerful means of inclusion in, and 
exclusion from social groups. Food in fact plays an essential role in 
constituting unofficial networks since people are particularly touchy about 
who sits near them outside the functional requirements of the office 
environment. Of course, the issue of access would not be considered so 
critical if it were more avail able - but in France the right of access to 
people or information is not a basic democratic principle. Having access is 
equated with power. 
Pol iti cal guests may al so be invited to meal s; perhaps in order to pl acate a 
disgruntled subordinate; or in order to "butter up" external parties like 
clients, suppliers, works' inspectors, or representatives from the 
employment agency and the town hall. They will be flattered by the time 
accorded to them and the charade of listening to their preoccupations. 
Dining with someone is also a mark of respect for that person. As one cadre 
explained to the researcher: 
"C'est une facon de reconnattre 1 timportance soci al e de votre 
interlocuteur. Un moyen de partager quelque chose qui soft au- 
del a de la conversation et de la cigarette. " 
(It's a means of acknowledging someone's social standing, of 
sharing something more than a talk and a cigarette). 
In this respect, it can help to cement an association. Just as a handshake 
facilitates informal comments 'centre quatre yeux", so the table reduces the 
physical distance between participants and enhances persuasive power. 
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Perhaps the most significant social implication of this obsession with food 
is the way it discriminates against women. They are pl aced at a relative 
disadvantage on two counts: firstly, long drawn out meals at lunchtime are 
fine provided one is free to compensate for the loss of time in the evening; 
secondly, in the organisational context (as outside), it is far less 
acceptable for a woman to be overweight than for a man. It is harder for a 
woman to set the pace at lunch time -a female executive is expected to be 
slim and elegant. Likewise, her diminished capacity to drink will put her 
at a disadvantage if she attempts to keep up with the traditional sequence 
of aperitif, two wines and digestif. 
Such discrimination helps to explain the paucity of women in senior 
management positions - and is all the more dangerous for being 
unintentional. Whilst it does not in itself explain their relative absence 
from the higher reaches of French management, it draws attention to the way 
in which the work pattern is designed to fit in with a man's lifestyle - and 
a unilateral change in habits (ie. working through lunch and leaving early) 
is useless unless colleagues do likewise. 
Coffee and drinks 
Contracted versions of the food sharing ritual are discernible in the French 
penchant for coffee and alcohol. Drinks are, after all, only liquid foods. 
Coffee provides a welcome psychosomatic boost to help managers start the day 
or ward off the soporific effects of a heavy meal - "un petit j us pour me 
mettre en route". It acts as a gentle prel ude to the rigours of work -a 
sort of ice-breaker whereby everyone gathers round the "cafetiere" 
(percolator) for the "pause cafe" (coffee break) which serves to prolong the 
morning handshake and ease people back into work. The informal congregation 
about the coffee machine in fact facilitates the obligatory "tour de mains" 
(round of handshakes) since everyone is within close proximity. It also 
provides an opportunity for a little informal chat which goes beyond the 
initial contact - and which may or may not be deemed productive. 
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One company visitea regaraeu coffee breaks as so unproductive that they had 
removed all coffee percolators save a drinks distributor in the basement - 
though there was a real percolator "pour l es hötes/invites de marque". This 
effectively proved dissuasive but the time wasted in descending up to seven 
storeys made the sol ution less than satisfactory. In addition, people were 
made to feel guilty if they spent too long in the basement. One cadre 
surmised that the "prohibition order" was indicative of French narrow- 
mindedness regarding management work. To "them", working and offices were 
synonymous - it was inconceivable that one might actually gain something 
from the informal contacts made around individual coffee machines installed 
on each floor: "En France on ne travaille que quand on a 1e cul sur une 
chaise" (in France you can only be working if you are sitting down). So much 
for Tom Peters' Management By Walking About (MBWA -a phrase coined in "A 
passion for excellence"). 
The early morning/early afternoon consumption of cafeine as a stimulant has 
its antithesis in the end of morning/end of day ap6ritif to wind down. The 
consumption of alcohol in French companies was not excessive but it was 
certainly regular. It was not uncommon for directors to have their own 
drinks' cabinets and to use them as bait with which to tempt colleagues to 
"prendre un verre/boire l'apero" (share a glass) and engage in an impromptu 
chat; just before lunch or prior to leaving in the evening. It provided an 
opportunity to relax and talk at greater length about the 'strategic' issues 
for which there is little time in the tumult of operational pressures. 
Perhaps this need for informal contact at the end of the day also indicates 
French aversion to MBWA. Observation suggests that the tendency of cadres to 
keep themselves to themselves throughout the day (with the exception of an 
American subsiduary, no open plan offices were encountered in the companies 
visited), may explain a need for informal contact at the end of the day in 
order to transmit information. It may be thatAmericans, with their more 
interactive management styles do not require a specific time set aside 
"after hours" for more diverse discussion (see following section about 
Americans leaving work "on time"). 
The formal version of the aperitif is the "pot" which consecrates the most 
insignificant piece of good news. One sales rep organised a "pot" simply 
because he had spent a whole year in the job. More commonly they are held in 
celebration of a personal event such as a marriage or birth. The 
announcement of these glad tidings is invariably greeted with the ritual 
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call of "qa s'arrose" (it's your shout) and the subsequent breaking out of 
various cocktails and savoury snacks. 
Since this is asocial occasion, absences are particularly unforgivable - 
the boss will generally be invited out of courtesy but his failure to take 
up the invitation will not go unnoticed and is l ikely to vex the person in 
whose honour the "pot" is held. The act of presence, because it is voluntary 
and non-work related is particularly important, and a brief speech on the 
part of the "patron" (boss) will prove an important mark of esteem. The boss 
can gain a modicum of goodwill vis-a-vis his personnel on these occasions 
but risks a far greater loss by failing to attend. 
Business hour 
The ritual of long working days is partly a knock-on effect of the 
preceeding ritual concerning copious meals. Because meals are both time- 
consuming (they 'eat' into the afternoon) and sleep-inducing, afternoons 
tend to be more sedate than mornings, with a compensatory effort in the 
evening. The managers i nvol ved in work shadowing regularly put in 11 hour 
days - typically starting around 8.30 a. m. and leaving after 7.30 p. m. Again 
this is a work pattern to which French cadres are accustomed from childhood 
since the school day generally lasts from 08h30 until 16h30, with a two hour 
midday break. 
For prima facie evidence of this tendency to work late we need look no 
further than the television. In most European countries the evening news is 
screened at 18h00 or 19h00 whilst the French "journal tel evise" 
traditionally has a 20h00 slot. This is probably a sign that the bulk of the 
news-watching audience is not home before that time. 
The ethos of working late is a curious one. Leaving on time is "mal vu" (bad 
show) and to do so is to risk accusations of having "un esprit de 
fonctionnaire" (a civil service mentality) - though the criticism can be 
warded off by being seen to take work home. This is based on the principle 
that a cadre, unlike a civil servant or a worker, is paid to do a job not to 
complete a set number of hours -a notion supported by the fact that cadres 
are not entitled to overtime pay. 
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Cadres superieurs are supposed to spend more time at the office. Leaving on 
time "ne se fait pas" (is not done) even if some allowance is often made on 
their morning arrival. ''Le patron" would not take kindly to his commercial 
or financial director not responding to his call at 7.00 p. m. And the virus 
spreads downwards from PDG to cadres dirigeants, to cadres superieurs, to 
cadres moyens. Not surprisingly, this has generated a certain amount of 
fol kl ore. One cadre recal 1 ed a col 1 eague who gave a show of 
conscienciousness by having two overcoats - one to wear and one on permanent 
display on the coa tstand, thereby signalling his presence when the boss 
walked past his office early in the morning and late at night. Another spoke 
of a colleague who would take his car to work and go home on the bus. 
The compulsion to leave late was seen by several cadres to have degenerated 
- so that they would stay behind, often to no great avail, simply "pour 1a 
forme" (for show). Staying late irrespective of the real need for it has an 
element of play acting about it. There is a certain amount of self pity, of 
playing up to the image of the cadre as an overworked, overburdened 
individual without a moment to himself - 'Ile malaise des cadres" (the 
unhappy lot of the cadre) is a frequently cited syndrome. There is something 
comforting about being hard done by in a culture where success should not 
be flaunted*. 
Quite apart from this self-pitying aspect, there is also an addictive side 
to staying late - cadres are conditioned into it. The upshot of all this is 
that they find themselves unable to "kick the habit". Several cadres 
confessed that they were reluctant to go home early because they were 
irritable and unable to relax - so they preferred to stay at work where the 
pace had slackened than to go home and risk annoying their wives and 
chil dren. 
*- The stereotypical joke about the cyclist and the Rolls Royce owner is 
indicative of the French attitude to success. The American cyclist wishes he 
too owned a Rolls whilst the French cyclist wishes the car owner had to ride 
a bike - it does not do to stand out in France. 
153 
Of course, this had a double edge to it since wives were fed up of taking 
second place to work. This problem was a particularly acute in the exacting 
hypermarket retail trade which boasted a high proportion of actual or 
prospective divorcees. One of the latter explained that his wife would 
almost rather he were adulterous than "la tromper avec le boulot" (play 
second fiddle to work). 
One Public Relations officer was particularly sceptical about the value of 
staying late at all costs. He felt that it promoted inefficiency - work 
would be dragged out to fill out the available time. And although one 
benefited from the absence of distractions ('phone calls or subordinates), 
the cadre was by the same token, bereft of secretarial help, making some 
work impossible. Another cadre confirmed, "On ne travaille pas toujours a 
fond le soi r" (we don't overexert ourselves in the evening). It is seen 
rather as an opportunity to wind down and reflect on the day's events. 
If, as certain (mainly American) specialists maintain, working outside 
normal hours is an indication of poor organization, of the individual or the 
company, then French managers or companies are models of disorganisation. 
Some speculated on the possibility of changing the "obligation" to work late 
and adopting a quasi-American approach of working more consistently hard but 
finishing on time. However, this was little more than wishful thinking since 
a unilateral change in working practices would not solve anything. It would 
only serve to put them, as a company, out of synchroni sation with their 
associates. In actual fact, they confessed, they had locked themselves into 
a recurrent cycle of inefficiency from which they could not break out 
(shades of Carl son's "administrative pathology"*). 
Whil st ostensibly French cadres long for regular hours they realise that the 
intensity of work which would necessarily accompany the change would not 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
- The term "administrative pathology" was coined by Sune Carl son in 
"Executive behaviour" (1951),. It refers to the inability of managers to 
devote more time to strategic matters because of their involvement in 
operational problems - which might have been pre-empted had they engaged in 
more reflection. 
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suit them. They are conditioned into supplying a long intermittent effort 
rather than a shorter more sustained effort. One female executive neatly 
summed up the difference in approach by saying: 
"En France il y a du temps mort et on sort ä 20 h00 - en Ameriq ue 
on sort a 17 h00 mais mort. " 
(In France there is quite a bit of dead time and we leave at 8.00 
p. m. - in America you leave at 5.00 p. m. but dead beat). 
She went on to enumerate some of the ways in which time was wasted - 
specifically on the 'phone and in meetings which seemed to drag out because 
"on se perd en paroles" (we get lost in words). She tentatively ascribed 
this disregard for time to the Latin mentality (a scapegoat for everything 
from money taboo to a lack of pragmati ci sm) and their tendency to "vivre 
dans le desordre" (live chaotically). 
Working long hours clearly implies a certain lack of respect for time. The 
Anglo-Saxons have ingeniously wedded time and money in the adage "Time is 
money"*. But this philosophy seems anathema to the French who do not share 
the American obsession with time as a measure of efficiency or as a serious 
constraint - "On f ini ra quand on f ini ra" (we will finish when we finish). 
They show a patience for, and appreciation of, the historical flow of 
events, a belief that problems can be put off and left to resolve 
themselves. For instance, Gerard Vincent quotes Henri Queuille (three times 
President of France in the space of only two years, 1948-50) who had this to 
say about decision making: 
"I1 niest aucun probl eme, si complexe soi t-il, qu'une absence de 
decision ne puisse resoudre. " (Santoni; 1982; 127) 
(Any problem, however complex, can be solved by failing to take a 
deci si on). 
*- In English, time (like money) is a commodity which is "spent" as opposed 
to the French "passer" - this reveals a more relaxed attitude to the 
passage of time. 
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This view of time 'the great solver' is reiterated in an old proverb 
(borrowed from the Chinese and naturalised) which goes: 
"Au dessus de fart, dej ä esti mabl e, de fai re fai re 1 es choses pa r 
1 es autres se situe fart, bien plus remarq uabl e de 1 ai sser 1 es 
choses se fai re toutes seul es. " 
(Beyond the fine art of getting others to do things, is the even 
worthier art of allowing things to do themselves). 
The sentiment was even echoed spontaneously by a cadre who was convinced: 
"Mieux vaut ne rien faire que de decevoir" (better to do nothing 
than disappoint). 
The need to stay late has a number of significant implications which are 
worth exporing in more detail. Firstly, it is worth reiterating the way in 
which it militates against the advancement of women. Their careers are 
subtly (if i nadvertantly) undermined by the expectation that cadres shoul d 
not l eave "on time". The solution is either to put up with irregular hours 
and all the concomitant family problems (including self-reproach) or else to 
leave on time and miss out on what is potentially the most crucial part of 
the day. One female cadre complained to the researcher that this was when 
the real decisions were taken - so family commitments effectively barred her 
from playing her rightful role in the decision making process. Whilst long 
hours are not solely responsible for the low incidence of women in the 
higher reaches of management they are indicative of a work pattern which 
seems more "hostile" to the integration of women than that of most Western 
cultures (noticeable for instance, in the relative absence of flexitime). 
What is worse, as far as women are concerned, is that the requirement to 
stay late is not uniform - it increases with rank ('noblesse oblige'). 
Thus, the hours spent are more or less proportional to organisational 
standing. Each cadre is supposed to see his subordinate arrive and more 
importantly see him leave. There is a plausible explanation behind this if 
we take account of the French tradition of French centralisation and 
unwillingness to delegate. Let us take as our starting point the assumption 
that the more senior a person the more onerous their responsibilities will 
be and, without delegation to al l eviate them, the l arger thei r work l oad. 
Thus, centralisation of authority and decision making automatically result 
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in a cumulative progression of the work load through the echelons. If this 
is the case then working late is not necessarily a sign of disorganisation 
but a form of organisation based on unequal allocation of tasks. 
Oddly enough, since it occurs only once a year, the main holiday is also 
something of a ritual. For a start, it invariably lasts four or five weeks. 
The French refer to their "moi s de conge" (month off) as if holidays in 
smaller units were inconceivable. This 'compulsory' duration is to some 
extent imposed by works' shut downs - for instance, when the large car 
manufacturers shut down for one month (in August) there is little point in 
staying open for many companies. Thus a whole host of suppliers, 
subcontractors and i ntermedi ai ri es must follow suit. There is a knock-on 
effect which provokes what one PDG referred to as "la mise en sommeil 
totale" (the hibernation) of the French economic machine. 
With the business world partly closing down from mid-July to early 
September, relations with French companies are difficult. French 
subsiduaries abroad will find it hard to get hold of people at head office 
and foreign customers will be unable to place orders with French firms. The 
holiday period can also prove disruptive for small French firms which are 
caught flat-footed and embarrassed by a sudden upswing in orders after the 
holidays. Yet, the ritual persists in spite of its penalising effect on 
French industry. 
A measure of the concentration of the holiday period can be seen in the fact 
that there is an identifiable period known as "la rentree" (the re-opening) 
which applies to politics, education and industry. As one cadre put it 
"France starts back to work next week". The degree of consensus surrounding 
the subject is also visible in the way cadres will naturally assume their 
peers have had a break. Throughout the month of September cadres ringing 
each other will open the conversation with "how did the holidays go? ", 
followed by mutual commiseration at having to be back at work, "crest dur la 
reprise" (the re-start is difficult). Even ci rcul as to the personnel may 
make allusion to the holiday. A note on security at Mir Liquide concluded 
with a P. S. wishing those about to leave 'a pleasant holiday' and those 
returning 'bon courage'. 
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The major preocupat on in offices from the month of April onwards, is 
scrutinising the calendar in order to extend one's holiday using bank 
holidays and "fours d'anci en nets" (seniority holidays) judiciously. A 
successful holiday is one which is complete contrast to work - it is the 
reward for the eleven months of effort, constraint and frustration which 
preceed it. But, it is preci sely this contrast which provokes greater post- 
holiday depression. In a month one has ample time to change one's lifestyle 
and the shock to the system is so much greater on returning. Add to that the 
fact that everyone's holiday coincides and the result is a case of mass 
depression. 
For most cadres the summer hol iday is not a chance to go somewhere exotic 
but a "retour aux sources"* (back to the land - in a1 iteral and spi ritual 
sense) - usually to a "residence secondai re" (weekend house) of which the 
French are particularly fond and which prompted Zel din's quip "a Frenchman's 
second home is his castl e" (1980; 205). The cadre longs for the freedom 
denied him throughout the year - yet he does not seek the freedom to do 
anything, but the freedom to do nothing. As Jean Gandoi s, the head of 
Pechi ney, expl ai ns: 
"Je ne vais surtout pas ä lautre bout du monde. Cel a, je le fais 
toute Tannes. En ete, je vais a la montagne et dans mon Limousin 
natal. " (Le Point; 17/08/87; 50). 
(I don't go to the other side of the world. I do that all year 
round. In summer, I go to the mountains and to my home region). 
The whole idea behind holidays is to "recharger ses batteries" (revitalise 
oneself) and to "faire le point" (think about things) or as Claude-Noel 
Martin (executive vice-president of the CNPF) puts it, "j'ai besot n de me 
retrouver moi-meme" (Le Point; 17/08/87; 50) . The French cadre generally 
uses the holiday period to reappraise his career situation. Indeed, hei s 
*- One is tempted to speculate that the importance of of regional roots is 
to some extent responsible for the notorious lack of mobility both within 
France and more acutely, away from France. This theme is developed in more 
detail in the chapter on "Work ethos", but the core hypothesis is that 
France is so heterogeneous (a geographic and climatic patchwork of regions) 
that individuals grow strongly attached to their particular region (or 
"pays") and are particularly averse to changing regions. 
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capable of genuine self -criticism ( in an abstract sense) but he does not 
show the same enthusiasm when it comes to acting upon those perceived 
strengths and weaknesses. Of those willing to discuss their shortcomings, a 
particular favourite seemed to be, "je parle trop et je n'ecoute pas assez" 
(I talk too much and listen too little). 
As in most other countries, French business rituals are losing their 
identity under the influence of international business. In terms of 
formality, younger cadres are adopting more easy-going styles. They have 
shown impatience with the old formal approach and are setting less store by 
titles and decorum. For instance, the use of first names, though still much 
less widespread in than Britain or the US, has become far more usual among 
the under forties, especially in the newer professions such as advertising. 
Similarly, the Stu' form of address is steadily gaining ground at the 
expense of its more formal equivalent. This is particularly the case among 
students and teenagers and to a lesser extent among younger cadres. 
Similarly, letter writing is giving way to the more mechanical telex or fax 
as well as the ubiquitous "Mi nitel "*. 
Another change is the 'Americanisation' of meal s. Many French executives for 
reasons of health and time are today putting less accent on the long heavy 
business lunch as a matter of routine, and will reserve it for special 
occasions. At other times, they will opt for a brasserie or even a snack 
bar. The American-style working breakfast, often in a hotel dining-room, has 
also now come into vogue. 
According to surveys, the French are now going on holiday nearer to home and 
for less time but more often. Long week-ends and short holidays are 
apparently sweeping the nation. This is partly the result of a push by 
companies to get into 'sync' with the rest of the Europe. Notwithstanding 
this trend, "l es grandes vacances" (the summer holidays) have mai ntai ned 
their grip over the French nation - and anyone who disagrees should try 
their hand at setting up meetings in the August/September period. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*- The Mi ni tel is a sort of telephone on a screen. It was in fact, the 
British Post Office which dreamt up videotex but it is the French who have 
created a massive network with the state providing free terminals. 
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Paradoxically, the foregoing rituals have as their unifying feature, the 
fact that by their mundane nature, they go unperceived by those who 
perpetrate them. Nor are they acknowledged by management writers when they 
are an essential dimension of business life. Their existence seems glaring 
to the novice, who is well placed to point out the absence of the Emperor's 
clothes. It also transpires that what may pass for petty concerns 
subliminally convey deeper messages reflecting and reinforcing essential 
characteristics of French management. 
One is particularly struck by the formality, restraint and awareness of 
status differences which would not be out of place in Japan. It has in fact 
been said that French executives "d'un certain age" are the Westerners who 
fit most easily into Japanese business life. Their behaviour has even earned 
them the label., "l es asi ati q ues de l'ouest". 
The theatrical aspects of French management are probably more developed than 
in Anglo-Saxon countries which value a more di rect approach. The French seem 
particularly adept at the art of organisational mime which conveys feelings 
or reinforces relationships without putting either into words. In extending 
a hand to shake, in their greeting or in electing to meet over 1 unch they 
pre-determine the relationship. 
The French still tend to be rather hierarchical and ceremonial, even if a 
new social informality is now emerging among younger people. The fact 
remains that the French continue to put val ue on doing things in el egant 
style, and on the formal courtesies and forms of address. 
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EXHIBIT 7 
Use of the familiar form 
of address to denote membership. 
As-Tu 
Paye 
to cotisation ? 
Cotisation 1986 
- de soutien 580 F 
- membre actif 470 F 
- retraite 290 F 
suivant possibilite a 580 F 
- promotion (82,83,84) 120 F 
au minimum. 
Cheque Bancaire : 
Association des ingenieurs ICAM. 
The CGT urging workers to pay their 
dues (below) and the book marker 
reminding alumni of 1'Ecole des 
Arts et Metiers to pay their 
subscriptions make strange bedfellows. 
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Virement Postal : 
Compte 90-1 1P LILLE 
Pense aussi 
ä la caisse de Secours. 
EXHIBIT 8 
Contrast between tone and content of a business letter. 
Pa 4",, t02 Sep. tembne 1981 
Mouiet". 
J' accuse neception de vole coutti. en en date du 29 Ju£= qui ne me 
hap/tend, tu. ne m' afi. , 4. te, ma ia m' itxito au pt" haut point. 
Je ne peux en e56et p04 accepter Le ton que voub voub cnoyez w to)24t 
d' wtiLü en. 
IL me 4 embLe que je 6u i, 4 cet L qui ut en dno. i t de demander de4 
exp1Aca, Li. on6, et que voua . tentez bi. en ma, Ladno. i Cement de nenve. & en ce. tte 
U' au- M. pah t, et que pouf . Lea choe eh 4 oient ela te4,4achez que j' entenda m' entice te. ni/c avec Mon. 6itat . ta, nt que tai, t moi 
y tnouueAon4 conversance et que je n' envi4age pa4 d' u, Li. Wex tea 
hetvicea de queLconquea int¢tmddiaite, 6 pours ce 6a.. iAt. 
En6. in, pu . que Mondieun a tCt Jjt6 onmt de not to di. 6 i tAend 
. tart pan vo4 4oJ. A4 que pan tu nu. ¢. na, je pens e quit 4 ena i. t heuneux 
qu' 1: C acceprte d' a6zi, 6 tVL au p. t ocha, tn Cone e£ d' n du 
CILBO. Je comp. te en eg6et but cette occaaiJ n pout abondtt a lß. & Pttc A#men, t 
que voud Le 4ouý gWL z La 4itua ion pedante que je voua AoupconnL, 
a. vihi que ce Mon6 Leon , de ctte& vo. Lonta. inement. 
Je -tenminvw en vouz pneci4anti 
- tue c' ea-t au tir. ne de £. a SARL T. A. T. que j' ai U, to u, et non PAT-MULTIRREST. 
- <<ue dvc, i. geant une SARL, j' en 4u. L6 £e 02La)tt et non . fie PUG. 
- Que m' ýc, ývan. t en quatitQ, de PnU. i. dent ciu CI L3C . fie Conti ei!. pew 
et do-i., t 2ß-, e £ndorcmý de notc. e "ge, La mention "Pei . tonne Le et Con6Zdentie. Ue" me panaizAanti d4&zce-e. 
Voub aouha, i, ta. su bonne nfcepb on de . ea pi ente, 
e, ' da n4 L'a, tten, te d' wie convocation pow Le cowcan, t , ep. ýembn2, 
Je voua pni, e d' agi vL, Mon ieccn, Z' eptu. 4ion de me4 4atutation6 
t-t. dib tc tguh .4. 
Jean-Pie Ae 
LE GERANT 
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EXHIBIT 9 
Elegant meanderings in letter of rejection. 
7 
Monsieur le Professeur, 
le 21 janvier 1987 
Vous voudrez bien ne pas me tenir rigueur du retard avec lequel je 
reponds au courrier que vous m'avez adresse en decembre dernier avec 
la recommandation de M. CARRON de LA CARRIERE, Ministre Conseiller 
charge des affaires economiques et commerciales ä I' Ambassade de France 
en Grande-Bretagne. 
Ce delai me permet cependant de vous repondre en meilleure connaissance 
de cause car mes collaborateurs ont pu ainsi etudier votre proposition 
avec une attention reellement bienveillante, ainsi que je les y avais 
invites. 
En realite, nos structures d'accueil pour les etudiants doivent faire face 
ä de nombreuses demandes et nous tentons de satisfaire le plus grand 
nombre d' entre eux. Malheureusement aujourd' hui, nous ne voyons pas 
la possibilite d'accueillir votre eleve le temps suffisant pour entreprendre 
valablement une etude en profondeur sur les methodes de gestion pratiquees 
dans notre entreprise. 
Croyez que je regrette de ne pouvoir vous apporter 1' aide que vous 
sollicitiez et je vous Arie d' agreer, Monsieur le Professeur, 1' assurance 
de mes sentiments tres distingues. 
6k(A 
Monsieur Peter LAWRENCE. 
cc : Monsieur G. CARRON d" LA CARRIERE. 
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9.1HE FRENCH MAMAGERIAL E1HOS 
"Il est peu de pays q ui se sentent aussi rattaches ä leur hi stoi re 
que 1a France; ou 1e passe expl ique autant le present. " 
(Peyrefitte; 1976; 373) 
(There can be few countries which feel so tied to thei r history as 
France; where the past has such a hold over the present). 
The glory of some nations 1 ies in what they are; for instance the United 
States. For other nations, notably the Soviet Union and China, it stems from 
what they are building. Others still, find meaning in chaotic growth 
(Brazil), recent independence (the young African or Asian nations) or the 
need to purge themselves of their past (Japan and West Germany). At 1 east 
one nation, Israel, in its endeavour to fulfill an ideal, is speeding 
towards a sort of anti-destiny. What characterises France is its respect for 
the past. 
French management bears subliminal traces of many of the forces which have 
shaped French civilisation including Catholicism, agriculture, together with 
a strong 1i terary and 1 ogi co-intel 1 ectual i st tradition. It is the aim of 
this chapter to look at these and other influences, many of which pre-date 
industrial i sati on, to see how they have affected the French managerial 
ethos. Having considered these intrinsic influences, we shall assess the 
influence of one important external force namely, the American view of 
management. 
There is a longstanding logical-rational tradition in France of which the 
some of the obvious flowerings are the work of Descartes in the 17th century 
and the age of Enlightenment in the 18th century. Their emphasis on 
rationalism and abstract thought, has left a lasting i mpressi on on French 
culture. At a very obvious level this is symbolised by the "jardin a la 
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francai se" -a tribute to mathematical rigour, clear conception and hostile 
to the whims of nature. A variation on the theme can be seen in the French 
style of comprehensive pl anni ng ("pl anni f ica ti on indicative") with its 
emphasis on intellectual development but relatively lax implementation or 
control : 
Tans aucun autre pays occidental il n'exi ste l'equival ent du 
Plan, cette projection ambitieuse quit vot6e sol ennel l ement tous 
l es cinq ans, pr6tend mettre le futur en fiches" (L'Express; 
1/3/85; 32). 
(No other western country has anything like the Plan - an 
ambitious forecast which attempts to frame up the future and is 
subjected to a formal vote every five years). 
Lionel Stoleru explains how the French have stubbornly persisted with the 
national plan in spite of its manifest inapplicability in a dynamic 
environment. He points out how the plausibility of the plan steadily 
declined from the mid-sev enti es onwards : 
"As from the 7th Plan, we began to sink into the unreal. In the 
middle of the crisis, the planners considered two scenarios, 5.5 
per cent growth, and 4 per cent, both being entirely unrealistic. 
At this point we passed from the unrealistic to the surrealistic. 
Everyone saw that the 4 per cent scenario implied 1m unemployed; 
inadmissible. So everyone agreed to reject it and adopt, in 
general cheerfulness, the 5.5 per cent scenario. This vainglorious 
("cocorico") wishful thinking ended lamentably, with 2.5 per cent 
growth and 1.5m unemployed. " (Financial Times; 5/11/87; 26). 
The above examples would seem to corroborate the longstanding view of the 
French temperament as pervaded by a disembodied intellectualism. A 19th 
century Swiss writer, Henri FredericAmiel described the French in these 
terms : 
"L'espri tf ranSai s met toujours l 'ecol e, la formul e, le 
conventionnel, 1'a-priori, 1'abstraction, le factice au-dessus du 
r6el et pref ere 1a cl arte ä la veri tb, l es mots aux choses, et la % 
rhetoriq ue ä la science" (L'Express; 1/3/85; 32). 
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(The French always place a school of thought, a formula, 
convention, a priori arguments, abstraction, and artificiality 
above reality; they prefer clarity to truth, words to things and 
rhetoric to knowledge). 
Whether these notions are really founded or not, they have been touted for 
so long that the French in general, and their managers in particular, end up 
believing them and living out the stereotype. For instance, in the eyes of 
the cadre, it is the ability to think logically and analyse systematically 
which sets him apart from the rest of the personnel. Indeed, there is no 
greater compliment for a French manager than to be described as "cartesien" 
since it implies a thourough and analytical mind and labels him as typically 
French. 
Even serious French sociologists perpetuate the view of their countrymen as 
people striving for intellectual satisfaction rather than for the truth 
about the real world: 
"Conf rontes ä un probl eme, l es Anglo-Saxons., peupl e empi rique, 
cherchent avant tout ä1 ui trouver une sol ution; 1 es Francai s, ä 
le traiter conformement aux regl es de la coherence 1 ogique, quitte 
ä le rendre insoluble. " (Weber; 1987; 259). 
(Faced with a problem, Anglo-Saxons with their empirical leaning 
will pl ace a priority on finding a sol ution; as oppo sed to the 
French who will apply the rules of logic to the extent of making 
it insoluble). 
This rather dogmatic approach to problem solving favoured by French managers 
was noted by Theodore W ei nshal l who contrasted it to American pragmaticism. 
Wei nshal l characterises the French approach as "the most systematic and 
quantitative assault possible on every problem, while taking into 
consideration all factors which may influence it" (1979; 266). The French 
appear to relish the intellectual exercise of taking the problem to pieces 
and contemplating it from all angles - something which Americans might 
consider time-consuming and ineffective' since it diverts attention from the 
crux of the matter. 
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On the other hand, this fascination with intellectual challenges is perhaps 
indicative of a higher tolerance for complexity and ambiguity. French 
managers are apt to deride what they consider US superficiality, whilst 
acknowledging the characteristic drive and optimism of Americans. Evidence 
of French disdain for US superficiality can perhaps be seen in the way the 
book, "One minute manager" flopped in France because of its perceived 
hollowness (see later section on "American influence"). French views of the 
book were typified by the criticism, "ca sonne faux" (it does not have an 
authentic ring to it). 
Further confirmation of this mental agility was noted by Wylie with regard 
to French interaction. He maintains that the French are capable of juggling 
with conversations - following a general conversation and a private 
conversation simultaneously without embarrassement or misunderstanding 
(Reynaud; 1981; 324). 
As has been stressed in previous chapters (notably in "The making of French 
managers"), intellect is regarded as the prime criterion for leadership in 
any field. This is why politicians will often point to their literary 
accomplishments when they seek election. The presidents of France since de 
Gaulle have all been intellectuals. Admittedly, de Gaulle was that unusual 
and stiff-necked thing, a military intellectual, but his whole process of 
thought was both radical and highly rationalised. The successive Presidents, 
Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand, have all been natural 
intellectuals, men for whom the qualities of the mind were the prime 
qualities. This is in contrast with the US and Britain which have witnessed 
a decline of intellectuals in politics - po ssi bl y because of the basic fear 
that those who can think can not act. Clearly, the French do not adhere to 
the Anglo-Saxon view that qualities of thought and action are mutually 
excl us ive. 
Another facet of the intellectual-cum-literary tradition, can be seen in the 
respect paid to powers of oration. This is perhaps epitomised by the 'grand 
oral' at l'ENA, in which a student must speak, with stopwatch on the table, 
for precisely ten minutes - an exercise of stunning oral vituosity. But the 
fascination for "1 e verbell can in fact be found at all levels of society. 
This concern with form was neatly expressed by one PDG from the observation 
sample, who explained that style served a practical purpose in smoothing the 
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co nze nti ; 
'ta forme ai dant, la rugosi to du message passe bi en. " 
(A nice prose style helps people to accept an unpalatable 
message). 
As one cadre put it to the researcher, "1 e pouvoi r se conquiert par la 
parole" (oration is the key to power). A leader distinguishes himself by his 
language and will make the most of meetings or other such occasions to press 
home this superiority - occasionally going as far as to pick up subordinates 
on grammatical correctness (essentially missed subjunctives). For the same 
reason, a union representative will be sent to a school for "cadres 
sy ndi caux" - not, as might be expected, to gain some insight into corporate 
economics, but in order to acquire "un certain maniement du verbe, et du 
1 angage qu'il n'a pas" (the oratory skills he l acks - Santoni; 1981; 156) - 
in other words, so as to avoid feeling linguistically inadequate in high 
level discussions. 
A similar impression seems to permeate the following banner headline which 
appeared during one of the fieldwork periods: 
"Chirac relance 1lindustrie aeronautique et spati al e" (Les Echoes; 
16/2/87; 1). 
(Chirac revives the aeronautics and space industry). 
The implication from the headline is that Chirac has done something to boost 
the industry. It transpires however, that he has simply outlined his policy 
for revitalising the industry in two speeches. Cynics might suggest that as 
far as many Frenchmen are concerned, words speak louder than actions - 
something which can perhaps be inferred from the abundance of sayings along 
the lines, "dire nest pas fai re" (saying is not doing) or "il faut j of ndre 
les actes aux mots" (words must be allied to actions). As the French 
themselves concede: 
'En France le di scours est plus qu'un penchant, plus qu'un talent, 
c'est une fin en soi. Au point de servir de substitut ä faction" 
(L'Express; 1/3/85; 32). 
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(In France, oration is more than an inclination or a talent. It is 
an end in itself - to such an extent that it becomes a substitute 
for action). 
The importance of speech was substantiated by the actions of one PDG from 
the observation sample. He repeatedly reproached trainee cadres in a meeting 
for using the conditional clause in describing intended improvements. For 
instance, a cadre would suggest "on va essayer de ... " (we will try to ... ) 
and the PDG would correct the statement to "on va fai re ... " (we will do 
... ). And he rounded off the meeting by reiterating his point: 
"Le changement passe par le langage" (language is the key to 
change). 
To burlesque the situation, having done a comprehensive job of analysing the 
problem and having discussed every possible angle, in France the 
implementation becomes a formality, since everything has been foreseen. 
There is less of the 'make it up as you go along? side of Anglo-Saxon 
management. As Graves suggests, "the Frenchman likes to be able to see the 
end of the tunnel before he enters it" (1973; 303). 
The same sort of attitude underpins the regular publication of books 
criticising the French. The latest one off the production line is "La France 
Paresseuse" (lazy France) which follows in the footsteps of best-sellers 
such as "Le mal francais" and "Toujours pl us". The authors are adept at 
highlighting the ills of French society but seem less inclined to propose 
courses of action. The classic example of this comes from the many grandes 
ecol es alumni who launch vitriolic attacks on the schools which 'made them'. 
These leave the impression of an "exercise de style" of an impertinent 
aristocrat who can afford to spit on his privileges - and what is more, 
perversely enhance the appeal of those grandes ecol es. 
Another feature of French society has been its considerable agricultural 
success. Of all the European countries, it is in France that the 
contribution of the agricultural sector has had the largest economic, 
demographic and cultural impact. At the turn of the century, the 
agricultural population constituted 60% of the nati ones manpower - and even 
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as late as 196b, is per cent of the population were still involved in 
agriculture as opposed to 2 per cent in Britain, and 3 per cent in Belgium, 
Holland and the US (Peyrefitte; 1976; 373). 
This tardy transition from agricultural to industrial nation may explain 
several tendencies in French business. To start with, it provides a clue 
concerning the longevity of Tayl on sm, which is stil 1 mentioned with 
surprising frequency, usually with reference to suppliers, competitors or 
the company's recent past. There is an apparent paradox here in that 
although the agriculture-industry transition came late, when it came it was 
fast, and involved the rapid conversion of an agricultural population into 
an industrial workforce and the consequent "exode rurale" (rural migration). 
Since this population had to be initiated into industrial tasks, Tayl on sm 
(the breaking down and specialisation of operations) was the simplest way of 
proceeding - and the model lingered on. 
A further concomittant of belated industrialisation is that the French do 
not possess the same sort of industrial substratum of professional training 
as, say, the Germans (Maurice; 1977). In France there are many poorly 
educated, unskilled workers, as well as many hierarchical levels: in the 
automobile industry for instance, seven hierarchic levels (in contrast to 
four or five in Germany) are not uncommon between production worker and 
plant manager - 'Iles ouvri ers, les r6gleurs, l es chefs d'equi pe, les 
contremaitres, l es chefs d'atel i er, l es chefs de departement, le directeur 
d'usi ne". This probably stems from a lack of basic technical culture - if 
technical training were more widespread, there would be less need for so 
many hierarchical levels. Because the workers are less technically 
proficient there is a greater need for co-ordination which is facilitated by 
narrower spans of control, hence the multiplication of hierarchical levels. 
Another manifestation of the rural influence is the attachment to place 
which, at an organisational level, shows in the low personal mobility of the 
cadre*. This was confirmed by a senior manager from the interview sample who 
explained to the researcher that one of the most expiditious ways "de 
degrai sser un siege social" (of reducing an overweight head office), is to 
relocate. The French have al ways been rel uctant to uproot 
*- According to L'Express (1/3/85; 25), France is among the countries with 
the lowest professional mobility - with an average of 17 years in the same 
company. 
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themselves; in recent times there has been none of the pioneering tradition 
that in America took migrants perpetually across the continent in search of 
more satisfactory employment and living conditions. Superficial confirmation 
of this can be seen in the way that those who move away will return to their 
native region with increasing frequency during holidays and often reti re 
there. As one cadre explained, tongue-in-cheek: 
"Ce niest pas comme en Ameri q ue. Nous avons une hi stoi re i ci - on 
est attache aux morts du ci meti ere,. " 
(It's not like the US - there are historical factors here which 
tie us to the those who lie in the cemetery). 
There is perhaps a logical explanation behind this attachment to place - and 
a brief geographical parenthesis may serve to highlight it. France is 
situated al most equidistant between the equator and the North pole. This 
means that France's North/South divide is not simply a social phenomenon. 
The country is in the unusual position of sharing in both the subtropical 
world of the Mediterranean and the temperate climate of northwest Europe. To 
add to this, France is firmly tied to the European peninsula and open to the 
Atlantic Ocean. Consequently, it is also in a state of climatic tension 
between continental and maritime influences. In terms of relief too, France 
shows a wide variety of terrains from high mountain ranges to expansive 
plateaus. Finally.. France shares its borders with no less than eight 
countries - all this amounts to a fundamentally heterogeneous country. 
France is a mosaic of regions and "pays", and its inhabitants have 
interacted differently with their surroundings depending on environmental 
conditions and neighbouring influences (Germanic, Hispanic, Anglo-Samen). 
This can easily be seen in the form of the habitat (low pitched roofs or 
not), culinary habits (olive oil or butter) and drinking preferences (wine, 
cider or beer) - not to mention the surviving patois in Alsace, Brittany, 
and the Basque country. These contextual differences have generated 
characterisitc types of behaviour. Thus, the Basque is represented as 
locquacious and sociable, the Al saci an as jovial but critical, the Lorrainer 
as cold and patriotic, the Parisian, as aloof, the Normand as indecisicive. 
These are more than platitudes - in the companies visited, personal faults 
would be attributed to regional origins (I should have known not to expect a 
straight answer from a Normand); and people were genuinely offended if they 
were associated with the wrong region. 
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With such awareness of regional identity, a lack of mobility is perhaps 
easier to understand. Notwithstanding these regional differences, Americans 
still tend to view immobility as a negative trait, both from a personal 
standpoint and even more so from a professional perspective. The French, on 
the other hand, look at it more positively. From a personal standpoint, it 
is associated with humane val ues such as 1 ove of the pl ace where one was 
born and unease in the face of increasing de-humanisation. 
From a professional perspective, Americans would maintain that movement was 
even more essential as proof of drive/ambition/mastery over one's destiny, 
to shake up corporate thinking and because mobility is synonymous with 
adaptability. The French are sceptical about this relationship - as one 
cadre pointed out, "l'instabilite n'a jamais et6 un indice d'adaptabilite" 
(there's no automatic ti e between instability and adaptability). Instead, 
the French stress the positive aspects of stability as a means of 
establishing relations of mutual trust, particularly between customers and 
suppliers and as a means of building team solidarity, complementarity and 
anticipation of each others actions - (dare I say it, of synergy). 
Furthermore, the French appear sceptical about the rationale behind 
mobility: firstly, because it is based on the idea that people are 
interchangeable, which offends the Frenchman's self-perception as an 
individual - "nous ne sommes pas des pions" (we are not pawns), 
interchangeable elements, to be shunted around into new positions; and 
secondly, because as one cadre explained to the researcher: 
"On peut rem uer sans bouger. " 
(You can stimulate ideas without moving). 
The implication here is that the benefits of mobility can be achieved 
without physically moving around. This notion that it is all in the mind, is 
perhaps to be expected from an essentially cerebral people. 
Finally, the rural influence may help to explain French attitude to change. 
After all, the existence of agricultural workers has always been marked by 
precariousness. It is hardly surprising that they should value stability and 
predictability in an environment where they were constantly exposed to the 
vagaries of the weather. Perhaps this accounts for a certain risk aversion 
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which still marks the French mentality. As the head of training commented in 
one of the companies visited: 
'nn s'accroche au passe comme ä une bouee de sauvetage. " 
(We cling to the past as we would to aa lifebuoy). 
Catholicism is regularly invoked to explain the sti gma which surrounds money 
and its possession in French society. It is regarded by some as the last 
remaining taboo, having outl ived even sex as an unsuitable topic for 
conversation at the dinner table. One cadre from the interview sample 
expressly drew that parallel, asserting that, "l largent est le sexe de 
l'economie" (money is the economic equivalent of sex) - in other words, 
something about which people talk very little or in roundabout terms (but 
enjoy having). 
The Catholic church has constantly cautioned its followers against the 
seductive 1 ure of money. According to Catholic logic, economic activity 
should be geared towards the common good, not individual enrichment. In 
short, the Catholic ethic is largely opposed to the 'spirit of capitalism', 
and especially to money made from exchange, more or less assimilated to 
"enrichment without cause". Such teachings have left their mark on the 
French population, including non-believers. As one personnel manager 
explained to the researcher, a Catholic's aim is to make a success of his 
spiritual, not his earthly life. This, of course, is in stark contrast to 
the prevailing ethos in Protestant countries where social success has been 
seen as a sign of divine predestination. 
The repercussions can be seen in the French business context where the 
profit motive is thought to be fairly weak. From the researcher's own 
experience, there is certainly a tendency to talk in terms of turnover 
rather than profit margins. Some writers have even gone so far as to suggest 
that the profit motive is virtually absent from much entrepreneurial 
activity. In Landes' classic description of French business and businessmen, 
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he quotes the head of a small company: 
'Do you mean to tell me that you can respect a man who has become 
weal thy th rough the ruin of a dozen or more com peti tors ? Such a 
man is a menace to society. " (Landes; 1951; 348). 
In 1970, Yvon Chotard, then president of the Centre Franýai s du Patronat 
Ch reti en, suggested that in employers' speeches, they might substitute the 
word profit with "rentabilite", in order to avoid negative connotations, 
"car profit evoq ue profiteur" (since profit suggests profiteer). Antoine 
Ri boud, the head of Boussois-Souchon-Neuvesel (BSN, the food and drinks 
group), responded that this would not resolve the problem, since 
"rentabil i te" is linked to "rente" (annuity) and "rentier" (person of 
private means). 
More recently there has been something of a turnaround in values. The money 
taboo has relaxed somewhat - helped along by such iniatives as the regular 
publication of pay leagues in business journals (L'Express, L'Expansi on, Le 
Point). Over the last 15 years or so, the French have grown accustomed to 
'looking at' each others' pay slips, albeit in an impersonal and voyeuristic 
way. 
The changing attitude to money was given further impetus by the socialists' 
rehabilitation of profit as a positive value. It is no longer taboo for a 
company to make money and set that as its primary target. Indeed, the French 
public has come to accept that firms must make money in order to survive and 
prosper. One PDG interviewed paid a backhanded tribute to the socialist 
government when he explained: 
"ca me fait mal au coeur de 1e di re, mai s 1 es soci al i stes ont 
donne ä l'argent une valeur soci al e nettement positive. " 
(I hate to admit it, but the socialists have turned money into an 
acceptable social value). 
Notwithstanding the theoretical progress made, the reality of individual 
behaviour remains cautious, as corroborated by a few examples from the 
interview sample. 
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To start with a general point, the interviewees were invariably guarded in 
their reactions to the subject of remuneration, even though the answers 
could be graded in terms of candidness. Those who offered a straight answer 
were generally self-employed or poorly paid and therefore derived a certain 
pride or self-righteousness from divulging their salary - their 'poverty? 
was an implicit testimony to their honesty (good Catholics). 
Secondly, there were those who revealed their salary after some prompting 
and a guarantee of confidentiality. A typical example was the interviewee 
who explained to the researcher: 
"Je n'ai pas honte de vous dire combien je gagne par mois: 40 000 
francs. Mais je ne sai s pas comment 1 es autres vont recevoi r cette 
information. " 
(I'm not ashamed to tell you my monthly salary - 40 000 Ff r. I 
just don't know how others will react to the figure). 
Next in line, and this was perhaps the most common response, were those who 
offered the researcher a general idea of their earnings. These ranged from 
the sign-posted lie, 'Disons que je gagne 350 000 francs par ans" (let's say 
I earn 350 000 francs a year), to the indeterminate revelation of an ex- 
civil servant: 
"A upa rav ant je ga gnai s 15 000 francs par moi s, mon sal ai re a 6te 
mul ti pl ie dans une proportion appreciable d'au moans trots ou 
quatre fois. " 
(Previously I earned 15 000 francs a month - my salary has 
increased at least three or four-fold). 
Finally, and there were a number of these, there were those who refused 
outright, some of them taking offence at the researcher's indiscretion. This 
group included several of the youngest and most successful interviewees - 
some of whom had recently graduated from a grande ecol e, boasted a relaxed 
outlook on management and were supposedly infused with American candour. 
Their rapid career progress would have rendered their salaries obsolete in a 
matter of months, so there appeared little to 1 ose from disclosure. Yet, 
their attitude is consistent with what one finds in accounts of French 
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success stories. The meteoric rise of dynamic young entrepreneurs is 
described in detail, but the reports somehow overlook their earnings. As 
Americans would perceive it, how can one possibly talk of success without 
putting a figure on it? 
The clash between the traditional and the revitalised view of money were 
strikingly enacted in an interview the researcher had the good fortune to 
attend as part of a non-participant observation study of the work of a 
general manager. The occasion was a job interview for a post as a salesman 
in a service company. The interviewer simply asked the candidate what he 
thought of money. The interviewee was visibly taken aback by the q uestion 
and his response was disjointed and self-consciously pro-money: 
"I'll be f rank -I11 ke money - itis an essenti al tool, not an 
end in itself - it's not a taboo subject as far as I'm concerned. " 
The awkwardness of the delivery, the divergence between words and tone and 
the unsure aggressive/defensive stance, all revealed a lingering ambivalence 
towards the subject. Here was the crystalisation of French uncertainty 
regarding the 'correct' attitude to money. 
More emphatic confirmation of the persistence of money phobia came from the 
experience of one young entrepreneur from the observation sample, who had 
found out about it the hard way. He had attempted to replicate a tried and 
tested Anglo-Saxon formula in France by creating a discount card which 
entitled the holder to benefit from fixed reductions in affiliated stores. 
Unfortunately, the market was not really mature enough and the business 
collapsed. According to the young entrepreneur, who had since set up a 
successful service in a different field, the card idea would have worked if 
customers could somehow have preserved anonymity, as they would at a 
cashpoint service. As it was, asking for a reduction made people uneasy. 
They were not sure how asking for a discount might be perceived by others - 
they were worried that it might be construed as a sign of privileged 
treatment or insufficient means. In short, they felt uncomfortable about 
drawing attention to themselves for. any reason related to money. In effect, 
the card had floundered for cultural rather than business reasons. 
I 
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As said, the eighties have clearly witnessed a mellowing of French attitudes 
towards money and profit which are starting to come into line with Anglo- 
Saxon norms. This can be seen in the regular salary surveys, alluded to 
above. on the subject. As recently as 1984, one opinion poll (SOFRES; 1987; 
76) revealed that the French public was mistrustful (47%) rather than 
approving (34%) of anyone who had made their fortune in a matter of years. 
By 1987, the respective figures in the same poll were 42% and 43%. 
In spite of this telling reversal of trends, one still gets the impression 
that the change in attitudes is on an abstract rather than a personal level. 
People now accept that money is the lifeblood of the French economy but are 
still loathe to specify how much they earn and accord honour to those who 
make 'too much'. And this individual reticence even extends to collective 
secrecy in the case of the civil service. France is the only democracy where 
the government does not know the exact salaries of the civil servants in 
central administration who receive jealously guarded bonuses. This is in 
contrast with the UK for instance, where civil servants 'salaries can be 
looked up in Whittaker's Almanac. 
Class structure 
Differentiation seems inevitable in societies. Today, we tend to focus on 
divisions of gender, race or region, but in France, as in Britain, class 
distinctions remain significant. 
French society is characteri sed by a rather rigid cl ass structure. This 
social ossification was a feature observed by Kindleberger who considered 
that. "it took at least two or more generations to rise from the lowest to 
the upper middle class in France, as contrasted with half a lifetime in the 
US and a generation in Britain" (1964; 106). 
More recently, several sociologists (Bourdieu, Birnbaum, Thelot and others) 
have shown that social background remains a strong determinant of 
occupations. Indeeds. French senior management is often held up as the most 
bourgeois in Europe. It is posited that French organisations have replicated 
French social hierarchy thanks to a socially discriminating educational 
system (see chapter on "Those who set the tone"). 
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Another aspect of class consciousness which has marked French business 
attitudes is the way commerce and production were denigrated by the 
aristocracy which refused to integrate economic values into its ethos. 
Social prestige was associated with more intellectual pursuits, and even 
within the business world there was a hierarchy of prestige (also discussed 
in the chapter on "Destiny"). The noblest activities were those where one 
did not have to deal directly with, for instance, lower-class consumers. 
These nobler activities contrasted with the low status areas such as 
retailing where one had to submit to the consumer's judgment. This may 
expl ai n why the best talents have been drawn away not only from busi ness 
pursuits in general but also, within business, away from its most central 
functions, sales and production, and towards administration and research. 
David Landes (1951) elaborates on this idea, suggesting that the 
aristocratic influence has also shaped the prestige hierarchy of French 
industries - and may shed 11ght on the current performance of French 
economy. To have the King, his court, nobility and the state for clients is 
more prestigious than having common folk. The industries with the highest 
standing are those which are in the service of the king (or its latter-day 
equivalent, the state): high finance, energy, communications, defence, 
transport. Beneath these one finds the production of industrial goods for 
other companies, followed by production for the general consumer, and at the 
very bottom, retailing - the lowest of the low since the entrepreneur is in 
a position of solicitor, and exposes himself to the judgment of the public. 
This may in fact, provide a cultural explanation for French 'di ri gi sme' - it 
is more honourable to work for the state as client than for the public at 
1 arge. 
At an individual level, this fascination with the state (and the 
'altruistic' spirit of state service) can be seen in the attitude of the 
French public. Even French entrepreneurs with their liberal,, anti-state 
discourse dream of sending their sons to 1'ENA, seeing them graduate in the 
top five, opting for the "inspection des finances", marrying "une heritiere" 
and rounding off their career with a pair of golden slippers, at the head of 
a bank. All this suggests that the aristocratic view of achievement, which 
has traditionally failed to stimulate the entrepreneurial fibre of the 
nation, still taints French business values. 
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Though lacking physical and ethnic unity.. France has been subjected to an 
unparalleled political and administrative centralisation. This was perhaps 
the price paid to unify a territory with such regional diversity (see 
earlier section on 'Rural background"). 
Paris has traditionally monopolised France - psychologically, socially, 
economically and, above all, culturally. For confirmation of Parisian 
influence one need only take a cursory glance at a map of France. Whether it 
is a matter of roadways, canals or rail roads, the same pattern emerges, that 
of a spider's web, the center of which is Paris. 
All the laws and regulations emanate from Paris, drawn up in great detail 
and often riding rough shod over regional particularities. For individuals 
dealing with provincial administrations there is a stock phrase to explain 
delays, "l e dossier est remonte ä Paris" (your file has gone up to Paris). 
Paris is also the corporate centre of France - businesses are only credible 
if they have a Paris head office. Quantitatively about 65 per cent of 
corporate headquarters are situated in Paris but if one considers France's 
most prestigious firms (with the notable exception of Michelin), the quasi- 
total i ty are based in Pari s. In this matter there isa contrast with, say, 
West Germany where company head offices are to be found variously 
distributed in Hamburg, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich. 
Similarly, in the US there is not only a tradition of rivalry between the 
capital and the main town (Washington and New York City), but also a 
tradition of head office location in such regional centres as Atlanta and 
Minneapolis. 
The centralisation which manifests itself at a national level, is also held 
to be the case at a corporate level, where bosses are seen as 'one-man 
shows' (see chapter on "Those who set the tone"). Desmond Graves goes as far 
as to suggest that this i ncl i nation can even be seen at an individual 1 evel : 
"The French manager, by cultural preference, centralises. The 
reason for this - not always well understood - is that by 
centralisation, he can maintain structural strength, i ntergrati on 
and dependence, whatever the human resources happen to be. " (1973; 
295). 
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Indirect confirmation of the tendency to centralise can perhaps be drawn 
from the fact that virtually every manager interviewed described his role as 
that of "ani mateur". This is a peculiarly French term meaning activator, in 
the sense of stimulating people into action. Perhaps, as suggested by 
Graves, the inertia generated by centralisation means that the chief problem 
of the French manager is to generate dynamism without destroying the 
structure upon which authority depends. In other words, French managers 
place a premium on their ability to activate people who are devitalised by 
excessive centralisation. 
Further evidence of centralisation can also be seen in the importance of the 
"systeme D" (practical resourcefulness) as a long-standing and cardinal 
feature of French life. As with the "cult of the ani mateur", this is a case 
of inferring the existence of centralisation from its perceived effects on 
personnel rather than positive identification. The idea is that the "systeme 
D" exists to counteract bureaucratic rigidities. As Ardagh explained: 
"Le systeme D brings human proportion into inhuman official 
procedures" (1982; 646). 
The non-participant observation threw up a particularly interesting example 
of this desire to escape or circumvent the absurdities of centralisation. 
The managerial team at a provincial car plant considered that the new 
manufacturing philosophy needed to be communicated clearly to the workforce. 
Having settled on an appropriate text, they decided that the best way of 
conveying the message was in the form of a cartoon slide show. 
Unfortunately, central control over funds was such that getting funds 
released at short notice was nigh on impossible. Consequently, the plant 
manager gave the person in charge of training the go ahead to undertake the 
project with minimum disruption to the other departments. The head of 
training approached two draftsmen, one an amateur cartoonist, the other an 
amateur photographer, to help him on the project. Within a couple of months, 
working on a part-ti me basis (including many unpaid week-ends at home), they 
completed the slide show. It was very well received by the personnel at the 
pl ant and has since been borrowed by two other pl ants to use with thei r 
staff. According to the plant manager, it even compared favourably with the 
full-length cartoon film commissioned from a professional cartoonist by head 
off i ce. 
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With few resources and a lot of initiative the team had produced a very 
creditable product. Yet, the plant manager's hands were largely tied with 
regard to rewarding the two hard-working draftsmen. Once again, the only way 
of rewarding them was by appealing to head office, and the unofficial nature 
of the exercise made the case for a bonus rather delicate. He opted instead 
for a celebratory meal in the exclusive executive dining room, dubbed "The 
Club". This served a dual purpose - first to placate the boss of the two 
draftsmen, whose department had been disrupted by their occasional 
unavail abil ity; and secondly, as a mark of esteem for the men themselves for 
whom this was the first vi sit to "The Cl ub". They were al so presented with a 
symbolic gift and the pl ant manager tal ked of "further rewards" - his 
intention being to divert some of the money saved by using a few of the 
company's 'unoccupied' workers to redecorate the conference room instead of 
calling in outside decorators as budgeted. 
The military experience and example has had some effect on the character of 
formal organisations in a number of countries but in France its impact has 
been greater and more sustained. To start with, not every nation can boast a 
Napoleon. His influence on French businesses can still be felt directly with 
the Napoleonic code continuing to govern many areas of work practice. But 
more importantly, Napoleon's obsession with administrative efficiency 
provided the blueprint for French business organisations - France's neat 
pyramidal structures live on as a tribute to him. 
Of course, Napoleon did not only provide a model for the future shape of 
French organi cations, he al so hel ped determi ne the sort of people who shoul d 
lead those organisations. The grandes ecol es are generally viewed as the 
characteristic institutions of the Napoleonic education system. The grandes 
ecoles corresponded to Napoleon's concern for the efficiency of the state 
machine. He found in them instruments well suited to the pursuit of his 
design for endowing France with trained cadres. -The students were selected 
by the most exacting intellectual criteria and subjected to a strict 
di sci p1 ine, often based on the military pattern. 
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Foremost among these, was l'Ecol e Polytechnique, established in 1794, which 
stands as the architypal grande ecole. By origin it is a military college, 
founded to train engineers for the armed forces. Today it is still run as a 
sort of residential officer cadet school, with a serving general at its head 
and crossed cannons for its emblem (hence the nickname 'X'). Its pupils, 
'Iles X", go on parade four times a year in full-dress uniform complete with 
"bicorne" (curly hat). But this military spirit has been greatly diluted in 
recent years, especially since the school's transfer from the enclosed 
atmosphere of central Paris to the wide open space of suburban Pal ai seau. 
Formerly, 'ales X" were confined to barracks most of the week; now movement 
is more or less unrestricted, though in school they must still wear khaki 
boy-scout uniforms. Very few today opt for a military career. Most, as has 
been indicated, enter public service or private industry. 
The link between industry and military was therefore established at an early 
stage in France with military engineers moving into top managerial posts. 
The military influence was further felt in the 1930s with the adoption of 
the cadre category from the armed forces (see chapter on "The French 
manager"). Boltanski describes how, from the outset, the cadre was perceived 
as "an officer in the army of 1 abour" (1986; Eng. trans.; 80). The style of 
leadership echoed military practice. The cadre was urged "to gain the 
sympathy of his men by his manner", "to look his men directly in the eye" 
and "know how to puni sh" (Bol tanski; 1986; Eng. trans.; 81). The vi ril e 
qualities which were seen as desi rabl e for an officer were al so deemed 
suitable for a cadre. As Daniel Jouve, who at twenty nine years of age was 
Director General of the Groupe Expansion, summed it up: 
"The best training for a manager is first military service, the 
responsibility for men the fact of being an officer. Commanding a 
section of 60 to 80 men at the age of twenty is an extraordinary 
education! In relation to what one can learn as a student which is 
theoretical you are- given power and learn practical matters ... 
Commanding men young is fundamental. " (Whitley; 1981; 67) 
Even at lower levels the military influence has had an impact. After all, 
for many young Frenchmen, the first experience of organisational life comes 
with national service. This inevitably colours their views of authority and 
of how to rel ate to others in the organisational context. The army provides 
strong röl e models for leadership and parallels between military and 
business spheres are often drawn. This may account for the widely held 
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perception of the foreman as akin to the long-serving NCO ("une mental ite 
d'adjudant"). 
Finally, in linguistic terms, the French use many military analogies. 
Needless to say, this is not exclusive to French business life. The methods 
and vocabulary of the armed forces have exercised considerable influence in 
many countries. What differs, is the context in which they are used. In 
general, in the Anglo-Saxon countries it is the field of marketing that the 
military analogy has had its greatest impact. Typically writers draw the 
parallel between business and military tactics and strategy. 
In France, on the other hand, the transfer from military to business setting 
has been different. It is discussions of structure and authority relations 
which are likely to be overlaid with military values, rather than discussion 
of managerial methods or strategic matters. Thus, in France, it is common to 
hear of "lletat-major" (top management), "1 es cadres" (middle managers), 
'Iles troupes" (rank and file), 'Il a py ram i de" (pyramid), "la vole 
hierarchique" (formal chain of command), "la medaille du travail" (medal for 
long service) and "le beton de marechal " (uppermost level of competence). To 
add to these, the verbs employed by managers often have a military resonance 
to them: "commander" (to order), "di tiger" (to direct), "convoquer" (to 
summon), "rendre compte" (to report back) ... 
Notwithstanding the strong influences mentioned previously, the overiding 
determinant of any nation's managerial ethos is probably its receptiveness 
to American influence. 
The French attitude to America is ambivalent. On the one hand, there is a 
latent anti -Americanism. This is perhaps based on rese ntment that France's 
old civilisation should stoop to borrow from America which is a mere 200 
years old. For instance, the recent plans to build a Disneyland east of 
Paris were denounced as "the encroachment of a n alien civilisation next to 
the city of enlightenment" (Sunday Times; 16/3/ 86). 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, stabil ity is prized in France and 
looked upon as a positive force. Longevity is teemed to bestow legitimacy 
upon practices and habits. This seems at odds th the American notion that 
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new is synonymous with progress. Whil st the French do not share this 
determination to bring about change, they do show gen ui ne respect for 
American drive and economic success. 
The American managerial lead was first acknowledged at an official level in 
1929. The Paris Chamber of Commerce (CCIP) sent a small group of people to 
the universities of Harvard, New York, Chicago, Columbia and North Western. 
They returned with a welter of observations which were at the base of the 
foundation of the Centre de Perfectionnement aux Affaires (CPA) in 1930 by 
the CCIP. This was the first senior management training centre in Europe and 
by its immediate adoption of the case study method demonstrated France's 
early receptiveness to US techniques. 
The post war economic reconstruction saw a quantum leap in French adoption 
of US managerial methods. The French Chambers of Commerce were particularly 
active in promoting exchanges by businessmen, senior civil servants and 
teachers to the US to study business organi sation & management methods. 
Story & Parrott (International Herald Tribune; 5/5/77) refer to "streams of 
French businessmen" who headed for the US to prostrate themselves before 
sales guru, Jose Trujillo. 
Further corroboration of the perceived US advance lay in the pilgrimage West 
throughout the fifties (this time for personal motives rather than state- 
inspired) by the cream of the commercial and engineering schools, in order 
to round off their education with an MBA. France seemed quite infatuated 
with American management and was in fact the European nation which 
dispatched the largest contingents to American business schools. The demand 
was such that a US style MBA was created in France (awarded by the French 
business school, INSEAD) to satisfy it. INSEAD, founded in 1958 on the 
Harvard model p had the explicit intent of closing the transatlantic 
management gap. It drew on American expertise in developing both curriculum 
and training suitable teachers. 
At around the same time the commercial grandes eool es led by HEC, set about 
changing their curricula and teaching methods. In terms of content, the 
focus shifted from a staple di et of 1 aw and accountancy towards the new 
disciplines such as marketing. As for the teaching style, there was a move 
away from lecture theatre pedagogy towards a lore interactive approach as 
typified by the adoption of the case study r hod. All this signalled a 
transition from commercial schools to mana 6 int schools, specifically 
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inspired by the American model. 
Further diffusion of American managerial values was ensured by emergence of 
a French management press. The launch of l'Express, and later 1'Expansion, 
both inspired by the American journal, Fortune, marked the transition of the 
economic press from one providing financial information for investors to one 
aimed at encouraging a new business-1 iterate 
again they confirmed the pervasive influence of 
the French managerial ethos. 
As Dyas and Thanheiser explain: 
generation of managers. Once 
America on the evolution of 
"American consulting companies, management theories, and US-style 
management education, all flourished quite independent of French 
foreign policy" (1976; 267). 
The obsession with managerial trends from across the Atlantic perhaps waned 
to a certain extent in the seventies, when it became clear that American 
methods and ideas were not automatically applicable to Europe. The point 
was driven home by translated case studies borrowed from the US with its 
less complex social structure and a more liberal economic system; tackling 
issues such as hi ri ng and firing "ä Tamer; cai ne", was unthinkable in the 
French context. 
The eighties have brought with them renewed interest in American conce ts. 
In particular, the cult of ma nageri al i sm has sparked off the same sort of 
enthusiasm elicited by American management ideas in the fifties and sixties. 
Tom Peters' books have sold better in France than anywhere else in Europe 
and home-grown replicas of the books abound. However, the French have shown 
themselves more discriminating than in the past when American managerial 
notions were transplanted without serious consideration of applicability to 
French culture. 
They have spurned certain American authors whose prescriptions are clearly 
at odds with French' culture. For instance, Lee Iacocca's tale of dirty 
dealings in Detroit has flopped in France, perhaps because of France's more 
structured managerial environment. A similar fate has befallen Kenneth 
Blanchard's 'One Minute Manager", with its apparently simplistic message - 
which seemed to offend French executives' intellectual view of themselves. 
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Several of the managers spoken to cast aspertions on its foundations: "ca 
sonne creux" (it sounds hollow), "ce n'est pas vecu" (it lacks 
authenticity), "c'est du profabrique" (it is contrived) were typical 
reactions. In addition to this perceived lack of depth or substance, 
Blanchard's book also proposed culturally inappropriate behaviour. As 
explained in the chapter on "The nature of work relations", the spontaneous 
violation of personal space (of the 'pat on the back' variety) is not always 
welcomed in France. 
In spite of a certain scepticism, educating managers through reading has 
become big business and this has been reinforced by a resurgence of 
business journals which are hel ping to disseminate the managerial ethos. 
These have contributed to the belated emergence of an enterprise culture, 
in a society which has traditionally been hostile to business and profit. 
There is a greater willingness to treat business as socially acceptable, and 
essential to the life of the country. 
Whilst the French may have a low opinion of American cul ture, they have a 
long tradition of openness to American managerial concepts - at least in 
principle. Perhaps by virtue of their intellectual powers they have latched 
on to American methods and techniques with apparent ease. As one American 
consul tant expl ai ned: 
"The average French manager is not only smart, he is also 
startlingly well educated. He is clearly not just the intellectual 
equal, but perhaps even the intellectual superior of his foreign 
counterparts. It's hardly surprising that he learns fast. French 
management has acted likea power vacuum cl eaner in its 
acquisition of US systems, techniques and concepts over the last 
few years. " (Dyas and Thanheiser; 1976; 267). 
There are, however, indications that French intellectual commitment to these 
concepts does not carry through into practice. This is something touched 
upon earlier in this chapter in the section on "intellectual tradition" and 
in the chapter on "French mal ai se". The French seem adept at i denti fy i ng 
their shortcomings but less prepared, to act on them. A similar pattern seems 
to characterise France's adoption of American managerial methods. Again, 
there is recognition of American superiority and intellectual commitment to 
American practices, but a failure to carry the ideas through. 
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The most frequently cited example is Management By Objectives (MBO) - there 
is even an unpublished doctoral thesis by George X. Trepo, devoted to the 
question, "The Introduction of MBO in France; Reality or Ritual ? "One PDG 
interviewed confirmed the view that French managers generally understand the 
new techniques or methods, but often only pay lip service to them: 
"Dans maintes cas, le nouveau jargon di ssimul eä peine la 
persistance d'anciens usages. " 
(In many cases the new jargon is only a thin cover for the 
continuation of traditional French practices). 
From the researcher's own experience a similar pattern seems to be emerging 
in the case of quality circles, many of which are barely distinguishable 
from worker representatives' meetings. This may account for the failure of 
quality circles to produce the anticipated results (see chapter on 
"Industrial relations"). 
Restatement 
According to an expression popular in both 1 anguages, France is both 'the 
eldest daughter of the Church' and the begetter of the Enlightenment and the 
Revolution - such a heritage must have an impact upon French management. 
Given the great change in national mood and attitude caused by German 
occupation and to a lesser extent by the coming to power of the socialists 
(1981-86), one can justifiably question the continued impact of pre- 
twentieth century history on individual psyches. There seems, however, to be 
evidence that French heritage still plays a vital role in determining the 
French managerial ethos. 
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10.1HOSE WHO SET 1W TONE 
"Peut etre apprecies personnel1 ement, l es patrons sont critiques 
col l ectivement. " Conversation with John du Monceau, Directeur 
Gen6ral des Titres de Services, Accor. 
(People generally like their bosses on an individual basis, but 
dislike them as a group). 
In much the same way as 'cadre' does not mean manager, so 'patron', the 
subject of the present discussion, has broader connotations than its 
translation as 'boss' or 'employer'. According to Priouret (1968; 14), the 
term 'patron' gradually superseded that of 'maitre' (master) under the 
Second Empi re (1852-70). It has its roots in the Lati no, 'pater' (father), 
which suggests patriarchal overtones - and, in spite of the advent of less 
loaded terms 1 ike 'chef d'entreprise', 'industriel Is, 'employeur' or 'PDG' 
(CEO), it remains the most widely used designation of the company head. The 
term is a catchall which includes the chiefs of owner-managed and 
professionally managed companies, in the public and private sectors. It is 
also used to designate intermediary bosses (somewhat on the lines of the 
English "governor") since, as one maintenance manager explained, "Pour 
1'ouvrier specialise, c'est le contremattre son patron" (as far as an 
unskilled worker is concerned, the foreman is his 'boss'). 
Employers in France have traditionally suffered from a poor public image. 
They have been criticised for making money by exploiting others ("sur le dos 
des autres"). Zola's "Germinal "j, published in 1885, provides a useful 
indication of the prevailing attitude towards Ile patron?. In this novel, 
one of the characters (Deneul i n) weighs up the various ways of making money 
and concludes, Ill 'argent que vous gagnent les autres est celui dont on 
engraisse le plus sürement" (Zola; 102 - making money through others is the 
surest way of making fat profits). The phrase endorses the popular view of 
profit as synonymous with profiteering. And, as Erhmann points out Zola's 
191 
portrayal ls by no means exceptional: 
"For a country where literary incarnations still command wide 
popular appeal, it is significant that in the French novel there 
seems to be not a single example of an outstanding entrepreneurial 
pioneer; where they appear at all, they are slightly ridiculed 
rather than pictured as heroes. " (1957; 210). 
In popular circles, for those brought up on a staple diet of Marxism and 
Catholicism the standard view of the 'patron? was of a parasite, "un buveur 
de sang". If this 'bl ood sucker' happened to be successful he was labelled 
"un aigrefin" (swindler); if he had the misfortune to fail, he would be 
dubbed "un incapable" (Weber; 1983; 42). 
As if this initial prejudice were not enough, the image of employers was 
further tarnished by accusations of open collaboration with the enemy in 
World War II. Some of the disgraced employers were punished with 
expropriation. For instance, Louis Renault who, immediately after the June 
1940 armistice, ran headlong into economic collaboration with the Germans, 
found his company confiscated (the same fate befell Berliet, the lorry 
manufacturing company) in the wave of national isations*1 which followed the 
War. As Erhmann puts it: 
"The government no less than the man in the street was convinced 
that the employers' record during the most difficult hours of the 
country had been at best undistinguished, in many cases 
despicable. " (1957; 103). 
Even de Gaulle joined in the 'boss-baiting' with a sort of catch phrase "Ot 
etiez-vous, messieurs? "*2 (Harris; 54) with which he regularly taunted 
representatives of the embryonic employers' union, the Conseil National du 
Patronat Francai s (CNPF). But whatever the extent of employer collaboration, 
there is a strong argument for suggesting that they had actually failed 
their country prior to World War II when conservative and uncompetitive 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*1 - Also included were Air France, the coal-mines, electricity and gas, and 
the larger 
-insurance companies and clearing 
banks. Much of this was done in 
an anti-capitalist spirit with de Gaul l e's backing. 
*2 - Analogous to, on the German side, the evocative title of Heinrich 
Boll's novel, No warst Du, Adam? " 
192 
practices contributed to the weak economic base of France - one factor in 
the country's collapse in the face of German might. 
From this all-time low at the end of the War.. French employers have achieved 
an impressive turnaround in societal esteem - to the point that chil dren 
will now announce with pride that their father is a PDG, when the fact was 
concealed for fear of retribution only a decade ago. The reversal of image 
is rooted in France's entry into the EEC in 1958. This prompted an 
important change in corporate behaviour since it opened up the French market 
to foreign competition, at least formally, and signalled the end of a long 
history of economic protectionism dating back to the fifteenth century. 
Ardagh drew a parallel with the effect of the Occupation - suggesting that 
the German menace (economic rather than military) had once again catalysed 
the French into action, "this time before def eat and without bl oodshed I" 
(1982; 37) 
Further progress was made as a result of the 1968 uprisings which emphasised 
the need for a change of style in corporate leadership -a point driven home 
by the fact that the strike had been the bitterest in the autocratic, of d- 
styl e firms like Citroen. Ardagh points out that: 
Nay '68 brought in a new questioning of the old assumptions about 
authority, and it sounded the death-knell of a certain rigidly 
autocratic French style of command, both in factories and offices" 
(1982; 96). 
The rehabilitation of top management has been enhanced in the 1980s by the 
so-called cult of managerial ism and the tardy emergence of an enterprise 
culture in France. The process was given additional impetus from an 
unexpected quarter, namely the Socialist government (1981-86). It is ironic 
that the reval on sati on of the 'patron' should have been engineered by those 
who were initially thought to 'have it in for him', as seen in the article 
entitled "Faut-il brill er l es patrons? " ("Should we do away with bosses? " - 
Le Nouvel Observateur; 12/12/81). 
In fact, the Socialist decision to varnish not tarnish was based on economic 
rather than ideological grounds. The entrepreneur had to be encouraged as a 
potential job creator and locomotive for the economy, ideas which though 
commonplace elsewhere were accepted only belatedly in France. This socialist 
repositioning in fact reflects a general shift to the right by all manner of 
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po ii ti ca i pd rti es, iai ca ti ng a greater public acceptance of market 
economics. Even countries as far away as China have experienced something of 
this revolution as indicated by Schel 1's book, "To get rich is 
gl orious: Chi na in the ei ghties" (1984). Pol i ti cs isa useful barometer of 
the changing attitude to entrepreneurs and business. 
The net result of these convergent forces is that corporate heroes have 
actually come to the fore. As Dean Berry put it in the Financial Times: 
"With business exposed, managers need heroes - they haven't had 
any. " (2/07/86; 18) 
Ways 
3rd 
the 
p 
This section will deal with the various routes to top management in France 
and comment on their relative merits. Three distinct avenues to corporate 
leadership have been identified in the research literature: inheritance, 
competence and intelligence. It goes without saying that these qualities are 
not mutually exclusive, but the terms have been selected to characterise a 
particular means of access to the top. In each category, an individual has 
been selected from the primary research as a representative for that group. 
He will be introduced with a brief personal file and his career will be used 
to illustrate various points. 
Inheritance 
Example: Francois Delachaux: PDG of a 'micro-multi national' (850 personnel 
and 12 foreign subsi duaries), founded in 1912 (grandson of founder). Aged 
47, with an MBA from the University of Indiana. 
The proportion of family-run firms in France is high both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. In other words, a high number of fairly large concerns are 
family run* - for instance, the Dassault family which supplies military 
aircraft to the state or the Rothschild family in banking (see chapter on 
"Corporate culture" for further examples). The French seem particularly 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*- Morin (1977) suggests that in the mid 70s, 44.3% of France's largest 
companies still had important minority, if not majority family ownership 
interests. 
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attached to the tradition. rower is relinquished to outsiders only as a last 
resort. Ferdinand Beghi n, the last in the line of a sugar and paper emporium 
(Beghin-Say) epitomised the view, when he stated: 
"Je n'ai jamais trouve dans ma famille de gens capables de 
m'ai der! J'aurai s ete enchante d'avoi r des gendres a qui j'aural s 
pu donner des places importantes. " (Harris; 22). 
(I have never found anyone in my family capable of helping me! I 
would have loved to have had sons-in-law to whom I might have 
entrusted important positions). 
The bourgeois saw success in life in terms of augmenting the capital and 
reputation of their families. Love meant enabling one's child to be richer 
than oneself and sacrificing individual whims in order to achieve this. This 
spirit of 'financial affection? is not dead and continues to perpetuate 
values like thrift and sacrifice - the supreme duty is still seen by some as 
the transmission of property to their children. 
One of the Peugeot chiefs (a company notorious for harbouring family 
members) was also quite candid about the raison dletre of a business: 
"Control er 1e capital , ca sert 
ä pl ace r1 es enf ants. " 
(L'Expansion; Sept. 1978; 139). 
(Control ing the capital guarantees jobs for one's children). 
Today, there is a rather more discriminating approach to nepotism with 
anyone 1i kel y to jeopardise the family business sidelined earl y. 'te patron 
de droit divin" (a phrase coined for Eugene Schneider, the one time 
flamboyant lord of Le Creusot) is a figure of the past. Those who are deemed 
a liability to the survival of the business will find their families less 
indulgent than was once the case. As Ardagh explains: 
"Nepotism, hitherto rife, has now waned: many patrons used to 
regard the family firm 'as a way of giving _si necures 
to dol ti sh 
cousins or nephews, but today realize that this spells disaster. " 
(1982; 42) 
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With successive generations, inheritors multiply and the company can become 
a repository for family members. In the common vernacular, "la famille vit 
sur la bete", "el le l ui fait rendre son j us" (the family milks the cow dry) 
-a case of the company working for the family rather than vice versa. Aware 
of the dangers of such a pol icy, the Delachaux brothers (designated at the 
start of this section as representatives of the family-run business) 
decreed: 
"Aucun Del achaux dans 1'entrepri se Del achaux. Si 1a mai son doi t 
servi ra nourri r1a fam i11 e, el le est vouee ä sa perte. " (Weber; 
1983; 26) 
(No Del ach aux in the Del ach aux company. If the role of the firm is 
to feed the family, we are bound to lose out). 
So, Francois Del achaux's rise to power illustrates the more realistic 
attitude to nepotism. In order to preclude the extinction of the busi ness, 
the 21 second generation Del achauxs got together in a family council to 
eliminate all but the single most competent family member from the company - 
in much the same way as the Michelin family have done. That is how Frangois 
Delachaux was elected. The other family members pulled out of the company 
and went elsewhere to exercise their industrial talents. 
Enlightened nepotism as demonstrated here, can yield substantial benefits 
without incurring the traditional drawbacks. To start with, the hei r 
apparent is inculcated early into the ways of the company. The old adage, 
"Je possede, donc je sal s" (I own, therefore I know), has more than a grain 
of truth in it. Bertrand Lepoutre the head of a family business explained: 
'Les gosses etai ent el eves dans 1'idee que teile etait la vocation 
de la fam il 1 e. " (Harris; 68) 
(The kids were raised on the belief that this was the family's 
vocation). 
Anticipatory socialisation enables the heir to prepare himself to take on 
the mantle of head. The training period can be intense with no holds barred. 
Al most certainly, criticism will be meted out more readily and accepted more 
easily since both master and apprentice have the family's best interests at 
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heart. As PatricK Kicara, zne PDG of Pernod-Ricard and son of the founder 
expl ai ned : 
"Tout ce q u'a fait mon pare, c'etai t avec 1'obj ecti f de me faire 
rentrer chez Ri card. " (L'E xpan si on; 4/06/81; 108). 
(My father's every action was channeled towards my joining 
Ri card). 
What is more, the argument of lack of motivation is perhaps overstated since 
the chosen successor must prove himself in relation to rival si bbl i ngs, is 
in daily contact with shareholders and is subjected to the critical gaze of 
fellow executives who may consider themselves more able. As a comparable 
American hei r once said, "I had to be holier than the Pope and work harder 
and more conscientiously than anyone el se. " (Fortune; 17/03/86; 25). 
Clearly, some chiefs will try to establish their right to the 'throne' by an 
epic display of industry and commitment. 
As an alternative to this, the future incumbent may have recourse to 
educational qualifications or experience in other companies as a means of 
justifying the heritage. Ideally, the heir should aim for an unimpeachable 
qualification - on that score, Serge Dassault's stay at Polytechnique makes 
him an easy irreproachable choice for taking over his father's aeronautical 
company. However, not everyone is gifted enough to avail themselves of such 
a qualification. Marceau notes that INSEAD is often used as an instrumental 
qualification to shake off the 'boss's son? label. This amounts to 
converting economic capital into more acceptable educational capital. 
This was the case for our example Francois Delachaux whose MBA was achieved 
without a bone fide first degree, thanks to America's more flexible 
educational system and the help of one of his father's old friends. The 
quest for educational legitimation is so important in France that some 
parents will gladly pay out to procure a diploma for their offspring. As the 
son of one PDG freely admitted: 
"Autant le dire tout de suite, je ne sui s pas arrive a1a force du 
poi gnat. J'ai fait q uelq ues etudes, notamment 1'ecol e Violet. 
L'Ecole des f il s qui n'ont pas l es moyens de faire des etudes, 
m ai s dont l es parents eux, ont l es moyens. " (Miler; 1975; 145). 
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(You might as well knows. I didn't get where I am through hard 
graft. I studied a bit, especially at the Violet Business School. 
That's the school for offspring who don't have the means to study, 
but whose parents do have the means). 
Legitimation through experience is perhaps easier to achieve than 
legitimation through qualifications, but it does not carry the same weight. 
It is an easier option since the family will generally have contacts which 
it can approach "pour placer quelqu'un de la famille" (to take on members of 
the family). Friendly suppliers, customers or banks should manage to put up 
with the offspring for a while in the knowledge that the favour might be 
reciprocated for one of their own. Again use is made of economic and social 
capital to provide the offspring with an artificial track record to mask 
heredity. He will be overpaid and overpromoted until he is ready to return 
to the family fol d. This was the tactic employed by the Coi ntreau heir who 
benefited from an HEC label, followed by three years with Arthur Young and a 
brief spell with Elizabeth Arden: 
"C'etai t pour moi un sine qua non d'al 1 er fai re mes cl asses 
ail l eurs... avant d'entrer dans 1e gro u pe familial e. " (1'Expan si on, 
4/06/81,113). 
(It was essenti al for me to get a good grounding 
elsewhere... before joining the family group). 
Competence 
Example: Philippe Loridan (58): Armed with only a baccal aureat, he found 
work in a forwarding agency in Morroco. He returned to France in 1955 to 
start up the French subsiduary of Treifus PLC, which he has since turned 
into a resounding success employing 800 people. 
Basically, there are two ways in which competence can lead to corporate 
leadership - either by working one's way up a single or a succession of 
companies over a number of years; or else by setting up a business which 
provides immediate access. 
Trying to reach the top of an organisation from a lowly starting position, 
is a fairly remote prospect in France, unless one works for a foreign 
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subsi duary. inese reputeaiy offer the quickest upward mobility for those 
without prestigious diplomas or family ties - but these companies also make 
demands on the individual (relentless pressure, set hours, geographical 
mobility and inflexible objectives) which are anathema to most French 
managers. As one woman cadre explained: 
"Pour un Franpi sl es conditions de travail chez Rank-Xerox sont 
epouvantabl es. " 
(A French person will find the work conditions at Rank-Xerox 
unbearable). 
Taking the example of Amstrad-France, the company has a young chief (35) who 
does not boast a grande ecol e education or family connections - and is a 
woman to boot. There is no way that Marion Vannier would have made it in a 
traditional French firm, where diplomas, seniority and masculinity are the 
keys to success. 
This tri umverate of qualities prev ai 1sin big business th roughout France. 
According to Michel Bauer, a researcher from the CNRS, instances of company 
men making it to the presidential chair are rare. The case of Franpi s Dalle 
and Charles Zviak (see chapter on "Corporate culture) who spent their entire 
careers at L'Oreal before being named PDG is exceptional among i ndi geneous 
companies. In contrast to this, IBM, Kodak, Nestle, Shell, Philips or 
Unilever all seek continuity of leadership by appointing individuals whose 
careers have been with the company. Michel Bauer is campaigning for what he 
terms the "deregulation" (opening up) of corporate leadership. 
There are various ways of reaching the summit in a system which favours 
introduction from above ("pa rachutage") over access from below. Travelling 
around as a counter to qualifications was the option taken by Philippe 
Loridan. Realising that he would not get anywhere in "ce pays ä di pl ömes" 
(this qualification-conscious country), he spent three years in Morocco and 
gained responsibilities which would have taken ten years to accumulate in 
France. Having made a- name for himself, he returned to France and was able 
to find immediate employment thanks to his experience. Self-imposed exile 
proved a means of acquiring the experience which would have been denied him 
in France. This is in stark contrast with countries like US where 
geographical mobility is part and parcel of the promotion game - in France 
it is simply the price paid for lack of qualifications. 
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Another means of rapid promotion is of course to set up one's own business. 
It is ironical that the nation which spawned the word "entrepreneur" Wean- 
Baptiste Say in 1800) should traditionally be so weak in that domain. A 
much-quoted work by David Landes (1951), the author blames unenterprising 
businessmen for holding back French growth in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. According to him, the bourgeois family values hampered 
economic growth by emphasising social success over individual profit or 
industrial expansion. Innovation and success in business were held in low 
esteem and risk-taking was shunned for fear of bankrupcy, which amounted to 
absolute dishonour in the social system which prevailed. 
As a result of the bourgeois influence, business creation was still frowned 
upon until a few years ago. Even today surveys show that relatively few 
grande ecol e graduates seriously entertain the idea of 'going it al one'. A 
recent poll of nearly 1000 graduate engineers by L'Usine Nouvelle (19/03/87) 
revealed that only 34% were even contemplating self-employment at any time 
in their careers and their answers suggested that for most this was only an 
outside possibility. Apparently, that particular road to business success is 
deemed too risky for all but the most adventurous. There seems little point 
in trading in the security of a well-paid job for the struggle of self- 
empl oyment and the derisive label of "parvenu" or "nouveau riche" should one 
succeed. The, pl ea for recognition was made explicitly by the head of one 
small firm: 
'Que la batai lle soit dure, l es adversaires coriaces et l'arbitre 
i mpitoyabl e, d'accord, mais qu'en cas de succes on ait le droit 
au tour d'honneur et non-pas au guet-apens. " (de Closets; 1982; 
137) 
(That the battle be tough, the adversary tenacious and the referee 
pitiless, fair enough, but if we win we could at least expect 
congratulations not hostility). 
In view of the traditional reception of business success it is hardly 
surprising that the only people likely to opt for-this are those who are 'i n 
a rush' to succeed and find enterprise creation the best short cut - or else 
those whose qualifications, class, sex or race preclude career success by 
more conventi al means. A more detailed discussion of the new attitude to 
business creation follows in the section "The new breed of managers". 
200 
Intelligence 
Example: Jacques Calvet: 57 years old and a product of Sciences-Po and 
l'Ecole Nationale d'Admi ni stration (ENA). Successively, senior civil 
servant, Chai rman of the Banque Nationale de Paris and since 1984 head of 
the private Peugeot-Ci tröen car group. He has managed to check the plunge of 
a group on the verge of bankrupcy. 
L'Expansion (20/11/80) included a feature on the CEO of an adverti sing 
agency which was entitled, "Lli ti nerai re modele d'Yves Cannac" (Yves 
Cannac's perfect career). The reason his was considered an ideal career was 
that he was a graduate of l'Ecole Normale (very prestigious), the "major" 
(laureate) of 1PENA (even better) and had spent 10 years in state service to 
boot. What more appropriate pedigree for the head of France's No. 1 
advertising agency, l'Agence Havas. 
Yves Cannac's career pattern is exceptional in content, but is by no means 
unusual in format. Jacques Calvet (Peugeot) boasts a similar curriculum 
vitae - after graduating from 1 'ENA, he took up various positions in the 
French administration, notably as the Directeur de Cabinet of Valery Giscard 
d'Estaign when the former President was Finance Minister (1970-74). He made 
his transition to the business world via the public sector where he was 
appointed Deputy Managing Director of the Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) in 
1974. By the time he joined the Peugeot group in 1982, he had risen to 
Chairman of BNP. 
A cursory glance at the backgrounds of most heads of large industrial 
concerns reveals a similar story. This is in stark contrast to Britain 
where, of the twenty biggest companies, sixteen have bosses who have spent 
virtually all their careers with the company (Economist; 5/03/88; 69). In 
France, it would seem that the state has taken over the responsibility for 
training individuals to assume leadership positions. As Michel Bauer, a 
researcher at the GVRS put it: 
"I1 semble normal, en France, d'accbder au sommet en etant non 
soul ement stranger a une entrepri se, mais egal ement stranger au 
monde de l'entrepri se. " (L'Express; 1/1/88; 33) 
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(It seems perfectly natural in France to be named head of a 
company without prior knowledge of that business or indeed of the 
business world in general). 
France's 1 argest public and private groups alike are headed by products of 
19a haute administration" (the higher reaches of the civil service). In the 
nationalised and semi-nationalised companies, the appointments are 
politically motivated. Thus it was that the French Socialist electoral 
victory in May-June 1981 was accompanied by the biggest reshuffle of 
corporate leaders ever carried out in a Western capitalist country (Stokman; 
1986; 184). 
The appointment of former state officials as heads in the nationalised 
sector is perhaps understandable. What is less obvious is their occupancy of 
similar posts in private companies such as Peugeot or Moet-Hennessy, as well 
as companies like Pechi ney, Rhone-Poulenc and Saint-Gobain whose management 
by senior state officials pre-dates their nationalisation in 1982. The 
ubiquitous presence of senior state officials in the private and state 
sectors makes the conventional distinction between public and private 
industry less relevant in France since both types of company will be run in 
similar ways. Inevitably, this raises the question of competence - what do 
private companies see in these individuals? 
It would seem that the attraction is primarily instrumental. The civil 
servant is courted for his contacts rather than his talents per se. In the 
French context, where relations with the state are more important to a 
company's well-being, it is desirable to be on good terms with the 
authorities. As Alain de Coi ntet put it: 
"Dans une economi e aussi largement admi ni stree, recruter des 
foncti onnai res i ssus de VX ou de 1 'ENA permet d'entrer en 
dialogue beaucoup plus facil ement avec ceux qui admi ni strent. " 
(L'Expansion; 20/1/80; 215). 
(In such an interventionist economy, recruiting top flight civil 
servants who have graduated from Polytechnique or ENA facilitates 
discussions with the government). 
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As ex-civil servants cney are accustomed to being on the receiving end of 
discreet pressure and are initiated in the ways of politics. They are 
responsible for building and maintaining the bridges between the company and 
the state. This does not mean they are bound to win out, but their case will 
not go by default of not being heard. 
Besides this capacity to open doors with the state, and bearing in mind that 
they are inevitably products of 1PENA or 1'Ecole Polytechnique, what else 
can these ex-state officials offer a company? Not much, if we are to believe 
Roger Martin, the ex-PDG of Saint-Gobain: 
'En sortant de Polytechnique, je savais tout mais rien d'autree" 
(When I left Polytechnique, I knew everything but nothing el se). 
There is a grain of truth in this statement in that these elite graduates 
lack specific expertise. However, the quip fails to do justice to the 
reasoning power, the depth and rigour of the study process, addiction to 
hard work, and the tradition of honesty inculcated into those heading for 
state service. These individuals are sought after because thei r intellectual 
probity is second to none. The compliment "une belle mechanique 
i ntel l ectuel l e" (a fine intellectual apparatus) is often employed to 
desc ri be them. 
Finally, if the alleged resistance to change (referred to by Michel Crozier 
in "La societe bl oq uee") is real, this provides another good reason for 
systematically appointing outsiders in preference to insiders. When a 
company wants to make sweeping changes, the task is best handled by an 
outsider. Insiders tend to be hamstrung by obligations towards individuals 
who have helped them on the way up. Perhaps, in France's 'stalemate 
society', this has proved the most effective way of implementing change. 
The new breed f managers 
The previous section outlining the various means of access to top management 
deliberately played down the setting up of one's own business - justifiably 
so since, until recently, there was little incentive or consideration for 
those who did so. 
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All that has changed under the combined influences of managerial ism and 
Socialist exaltation of entrepreneurs. The acceptance of managerialism is 
largely attributable to "In search of excellence" by Peters and Waterman. 
Its French version achieved quite spectacular success with sales of 100 000 
copies in just three years - that, in a country where a business book was 
deemed a hit if it sold 5 000 copies in a year. 
In parallel with France's love affair with American business gurus, the 
Socialist regime (1981-86) endeavoured to promote the entrepreneur as the 
new saviour of the economy. In many respects, this turnaround could only be 
achieved by a Socialist government whose a priori hostility to employers 
lent authenticity to its message - if they say employers are al right, they 
must be. Had the same notion been put forward by a right-wing government it 
would certainly have been viewed with suspicion. 
In the space of a few years, the self-made individual has become a folk 
hero, replacing philosophers and writers as France's new gurus. As Gerard 
Mermet puts it. 
"Apres 1 es mattres ä penser, les mattres a agi r. " (1986; 254) 
(After the men of thought, the men of action). 
As one PDG saw it there has been a subtle change of emphasis in busi ness 
philosophy: 
"I1 s'agit mai ntenant de 1 utter pour et non pas contre quelque 
cho se. 11 
(We now fight to achieve something rather than to resist change). 
The socialist rehabilitation of profit and entrepreneurial values were 
helped substantially by the success of one particular individual, Bernard 
Tapie. He more than anyone can be credited with the restitution of the 
entrepreneur. His case is worth investigating since it is inherently 
interesting and highly revealing of the French need to personalise the new 
movement in order to exorcise anti-capitalist prejudices. It is difficult to 
find an article on the new French managerial values which does not 
acknowledge Tapie's influence. 
204 
uescrioea as znf , bupwt-bLa, " of French business, Bernard Tapie is in his 
mid-forties, the son of a fitter, a graduate of "u ne petite 'grande ecol e"' 
and an unsuccessful crooner in the 1960s - pure Hollywood melodrama. He 
heads a conglomerate of companies which include La Vie Claire, the leading 
French health food chain, Wonder Batteries (a joint venture with Francis 
Bouy gues), Look Ski Appliances, the Marseilles Olym piq ue football club (ä la 
Robert Maxwell), as well as the fashion house Gres and Kicker shoes. 
His business empire, built up from scratch in nine years employs 10 000 
people and has a turnover of Ff r5 billion (about 500 million pounds). He has 
specialised in buying up bankrupt companies for a symbolic Ffrl and turning 
them into profitable concerns - without even trying to capitalise on the 
much vaunted synergy. Instead he exploits the French legislation which 
allows the receiver to issue a 12-24 month freeze on the company's debts 
from the moment of filing the winding-up petition. While his managers 
streamline the staff and start working on new productss. Tapie buys back most 
of the debts from hard-pressed creditors. 
His knack for turning al 1 manner of 1 ame ducks into gol den geese is such 
that there is actually a waiting list of companies in distress hoping to be 
acquired by his conglomerate. His selection criterion is simple: it must be 
the company's management, not its products which are at fault. 
"I1 detecte 1 es soci etes dont 1 es deboi res sont i mputabl es ä1a 
mauvaise gestion. Ce qui permettra de retabl ir leur rentabil ite en 
resserrant l es boulons. " (Baumier; 1984; 109) 
(He seeks out those companies whose setbacks are the result of 
mismanagement - which will allow them to return to profit by 
tightening up a few nuts and bolts). 
So powerful is his effect, that simply being associated with him is often 
enough to redress the falling share price. As Vincent Beauf il s of 
1 'Expansion points out: 
"La presence meme de Tapi e, par son action medi ati q ue, est ä ell e 
seule un facteur de benefice" (L'Expansion; 23/10/86; 62). 
(The mere presence of Tapie i s. 9 in i tsel f, worth several 
percentage poi nts). 
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He is anti -establishment and pokes fun at the archaic approach of most 
French employers. His blunt style and taste for hype have not made him a 
favourite in traditional French business circles. His style is perhaps best 
captured by a commercial for one of his products. 
It shows an energetic business man striding purposefully through his office 
pursued by journalists, politicians, secretaries, Japanese factory managers.. 
Arab oilmen., American salesmen, union leaders and assorted business figures 
while he relentlessly flings orders to a harried assistant. 
As one pursuer after another falls to the floor exhausted, the voice-over 
asks: "But what makes him run? " Whereupon the businessman reveals a cavity 
in his back, containing a pack of 'Wonder' brand alkaline batteries. 
As his assistant pulls them out, he also collapses with a wink at the 
camera. 
The star of that advertisement is Bernard Tapie himself (ä la Victor Kiam), 
plugging one of his own products. The whole presentation is typical of his 
cocky, go-getting style with "un sens extraordi nai re de la mise en scene" 
(an uncommon appreciation for theatrical effects) . He is a master of self- 
promotion, combining the high profile of Richard Branson (Virgin Records' 
irrepressible chairman) with the business style of Chrysler's popular CEO 
Lee Iacocca. Christine Mital of l'Expansion described him as: 
"Le patron ä grand spectacle qui reconcil iel es Francai s avec 
1'entrepri se, la fortune, la reussi to et 1'esbroufe. " 
(l'Expansion; 11/09/86; 45) 
(The epic boss who .is reconciling 
the French with industry, 
weal th, success and showing off). 
He has become a symbol for the new business-minded, money oriented France of 
the late 1980s: the self-made entrepreneur who creates jobs, does not beg 
for state subsidies, and is proud of his wealth, success and hard-edged 
business approach. He has managed to make a hero out of the "nouveau riche", 
a traditional figure of fun in French theatre. 
206 
He is endlessly selected in opinion polls as the individual young people 
would most like to meet or emulate. A poll in 1985 actually found him to be 
the ideal holiday companion of 48% of French women, ahead of the film stars 
Yves Montand and Alain Delon; whilst 36% of French voters would like him as 
Prime Minister. He is generally regarded as the best known French 
personality outsi de the political world. 
Tapie's cue has been taken by many who have tried to follow in his 
footsteps. The management press is hunting out all the brightest, most 
personable young entrepreneurs and turning them into folk heroes - Vincent 
Boll ore, a 35 year of d, with "l e look du gendre i deal" (the appearance of 
the perfect son-in-law) and a meteoric rise behind him makes ideal fodder 
for the voracious cover features. His opinion is regularly canvassed - I-es 
recettes de Vincent Bol l ore" (Challenges - March 87); "Saint Bol l ore - 
gagner pour nous" (l'Expansion; 22/10/87). Such individuals are merely the 
tip of the iceberg. 
The management journals regularly present new sets of entrepreneurs who have 
succeeded "ä la Tapie": l'Expansion (11/09/86) introduces us to, ' 1ui nze 
stars" (fifteen stars); Le Point (14/4/86) reveal s, "Comment faire fortune 
en 1986" (how to make a packet in 1986); Le Nouvel Observateur (4/2/83) lets 
us in on 'te secret des Gagneurs" (the winning formulae of the successful); 
Tertiel (sept. 1987) detail s, 'te who's who des clubs d'entrepreneurs"; and 
1'Expansi on (10/09/87) presents "Le cl ub des gagneurs" (the winners' club). 
When the journals are not highlighting a cross-section of successful 
entrepreneurs, they will focus upon individual bosses (preferably under-40) 
and question them on their recipes for success. 
The journals are bolstered by a quantum leap in the number of business books 
with a similar thrust: "Les heros de l, economie" (superstars of the 
economy), "Ces patrons qui gagnent" (bosses who win)... etc. Thei r aim is to 
draw up a photofit picture of what it takes to succeed in order to provide 
budding entrepreneurs with role models and inspiration (if little else). The 
portrayals conveniently play down money, qualifications and contacts but 
emphasise youth, imagination, courage, effort and perseverence. Thei r 
central tenet is that "n'importe qui peut faire fortune" (anyone can get 
rich quick). The new buzz words quoted by Le Point (No. 723,28/7/86,66) 
are all success-oriented: "Les tdeci deurs', 'battants' or Islinvesti rl, 
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tassurert" (deciders, battlers, commitment, self-confidence) - words which 
have traditionally been in poor taste in ? aristocratic? France. 
In short, public opinion is now favourably inclined towards business and 
businessmen. However, the backbone of this new ethos has not been tested and 
there are real doubts over its survival in the event of a major crisis. 
Because Bernard Tapie has been so instrumental in forging the new enterprise 
culture, their fortunes are permanently linked. Consequently, his personal 
failure might have devastating repercussions on the fate of French 
capitalism as aw hol e. 
In his bid for success.. Tapie has not endeared himself to everyone and even 
his peers ("l es patrons") include many detractors who resent his 'stardom'. 
There have been several unkind rumour campaigns to the effect that his 
business empire is built on debt. Tapie himself admits to debts of Ffrl 
billion, but his group turns in a profit and benefits from an A-credit 
rating from the Credit Lyonnais. Notwithstanding Tapieºs reassurance, his 
critics have a point. His entire 'system? is based on confidence and growth 
-a stumble might quickly reveal an inability to refund his group's debts. 
The em bodi ment of new, French style capital ism in one man is at once a 
strength and an achil l es heel. Christine Mital expressed her fears that the 
bubble could burst: 
"On tremble ä l'idee qu'il l ui arrive quelque chose: 1'image du 
capi tal i sme en prendrait un coup dont i1 ne se rel everait sans 
doute pas! " (L'Expansion; 11/09/86; 45) 
(Perish the thought that anything should happen to him: it would 
deal a hefty blow to our perception of capitalism and it is 
doubtful that it would recover! ) 
It would seem then, that 'Ile phenomene Tapi e" is a precarious one. And, 
beneath the vociferous support, French capitalism is in fact highly' 
susceptible to a reversal of values. Oddly enough, much of the danger comes 
from the "patrons" themselves - outwardly, they join in the chorus of 
openess or mouth the latest buzz-words, but privately they resent the 
invasion of American-style values. Paul Evans professor of organisational 
behaviour at INSEAD, the European business school based just outside Paris 
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strikes a cautionary note: 
"Things have only changed on the surface. There is lots of talk, 
and a mood of change, but deep-set social and political changes 
have not yet occurred. " (Financial Times; 2/07/86; 18) 
Perhaps because of the very rigourous intellectual training which French 
chief executives typically receive, they have difficulty in subscribing to 
the view of management af ai rly straightforward activity -in the Tom Peters 
KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) tradition. There seems to be resistance to the 
notion that managerial work includes some routine, fire-fighting, juggling, 
wal king a bout, 'man-handling' of recalcitrant ci rcumstance (and people), 
speedy arational decision-making, and inspired acts of adaptive 
implementation; individuals chosen for their brains are not necessarily best 
suited to carry this out. Maybe the French overcomplicate management but 
this seems consistent with a more complex view of human behaviour than that 
adhered to by Americans. 
So behind all the media hype, fronted by American-style managers, there is 
an undercurrent of scepticism, which top managers generally refrain from 
expressing in public, since to do so would be tantamount to subverting 
progress. As one PDG put it: 
"ca serai t consi dere une tare pour un patron de ne pas adherer ä 
ce movement. " 
(Not to endorse managerial ism would be viewed as a real defect in 
a boss). 
The current obsession with American gurus and the 'go-getting' spirit is so 
powerful that it would be foolhardy to criticise it out loud. Yet in private 
conversations, a number of managers speculated that the cult of 
managers al i sm and the public interest in management were a flash in the pan 
(un phenomene de mode) and fully expected val ues to go round f ul 1 ci rcl e. 
They were simply waiting for the whole thing to blow over and for ? normal 
se rv i ce ? to be resumed. 
One is reminded of the way the French embraced management by objectives or 
quality circles in theory, but have failed to implement them successfully. 
Perhaps these are simply manifestations of what Ardagh regards as a national 
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trait: 
"The French have a tendency to fal 1 in 1 ove i ntel 1 ectual ly with 
new ideas and then not to bother too much with their appl i cation; 
in some firms, new American jargon and gadgetry barely conceal 
the persistence of old French habits of rigid hierarchy and 
routine. " (1982; 42) 
In the light of the preceding discussion it may seem odd to discuss the 
homogeneity of French bosses. Allusions have already been made to their 
divergent career patterns - in particular the distinction between owners 
(sometimes called "le patronat reel") and salaried heads ("le patronat de 
gestion"). Notwithstanding this fundamental duality, a number of common 
traits are worth highlighting. 
United we stand 
To start with, bosses are united under the banner of a single union (in 
contrast with five separate worker unions), the Conseil National du Patronat 
Francais (CNPF). The organisation was conceived after the Li berati on as a 
means of facilitating contact between employers and government - and in the 
hope that it might help retrieve some of the employers power and self- 
esteem, damaged by the Occupation. The head of the confederation is usually 
referred to as l9 e patron des patrons" by newspapers. 
But the notion of collective body goes beyond a single union. The "patrons" 
are clearly perceived by the media, as an entity sharing common political* 
economic and social views: 
- "Edmond Mai re r6habil ite 1 es patrons" (Edmond Mai re 1 egiti mises 
bosses) - Le Nouvel Observateur - 13/03/86 - p. 19. 
- "Les dix patrons 1 es 'pl us Burs" (The ten toughest bosses) - 
L'Expansion - 19/09/85 - p. 90. 
- "Pour gagner, changez vos patrons" (If you want to win, change 
your leaders) - L'Express - 1/01/ 88 - p. 33. 
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- "Comment l es patrons prennent conges" (How bosses take thei r 
holidays) - Le Point - 17/08/87 - p. 50. 
- "Metier: patron" (Profession: boss) - L'Expansion - 7/11/85 - 
p. 51. 
The idea is rei nforced by books with titles such as, 'Les patrons face ä1a 
Gauche" (The impact of the Socialists on bosses), "Paroles de patrons" (The 
bosses speak out), "Les patrons" (bosses), "Comment devient-on un grand 
patron" (how to become a big boss), "Ces patrons qui gagnent" (bosses who 
win), '1. a fin des patrons" (the end of the bosses) and so forth. As with the 
cadres, the media tend to treat them as a discrete group in spite of their 
sel f-professed heterogeneity. 
But, whilst bosses are themselves rel uctant to acknowledge a common bond 
which transcends questions of ownership or background, there are indications 
that it does exist. According to Harris, Francoi s Ceyrac the former head of 
the cNPF, was particularly adept at hitting this unifying chord, each time 
he addressed the bosses: 
"Cette disposition bi en f rancai se, un peu maurrassi enne, 
qu'accompagnent en general le goat du beau langage, pour ne pas 
dire des belles-lettres et une certaine mef fiance vis-a-vis des 
modes et de la moderni te, Franýoi s Ceyrac en use et en joue a 
chaque occasion. " (Harris; 46) 
(Francois Ceyrac forever plays upon the peculiarly French 
penchant, rather in the manner of Charles Maurras, for stylish not 
to say sophisticated language and a certain suspicion of fashion 
and novelty). 
This view was corroborated by a PDG who, as an "habitue" of CNPF meetings, 
had seen many a skilled orator unite the various factions of employers with 
a few well-chosen words. According to him, all you had to do was evoke a 
few of their "bates noires" (pet hates) - union leaders, civil servants, 
politicians, intellectuals - to elicit Pavlovian indignation from all 
quarters. 
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so, in spice oT me emerWncts of the new entrepreneurial culture, the legacy 
of vilification against bosses has left its mark - and for many of them the 
solidarity born of adversity remains a source of considerable unity. This 
reaction is the product of several decades of perceived persecution and 
misunderstanding - and the struggle to gain public approval. Bosses seem 
particularly preoccupied by the no-win situation in which they have found 
themselves in the past. Harris quoted a number of bosses on the matter: 
"Si nous reussi ssons, noes sommes des exploiteurs; si nous 
echouons, des salauds doubles d'incapabl es. " (1977; 8) 
(If we succeed, we're exploiters; if we fail, we're bastards - 
useless one's at that). 
"Aujourd'hui, etre patron, c'est peut-etre aussi accepter de se 
senti r 'mal aime"... " (1977; 23) 
(Being a boss today is also about being disliked). 
"Les di ri geants? depuis le temps qu'on leur col le mauvai se 
conscience! " (Harris; 36) 
(Bosses? how much 1 onger must they be made to feel guilty? ) 
"Stils font des benefices, ce sont des sal au ds; 5j ls rate nt, se 
sont des imbeciles et il faut s'en debarrasser. " (1977; 36) 
(If they make money, they're bastards; if not, they're idiots and 
we should be rid of them). 
The consensus view on the part of bosses was that they were despised by the 
general public, or at very best regarded as a necessary evil - we need 
bosses, "comme il 'faut' des gendarmes ou des putainsl" (Harris; 74 - in the 
same way as we need policemen or whores). Even if their image has changed in 
the last few years, the disdain is still fresh in thei r collective memory 
and there is no telling how long the present euphoria will last. The bosses 
remain bonded by the solidarity borne of adversity - and in their own 
mistrust of the fickle public. 
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Types of Capital 
Another thing which unites the corporate rulers, whether owners or salaried 
heads, is their possession of one or other form of capital : economic 
(money), educational (qualifications) or social (connections). The theme of 
social inequality in France is very well documented - the hobby horse of a 
number of French sociologists. Alain Girard was one of the earlier 
contributors to the debate: 
"Tout se passe comme s'il existait une veritable transmission 
professionnelle de generation en generation" (Girard; 1965). 
(It's as if professional status could be handed down from 
generation to generation). 
A similar argument was put forward by Pierre Bourdieu who argued in "Les 
heritiers" (1966) that the French bourgeoisie had hit upon a system of 
'social reproduction? whereby the various forms of capital could be passed 
on from one generation to the next - thanks largely to the nature of the 
education system. 
Around the same ti me, a statistical study by researchers at INSEAD revealed 
that of the heads of France's 500 largest firms in 1966-67: 42% had fathers 
who were themselves company heads and 25% could boast at least two 
generations of chief executives. According to Marceau this tendency to 
social closure was reinforced by endogamy, that is, marriage within similar 
social circles (1976; 134). 
These findings are confirmed by the more recent work of Pierre Birnbaum - 
and also by Claude Thelot whose book on the subject bears the appropriate 
title, "Tel pare, tel f il s" (like father, like son). In fact, the social 
reproduction argument is further enhanced by the fact that individuals with 
different political convictions take a similar stance. 
The three forms of capital identified earlier are by no means mutually 
exclusive - more often than not they are cumulative. For instance, the PDG 
whose offspring is not bright enough to reach one of the grandes ecol es may 
well deploy social and economic capital in order to send his children to 
foreign universities - rather than opt for a French university with its 
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'second rate, 1 mage in reg ati on to the elitist grandes ecol es. The value of 
a forei gn higher degree (preferably from an American university) will go 
some way to offsetting the lack of a highly prestigious French diploma. 
Such a conversion strategy is fai rly typical since educational capital is by 
far the most precious form of currency - presumably because of its cleansing 
effect on the less meritorious social or economic capital. Inherited power 
is concealed beneath a veil of merited power thanks to highly competitive 
and overtly objective (based on maths) public secondary and higher education 
system. Bourdieu and Passeron argue that the grandes ecoles transform 
inherited privilege into 'merited' privilege (their thesis as to how the 
sifting process operates is covered in our earlier chapter "The making of 
French managers"). 
As Birnbaum explains this system is not guaranteed to work for a particular 
individual (that is where the element of merit comes in) but on a class-wide 
basis it does ensure the reproduction of the ruling class. That does not 
mean that the individuals at the top are incompetent, but simply that their 
accession was in part based on considerations other than strictly rational 
and objective ones - and in some cases, carried more weight. 
Another example of the way one form of capital will help procure other forms 
of capital is that of those already in possession of educational capital. 
The graduate who comes from a well-to-do family stands a better chance of 
rapid accession to top management than his working class counterpart. As 
Vincent puts it: 
"Si on a un pare bi en places on obtient des avantages qui sont 
evi dents, soit par la position m eme du pare, soit par la position 
des am is du pare. " (Santoni; 143) 
(Having a father in a position of authority is a source of obvious 
advantages, either directly through his actual position, or 
indirectly through that of his friends). 
The various forms of capital will be inherited, invested, accumulated, 
multiplied (through marriage) and converted so that, in Jane Marceau's 
words, "to him that hath, more shall be given. " (Howorth; 1981; 118). Or, as 
Bourdieu put it "capital attracts capital l. 
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Whatever one's mode of access to the "patronat" (top management), the notion 
of predestination is strong. Yvon Gattaz, the former head of the CNPF went 
as far as to say that the desire to be a boss was "congenital", (Zeldin; 
1983; 193). This view of bosses as a hereditary cl ass is corroborated by 
Gail lard's book "Tu seras presi dent, mon f il s" (a chai rman you w il 1 be, my 
son). It is rare in France to succeed from nothing, without any of these 
trump cards. Characters like Fitzgeral d's "The Great Gatsby" are nowhere to 
be seen in French folklore. It would seem that Detoeuf's (progressive boss 
of the 1930s) quip still holds true: 
"En France, pour reussi r, un seul secret: avoi r deja reussi. " 
(Santoni; 174) 
(The secret of success in France is to have succeeded already). 
One is reminded of a saying attributed to Bob Hope about banks only lending 
money to those who can prove they don't need it. 
Activities 
The notion that top managers all round the world partake in the same sort of 
activities is true to a certain extent - but there are differences of 
emphasis which unite bosses from a particular nation and may distinguish 
them from their counterparts in other countries. In the case of French 
bosses, the distinguishing features seem to derive from the nature of the 
relationship with the authorities, and from a certain taste for ritual. 
In terms of activities, there is common ground between all manner of bosses. 
For instance, parallels can be drawn in terms of their dealings with the 
authorities. Whether these are at national level or at local level, French 
bosses find themselves involved with the state to a far greater extent than 
their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. 
In France, when there is lobbying to be done, the onus generally falls upon 
the individuals at the top. Partly this is by virtue of their educational 
background, which wil 1 stand them, in good stead with 1 ike- minded civil 
servants. But status al so enters into 'i to since the state officials w il l 
find the attentions of a PDG more flattering than those of one of hi s 
'lackeys'. However, when the qualifications of the PDG are somehow 
inappropriate, a more suitable corporate representative may be sought out. 
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For instance, confronted with a rather thorny issue, the head of a 
provincial production plant, an engineering graduate, elected to send his 
second-in-command, the "di recteur admi ni strati f", to meet the local "pr6fet" 
- this in the knowledge that the pr6fet would be an "enarque" and in all 
probability, a graduate of "Sciences-po" (the favoured preparation for 
l'ENA). In the administrative director's own words, "the conversation 
'somehow' got round to 'Sciences-pot and the period we were there - and the 
dialogue was much easier after that. " 
At a local level, the head of a production plant or small business will be 
considered "une personal ite locale" and his presence is often requested at 
official functions. Relations with the mayor and the town council will be 
attended to, so that favours do not fall on deaf ears later. For instance, a 
hypermarket manager in our observation sample wanted to use the municipal 
stadium for the corporate football team's home games. With the town council 
making an unnecessary fuss over the matter, the head discretely reminded 
them that the local handball team was sponsored by the company. Needless to 
say, access to the facilities was granted. 
Another example from our observational case studies involving reciprocity 
was demonstrated in a communist-dominated municipality. Late one afternoon, 
at about 5 p. m., the Communist mayor with whom relations were strained to 
say the least, telephoned the head of the business. He explained that he was 
in a fix since he had invited a number of guests from England (neo-Marxists 
according to the PDG), and the factory they had intended to visit, had gone 
on strike - so, finding a substitute factory was a matter of some urgency. 
The PDG gave his approval and the visit went off without a hitch. Later that 
year, the poor results of the company's divisions meant that 50 people had 
to be 1 ai d off, so the PDG contacted the mayor. He outlined the situation 
and explained that the last thing they needed was a stirring up of public 
disapproval. The mayor . "qui avast la haute main sur la CGT" (who had 
control over the communist-based union, the CGT) reassured the PDG that he 
need not worry and stood true to his word. 
At a national level, the same sort of preoccupations were evident on a 
larger scale. For instance, the national management of the same hypermarket 
which had negotiated access to the municipal stadium, were trying to 
persuade those concerned to ref rame the legislation on pharmaceutical 
products - and lift the chemists' monopoly on their sale. 
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Another company, selling luncheon vouchers, was i nvol ved inl obby ing the 
authorities for greater tax relief on their service where the profit margins 
were melting away. Of course, when secured, these concessions would benefit 
the entire ? industry', not just the company in question. But there was 
rather convenient division of labour since the company's main rival happened 
to be a co-operative. So, if a left wing government was in power, the head 
of the co-operative would "go and see his socialist friends" - if the right 
were in power, it was the turn of the company's PDG "d'al l er au charbon" (to 
go to work). In the face of this "force majeure" the two competitors 
collaborated to achieve the best possible deal for the industry. 
In a similar vein, the head of a leading pet food company was exerting 
pressure on the treasury minister to place their product in a lower VAT 
bracket*1, on the basis that pet food was a necessity not a luxury. 
Irrespective of the success of this request, the pleading was designed to 
raise part i mentary awareness of the company's performance and shatter the 
illusion that "c'est une activite facile qui rapporte gros" (it's an easy 
way of making money). The real aim was to legitimise their business so as to 
pre-empt "some half-wit parlimentarian from demanding that we be included in 
the uppermost VAT bracket. " 
Another feature of French corporate management is the need to comply with 
certain duties, either by law or by custom. It may be worth highlighting a 
few of these which distinguish the French employer from his Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts at least in degree. The company head will generally attend the 
works' council meeting ("comite d'entreprise"). His presence will also be 
expected at internal ceremonies such as handing out of medals (which range 
from the basic "medail le du travail "t through "meilleurs ouvriers de 
France", to the highly-prized "Legion d'honneur"*2). Other, internal 
appearances include best wishes for the New Year, and cocktails for special 
(and not-so-special) occasions such as departures. The PDG will also be 
*1 - France has three basic VAT rates (33%, 18% and 5%) together with a 
special category for cars (28%) so as to keep the French automobile 
manufacturers internationally competitive. 
*2 - Where the PDG is himself the recipient of the 'legion d'honneur" it may 
be pinned on him by the minister for industry. At Accor, those not privy to 
attend to the ceremony in person, were cordially invited to watch it live 
on closed-circuit tv. 
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called upon to attend a number of statutory assemblies with the unions or 
with employers' organisations. One gets the impression that the French chief 
has more official duties foisted upon him than his Anglo-Saxon counterparts 
- and what with 'Il a reunioni te" (meeting-itis) of which the French are so 
fond, the boss's day seems al most enti rely prepl anned. 
Finally, in the list of distinguishing activities is one which is new to the 
French boss, namely the art of media communication. With the new public 
interest in business, bosses suddenly find themselves the subject of 
considerable media attention. They are increasingly accountable to the 
general public and their views are eagerly canvassed by reporters. This is 
proving just as time-consuming for small bosses with the regional press, as 
it is for large employers with their national counterparts - since the 
former, though less solicited, do not have a specialist in public relations 
at their disposal to take some of the burden off them. 
The new leader must be "un homme de la communication" (a communicator) - and 
the bosses are aware of this new imperative since many are taking courses on 
how to present themselves effectively on TV. One specialist consultant in 
this field, explained to the researcher that he had seen the number of heads 
seeking advice multiply ten-fold in the last decade. Indeed, his appraisal 
of the situation was endorsed by the fact that even large management 
consultancies (such as the CNOF) had been forced into providing media 
induction courses in order to satisfy demand and to maintain their blanket 
coverage of available management development courses. Of course, it may be 
held that this media exposure is not strikingly different from what goes on 
in the UK, but this facet of the boss's work should be seen in the French 
context where it is* on the whole, novel. 
Photofit picture 
Finally, the ranks of the "patronat" al so bear a number of outward 
similarities. An annual check-up by 1'Expansion of big business in France 
("La gal Brie de portraits des Brands patrons") is particularly revealing in 
thi s respect. Of the 100 bosses surveyed: 
- 50 are grande ecol e graduates - including 6 'enarques' and 29 
polytechni ciens' . 
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- uniy i nave no-t; unuergone higher education, and of those only 
two (each with their own business) admit to being 'autodi dactes'. 
- In terms of age, 14% are in the 40-50 age group; 38% are between 
50-60; and a surprising 32% are in the 60-70 bracket - the 
remainder are divided almost equally between over 70s and under- 
40s. 
- Not a single woman appears in the sample population, "l'univers 
de la grande industrie" (the realms of big business). 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings. Firstly, French bosses 
are highly qualified in international terms - and those who were not privy 
to higher education prefer to keep quiet about it. Little pride is derived 
from having succeeded against the odds or being a 'self-made man' - 
presumably because those who were bereft of qualifications had other 
resources to fall back on such as heritage. Secondly, as a group they are 
relatively elderly, certainly in comparison to the workforce they lead. This 
is a finding corroborated by Maurice (1986; 274) who points to a number of 
empirical studies which have shown that French company presidents are older, 
on average, than their German counterparts. Finally, they appear hostile 
(whether consciously or not) to the infiltration of women in thei r ranks. 
The fact that big business is an exclusively male domain is worth 
investigating in more detail. 
Women bosses 
The French business world and its uppermost stratum in particular, remains 
to a large extent, a male bastion. This is partly the result of the overt 
chauvinism of the grandes ecol es which supply industry with its business 
elite. The foremost school, 1 'Ecol e Polytech niq ue, did not open its doors to 
women until as late as 1972. What is more, the annual intake of women at 
1'ENA rarely exceeds 15% whilst at Polytechnique the ? barrier' is around 10% 
- this, in spite of the fact that the percentages of women candidates are 
approximately double those figures. The heads of the schools are baffled, 
but the indications are that the entrance exam somehow militates against 
female success - thus denying women access to these seed beds of top 
managerial tal ent. 
Women are perhaps discouraged in first place because the top "grandes 
ecol es" are founded on 'vi ril el val ues - decisiveness, networks, 
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hierarchies, comradery and dominance. There is little place for "feminine" 
qualities like nurturing, accessibility, intuition or openess. The 
curriculum too, bears the stereotypical masculine hallmark of logic, 
mathematics and Cartesianism. Boltanski explains: 
'Les valeurs viriles inculquees dans l es grandes ecol es conduisant 
traditionnell ement a des positions d'autorite daps l'industrie, 
comme 1 'Ecol e des Arts et Metiers ou 1 'Ecol e Central e, sont 
fortement exal tees et recherchees. " (1982; 325) 
(Qualities of leadership and other manly virtues inculcated by 
schools such as the Ecole des arts et metiers and Ecole central e, 
whose graduates have traditionally assumed positions of authority 
in industry, are highly praised and exalted). 
The traditional hostility towards 'soft' values is also linked with France's 
attachment to classical management - after all, it is in classical 
management that our association between man and management is rooted. Was it 
not Henri Fayol who helped designate management 'a man's job' by equating it 
with rational and deductive aptitudes such as organising, commanding and 
controlling? But even before Fayol imposed his 'macho' view of management, 
top management in France was dominated by engineering graduates - something 
which is still true today. 
The combined legacies of engineering and classical management have done 
little to facilitate female access to top management. In fact, the few women 
who did manage to infiltrate this preserve seem exceptionally gifted: women 
like Yvette Chassagne, who graduated from 1'ENA and was the first woman to 
be appointed in a succession of prestigious civil service posts and recently 
retired as the head of l'Union des assurances de Paris; entrepreneurs such 
as Annette Roux, the PDG of Beneteau pleasure crafts (and the only woman on 
the CNPF's executive council); or, Francine Gomez, who inherited and worked 
wonders with Waterman pens. Cynics maintain that the regular appearances of 
these women in the management press is an attempt to allay fears of 
underepresentation. They are sometimes referred to as "femmes alibis" (token 
women). 
It may be that French women have been socialised into adopting a more 
passive role than their cohorts in other countries. No doubt the bourgeois 
values (based on aristocratic aspirations) which are blamed for influencing 
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French businessmen have also marked their wives and daughters. The idea of 
the wife having to work was considered to reflect badly on the ability of 
the provider to fulfill his role. And the daughter was seen not in terms of 
a potential inheritor of the family business, but as bait t o attract a 
'competent" son-in-law. Alternatively, Francine Gomez (the PDG of Waterm an 
pens) suggests a more endemic explanation for French women's attitude to 
power: 
"Les horn mes ont un de si r de puissance que Wont pas 1 es femmes, 
c'est physiologique. " (Harris; 39). 
(Men have a craving for power which women simply do not possess - 
it's physiologi cal). 
Optimists point to the belated emergence of an enterprise culture as a 
possible way round traditional barriers. Certainly, the starting up of small 
businesses by women has received a lot of publicity, notably in the women's 
magazines. And institutional backing was provided by the socialists in the 
form of a Ministry for women. 
This, together with the new managerial emphasis on openess, accessibility 
and intuition may help to undermine the masculine stereotype of top 
management. To some extent, the traditional view of management as a 
logical, mechanistic process is being replaced by a more 'feminine' 
approach. The new manager is seen as "un animateur pas un gendarme" (a 
facilitator not a traffic cop); as someone who should be accessible and 
supportive not distant and di rective. The foundations are perhaps being laid 
for more widespread female involvement. Certainly, courses in management 
studies are attracting more women - at least three of the well-rated ESCHE 
business schools (Le Havre-Caen, Pau and Toulouse) have equal percentages of 
male and female students (source: Annual re national des ecoles de commerce; 
L'Etudiant). It can only be a matter of time before women start to filter 
through to top management. 
In spite of these encouraging signs regarding wider female involvement in 
management, there is a nagging feeling that the very highest rung may 
continue to elude them - in much the same way as it continues to elude the 
under-forties. This is tied to the concept of corporate leadership in France 
which seems to demand more than mere management ability. 
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JJ'IQ role 
The way the. French view their national leaders may give an indication of 
what they expect of their corporate leaders. 
The central isation of authority in the hands of an individual is a long- 
standing and popular trait in France. The authoritarian central i sers in the 
nation's history are all glorified and looked upon as heroes - stemming from 
monarchs like Philip the Fair at the start of the 14th Century, through 
Richelieu, Mazari n, Louis XIV, Col bert, Napoleon and most recently de 
Gaul 1 e. 
One could posit that the French reputation for individual ism requi res strong 
leadership to galvanise them into collective action - as de Gaulle did after 
World War H. The umbrella of his prestigious paternalism helped to provide 
a national focus in the period of turmoil and moral confusion after the 
Liberation. The French are prepared to entrust one man with absol ute 
authority, provided he is remote and cannot act directly upon them. They 
have a taste for the personification of power and show deference towards it. 
Today, General de Gaul l e's absolutism is in many ways replicated by Francois 
Mitterrand's style of government. In fact, the history of the 5th republic 
(1958- ) is replete with 'monarchic' leaders who apparently adhere to the 
philosophy 't'etat c'est moil', 
For instance, before reaching office Francois Mitterrand, pronounced the 
following indictment of Giscard d'Estaign: 
'Dejä pourvu des grands pouvoirs que l ui confere la Constitution 
de la Ve Republique et heritier d'usages et d'abus qui en ont elargi le 
champ, il s'est empare de ceux qui lui manquaient... L'executif, c'est 
l ui...,, le legislatif, c'est l ui..., le judiciaire c'est l ui. " (Le 
Monde; 11/02/81) 
(As if the tremendous powers invested in him by the constitution 
and amplified by custom and malpractice were not enough, he has 
seized those which he lacked... he is the executive..., the 
legislative..., the judiciary). 
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This from the president dubbed "Un roi social i ste" (a socialist monarch) by 
Konrad Muller (1983), his own biographer. 
Another, manifestation of the elevation of selected individuals can be seen 
in the way that former political leaders tend to embody political 
philosophies. Sympathisers are referred to as "gaulliste", "pompidolien", 
"giscardien", "chiraquien", "barriste" (in the way reserved in Britain for 
monarchs or longstanding leaders: Victorian, Thatcherite, Churchillian). 
The tradition of omnipotent political leaders is echoed in corporate 
ci rcl es. And company law replicates the French constitution by conferring 
absolute power upon a single person. 
France has a singularity in terms of company law: the President Di recteur 
General (PDG). Based on the "Führerprinzip" model imposed by the Vichy 
regime in 1940, French corporate management has the peculiarity of placing 
in the hands of an individual what, in most countries, is shared out: 
deciding o n, executing and co ntrol i ng a policy. The PDG is w hat B ri tai ns 
would regard as 'Chairman of the Board' and 'Managing Director' rolled into 
one. His role is in even sharper contrast to that of the primus-inter-pares 
German Vorstandsvorsitzender (a chairman of the executive committee). This 
point was brought home by the PDG (CEO) of a small firm visited, who 
cl aimed: 
"Je peux tout fai re sauf vendre 1a soci ete". 
(I can do what I please with the exception of selling off the 
company). 
This concurs with Horovitz' view of French businesses as 'one-man shows' 
(1980; 64) which is nicely captured by Sem pe's illustration (see Exhibit 
10), and is further reinforced by an article in 1'Express, stating: 
''Le patron regne en maitre absol u, quitte 
a etre blackboule sans 
preavis par le conseil d'administration. qui le designe". 
(L'Express; 1/3/85; 33) 
(The boss rul es likea feudal overlord, unless there isa 
spontaneous vote of no confidence from the administrative council 
which elected him). 
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Tenure appears almost completely assured (barring political interference) 
irrespective of age, longevity and even to some extent performance. The 
status of the PDG is sharply differentiated from that of the rest of top 
management, which helps to explain why bosses are so revered in France. 
"I1 faut voi r, en parti cul i er dans 1 es grosses entrepri ses 
nationales, Papparat et le phenomene de cour qui entourent les 
preci eux PDG, avec hui ssi er personnel, ascenseur prive et 
col l aborateurs directs qui servent du 'Monsieur le President? gros 
comme le bras a cel ui que des Ameri cai ns appel l erai ent tout 
simpl ement'Bob' ou 'Bill"' (L'Express; 1/3/85,33). 
(It is difficult to imagine the pomp and cicumstance which 
surrounds the CEO, particularly in large national companies. What 
with his own 'orderly', private lift and a cortege of immediate 
subordinates who earnestly address him as "Sir" when Americans 
would simply cal 1 him 'Bob' or 'Bil 1'). 
These are, clear manifestations of the difference between PDG and those 
around him - rather like a yucca tree, which grows strong while killing off 
everything around it. Other signs of the demarcation between the PDG and his 
staff, can be seen in the apparels of power. By Roger Al exandrePs reckoning, 
a chief is identifiable "ä l'epaisseur de la moquette, a la cylindree de la 
voi tune, au nombre de pl antes vertes... " (by the depth of the carpet pile, 
by the horse power of the car, by the number of potted plants... ). What is 
more the PDG's intellectual aloofness is reflected in his physical 
remoteness. France does not favour a 'hands on? approach to management and 
the PDG is invariably out of harm's way: 
"Ou met-on le chef, oü situe-t-on le pouvoir? Au sommet, 
naturel l ement. Au plus haut, au presque inaccessible, la ou 
11humanite a toujours place l es dieux, l es heros et l es 
confitures. " (L'Expansion; 19/05/85; 72) 
(Where should we place the chief, where should we locate the 
power? Why at the top, of course. At the very highest, least 
accessible point, that spot which men have always reserved for 
gods, heroes and jams). 
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The coalescence between God and the boss is actually formalised in a number 
of set expressions, "pl us on est pros du bon Dieu, mieux on se porte" (the 
closer you are to God, the better off you are). Similarly, "l e patron de 
droit divin" (divine right boss) is a phrase which is in popular usage to 
describe those who acceed to power by birth. On another occasion in our 
observational study, a perplexed cadre emerged from the boss's office 
muttering, "l es voi es du Sei gneur sont i mpenetrabl es" (the Lord works in 
mysterious ways) - which again denotes the PDG's supremacy. 
Since one individual is endowed with so much power, the status of PDG has 
tended to inflate proportionately. As Dyas and Thanheiser put it: 
n"Etre PDG" (to be a president) is referred to as belonging to a 
caste apart, regardless of the size of the operation being run. 
The respect is given almost more to the ability of a president to 
exercise absolute authority than to the actual power to influence. 
And "de PDG" (as in "vol ture de PDG") has become an adjectival 
phrase to descri be a high status item somewhat as the word 
'executive' is used in the US. " (1976; 246) 
There is also a measure of self-fulfilling prophesy in this 'one-man show' 
image. The perceived status and authority associated with the title of PDG 
affect the behaviour of both title holder and those around him. Dyas and 
Thanheiser (1976; 246) quote a French cadre who speculates that simply being 
named PDG has an impact on behaviour, bringing out the autocratic 
tendencies - the sort of outlook typified by 1'Expansi on's "ten toughest 
bosses" (19/09/85). In its bid to identify the nation's top despots, 
1'Expansi on took statements from those who worked alongside them. This is a 
typical selection: 
- "L'autorite est du style quasi mil itai re. Quand il convoque, 
c'est pour dans deux minutes" (It's not unlike a military regime. 
When he calls you in to see him, you don't play hard to get). 
- "Il est au courant de tout, y compris des probl 
emes personnel s, 
il a des sous-marins partout" (He permanently knows what's going 
on, including personal probl ems - he has spies everywhere). 
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- "Ultracentral isateur. Les meil leurs cadres deviennent des 
executants. Il si gne tous 1 es cheques ä1a main. " (The ul ti mate 
central iser. The very best managers are reduced to puppets. He 
signs every cheque by hand). 
- "Quand il slest fait son opinion personnel l e, il ne sait plus 
scouter" (Once he's made his mind up, you might as well talk to a 
post). 
- "I1 faut etre di sponi bl eä tout moment. Les coups de tel ephone ä 
des heures impossibles, ýa pleut" (You must be available at all 
ti mes. Tel ephone calls come raining in at all hours). 
The notion of the all-seeing, all-knowing boss is fairly widespread in 
France. This makes it difficult for the bosses themselves to ask the advice 
of their subordi nates since, as one cadre expl ai ned, the "patron" is 
supposed to have a monopoly on ideas and solutions: 
"Il est parfois mal vu pour un PDG de consulter ses collaborateurs 
au sujet d'un probleme dont il est cense, par sa position, 
con nattre la solution. " 
(It is generally bad show for a PDG to consult his staff about a 
problem to which, by his position, he should know the answer). 
Nor are subordinates encouraged to offer up alternative solutions on matters 
where "l e president consi dare detenir la veri te" (1'Expansion; 19/09/85; 92 
- where the CEO's word is gospel). As one of Francis Bouygues' staff put it: 
"Chacun avait le droit de prendre la parole, mais peu de 
temerai res osai ent 1e contredi re. " 
(Everyone was free to express themselves, but few were reckless 
enough to disagree with him). 
Bosses are perhaps encouraged in their despotism by the very fact that they 
have been traditionally disliked by the French public, which leads them to 
take a 'devil-may-care' attitude to the popularity of their management 
style. It may be that their authoritarianism stems from the fact that they 
are disliked (and consequently do not care) rather than vice versa. This 
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view was suggested by a number of comments: 
"Je ne veux pas qulon m'ai me, je veux qu'on m'obei sse" (Harris; 
84) 
(I want people to obey me, not 11 ke me). 
"De toute fapn, il est detest4, le patron. Le probt eme nest pas 
d'etre ai me, mais d'etre respects et suiv i. " (Harris; 94) 
(Anyhow bosses are hated. The aim is not to be liked, but to lead 
and to be respected). 
But the signs are that this approach suits the French - that they actually 
admire them. Why el se glorify them by searching for the nation's toughest 
boss? 
The PDG is effectively at liberty to do as he pleases - something which 
manifested itself in the way that bosses behaved towards their subordinates. 
The conduct of one particular boss from the sample is worth highlighting 
since by Anglo-Saxon standards it would appear rather unusual. 
The boss in question had an obsession with picking people up on minor faults 
- correcting their French on a number of occasions: not "prendre la ports" 
but "passer par la ports"; not "aller au coiffeur" but "allez chez le 
coiffeur" (rather like correcting someone on "different to" or "equally as" 
in English). He also castigated a woman for chewing gum and a cadre for 
tal king with a ci garette in his mouth. He was no doubt cari catural in the 
extremity of his behaviour, but the trait was visible among other bosses in 
the sample. Another boss, insisted on correcting a cadre who used "ennuyant" 
rather than "ennuyeux", and invariably drew attention to missed 
subjunctives. These are not, in fact, si gns of disrespect for the personnel 
since the same boss who was such a stickler for savoi r fai re claims he would 
never take the liberty of sitting at a subordinate's desk - he refuses to 
exploit his authority. 
Perhaps the motive behind correcting subordinates is that the patron sees 
himself as responsible for the education (au sens large) of his workforce. 
On the upside for instance, the pedantic boss described above, made a point 
of complementing one cadre - after checking in the dictionary - for 
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employing an aaj ective never before heard by the boss. He congratulated 
another cadre "pour une lottre bien tournee" (for a stylishly written 
letter). Perhaps such behaviour is to be expected since it is conventionally 
the boss's education which sets him apart from his subordinates (see chapter 
on "the making of French managers"). Therefore to correct a grammatical 
mistake is a means of reaffirming one's intellectual superiority and, by the 
same token, one's right to lead. 
Explanation? 
The desire to entrust one person with absolute power is a trait identified 
by Crozier in his classic analysis, ''Le phenomene bureaucratique". He starts 
with the basic premise that the French are individualistic. Consequently, 
they will not tolerate dependence relationships which impinge upon their 
freedom of action. Yet, the collective action requires some form of 
leadership. So, an omnipotent conception of authority has emerged whereby 
the locus of the power is sufficiently remote to preserve the independence 
of the individual. Crozier characterises the French model as: 
"preferring to submit to impersonal rules and to appeal to a 
superior authority than to fight and compromise in its own right. " 
(1964; 251) 
Individuals are quite prepared to accept the arbitrary decision of a distant 
leader since it provides direction but guarantees independence. Such a 
perception of decision-making might seem alien to the Anglo-Saxon mind which 
believes that decisions should be taken at the point of action. But the 
French approach compensates for loss of detail with enhanced objectivity. 
On a national scale, this willingness to bow down to a greater design can be 
seen in the French system of "pl ani f icati on indicative" (five year plan) 
which was successful for several decades while long range planning was a 
meaningful exercise. The French approach is perhaps epitomised by the senior 
civil servant who explained: 
"In the final analysis, the best decisions are the ones that are 
made when one is able to be at some distance from reality" 
(Crozier; 1982; 222). 
228 
The present chapter has attempted to hone in on the French corporate leaders 
in terms of how they reach the top, how they are perceived, how they 
perceive themselves and what is expected of them. Particular attention has 
been given to their changing image which coincided with the arrival of the 
socialists to power and the cult of managerial i sm imported from the US. 
We noted that the PDG enjoys comparatively higher status than his Anglo- 
Saxon counterparts, the CEO or MD - that he was, in fact, more of a MD-cum- 
chairman of the board. Partly, this is a product of the legislation, but it 
is al so a cul tural and sociological preference. French preference for 
Napoleonic leaders appears to permeate all walks of life. There seems to be 
a need for a father figure to channel French individualism into collective 
action. 
Because of this common role, it is possible to talk of French bosses as 
constituing an indentifiable "milieu" which holds certain shared beliefs, in 
a way not found in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
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11. ODRPORATE CUL1U RE 
"It's very difficult for me to explain what is distinctive about 
the company - the singularities are a part of my mental 
furniture. " Conversation with M. Lafforgue, Di recteur General 
Technique, 1'0r6al - 8/04/87. 
Corporate culture is a difficult thing to grasp. Yet, it is an aspect of 
organisational life which an outsider is perhaps better placed to appraise 
than insiders, who grow oblivious to corporate idiosyncracies. 
In this section, four companies have been picked out for closer scrutiny. 
The selection is based on spontaneously cited examples of what are 
considered typical French companies. Although each of the four companies is 
unique, it is hoped that a number of common threads may emerge - and that 
these elements may provide some clues as to the national identity of French 
companies. 
A recent book parodying the careerist tactics which offer the best chances 
of success in particular French firms included a fairly comprehensive 
selection of the top French firms (including two of the companies cited 
1 ater). But, by the book authors' own admission, one conspicuous absentee 
was Michelin - the reason being: 
"... que 1'organi sati on cul tive avec une redo utabl e of f icaci to 1e 
goOt du secret. " (Wickham; 1983; 206) 
(... that the company has an extraordinary capacity for the art 
of secrecy). 
TM s research has al so been affected by the company's renowned secrecy. 
Affirmations about the firm are derived from interviews with high ranking 
personnel but have not been confirmed by informal contact with 
junior 
personnel or by periods of direct observation. Even with this limitation 
the 
standing of Michelin certainly justifies a discussion of 
its culture. 
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it is gene rci i ýy ayi-ecu L. nCI t, secrecy is a definite feature of this company. 
Outsiders are immediately confronted with it since interviews are conducted 
in a meeting room which acts as a no man's land between the the company and 
the outside world. But this is no reflection on the status of the visitor 
since even de Gaulle was forced to leave his presendential cortege at the 
entrance when he came to visit the company in 1959. 
It is a company which makes appearances in the specialist or trade press but 
is rarely si ghted in the management press. The role of the journalist is 
seen as being fundamentally opposed to the interests of the company: 
"Votre metier est de percer l es secrets. Le notre est d'assurer 
l'aveni r de la Mai son. " 
(Your job is to penetrate secrets. Ours is to safeguard the 
future of the Company). 
Anonimity has become a way of life, and the tone is firmly set by the 
discretion of Francois Michelin, the grandson of the founder. So contagious 
is the desire to avoid 'Ile vedettariat" (stardom) that even the person in 
charge of public relations prides himself on only having been quoted on two 
occasions, and that was by mistake. Still more surprising, there was talk of 
the same head of public relations naming a porte parole of his own - but the 
idea was finally turned down on the grounds that it would degenerate into a 
sort of cascade effect. 
Of course, efforts to stay out of the limelight tend to fuel speculation. 
And exaggerated rumours persi st simply because the company refuses to be 
drawn into public deni al. One example is the lingering myth that presence at 
mass was compulsory for the personnel. Whilst it is true that Francois 
Michelin is a devout Catholic, the rumour itself is totally unfounded. In a 
way the company is a victim of its own secrecy - and its head, Frangoi s 
Michelin, all the more enigmatic for keeping a low profile. He is a man of 
few words, who holds by the Chinese proverb, "Tu es pri sonni er de la parole 
que tu vas lächer" (you are a prisonner of your next word). 
He claims that his behaviour is the result of corporate socialisation: "Ce 
que je suss c'est la Maison qui l'a fait" (Michelin made me). Francois 
Michelin sees himself as no more than an inheritor of the tradition 
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niilatea Dy his granaratner: 
"... la grande ombre d'Edouard Michelin, sa clairvoyance, son 
mepris de l'opinion publique. " (Internal publication, May 1945). 
(... the almighty spectre of Edouard Michelin, his vision, his 
contempt for public opinion). 
The founder's influence is undeniable, but the present head does not do 
himself justice. By shunning publicity when others are clamouring for it, 
Francois Michelin has done far more than simply perpetuate a legacy. Media 
interest in business has reached such a pitch in the 80s, that staying out 
of the limelight has to be a conscious decision. The company regularly has 
to turn down offers of free publicity, including one from the American 
Institute of Management which sought to present the company in a book on 
management success stories. 
Francois Michelin's attention is turned inwards rather than outwards. He 
sees his responsibility as being to ensure that people fulfill themselves: 
' iue chacun dev i en ne ce q u' il est". He uses simple imagery to get this 
message across: 
"Imaginez que vous ayez trois verres sur cette table. Un grand, un 
moyen, un petit. Le role d'un patron, c'est toujours de faire en 
sorte que chacun des verres puisse se rempl ir d'eau au point de 
deborder. " (Freydet; 203). 
(Imagine three glasses on a table - one small, one medium, large. 
The boss' role is to see to it that they are permanently 
topped up) . 
The si mpl i ci tl y of his language is just one aspect of a corporate culture 
which has oriental overtones and which has prompted the description, 'Il a 
plus j apo nnai se des entreprises f rancai ses" (the most Japanese French 
company). It is worth exploring this comparison since the company exhibits 
several traits traditionally associated with Japanese companies. 
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Many of Francois Michelin's speeches include messages which would be 
considered trite or hollow in other companies, or from other heads but are 
not in his case. Take his conditions for success, expressed in the company's 
brochure: 
"Au fond, ces conditions du progres expriment 1 'essenti el : rester 
jeune et ouvert sur la r6alite des hommes et des choses. " 
(Simply stated, progress is dependent upon our staying youthful 
and open to the reality of men and things). 
Another example was Francois Michelin's speech when awarding the "knedai lle 
du travail" to a number of workers: 
"Derriere le contrat q ui vous lie ä la Mai so n et q ui lie la 
Mai son ä chacun de vous, il ya un contrat moral, un contrat de 
conf lance qui nous 1 ie l es uns aux autres avec nos clients et qui 
est le vrai fondement de l'ouvrage. " (1'Expansion; 1979; 104) 
(Underpinning the contract which ties you to the company and which 
ties the company to every one of you, there is a moral contract 
which ties you to each other and to our customers. That is the 
real basis of our work). 
Two further points emerge quite forcefully from the above speech : firstly, 
a concern for the customer and secondly a heavy dose of paternalism. 
Whilst the company is not overly concerned with public opinion, it is 
clearly committed to its customers. As Francois Michelin himself explains: 
'ta seul e mission dune entrepri se, crest de servi r ses clients" (a company 
has only one mission - to satisfy its customers). Senior managers spoke 
convincingly about the fact that they were fundamentally answerable to the 
customers who are literally trusting them with their lives every time they 
purchased a Michelin tyre. What is more, it is the customer, not Francois 
Michelin who really pays their wages. ' 
There is more than a hint of paternalism in the reference to a moral 
contract between the individual and the company in the short passage quoted 
from l'Expansion - an idea reinforced by the use of the noun "Mai son" to 
237 
designate the company, wnicn has the same overtones as House in English used 
in., for example, the fashion business or publishing. Another obvious 
manifestation is the workers' reference to "Monsieur Frangoi s". This is 
typical of family concerns in which it has been necessary to distinguish 
between various members of the family. 
Paternalism at Michelin has been a powerful and 1 ongl asti ng force. But it 
has still been steadily eroded as a result of state intervention. For 
instance, holiday camps, the Christmas tree, leisure spending have all been 
put in the hands of the Works' Committee. And control over corporate schools 
was rel i nq ui shed to the state, al bei t as l ate as 1967. This is regarded in 
Michelin as a "d6responsabil i sation" of bosses who need no longer concern 
themselves w ith the wel l fare of the workforce. Nonetheless, at Cl ermont- 
Ferrand, (the heart of the company), there is still a Michelin hospital, a 
sports complex and a chain of stores which bear witness to the company's 
sense of pastoral responsibility. 
Michelin also displays certain Japanese values in its personnel policies : 
recruitment, promotion, training and employment. 
In terms of management recruitment, Michelin rarely seeks to fill a specific 
vacancy: 'Nous cherchons des gens qui fassent carriere" (we are looking for 
people who want a life long career with us). A "Michelin Man" was described 
to me as, "self-motivated., self-respecting and self-sufficient". He should 
also be able to cope without an envel oppi ng hierarchy or a "titre ronflant" 
(pompous title). The consensus was that Michelin Men are made not born, but 
that there is certainly an element of predisposition. The recruitment policy 
is biased towards young entrants who, as the head of personnel put it, 'bnt 
une formation mais pas de deformations" (who are qualified but not 
corrupted). 
More recently, there have been a few problems with experienced "cadres" who 
have joined the company. Until the 1960s the company relied on home grown 
talent notably from the region of l'Auvergne which is a rather dour region 
in central France. But expansion and internationalisation provoked a call 
for new blood with broader experience. Inevitably, the steadfast values of 
the company have provoked occasional culture shocks among individuals who 
were not "type Mai son" (company men). 
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Recrul ted usua iiy at an early age, immersed in the corporate cul ture, there 
is a sort of cl ubbi shness about the company. Managers will talk fondly about 
the career progress of people who were on the induction course at the same 
time as them. An essential part of the induction program is to learn 
humility (very Japanese) which can prove a hard pill to swallow for the more 
extravert who are quickly brought back down to earth. One divisional head 
was quite adamant that it was one of the rare companies where 'bn peut 
gagner en s'appuyant sur l es faits" (you will win if your argument is 
founded) ; and where one would ultimately fail by trying to "vendre du vent" 
(pull the wool over people's eyes). 
In terms of career development, the company seeks to fit the job to the 
person rather than vice versa. Individuals are given a free rein as well as 
the concomittant "droit a 1'erreur" (right to foul up), to accumulate what 
responsibilities they feel capable of taking on. As one cadre quaintly put 
it, people are like the Michelin Man of the well-known advertisement - they 
are allowed to inflate their jobs to their natural limits. A job definition 
is determined by the particular aptitudes of its incumbent. This notion was 
epitomised by the experience of the head of Public Relations. He started off 
promisingly in the prestigious R&D section of the firm but it became clear 
that his personal skills would make an ideal Communications person out of 
him. He took on the post in a small way and turned it into a significant 
force in the company: l9 e poste a grossi avec l ui" (the post grew with him). 
This is empire building with a difference - it is not a negative force. 
Horizons are not blocked and "aucune rente nest acqui se" (no position is 
for keeps). 
The familiar race for inflated titles is minimised at Michelin since there 
are none. Managers will introduce themselves modestly as Mr. X, Michelin*. 
Officially, even Francois Michelin has no more of a title than anyone. He is 
modestly known as the "gerant" (manager) in the corporate vernacular. Even 
corporate heroes such as. the inspired worker who invented radial tyres are 
not glorified in the company folklore. On the other hand, workers' 
suggestions are considered seriously and rewarded appropriately - the 
implication being that anyone may make a useful contribution but everyone 
-------------------------------------=------------------------------------- 
*- The absence of formal titles with the exception of financial director 
and plant manager can prove quite disconcerting for outsiders who like to be 
able to situate their opposite numbers - and some concession to titles has 
therefore been made in order to accommodate outsiders. 
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is on an equal roozi ng. rrancoi s Michelin rejects the spurious distinction 
which opposes "patron" and "salaries" and points instead to a common goal : 
"Tous ceux qui travai ll ent chez Michelin ont un meme dessein: 
fabriquer le meilleur produit possible pour le client. " (Freydet; 
206) 
(All those who work for Michelin have a common goal : to make the 
best possible product for the customer). 
This smacks of the advice given by Peters and Waterman in "In search of 
excellence" (1982). The authors singled out a number of successful companies 
whose priority was customer satisfaction through product quality. 
Another feature reminiscent of Japanese business, is the commitment to 
lifelong employment. We have already seen how recruitment and promotion 
policies are geared towards life long careers through careful selection and 
acculturation of entrants. The same applies to the organisational structure 
which was put forward as being a web, as opposed to the more familiar rake 
or pyramid. It is claimed that the company lives without an organisational 
chart. In a way, the company has a biological aspect with each cell 
fulfilling its natural function. Of course, there are grey areas where 
responsibilities are not clear. But it is this natural slack which helps to 
preserve lifelong employment - thanks to what the French call "voi es de 
garage" (sidings for burnt out managers) or on a grander scale 'fonctions de 
delestage" (functions or departments which have been put out to grass). 
Finally, in terms of Japanese similarities, the company exhibits caution, 
patience and meticulous planning in its approach to exporting and production 
abroad. They are willing to export for decades before committing themselves 
to manufacturing on the spot. Nor does the company suffer from the 
traditional French weakness of impatience when results are not forthcoming. 
Instead it shows aw il 1i ngness to devote ti me and money to establishing 
links, preparing the ground and sealing a contract. 
The company philosophy is based on a certain pragmaticism which manifests 
itself in "le culte des faits" (quest for proof, or as Harold Geneen of ITT 
called it, the search for unshakeable facts! ). There were several references 
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to the i mporance or truzn and the need to support one's case with hard 
facts. One cadre explained that the company gives a priority to facts rather 
than financial, political or "custom and practice" considerations. The 
implication is that the truth will out. 
What holds true at interpersonal, interdepartmental level, is equally true 
at corporate level. The company is not given to "di scours intoxicants" 
(inflated opinions) or predictions about new products, profits or likely 
performance. Information is not released unless the company is capable of 
backing it up. Indeed they prefer to underestimate targets in order to avoid 
unnecessary speculation. Frangoi s Michelin's language is devoid of the 
hyperbole normally associated with corporate figureheads. On the contrary, 
his is "un langage dune banal ite stupef iante" (a language devoid of 
pretention). Yet, it is meaningful to those imbued by the Michelin spirit. 
Further proof of corporate integrity can be seen in the decision by the 
Algerian government not to nationalise the company. Michelin justifiably 
derives much pride from the fact that it was the only foreign multinational 
spared that fate -a real tribute to its moral rectitude. 
This no-nonsense approach is perhaps a manifestation of the company's 
provincial roots, and more specifically its origins in Auvergne. It is one 
of the few companies which persistently shuns the bright li ghts of Paris. 
While the likes of Peugeot claim to retain their provincial identity with a 
nominal presence in Sochaux, Michelin's bosses are actually based in 
unglamourous Clermont-Ferrand. They have not renounced its provincial 
o ri gins. 
The region of Auvergne is believed to exercise a profound influence on 
corporate values. Certainly, the company mirrors the cautious, thrifty, 
sober and conservative attitudes which characterise that region. What is 
more, the French provincial disdain of Paris as depraved and superficial is 
reflected in the company's refusal to succumb to the lure of Paris. So in 
spite of the company's global expansion it remains staunchly based in 
Clermont and its officials still eschew the salons of Paris. As one cadre 
p'ut it to me, "When they tell you it's raining in France, they mean it's 
raining in Paris. " Perhaps it is thanks to the fact that it remains little 
known to the authorities that it escaped the national i cations which befell 
half a dozen big industrial firms (including Elf-Acq ui tai ne, Saint Gobain 
and Thomson) under the Socialist (Mitterrand) regime in February 1982. 
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uo I Iv IVUý LV L. 1 v-P % parochial ism, Francois Michelin steers w el l 
clear of the crowd of civil servants, bankers and industrialists who 
consort to run France. A divisional head explained how Francois Michelin 
shuns the fallacious trappings of power. He illustrated the point by saying 
that Francois Michelin would not have to ring twice to have an audience with 
a Minister. Yet he refuses to indulge in that sort of egotistical power 
mongering. So, while Michelin might resemble Dassault, the aeronautic 
pioneer, in many respects, he is totally different when it comes to 
relations with the state. 
The company has a very strong production orientation. For instance, the 
Factory is designated with a capital letter like "la Maison, le Patron ou le 
Client". In fact, the Factory is used as the generic term which implies the 
company as a whole rather than the place of work. 
Technically speaking, Michelin has no reason to hide its 1 ight under a 
bushel. It is one of the few companies in the world which has single- 
handedly transformed an industry by a revolutionary invention, namely the 
radial tyre (1946). Its reputation for innovation and quality products is 
second to none, as reported in a recent survey in 1 'Expansi on (3/12/87). 
There is no skimping on research. The company reputedly devotes 5% of its 
turnover to R&D. By doing this irrespective of financial wellbeing, it has 
managed to retain its technical advantage over competitors. Indeed, part of 
the reason for the recent opening out of Michelin was to let the public know 
that poor performance would not impinge on research programmes. The 
development of the public relations department was a 'proactive' move 
designed to attenuate possible fears that a downturn in performance would 
1 ead to R&D cut-backs. 
Michelin frequently develops products related to wheels and the vehicle 
suspension system, but it sells the technologies to others (again, "a la 
j aponnai se"), preferring to concentrate on tyres. The company sees no need 
to diversify, any further than the guide and maps. These were shrewd 
developments since they guarantee a permanent association between the 
company's name and the idea of travel for pleasure. The deci sion not to 
emulate Goodyear and Firestone in wider diversification (to cushion the 
volatile automobile market) is based on Francois Michelin's philosophy that 
diversification is not the company's problem but that of the 
sharehol ders. Francoi s Michelin displays a shrewd awareness of what the 
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company is sei i ug - the fundamental need to travel. And he real ises that 
to-date, there is nothing better than a tube of rubber envelopping a mass of 
ai r under pressure to get about on land. That is the raison d'etre of 
Michelin. 
There is a very real affinity with and respect for the raw material. Rubber 
is venerated as an quasi mystical substance and one which lends itself to 
corporate analogies. Francois Michelin himself claims the company is like a 
tyre ("Nous sommes pneumatiques") - supple and resilient. The company is 
al so compared to its embl em (the Michelin Man) in its resol ute 
determination to swallow all obstacles placed in its path. 
This association between company and emblem was carried to its logical 
conclusion in London's Fulham Road where Michelin House was built in 1911. 
The tyre showroom broke new architechtural ground by using the facade to 
advertise the product. The Michelin building embodies the bravura and 
ebullience of Mr. Bibendum (the Michelin Man) himself. To employ the company 
engineer Mr Franpi s Espi nasse, who may or may not have been an architect, 
to design the building was a brave stroke. The result was a building which 
was not only functional but also incorporated the selling of tyres and the 
promotion of an image. 
Another Michelin trait is the importance of freedom. First and foremost, 
this means independence from state interference. But secondly, it means 
steering clear of "the Parisian virus" which, according to Francois 
Michelin, merely cuts people off from reality. And finally, for the head 
himsel f, it means vol untary excl usion from the French employers' 
organisation*. 
The company values its independence, not to say isolation. Michelin's is a 
closed world whose workings are difficult to grasp. Indeed the more one 
delves into it the more one wonders how it works. And yet... Michel in is a 
testimony to the fact that a different management philosophy from the 
traditional US blueprint can work - not only in France but also in the US. - 
where Michelin has five production plants as well as research and testing 
centres. 
*- Feeling let down by the alleged irresponsibility of the Confederation 
Nationale du Patronat Frangai s (the French Employers' Organisation) in 1968, 
Francois Michelin decided to opt out of the organisation. 
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Strangely enougn toe avant-gua rde technology goes hand in hand with 
practices that some might describe as archaic. The company was characterised 
by a senior manager as having one foot in the 19th century and one in the 
21st century. This manager intimated that they were trying to eradicate the 
19th century side, yet without it, the company would not be Michelin. 
The company is run in a dedicated, unpretentious way which is deeply rooted 
in its provincial origins. There is a strong sense of what the company 
values - modesty, a respect for facts, personnel and customers. Clear ideas 
and consistent language, 'tangage simple , idees fortes". Its members speak 
intelligently and convincingly about what makes this organisational 
anachronism tick. 
Michelin is perhaps the ideal representative of French corporate culture - 
or at least it would be if it were not so exceptional. It embodies both 
extremes of what typifies French companies. 
L'Air Liquide 
L'Air Liquide is a family firm producing industrial gases. It is the world 
leader in its field and boasts large market shares in Europe, North America 
and Japan. 
In its own way, l'Air Liquide is even more self-effacing than that paragon 
of discretion, Michelin. Of course, it has the advantage of manufacturing an 
industrial rather than a consumer product. But in addition to this, it does 
not shun publicity in quite the same obsessive way that Michelin does, and 
therefore avoids undue attention. 
In its long history the company has always done its best to stay out of the 
limelight - to steer clear of litigation with either customers or personnel. 
As a matter of policy the company refuses to lay people off for economic 
reasons - the only proviso being that individuals accept transfers. Anyhow, 
in view of its impressive profit record, the company would probably be 
prevented from making anyone redundant by the "Inspection du travail" 
(equivalent of the Department of Employment in UK). So, although l'Air 
Liquide bears the battle scars of lost markets, failed initiatives and 
missed opportunities, it gives an impression of immunity from injury. The 
company has earned an unparalleled reputation for stability. 
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This has made the company a firm favourite with investors. Its shares are 
highly respected in the investment fraternity who look upon them as "une 
valeur de fond de portefeuille" or "une valeur de pere de famille" (blue 
chip investments). These are the corporate equivalent of granny bonds - they 
will provide shareholders with a steady income year in year out. 
Primarily for this reason, the company boasted by far the largest private 
share ownership until the recent spate of privati sati ons. It has over 
300,000 faithful shareholders. Their influence has a considerable impact on 
the company's actions and in many respects determines the corporate culture. 
The atomi sation of the company's capital means that the group is 
theoretically vulnerable to the sanction of the market. The sharehol ders can 
decide to vote with their feet if they are not happy with the management. So 
the company is particularly attentive to its shareholders. This is rather 
unusual for French companies, which are generally unsympathetic to gains 
not earnt through effort. But the PDG, Edo ua rd de Roy ere, is quite adamant 
that the shareholder takes priority: 
"Chez nous, 1 es acti onnai res passent avant 1e banqui er. S'il ya 
une bonne affaire ä realiser, c'est l'actionnaire qui dost en 
profiter. " (L'Expansion; 16/04/87; p. 64) 
(Here the banker takes second place to the shareholder. If there's 
a good deal in prospect, the shareholder must be the first to 
benefit). 
On the other hand, provided the company retains the goodwill of its 
shareholders, it is in a stronger position than companies with a more 
concentrated ownership. Some consider that the company can partly thank its 
shareholders for avoiding nationalisation in 1982. Had it not looked after 
its small shareholders properly, 1'Ai r Liquide might have suffered the same 
fate as the nationalised companies whose disillusioned small shareholders 
offered little resi stence - succumbing easily to the state pay-off instead 
of putting up any resistance. Another feature of the share ownership which 
promotes solidarity is the absence of differentiation. The company has 
avoided several categories of share, which might prove divisive and 
frustrating. It has opted instead for a system which entitles shareholders 
to financial benefits but limits their decision-making participation. 
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Many of the corporate characteristics em i nate di rectly (perhaps 
subconciously) from the image of stability which the company seeks to 
proj ect. 
Visually speaking, this stability is apparent in the sartorial temperance at 
Head Office. The aim is not to stand out (contrast with 1 '0real ), but to 
maintain a low profile. The same reasoning lay behind the company's recent 
decision to sell the company jet which gave an unnecessarily flashy 
impression to customers and personnel alike. The trappings of corporate 
success must be toned down in an era where money is one of the few remaining 
taboos. Again this shows considerable sensitivity to the image projected 
and is somehow reminiscent of the frayed curtains, threadbare carpets and 
ink stained desks in the solicitors' office - comforting signs which give 
the impression of low fees and inspire the confidence of their thrifty 
cl i entel e. 
The company does not value the showy approach of some of its counterparts: 
for instance, the head of Saint-Gobain (Polytechnique graduate but modest 
origins) was regarded by one senior cadre as excitable and lacking in 
'savoi r faire? in comparison to the sober Edouard de Royere (PDG of l'Ai r 
Liquide and a member of the French provincial aristocracy). The austerity is 
also visible in the attitude of the PDG who, according to one senior 
manager, is barely happier when the shares go up unexpectedly than when they 
go down. What he wants to see is measured progress based on performance, not 
speculation - it is precisely to quell volatility that, according to one 
sharehol der, "la societe fait tout pour lisser ses resultats" (the company 
does everything to smooth out its results). It is this sort of attitude 
which prompted 1'Expansion (16/04/87) to describe the company as having, "on 
management aussi discret que peu remuant" (a management whose discretion is 
matched only by its aplomb). 
For the same reason, political activism is not appreciated when it 
interferes with professional life. The upper echelons are particularly 
sensitive to the development of a "hierarchie parallele" which might 
undermine 1111hierarchie naturelle". For this reason when informal discussion 
groups ("droit d'expression des salaries") were introduced by the 
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sociaiis-cs, tine company took the precaution to impose the "chef 
hierarchique" as session leader rather than run the risk of having a 
political activist elected as group leader (the theme is discussed in the 
chapter on labour relations). 
The family nature of the business also contributes to the stability. With 
only three bosses in over ei ghty years, one could hardly hope for greater 
continuity. Of course, the massive reigns of Edouard de Royere's two 
predecessors (Paul Delorme 1902-45; and his son Jean Delorme 1945-85) have 
left their imprint on the firm. So in spite of his long apprenticeship as 
the firm's second in command, Edouard de Royere has had some difficulty 
stamping his own personality on the company. 
He is also faced with the problem of modernising the image of the company, 
"de rompre un long silence" (to break a long silence) without shocking 
public opinion or his predecessor who has been given an honoury post as 
"President du com ite general consul tats f"*. As the head of public relations 
told me: 
"15 yeahs ago, the company was like a black box - no-one knew what 
was going on inside. But now there is pride in the company's 
ach i ev ements. 11 
This contrast in exposure was underlined by the fact that 1'Air Liquide now 
sub-contracts the measurement of column inches and tv seconds allotted to 
the company to determine the value in terms of publicity. The Head of Public 
Relations pointed out that, until recently, this would have been a useless 
exercise owing to the company's secrecy and the absence of media expo sure. 
Jean Delorme, the present PDG? s father-in-law would not hear of being talked 
about in the press or being photographed (ä la Michelin). But de Royere 
would like to dispel the company's rather staid and comfortable image "d'une 
grosse entreprise tranq ui lle, sans relief et bi en nourri e. " (of a large 
company which is aloof, characterless and slightly overweight). 
*- Thus bearing out the old French chestnut - "Once a presi dent, always a 
president" (of some committee or other). 
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Curlousiy, ror a company wnich is so familiar to investors, the company is 
remains little known to the general public. The decision to set up a public 
relations department was not really intended to remedy the fact - it was 
more for the benefit of the shareholders. In the light of media interest in 
corporate affairs, lýAi r Liquide could not afford to stay hidden, since this 
might be interpreted as a sign of i na da pta bili ty. If the company showed 
inability to move with the times on the communications front, sharehoders 
might equate this lag with i nadaptabil ity, backwardness or worse still, 
skeletons in the cupboard. And with the company so susceptible to rumours 
something had to be done. 
So, like Michelin, l'Air L iq ui de's concession to expose itself was a 
proactive move primarily desti ned to allay sharehol der fears. Still, the 
Head of Public Relations was not enti rely convinced that the medi a 
revol ution was anything more than a passing fad. These sentiments were 
echoed by Edouard de Royere hi msel f, who showed scepticism about the current 
'love affair' between companies and the media: 
"Je ne croi s pas qu'il suff ise d'un coup de pub pour obteni r la 
confiance des actionnai res. " 
(It takes more than a bit of advertising to gain shareholder 
confi dence). 
And he adds that it has taken l'Air Liquide several decades to gain the 
trust of their shareholders. 
The caution displayed by the company - in exposing itself and its profits.. 
in avoiding negative publicity - is a deep-rooted trait which finds physical 
form in the head office. When it was built, in 1932, the building was 
designed to double up as a hotel should the existing business turn sour. 
This may have been a wise precaution on the part of the founder, but it has 
left a legacy of mazy corridors and isolated offices. 
The physical geography of the building does not lend itself to easy 
communication - either spoken or physical. What is more, the sumptuous, 
marbled decor (reminiscent of a museum or ministerial office), seems to 
militate against any sort of informal contact - the only coffee point for 
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instance, is in the basement. Whilst this is an extreme example, it does 
highlight French attachment to classical management and the rejection of 
spontaneous exchanges, or what has been dubbed "management by walking 
around", as a legitimate means of communication. The French attitude to work 
is based on the ideal of intellectual effort. 
The coldness of the architecture seems to have repercussions on the 
personnel. Wickham (1982; 324) refers to the company thus: 
"L'Ai r Liquide nest pas repute pour la cordial ite des relations 
que lion entretient avec ses col l egues. " 
(L'Air Liquide is not renowned for promoting friendly relations 
between colleagues). 
The climate is certainly rather reserved when it comes to interpersonal 
relations. A fact corroborated by the generalised use of the "vous" form of 
address*1 which plays a protective role for those in authority. Whilst I was 
there, a secretary was at a loss to communicate the forename of one of her 
immediate superiors in order to book a flight. Similarly, considerable 
importance was attached to being on first name terms with the PDG. Only five 
or six people were privy to it, and it was deemed, "une marque d'esti me 
extraordi nai re" (real recognition)*2. 
The company appears strong on vertical differentiation - quite literally, 
since the importance of managers at head office could be determined by their 
position along the plumb line linking earth to the sky. The PDG was at the 
summit and the typing pool in the basement - which gave new meaning to the 
careerist's quip "pour titre plus pres du Bon Dieu" (to be closer to God). 
*1 - The "tu/vous" distinction and the preference for first names or 
surnames proved useful "litmus tests" when attempting to determine the 
nature of interpersonal relations. 
*2 - One is reminded of Pierre Daninos (1960): "A ma connaissance, il ya 
quatre personnages qui ont droit aux fleurs (comme le patron'. " (To the best 
of my knowledge, there are four people who are entitled to have the same 
sort of flowers as the boss). 
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Having reached the desired 'altitude' (same floor as the PDG), thoughts turn 
towards geographical proximity. It was ironic that the Public Relations 
managers whose role as company impressario brought him into constant contact 
with the boss, would never be given an adjoining office for fear of 
upsetting the numbers two and three. The PR manager described himself as an 
'offshore' cadre (i e. outside the direct hierarchy) and therefore an 
unsuitable candidate for such a choice spot. Instead he was on the same 
floor - but "cote cuisine" alongside the secretaries. Even if the regularity 
of contact logically warranted a closer office, the proposition was 
inconceivable from a prestige point of view. Protocol dictates that the 
general must be surrounded "par son etat major" (by the top brass) - even if 
the radio operator is his most valuable ally. 
Whist the preceeding description tends to burlesque the situation, these are 
latent but very real concerns. For all their egalitarian claims, the French 
seem to cherish pecking orders and the perks that go with them. To indicate 
the meteoric rise of a mutual acquaintance, one plant manager explained to 
another, "il a un parking au siege" (he has a parking space at head office). 
There was also a hint that political games were being played at Head Office 
where one progressive young manager had suddenly become more cautious "I1 
n'y pas longtemps il foncai t, j usqu'ä ce quion a commence äl ui glisser des 
peaux de banane" (he used to rush headlong, until they started slipping him 
a few banana skins). 
As regards careers, the favoured route to the top is allegedly research. 
This is perhaps understandable in view of the research orientation of the 
company. Research and the ability to find concrete commercial applications 
for new products are deemed the groups main assets. Though a promising young 
'Central ien' who had started in research claimed that research was a dead 
end - adding "pour avancer dans cette bolts il faut se frotter au client" 
(to make headway in this company you have to move into the commercial side). 
It is noticeable, though not necessarily significant, that he referred to 
"bol'te" (meaning firm) which is colder than the more homely "mai son", 
employed by Michelin personnel. 
Another promising route was said to be expatriation. It is understandable 
that mobility within the group is valued since the majority of the 
company's activities and personnel are abroad. What is more, the management 
of its international implantations is regarded as an essential 
apprenticeship for taking on the group's more prestigious French operations. 
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Ana moui ii L-y i-a.. important means of diffusing the corporate 
culture, "veritable ciment de l'ensemble" (a real corporate stiffening 
agent) promoting group coherence. 
It al so helps if one isa graduate of 1'Ecol e Central e, though al 1 three top 
engineering schools (Polytechniq ue, Mines and Central e) are w el l 
represented; as well as the top business school.. HEC. Edouard de Roy ere 
(Valeurs Actuelles; 21/07/86; p. 32) explicitly denied the popular rumours 
that there are "maf ias" within the company by stating that the upper 
echelons were not recruited as a result of their qualifications: 
"Les membres de la direction general e ne sont pas recrutes en 
fonction de leur di pl omes au sein de chapel l es particul ieres. " 
(Those on the board of di rectors are not sel ected on the basis of 
qualifications obtained from particular establishments). 
Clearly, there is some confusion about the best recipe for success at 1 'Ai r 
Liquide. But the fact that the PDG feels compelled to comment on them tends 
to suggest there may be an element of truth in the rumours. Still, it is a 
company which is committed to life-long employment (with a qualification of 
mobility) and which encourages "promotion interne". 
Independence is another key word for the company. Like Michel i n, l'Ai r 
Liquide is determined to stay clear of the state in spite of obvious 
attractions: 
"Bien sur, -nous pourrions titre tentes de ceder ä teile ou teile 
pression des pouvoirs publics, par exemple en mats ere 
dI investi ssements. It 
(Of course we coul d be tempted to succumb to pressures from the 
state, for example where investments are concerned). 
This independence is of course based upon a solid financial base, which 
allows the company to snub the state. It has enjoyed spectacular post war 
growth - without state assistance. According to their Head of 
Public 
Relations, the company's policy is to be "une bonne citoyenne" - to put new 
legislation into practice quickly, and never to ask for subsidies or "passe- 
droit" (favours). In exchange for steering clear of the state, the company 
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does not expect the state to interfere in its running. As with Michelin, 
this is believed to have contributed to their avoi dance of National i sation 
in 1982 - since the company was an un known quantity. Indeed one plant 
manager jokingly wondered how much the company had paid the Socialists to 
stay off the Nationalisation lists. 
On the matter of the future the question was raised about prospective 
successors to Edouard de Royere, "Do his sons work here? ", I ventured. Not 
yet", let slip a senior manager. He added that the logical successor would 
have been Jean Delorme's own son (rather than his son-in-law) but in spite 
of his intelligence he was politically imprudent, had played his cards badly 
and now found himself permanently "ä l'ecart" (sidelined) - in a Singapore 
diving equipment subsi dua ry. 
L'Oreal 
Like l'Ai r Liquide in industrial gases, 1'0real is the world leader in 
cosmetics. Like 1 'Ai r Liquide it has an enviable financial and export 
record. Like 1 'Ai r Liquide it has known only three heads since it started in 
1907. Like 1 PAi r Liquide its penultimate head has been forced into 
retirement having reached the statutory age limit but retains an honoury 
position as advisor. 
But, whil st the two compani es share si mil ar track records, they are very 
different in character. For instance, l'Ai r Liquide's low key approach is in 
stark contrast with 1'0real's polished image. For the last two years 1'0real 
has been voted top in the corporate image stakes by the readers of 
1'Expansion (3/12/87). Company reputations were judged on six criteria - and 
Or6al won two individual categories (quality of management and capacity to 
innovate) as well as the overall title - ousting the illustrious IBM from 
that position in the process. 
The company bears the hallmark of the product it sells - appearances matter. 
On a superficial level this can be seen in the sophi sti cated and arti sti c 
decor at head off ice and in the sartorial el egance of its personnel. Yet, 
the characteristic percolates much deeper than this - Wickham (1983), a 
cynical observer of French careerist manoeuvres, goes as far as to suggest 
that it colours managerial behaviour. At a number of levels substance plays 
second fiddle to style. 
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For example, the production plants out in the provinces - establishments 
conventionally associated with purely functional goals - pay real attention 
to 'window dressing'. The offices are pleasantly decorated, the plant 
manager smartly dressed, and the corridors carpeted. Even the production 
line was marked by 'Ile souci de l esthetique" (a concern for aesthetic 
values). Production managers would enthuse about the visual merits of glass 
protection over metallic protection on the machines: "ca donne älali gne 
une allure geniale" (it makes the production line look wonderful). 
There was a concern for making the workplace more pleasant for the benefit 
of visitors and personnel alike. The customisation of machinery was 
encouraged and bright colours were used to liven up normally dull workshops. 
There was what one production manager termed, "un cote cinema" (showy 
aspect) to all this, but there were also sound practical reasons. The 
judicious use of glass protections on the machinery meant that workers could 
see what w as happening on the production li ne. The pleasing appearance of 
the workshop made workers more inclined to keep it clean and tidy. 
However, the point about image consciousness was brought home most 
forcefully at a meeting attended on the external re-decoration of the 
factory. The meeting was a presentation of the various types of wall 
covering available for the facade. For nearly an hour the discussion 
revolved around the visual impact of the various coverings as typified by 
phrases like: "ton pourra faire des trucs marrants" (we'll be able to do some 
fun things).. "un brin de fantai si e" (a touch of inspiration), "rendre la 
facade v ivante avec la1 umi ere" (make the facade lively with light). One 
form of covering was even deemed "plus fin, plus noble" (more refined and 
noble) - not the sort "quIon retrouve partout" (you see everywhere). Not 
until the very end of the hour long meeting were practical considerations 
like resilience or cost brought up - again the preoccupation was with 
appearance rather than function. 
L'Oreal 's culture has been heavily influenced by two men - the founder, 
Eugene Schuel l er and his successor and penultimate PDG, Francois Dalle. 
Between them they 'ruled' for nearly 80 years-(and Dalle now heads the 
"Comite strategique" regarded by some as a sort of golden cupboard, "un 
placard dore"). They incarnated the two driving forces of the company 
namely, research and marketing. 
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Research was the great strength of the founder Eugene Schueller who invented 
the first artificial hair colourings. This tradition has been reinforced by 
the appointment of the current PDG, Charl es Zviak, whose enti re career at 
1'0real has been in fundamental and applied research. He spells out this 
commitment in slightly melodramatic terms in the company brochure: 
"Il etait une foss une entrepri se qui avait choi si 1a qual ite et 
1 es moyens dIobteni r cette qual i te: eile av ai t choi si 1a 
recherche. " 
(Once upon a ti me, there was a company which had chosen quality 
and the means of achieving that quality; it had chosen research). 
"L'essenti el, c'est de chercher, toujours chercher. Les i dees 
viennent quand on a la volonte acharnee de promouvoir lventrepri se 
a la poi me de la qual ite, a la poi me de 1'innovati on. " 
(The main thing is to seek, ceaselessly. Ideas will come if the 
company is wholeheartedly devoted to staying at the sharp end of 
quality and innovation). 
L'Oreal is continually innovating and coming up with new products. So 
research is critical to the company's success - but to capitalise on that 
research requires marketing dexterity. The man responsible for giving 
1'0real this appetite for marketing was Francois Dalle, a particularly 
fervent admirer of "l e marketi ng ä 1'americai ne". When he took over from 
Eugene Schueller in 1957, he introduced marketing techniques borrowed from 
the likes of Procter and Gamble - and these had a considerable impact on the 
unsophisticated French consummer. 
For instance, when 1'0real launched its now famous tetrahedral shampoo 
container ("shampooing-berlingot") it revolutionised French social habits. 
Novel packaging, clever promotion and low price, turned the product into an 
instant success. It also transformed the French into the world's most 
devoted hair washers - this in spite of their otherwise poor reputation 
(among developed countries) for personal hygiene. 
It was Dalle who coined the phrase, "Saisi r oe qui commence" as a corporate 
rallying call. This dictum reflects the company's obsession with being at 
the centre of things. The company's main concern is not to miss 
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opportunities. ivii ss g the boat on the trend in 'natural' products was a 
particular disappointment - despite the fact that the company has now made 
up for lost time. This was a severe blow to the corporate ego which prides 
itself as being a trendsetter not a follower. 
Before handing over the reigns to Charles Zviak in 1984, knowing that the 
latter was due to retire in 1988, Francois Dalle nominated a successor. His 
name is Lindsay Owen-Jones and his background, like Francois Dalle's, is in 
marketing. Many look upon the current PDG, Charles Zviak as an interim PDG 
who is 'minding the store' until Francois Dalle's "fil s spirituel"., Lindsay 
Owen-Jones, comes of age. (Dalle himself was nominated by his predecessor, 
Eugene Schuel l er). Lindsay Owen-Jones, or O. J., as he is known, is 40 and a 
graduate of Oxford University. So the company looks set for another lengthy 
reign, as well as a slight shift back towards marketing. 
When questioned about the strengths of 1'Oreal, Lindsay Owen-Jones paid 
tribute to the company's commitment to research and marketing, but went on 
to underline the quality and motivation of 1'Orealls management - something 
he attributes to being picked early: 
'Nous avons la chance, pour la tres grande maj on to d'entre nous.. 
de faire notre vieä 1'0rea1. J'y s ui s entre pratiquements, comme 
tous mes camarades, di rectement ä1a sortie de 1 tUniversa to et, a' 
40 ans, j'ai presque 20 ans de l'Oreal derriere moi. " (L SA; No. 
1057; 15) . 
(The vast majority of us are fortunate enough to build our careers 
at L'Oreal. I entered the company, like all my colleagues, 
straight from University, and now aged 40, I have had nearly 20 
years as a company man). 
The same is true of Charles Zviak and his "etat-major" (council).. most of 
whom have been with the company all their working 1 ives. The company clearly 
places a high premium on loyalty. This was obvious from the slightly 
derisory way a plant manager referred to his young second in command - with 
a tally of four companies to his name: 
"C'est un carri 6ri ste. I1 n'a pas de maison - comme un escargot" 
(He is career-minded. He has no house (firm) - just like a snail). 
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This commitment to 1 te- gong employment has several repercussions - notably, 
on recruitment and promotion policies, management training and on the 
handling of 'burnt out' cadres. 
sources recruitment 
As one might expect of a company which pl aces a premium on ideas and 
initiative, 1'0real can not afford to recruit from a single source. It must 
cast its net wide so as to avoid the problem of too many like-minded 
individuals stiffling creativity. So, as one personnel manager put it, "par 
vol onto de pl ural i sme", the company recruits indifferently from both tiers 
of higher education - universities and "grandes ecol es" (see chapter on 
'Destiny" for clarification of the distinction). 
This is rare for a large group, particularly a successful one which could 
recruit exclusively from the cream of the grandes ecoles if it wished. 
L'Oreal sees itself as a sort of "equal opportunity employer" as far as 
university students are concerned. This fact was corroborated by the 
presence of university people in a number of key posts, not least Director 
of Management Development. However, the insistence with which the cl aim 
"nous n'avons pas peur des universitaires" (we're not scared of university 
people) was reiterated, tended to draw attention to their second cl ass 
status in France - the point would not have to be made if there were parity 
between the two sides of higher education. 
Lindsay Owen-Jones sees motivation, rather than qualification, as the main 
recruitment criterion: 
"I1 faut fai re un choix entre ceux qui recherchent l'appartenance 
a 1'0real parce qu'il sy voient une fawn de slexprimer dans une 
organisation dejä dynamique, et ceux qui cherchent avant tout une 
securi te, qui ont envie d'etre portes par la vague. Nous avons 
besot n de porteurs, et pas de gens ä porter. " (LSA; no 1057; p. 
15). 
(We must distinguish between those who see 1'0real as a means of 
expressing themselves in an active company, and those who seek 
security first and foremost, and want to be carried by the wave. 
We need locomotives, not wagons). 
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L'Oreal appears less than sympathetic to the old school tie allegiances 
("les mandari Hats") whi ch often dominate French companies. Perhaps this 
reflects the university backgrounds of its leaders. The company has nothing 
against gran des ecol es graduates, but it expects them to set a si de th ei r 
schooling when they join the company. As Fr ancois Dalle put it: 
"Nous souhaitons seulement qutetant chez nous, ils gardent le 
moms possible 1'esprit de l'ecol e d'oü il s viennent. Nous 
souhaitons qulils perdent cette forme d'orgueil que donnent les 
grandes ecol es. Nous voulons des hommes disponibles, et non pas a 
priori superieurs. " (Priouret; 115) 
(We simply hope that once admitted, they don't retain the spirit 
of the school to which they belonged. We hope they lose that sort 
of conceit typical of grandes ecol es. We need people with 
adaptability, not a superiority complex). 
As with recruitment, individuals are judged on their merits and on their 
performance "on the job" rather than by their educational credentials - 
though Francoi s Dal 1e qualifies this, by saying: 
"Sous cette reserve que nous attachons beaucoup d'importance ä la 
culture et 1a formation q ue represente un di p1 öme. " (Priouret; 
111). 
(Bearing in mind that we attach a great deal of importance to the 
culture and training which qualifications represent). 
When a post comes up, there is al ways conscientious "tour de piste" (lap of 
the track) before the company looks outside for talent. They are proud of 
their internal promotion tradition. Even "autodidactes" have a chance of 
'making i t', provi ded they pl ay their cards ri ght. One cadre expl ai ned that 
you could make it th rough the tradesman's entrance ("1 a peti to porte" as 
opposed to 'Il a voce royale") but, you have to 'navigate?. This was meant 
both literally; that is, you have to be geographically mobile (such is the 
price for a paucity of qualifications); and metaphorically - in other words, 
you have to be politically adept and manoeuvre judiciously. 
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Whilst there were no clans based on educational allegiances, one cadre 
suggested that there were divisions by generations - "I1 ya l'equi pe de 
Dalle (60-65)", then a gap of twenty years to the 40-45 age range, and then 
a ten year gap including the 30-35 year olds. 
Of course, internal promotion also necessitates some commitment to 
management training in order to prepare "cadres" for changes in 
responsibility. The company was instrumental in setting up a co-operative 
training establishment, the CEDEP (Centre europeen d'education permanente), 
in 1971 on the INSEAD campus at Fontainebleau. This centre is staffed by 
INSEAD professors and provides the company's top and middle management 
personnel (along with cadres from a restricted number of companies) with 
high quality management development. The stated aim of this establishment 
was to provide member companies with a "critical mass" of managerial talent, 
speaking the same language and with the same objectives to enable the 
companies to act coherently and break through the "pesanteurs sociologiques" 
(all forms of sociological inertia). 
Being sent to the CEDEP is invariably regarded as an important sign of 
career development - indeed it often confirms a forthcoming promotion. As a 
result, value it more for instrumental reasons (confirmation of prospects) 
than for its, intrinsic worth (knowledge imparted). Those selected described 
it as: 
'Un peu repeti ti f mais tres val on sant" (a little repetitive but a 
great personal endorsement). 
"C'est la super recompense" (it's the supreme reward). 
"C'est un evenement professionnel" (it's a professional 
watershed). 
"Un sine qua non pour 11avancement" (a pre-requisite for 
promotion). 
The course clearly acts as confirmation of the company's faith in a 
particular individual - it acts as implicit confirmation of one's career 
prospects. But because of the small quota alloted to each company in the 
association, the waiting list "de gens CEDEP-able" (of possible candi dates) 
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is long. Strict ru i es govern eligibility and the appropriate mix of ages, 
functions and hierarchical levels allowed on to the prestigious course. 
There isa touch of hierarchical apartheid si nce 1 earni ng is consi dered a 
potentially embarrasing situation - "on se devoile" (you bare yourself) and 
seminars involve "relations i nti mi stes" (intimate relations). To mix levels 
would be to risk erecting psychological barriers to communication. L'Oreal 
is also careful not to award a diploma with the course - presumably to deter 
individuals from using it as a springboard to leave. 
Burnt out cadres 
A policy of life-long employment implies dealing with individuals whose 
relative contribution to the company is diminishing - what American 
managerial parlance has labelled the "Bobo" (burnt-out but operating) 
syndrome. The grounds for keeping on these individuals are often 
humanitarian: out of tolerance, respect or recognition for having helped the 
group through difficult times. Alternatively, more practical reasons may be 
invoked for their retention: to help nurture young talent, to preserve the 
collective memory of the company and pass on the corporate culture. Or as 
Francois Dalle put it: 
"L'ancien peu rendre des services avec son experience, dans un 
domaine different de celui ou il est reste j usque-1ä" (Priouret; 
116) 
(Senior managers can put their experience to use in an area which 
is new to them) . 
Francois Dalle goes on to explain why he considers the problem of dealing 
with ageing cadres as one of his foremost preoccupations: 
"Je sui s attache ä ceux qui ont fait leur vie dans 1'entrepri se, 
parce que cola correspond ä mon temperament. I1 s'agit lä dune 
simple correction; on ne peu pas etre ingrat avec ceux q ui ont 
con tri bue a faire 1 am ai son. Mais etre fi del e, crest aussi notre 
i nteret; si Von sacri f iai tl es anci ens, l es jeunes n1aurai ent pas 
confiance dans l'entreprise. " (Priouret; 116) 
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(I am attached to those who have spent their working 1 ives with 
the company, because I can identify with it. Being grateful to 
those who have h el helped build the company is simply a matter of 
fairness. But it is also in our interests to stand by them; if we 
sacrifice the older managers, the younger ones will have no faith 
in the company). 
In other words.. Dalle expresses the concern that if 1'0real fails to "take 
care" of its ageing cadres, it risks deterring young cadres from even 
joining the company! 
So the company is left with the problem of what, in practical terms, it 
should do with its loyal servants. L'Oreal is fortunate in that it is large 
and successful enough to accommodate a fair amount of excess weight in the 
so-called "voies de garage" already mentioned for Michelin. 
This slack remains invisible because of "un certain flou" (a slight blur) in 
the organi sational chart. Thi s vagueness woul d seem to confi rm Wickham's 
characterisation (p. 220) of the company as being "tres intuitive, ä 
1'organi sation un peu anarchiq ue" (very intuitive, and rather anarchic in 
its organisation). By his reckoning, territories and responsibilities are 
ill-defined, re-negotiated daily, with politics and careerism rife. 
L'Oreal's personnel is reputedly impulsive, "brouillon" (opaque) and perhaps 
a touch courtesan. As one plant manager expl ai ned, ideas must be sold to the 
right people and support canvassed in the right areas "avant d'al l er 
presenter son projet au 10eme" (before taking a project to the top floor). 
Wickham (1983; 332) also notes that "certai nes decisions seront prises al ors 
qu'el l es n'ont apparemment fait 11objet d'aucune deliberation off i ci el l e" 
(certain decisions will be taken which have not apparently been the subject 
of official deliberation). 
This analysis was born out at plant level where decisions from head office 
were often greeted with incomprehension. Explanations from the head office 
were typically lacking and production plants were presented with a 'fai t 
accompli': "le comment mai s pas le pourquoi des choses" (the 'how' not the 
'why' of things). This proved demotivating for those on the receiving end 
and prompted criticism along the lines: 
'Les economistes de la division manquent de methode, de logique et 
dlobjectifs. 11 
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(The divisional economists are short on method, logic and 
objectives). 
This criticism seems to point to a certain subjectivity in decision-making 
- the implication being that even the managerial ethos is coloured by the 
"pa rattre" (seeming) and "ötre" (bei ng) ambivalence of the product. Cadres 
at all levels would pride themselves on their ability to assess a situation 
without empirical evidence - and there were numerous references to "le 
feeling"or what used to be called "le pif" (the nose). It would seem that 
at 1'0r6al at least, intuition is deemed a legitimate basis for action. 
The professed penchant for intuition, together with the "coloration feminine 
du produit et du metier" (the feminine nature of the product and the 
profession), make the actual paucity of women all the more shocking. One 
female cadre suggested that whilst the company boasts "une Brande 
ouverture" (great openness) towards sex and race, the reality is that it is 
not "tres en avance sur le restant de la France" (very far ahead of the 
rest of France). She went on to explain that research and marketing are 
fairly open to women since these involved limited responsability in human 
terms; but production and sales are strictly out of bounds. Only recently 
have there been any female sales representatives -a real irony for a 
product essentially aimed at women. 
The company operates a decentral ised philosophy. "t'est une culture qui fait 
confiance aux hommes" says one plant manager who receives a budgetary 
enveloppe to allocate as he sees fit. The plant manager himself is referred 
to as his own boss, with a big B. "C'est l ui q ui fait la pl ui e et le beau 
temps de ses cadres" (he determines the lot of his cadres) since it is he 
who evaluates them and awards bonuses - though, as might be expected, the 
evaluation is oral, since writing is deemed to promote vindictiveness. 
The company also boasts the hackneyed "droit ä l'erreur", though one cadre 
suggested this was only possible because of the high profits. In other 
words, it is easy in their position to allow people to pursue far-fetched 
ideas. The result isa virtuous circle where, "il faudrait etre idiot pour 
perdre de 1'a rge nt" (you'd have to be stupid to lose money). 
As with the companies previously described in this chapter on corporate 
culture, 1'0real is a company which boasts total independence from the 
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state. As uai Ie pus. L.; 
'Tlous n'avons rien ä leur demander. " (Priouret; 1968; 120) 
(We have nothing to ask of the state). 
The fact remains that rumours suggest that there may have been one or two 
instances of state indulgence on legislation enabling 110real to maintain 
competitiveness - and these rumours are lent credebility by Francois Dalle's 
longstanding friendship with Francois Mitterrand. Baumier (p. 54) describes 
Francois Dalle as, "Un des rares, parmi ses proches, a tutoyer Francois 
Mitterrand" ("One of the few, in Francois Mitterrand's entourage, on 
familiar terms with him). And, as one rather cynical PDG suggested: 
"So many industrialists say they want government off their backs 
when what they really mean is that they want government in their 
1 aps. 11 
In terms of self image, the company sees itself as a beacon for French 
companies in general, and as an advert for "The French way of 1 ife". The 
company brochure refers to: 
"A travers l es liens multiples que tissent 1 'entrepri se, ses 
produits, ses hommes, s'inscrit une certaine image de la France. " 
(Through the multiple ties made by the company, its products and 
its people, a certain image of France emerges). 
However, behind its international success, 1 '0real faces unsuspected 
problems in finding French cadres to look after their international 
operations. As Francois Dalle put it: 
'Nos cadres sup6rieurs et nos directeurs veulent bi en, pour nous 
depanner, aller un mois ou deux en Am6rique du Nord ou du Sud, ou 
en Asi e, ou en Af riq ue, mais pas au-del ä. " (Priouret; 114) 
(Our senior managers and directors are perfectly willing to go out 
to North or South America, Asia or Africa for a couple of months 
to help us out - but no longer than that). 
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-mhe corpuv 1. C %. u i tu- ii rw the companyls im age ºý age is "soigne (wel 1-groomed). 
Each year the top 50 individuals in the company (19a premiere couronne") get 
together to reflect on the group's culture and the values to be encouraged. 
The trick seems to work since the personnel spontaneously refer to the 
distinctive culture of the company - 'Ile monde de 1'0rea1 ", "1'homme 
orealien", or "une Brande famille" - phrases which one might expect from an 
IBM-er. It clearly leaves its mark on those who enter it. 
Carrefour 
Carrefour isin the vanguard of successful post-war French companies 
alongside groups such as Accor, Club Mediterranee, Bouygues or BSN. 
Carrefour is different from the companies which preceed it in this chapter 
in that it is a retailing not a manufacturing company and was launched in 
the early 60's rather than around the turn of the century. 
Its founders, Marcel Fournier and the Defforey family have been responsible 
for introducing several innovative concepts to the French retail sector - 
most notably the hypermarket and "produits li bres" (no-name products). Over 
the past quarter of a century, Carrefour has developed into one of the 
leading food retailers in Europe -a success which has been built on a 
number of tenets. 
The cornerstone of the firm's operating philosophy has been the 
decentralisation of management. Although financial control is highly 
centralised, and the performance of individual stores is closely monitored, 
in most aspects of operation the company is decentralised. Each store is 
operated as a profit centre and the store manager has complete 
responsibility for the performance and operation of the store which must 
meet sales objectives established annually by the company. 
It is worth noting that this philosophy runs counter to received wisdom on 
responsibility. Clutterbuck and Goldsmith (1984; 29) maintain that whilst 
decentralisation is a hallmark of successful industrial groups, retailing 
operations rely on centralisation. In support of this thesis they cite 
Sai nsbury's and Marks and Spencer which maintain central control over 
design, presentation, stock and pricing. 
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The decentrai 1sa-eyon or authority is intended to provide scope for 
flexibility, allowing store managers to respond to local factors and 
environmental conditions*. The store managers are encouraged to think of the 
stores as their own businesses -a notion made quite explicit by the head of 
Carrefour-France, 'Nos di recteurs doivent etre plus que j amai s des chefs 
d'entrepri se" (more than ever, we expect our store managers to behave like 
heads of thei r own companies). This was confirmed in the field where one 
store manager explained to me that the buck stopped with him, that this was 
the reason for his security consciousness - it was his money that he had to 
fork out - and he underlined the view further by refering to "mon magasin" 
(my store). 
Ironically perhaps, the best testament to the level of discretion enjoyed by 
store managers is that independence is not a hard and fast rule. Store 
managers are at liberty to contravene the decentralisation philosophy and 
get together in small groups so as to improve their competitiveness. Further 
proof of this delegation of responsibility can be seen in the size of the 
head office staff which numbers only about 20, including secretaries, 
chauffeurs and caretakers. In terms of communication too, little more than 
10% of the overall budget is devoted to the national campaign. The latter 
merely serves to set the tone and avoid "une cacophonie d'ini ti atives" which 
would leave the customer "dbpay sä" (confused). 
This commitment to decentralisation does not stop at store manager level. 
Within the store, the individuals in charge of particular sections are free 
to decide which goods they wish to carry and are responsible for negotiating 
additional discounts with suppliers. The aim is to personalise all that is 
on show to the customer. 
Of course, the greater the level of decentral isation the harder it is to 
maintain a sense of corporate identity. Until recently, coherence was 
achieved via an oral tradition. Corporate values were passed on in an adhoc 
way through meetings and informal contacts. Standardisation was given 
further impetus by the systematic rotation of store managers. (Only three of 
the 71 store managers have been 'ten place" for more than three years). These 
methods are still used to communicate corporate beliefs but they have been 
supplemented with a formal expression of "corporate culture". 
*- This would tend to confirm the regionalistic nature of France mentioned 
in the chapter on "Managerial Ethos". 
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In 1979, Carrefour ntroauced a small book entitled Pol itiques" -a sort of 
corporate manifesto which set out objectives and policies as well as 
expounding the corporate philosophy: 
"La perenni te, 11independance et 1a croi ssance reguliere de 
CARREFOUR sont fondees sur les hommes. Tous, chaque jour, 
s'ef forcent d'apporter une repo nse plus harmoni euse aux attentes 
multiples des partenai res de l1entrepri se. " 
(The future, the independence and the regular growth of CARREFOUR 
are based on people. Together, each day we must do our utmost to 
satisfy more fully the many expectations of the partners of the 
company). 
These are regarded as the terms of reference for any initiative, or as the 
Head of Carrefour France put it, "C'est 1'el ement le plus f6derateur de la 
culture originale de notre groupe" (it is the most unifying element of the 
group's unique culture). 
In theory, the exi stence of such a document takes the responsi bil ity off the 
store managers for spreading the corporate gospel. They merely have to refer 
their personnel to the booklet when the need arises. For instance, when 
documents are drafted at a local level, store managers will urge the writers 
to use the existing terminology in order to promote written standardisation. 
Yet, the oral tradition seems to persist. Store managers proved very adept 
at peddling the corporate message using concrete incidents as they occurred. 
For instance, one store manager would make a point of conscientiously 
stopping to pick up litter on the floor of the store. The implications of 
this action were twofold. On the one hand, this confirmed the idea that he 
thought of the store as his own ('Tlous ne sommes pas des fonctionnaires" - 
meaning that they are not civil servants devoid of personal involvement); 
and on the other hand, he was effectively saying to colleagues that no-one 
is too big to bend down and pick up rubbish. In the same vein, on his way 
through the store to lunch (sacred) with a number of cadres, he made a point 
of stopping to answer customer queries (to reinforce the notion of service). 
Afterwards he pointed out to his colleagues that some of their personnel 
still walked off in the opposite direction when they saw a customer heading 
for them. He implores them to "fai re passer le message" (pass on the 
message) to their teams. 
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His example was quickly picked up and applied down the line. In one 
instance, a section was getting a little carried away with its displays. 
This prompted the head of the sector to rehash a message passed on to him 
that very morning by the store manager, namely: "Il faut raisonner client, 
pas professi onnel " (we have to reason like customers not retailers). This 
was in response to a self-consciously clever display which only served to 
confuse customers and impair their judgment. The sector manager then went on 
to remind his team that the company philosophy regarding customers states: 
19e client doit garder le li bre arbitre" (the customer must have freedom of 
choice) . 
This respect for the customer is reflected in another Carrefour peculiarity, 
the inverted organisational pyramid. This is a vivid, if somewhat gimmicky 
image whereby the customer is on top and the top brass at the bottom. Not 
everyone was convinced about the reality or desirability of this claim. Some 
sceptics criticised its feasibility: 'U ne py ram i de äl 'envers ca se casse la 
gueule" (an inverted pyramid is bound to topple). Others, at section level 
failed to carry the logic through and had their own (sector level) pyramids 
"the right way up". But irrespective of these drawbacks.. it isa symbolic 
statement and provides a visual reminder of customer supremacy: 
"C'est 1 ui q ui pace l es sal ai res, 1 ui q ui permet d'i nvesti r, 1 ui 
qui pale l es dividendes aux actionnai res. " 
(It is they who pay our salaries, they who allow us to expand, 
they who keep our shareholders satisfied). 
The inverted pyramid also helps to promote the check-out personnel as those 
in the front line. They are in constant contact with the customer and 
provide the first and critical link in the feedback process - prime 
communicators of customer needs. What is more, the inverted pyramid serves 
to reiterate the central tenet of decentralised responsibility by 
emphasising the way in which the success of the group depends upon its lower 
level personnel. 
Of course contact with the customer is not the sole perogative of check out 
personnel. Even the store manager eats in the same canteen as the customers. 
This enables him to see things from the customers' perspective and to 
eavesdrop on their conversations. The very nature of the work brings the 
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managers into constant contact with the customer and there is an immediate 
response to new initiatives. Because of this immediacy, action was valued. 
There was little point doing two years research, when a makeshift 
improvement could be implemented straight away and fine tuned in function of 
customer reaction. 
As mentioned earlier, there is tangible evidence of the commitment to the 
customer. Respect for the customer's freedom of choice translates into wide 
aisles to ease circulation around the store, objective information round the 
store and an absence of pressure to buy at the check out. Further evidence 
of customer orientation can be seen in the shift away from the original 
"move more merchandise" conception towards a more qualitative approach. The 
customer is no longer offered "rock bottom prices", but a wider choice of 
goods instead. This reflects Carrefour's move away from consumerism and 
towards what the company labels, "humanism". Customers are actively involved 
in the selection of products through in-store questionnaires and 'round 
tables' in which they offer constructive criticism. 
The image of Carrefour as the leading innovator in French retailing is one 
of which the company is understandably proud, and the group has taken steps 
to preserve this reputation. As TV advertising by retailers is prohibited in 
France.. Carrefour has had recourse to less traditional methods, notably the 
monthly "Carrefour Journal" produced individually for each of its stores 
(once again confirming commitment to decentralisation). This eight-page news 
sheet, which accounts for 20% of the group's advertising expenditure, is 
delivered free to nearly a million households. 
But there are other means of getting round the advertising bar. One way is 
to get reported on in the media - rather in the same way that betting shops 
in the UK will take advantage of free editorial to get round advertising 
restrictions*. In this respect, the launch of the "produits li byes" range 
of generic products in 1976, proved an important publicity and marketing 
coup for the company. 
*- For example, William Hill betting shops gained worldwide media coverage 
(which they could not buy) by offering odds on who shot JR, on the name of 
the Royal Baby, or most recently on Chris Bonnington's chances of finding 
the Yeti. 
26 7 
But Carrefour is not averse to grabbing media attention in more notorious 
ways. In 1979, Carrefour first tangled with the thorny issue of the legality 
of comparative advertising, when the group launched an "economic indicator" 
to reinforce the discount element of the Carrefour operation. The 
comparative advertising campaign encroached upon a grey area of the law, and 
prompted a series of law suits from furious competitors. The campaign is 
thought to have cost the company four million francs in legal fees, but made 
a lasting impact on customers: "pa a fait parler de no us" (it got people 
tal king about us. "). 
At a local level the emulation can take many forms. One interesting 
initiative was that of a store manager who managed to gain prime time 
(national news) TV exposure and newspaper coverage (see Exhibit 11) by 
introducing condom dispensers into his store. This shrewd manoeuvre was 
justified on the grounds of responding to the AIDS scare. But the 
introduction of these vending machines, was calculated to cause a stir in 
Catholic France where the subject remains taboo: "on gesti cul e pendant 20 
minutes" (people gesticulate for 20 minutes) before daring to buy the 
offending item. This initiative demonstrated the store manager's presence of 
mind and his eye for a coup; but also confi rmed his independence since he 
did not have to seek Head Off ice cl earance (even on potentially damaging 
publicity) before inviting the film crews to his store. 
Other off-beat examples include a store manager who succeeded in getting the 
Carrefour logo displayed on all the street maps in the locality by offering 
to pay for their printing. Another store manager employed what can only be 
described as "preventive-adverti sing" in his fight against local rivals. 
Following a decision to try to attract more occasional customers, signposts 
were put up to syphon off traffic from the nearby motorway. However, the 
route signalled was neither the shortest nor the quickest - it was simply 
the least competitive l 
The foregoing evidence suggests that there is little love lost among 
retailers. Partly, this is due to the transparency of any new initiative. 
Competitors have easy access (as customers) to the store and are free to 
steal any distinctive advantages since these can not be patented. As a 
result of this visibility, '"espionnage" is difficult to counter which means 
that the best (only? ) form of defense is attack. 
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This can take two forms: firstly, store managers will encourage their staff 
to display the same sort of curiosity as the Japanese when they visit 
competitors in order to cull ideas. And secondly, the company must 
constantly innovate- a real task of Sisyphus, given that nothing esca pes 
copy. But Denis Defforey, the PDG (CEO), takes this philosophically and 
points out, "It is always good to be imitated, because when one of your 
competitors imitates you, he does not innovate. " (LSA 666, 
, 
1978). So the 
company retains its competitive edge. 
In spite of the company's reputation for innovation, retailing continues to 
suffer from longstanding French antipathy towards commerce ('Ice sont des 
vendeurs de sardine" - they are sardine sellers, is the traditional graduate 
line). Nor is the notion of service especially well developed in France. As 
the Head of Carrefour France puts it, "l'idee de donner du service a 
d'autres nest pas toujours tres bien percue" (the idea of serving others is 
not very highly thought of). Consequently, the company finds it difficult to 
attract the high fliers from the grandes ecol es, including business school 
graduates whose training should find an ideal outlet in the retail sector. 
Quite apart from these image probl ems, the company (like retailing as a 
whole) makes hefty demands of its personnel which tend to deter prospective 
candidates. The job has to be learnt out in the field doing menial tasks and 
in stressful contact with the customer. The initial status of "stagi ai re" is 
off-putting for graduates who know they are passing up the chance to be 
named "cadre" immediately elsewhere. Managers are subjected to long hours 
("corveabl e et tail l abl eä merci" - constantly on call) and geographical 
mobility is an essential requirement. Managers can turn down a posting once 
but not twice. 
What is worse, young graduates will be accountable to "une hiera rchie 
autodi dacte" (a hierarchy of self-taught managers) which may jealously guard 
its privileges and is liable to show hostility towards their qualifications. 
One Carrefour manager admitted that this was the case in certain groups and 
alluded to a competitor, Casino, which (in an official brochure) allegedly 
requested of its personnel, 'We pas bloquer les Bens plus intelligents que 
vous" (do not impede those more intelligent than yourself). However, the 
manager in question was adamant that no one was held back at Carrefour, 'nn 
ne met pas de batons dans l es roues i ci" (we don't trip people up here). 
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One thing szuaenzs Know is that their qualification will count for little 
once admitted. The company they are entering has a reputation for self-made 
individuals - in keeping with the background of its founders. Qualifications 
will not procure the same sort of steady progress which it might in more 
traditional firms - "chacun dost faire ses preuves" (individuals must prove 
their worth). 
It is perhaps understandable that grandes ecoles graduates who have exposed 
themselves to risk and won, are loath to do so again when they are 
guaranteed more comfortable posts elsewhere. Deprived of this source of 
talent.. Carrefour tends to look towards the Instituts Universitai res de 
Technologie (IUT) as its favourite hunting ground. These IUT offer two year 
vocational courses and turn out students who are well equipped for careers 
in retailing, and who do not suffer from delusions of grandeur, (or as one 
store manager put it, "C'est nous les plus beaux, c'est nous les meilleurs" 
-we're the f ai rest, we're the best). 
However, retailing seems to be gaining its "1 ettres de noblesse". Certainly 
Carrefour has started to attract talent from the more prestigious 
establishments. Partly, this is on account of a change in retailing. As one 
cadre put it, "Le metier s'enrichit" (the profession is developing) and 
hypermarkets are now firmly implanted in French society. But it is also a 
product of the change in student attitudes. Spurred on by the exploits of 
entrepreneurs like Francis Bouygues and Bernard Tapi e, they are prepared to 
forego immediate responsibility for greater medium term responsibilities. 
They have come to realise that the possibilities are more varied, the rungs 
fewer and the chances of promotion enhanced - for anyone willing to make the 
effort. 
In fact, it is an essential part of the career folklore at Carrefour that 
anyone can make it. Of course, the company has changed since the days of 
unbridled expansion in the early 70s: 
"C'etait l'epoque des armees de Bonaparte: entre comme employe 
chez Carrefour, vous di ri gi ez un magasin quelques annees plus 
to rd. " 
(At the time, it was 11ke Napoleon's army: you came in at a junior 
level and you'd be in charge of a store a few years later). 
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Aiinougn rrrýýýý, ,.. , Q, e less abundant, the company is still keen to 
highlight them (see Exhibit 12). The company newspaper for instance, focuses 
on a number of store managers in their mid-thirties who have nothing more 
than a "bac" to their name - people who might have reached their "baton de 
marechal" long ago in other companies*. 
The company ethos remains imbued with that go-getting spi rit. As one store 
manager put it: 
"Chez Carrefour, 1'ambition nest pas une tare. Au contras re, si 
on fait ses preuves, tout est ouvert, sans aucune restriction. " 
(At Carrefour, ambition is nothing to be ashamed of. On the 
contrary, if you prove your worth, all doors are opened, without 
exception). 
The implication is of course, that overt ambition is perhaps frowned upon in 
more traditional French companies. 
Further evidence of this work ethos is the attachment to long hours. These 
are inherent to retailing but the trend is taken to extremes at Carrefour, 
where "un certain snobi sme" is associated with working longer than 
colleagues. In terms of the physical stamina required, one store manager 
took a humourous dig at the underperforming textile department by suggesting 
the introduction of a perspiration indicator. He was convinced that no-one 
in textiles "aurait le dos mouil le" (would have a damp back) at the end of 
the day. And he threatened them with a short 'work-out' in one of the high 
turnover sections. 
Given this commitment to work, it comes as no surprise that stress is an 
occupational hasard. Two senior managers complained of hyperactivity - one 
told me, "Je tourne en rond le di manche - je sui s insupportable" (I 
don't know what to do with myself on Sundays - I'm unbearable); whilst the 
other confessed that he daren't go home early for fear of irritating his 
family. 
*- Though for all its meritocracy, the company has a mysogenous reputation 
with only two of the seventy-odd store managers being women. 
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It is a job which elicits involvement but which requi res sustained mental 
and physical efforts. The stress factor means that no one has yet retired as 
a store manager - and few of them reach 50. Another manifestation of this 
ambition can be seen in the obsession with self-improvement. There is 
healthy rival ry within the group with each store trying to improve its 
displays and service in order to climb in relation to sister stores in the 
Carrefour turnover rankings. In contrast to this, store managers were 
perfectly willing to show round their counterparts from sister stores - and 
would consci enci ousl y point out features of interest and allowing thei r 
counterparts to record them on a note pad or a miniature di ctapho ne. 
This ambival ent rival ry/co-operation could also be seen at departmental 
level. Competition is instilled between the sections by the daily printouts 
of sales figures which pit the performance of each sector against that of 
corresponding sectors in other Carrefours; as well as keeping a running 
check on actual performance as against forecasts and previous year's 
performance - there is a rolling comparison daily with the corresponding day 
the previous year. 
In spite of constant comparisons between the sections and jibes about poor 
performances, intrastore co-operation was high - one sector which was being 
refurbished suggested to the electrical appliances sector that it could 
usefully employ the unwanted chairs to sit customers down while the rather 
lengthy order was attended to. There was little evidence of back-bitting or 
power feuding. Indeed, interpersonal relations were unusually forthright and 
informal. Cadres were on first name terms, they wore shirt sleeves and tie 
rather than suits, and used the familiar "tu" form of address. The 
standardisation of the furnishings too, were also signs of an egalitarian 
culture - and were in marked contrast to the considerable vertical 
differentiation evident in French industry as a whole. 
By French standards Carrefour is classless - the ubiquitous qualification 
hierarchy which dominates French manufacturing industry, is diluted. 
Graduates rub shoulders with the autodi dactes - though it is fai r to say 
that grandes ecoles graduates are thin on the ground. Social and educational 
backgrounds appear to have limited impact on promotion chances/expectations. 
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Carrefour's commitment to training and staff relations is another essential 
feature of corporate policy. The development of personnel, in support of the 
corporate ethic of the Carrefour group: "Carrefour's future, independence 
and steady growth are based upon people. " 
The personnel policies are in keeping with this respect for the personnel - 
5 weeks holiday, bonuses for holidays, end of year, attendance, and a share 
in the profits. 
In terms of pay policy.. the company is at the foref ront of the move to 
undermine sacro-sanct French salary structures. Carrefour salaries have 
three components related to inflation, company performance and individual 
performance, for the entire personnel - this is undermining more 
conventional seniority based increases, epitomised by the French Railways 
(Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer - SNCF). In 1987, a proposal that 
wages should partially depend on merit, so incensed French railway workers 
that a nationwide strike was called. 
Considerable effort and resources have been channelled into personnel 
management, and Carrefour pride themselves upon their staff relations and 
training programme. The company invariably exceeds the legal requirement, 
since it regards training as a guarantee for the company's future. This year 
4% of the wage bill was spent on training in comparison to the 1.1% legal 
requirement. 
By pioneering French style hypermarkets, Carrefour has out-Americanised the 
Americans. The company has taken the retailing techniques championned by 
Bernard Trujillo in his 3M seminars 30 years ago, and extrapolated the 
logic. France is now in the unique position of being able to export to the 
Americans a formula it originally imported from them. 
Of course, part of the reason that hypermarkets did not develop in the US 
was that the American environment was too competitive - hypermarkets would 
never have got off the ground over there. Carrefour itself has found it 
necessary to opt out of the more developed markets in Europe and focus its 
attention on less developed markets such as Spain and Latin America - which 
in fact resemble the state of French retailing at the time when Carrefour 
was launched. 
f 
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Whilst the companies described earlier in this chapter are divergent in 
numerous respects, there are some resemblances. These common features will 
be used as a 'point de departf - on the one hand to generalise about French 
companies as a col 1 ective enti ty, and on the other to contrast these four 
internationally successful companies with the vast majority of French firms 
- they will be the exception which proves the rule. 
It is also worth pointing out the divergence between Michelin, l'Air Liquide 
and 1'0real, on the one hand, and Carrefour on the other. It may be argued 
that Carrefour typifies the new generation of French companies which have a 
less traditionalist outlook. This distinction mirrors a similar split in the 
French industrial landscape. We can use the theme of secrecy to ill ustrate 
the point. 
With the exception of Carrefour, the chosen companies were remarkably coy by 
British or even more.. American standards. All were very selective in their 
approach to publicity and shunned Carrefour's "all publicity is good 
publicity" maxim. Even 110real, whose outgoing image would suggest easy 
access, proved very difficult to penetrate. Indeed, at each of the companies 
visited there were expressions of surprise at my having made it. For 
instance, the senior manager who vetted my request atl'0real, speculated 
that I must have encountered some difficulty in gaining access to French 
companies "qui sont assez speci al es dans ce domaine" (which are quite 
peculiar in that department). 
There is no reason to believe that the chosen companies were exceptional in 
this respect and the findings concur with Erhmann's view of France as "the 
country of 'counter-publicity"' (1957; 211)*. Incidental corroboration in 
the form of newspaper headlines also suggests that it is a common trait 
among French companies. A recent issue of Tertiel (no 28) whet readers, 
appetites with its cover feature, "Le PDG le plus secret de France" 
("France's most secretive CEO"). And the Financial Times (13/01/88) did 
likewise with, "Paul Betts meets Gustave Leven, the publicity-shy ch ai rman 
of Perrier. " Horovitz al so encountered and noted French secrecy (1980; 46). 
*- Ehrmann quotes Detoeuf on the matter: "The Frenchman is not a chess 
player, but a card player; he chooses games where one hides. " (1957; 209) 
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ni s secrecy PI-0110 ä , -ýr Fuca was described by the PDG of a small firm as: 
"Pour v ivre heureux, v ivons caches" (to 1 ive happil ly, we must 1 ive hi dden). 
In the French context, this approach makes sense for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, secrecy protects the company from competitors - this was a 
particular preoccupation of Michelin's which refrains from patenting for 
that very reason. 
Secrecy has al so been part and parcel of the fiscal game ("1 a contrai me 
fiscale") which companies play with the authorities. More recently, the 
threat of nationalisation has provided renewed cause for remaining an 
unknown quantity for the State. 
However, the primary reason for maintaining 'radio silence' has been to do 
with the general public. Traditional antipathy towards profit-making may be 
the motive behind the secrecy of these high performance firms. One PDG 
explained that "personne n'aime une entrepri se qui crache du fric" ("no-one 
likes a company that spits (sic) money"). So, "pour avoi r1a pal x" (to be 
left in peace), successful companies have kept themselves to themselves. We 
can cite the PDG of the large industrial group, Saint-Gobain who, on the eve 
of the company's re-privatisation (November 1986), addressed his personnel 
thus: 
"Chaque jour, de nombreux articles de presse ou emissions nous 
placent sous leur projecteur; et nos concitoyens redecouvrent 
qulil exists, dans notre pays, un groupe industriel - le notre - 
qui est leader mondial ou europeen dans la plupart de ses 
11 metiers... " Jean-Louis Bef fa, PDG of Saint-Gobain (Publication for 
Saint-Gobain personnel - November 1986) 
(Each day, we are the focus of attention for press articles or TV 
programmes; awakening the French public to the fact that it 
harbours, in its midsts, an industrial group - ours - which is a 
World or European leader in most of its fields). 
This speech perhaps symbolises the transition in French attitudes. All of a 
sudden, a company which, according to its PDG, "est souvent rests a 116cart 
des medias" (has generally stayed out of the limelight), moves into center 
stage. He found himself introducing the group to an eager French public who, 
until then, were blissfully unaware of its existence. 
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Only since the entrepreneur has been billed as the saviour of the economy in 
the 1980s, have companies really felt safe to emerge from their shells. The 
managerial movement has thrown up a host of individuals like Antoine Ri boud, 
Gilbert Tri gano, Francis Bouygues or Bernard Tapie whose business empires 
are in stark contrast to the closet MNCs which have dominated France. These 
men actually court publ i cty - Bernard Tapie popularised the enterprise 
culture with his prime-time television shows and Francis Bouygues has 
purchased the recently privati sed TF1 (France's No. 1 TV channel). Such 
extravagances do not endear them to everyone. They are criticised in some 
quarters as self-seeking publicists who use their companies as vehicles for 
their personal promotion. 
"Le vedettariat" was particularly condemned in the more traditional 
companies. One cadre expl ai ned "Il s passent pour des truands" (they are 
looked upon as outlaws), since there is something "louche" (fishy) about 
anyone who 'makes it' without the benefit of inheritance or qualifications. 
Whilst people like Tapie are admired by younger generations, their elders 
are sceptical about what Tapie is up to - rapid success in French terms 
leaves him open to all sorts of accusations of government collusion (in 
terms of facilitating necessary redundancies in newly-acquired companies as 
well as reciprocal favours with the former Socialist finance minister), 
Pierre Beregovoy). The view of the businessman as villain dies hard. 
As mentioned earlier, another justification for the secrecy of the companies 
described, was that it helped avoid state interference in corporate affairs, 
and particularly Nationalisation in 1982. The fact that all four of the 
companies should actually boast about resi sting state advances, is a measure 
of its persuasiveness - and indicative of a qualitatively different state- 
industry relationship from that found in the UK or the US. 
Looking to the state for help does not carry the same negative connotations 
in France. One need only look at the way Renault's modernist headquarters on 
the banks of the Seine announces in huge letters that it is "Renault - R6gie 
Nationale" -a nationalised industry. It is unthinkable that the Rover Group 
or any British state-owned industry would do the same. Nationalisation may 
be a preoccupation but it is not a stigma. To be nationalised in France is 
to have the full weight of the state behind you. This can prompt role 
reversal, with the company, not the state, making all the running. As one 
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journalist put vc: 
"Au moi ndre pepi n 1 es chefs d'entre pri se sont prets ä se 
preci pi ter dans l es bras de 1'Etat-papa" (L'Express; 1/03/85; 30). 
(At the slightest si gn of trouble chiefs are ready to run into th e 
arms of Daddy-State). 
A fairly accurate indicator of whether a company is under state tutelage, is 
the background of its chief executive. It is a feature of nationalised or 
semi-nationalised companies that their heads are appointed, usually from 
outside the group, by the government in office. Needless to say this tends 
to provoke a real game of musical chairs, whenever there is a shift in 
political power. Such instability is in marked contrast to the unruffled 
continuity of the four companies examined earlier in this chapter. 
Three of the four companies were family-owned or managed. There is a strong 
tradition in France of relatively large groups being dominated by an 
individual or family - even Carrefour, with its tradition of open 
competition, includes Bernard Fournier (eldest son of the co-founder Marcel 
Fournier) on its board. Apart from the companies investigated, there are the 
Dassaults in the aeronautical industry; the Triganos with their 'Club 
Medi terraneet; the Leclercs, the Montlaurs or the Gui chard-Perrachons in 
retailing; the Ri ca rds, the Cointreaus and the Dubreui ls in alcohol 
manufacture; the Peugeot family in the automobile industry; or the Leroy 
family in the aptly named Groupe Mai son Famil ial e (smal 1 house 
construction)*. Even the model entrepreneur, and building magnate, Francis 
Bouygues has succumbed to temptation of employing his own offspring. 
French companies have traditionally shown a penchant for "management by 
chromosome". But more recently, this has been tempered by judicious business 
sense. The case of 1 'Ai r Liquide is a perfect example - one of the PDG? s 
sons worked for the company but he was passed over in favour of the son-in- 
law as the successor to the throne. The automatic handing on of the top job 
like a family heirloom is a thing of the past. Family companies will do 
their utmost to keep the business from '4nains etrangeres" (foreign hands) by 
exercising greater discrimination in their choice of successor. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*- For a more detailed discussion of French corporate leadership see the 
chapter, "Those who set the tone". 
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The current approacn mignt ee termed enlightened nepotism, whereby family 
companies exploit its positive aspects whilst limiting its drawbacks. The 
most important benefit is continuity. The heir to the throne is prepared for 
the top job from an early age. Even before entering the company, the future 
pDG is impregnated with the corporate values which are often an extention of 
family val ues. Consequently, the baton changes hands smoothly. 
A smooth transition of power is important to those who have dealings with 
the company (customers and supliers) who will not wish to have to change 
longstanding arrangements. It is also of particular interest to the 
personnel, who will wish to avoid an upsetting change of regime. The case of 
a somewhat smaller (800 people), provincial, paper-making company provides 
an interesting illustration of this point. The company was a struggling 
family concern which decided to appoint an external PDG 20 years ago. He has 
managed to turn the business into a minor success story - and now, with 
reti rement looming he has been unexpectedly approached by his management 
team. They had had dealings with his son who worked in a local company, and 
proceeded to recommended to the PDG that he take on his own son with a view 
to succession (the company had gone full circle). 
Such is the desire for continuity that non-family businesses may try to 
manufacture 'surrogate offspring' who can be entrusted with the running of 
the company. Generally, these individuals wil l be picked at an tender age 
and prepared for the role of 1 eadershi p. At 110real for instance, the next 
PDG is known long in advance. He is variously described as, "fil s spirituel" 
(spi ritual son), "bras droit" (right hand), "heritier presomptif" (heir 
apparent) or "dauphin" (crown prince). Such expressions leave the future 
occupier "du fauteuil du PDG" (of the CEO's chair) in no doubt as to what is 
expected of him. 
Whether in a family business or not, those chosen must dispel the 'divine 
right' label by proving themselves more worthy than their peers. The 
argument that this will demotivate senior cadres who have ? no shot at the 
top' is probably overstated since those with such ambitions will steer clear 
of companies where predestination operates. On the contrary perhaps, it acts 
as a political dampener, since the pole position is out of bounds. 
Another feature of the leadership in the chosen firms was its longevity: 
Michelin and Defforey (Carrefour) had been in place since 
1959, whilst l'Air 
Liquide and 1'0real had recently changed leaders after 
'reigns' of over 35 
278 
years apiece* - though each of the recently deposed leaders continued to 
exert influence through their presidency of a strategic committee. In such 
cases, the firms inevitably become synonymous with their heads - thus 
provoking a certain personality cult. In fact, if Peters and Waterman are to 
be believed, these corporately historical figures may account for the 
success of the companies examined: 
"Associated with every excellent company was a strong leader .. who 
seemed to have a lot to do with making the company strong in the 
first pl ace" (1982; 26). 
Evidence for the existence of such a personality cult lies in the 
widespread devotion to work. Working long hours seemed less a feature of the 
rules or expectations than a part of the culture in which charismatic bosses 
reign. People would ring each other at 19h00 fully anticipating an answer. 
Such anti -social hours tend to militate against the presence of women in the 
higher reaches of French management - this, even in retailing and cosmetics 
where one might have expected a moderate feminine presence. 
The exceptional longevity of the PDG in the companies investigated was 
mirrored by the personnel which, except at Carrefour, tend to benefit from 
lifelong employment. This also requires corporate commitment to internal 
promotion, expenditure on training and a bit of slack in the organisational 
chart. 
The lack of definition in the organisational chart means that 
responsibilities are 'up for grabs'. This makes internal promotion easier to 
handle - unfettered by organisational constraints, able individuals will 
naturally rise to the top. This vagueness is in stark contrast to American 
organisational charts which pin-point exactly who does what and who is 
answerable to whom. Part of the lack of precision also stems from the 
absence of job descriptions in France. In addition to helping internal 
promotion, the organisational "flou" (vagueness) enables the company to 
maintain loyal servants in ill-defined posts. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
- Again, this is stark contrast td the companies under state influence, 
where 10 years is considered a good innings. Michel Bauer, a CNRS 
researcher, makes the surprising claim that of the 200 largest French firms, 
only 29% of bosses actually entered the firm before the age of 30 - as 
opposed to 50% in the US and 74% in Japan (l'Expansion; 22/10/87; 130). 
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Another feature of the four companies examined was their very definite 
product identity. Efforts were directed towards one goal - undiluted by 
diversification. Even Carrefour which might have been tempted to emulate its 
American counterparts with vertical integration has passed up the chance. As 
Denis Defforey put it: 
't'est dej ä assez di ff icil e de connattre son metier - nous devons 
avant tout evi ter de devenir un congl omerat. Nous nous ref uson sa 
i nvesti r dans l'agro-al i mentai re: nous savons tres bi en que faire 
de nos magasins des clients captifs de nos usines et y vendre nos 
propres conserves de 1 egumes serait forcement au detriment de la 
qual ite et de la prod uctivi te. "(Le Nouvel Economiste; No. 333; 
p. 79) 
(It's difficult enough getti ng to gri ps with our busi ness - we 
must at all costs avoid becoming a conglomerate. We have 
deliberately resisted investing in agro-nutrition: we are fully 
aware that making our stores into captive customers for our 
factories and selling our own tinned vegetables through them would 
inevitably impinge on quality and productivity). 
L'Oreal too, has avoided emulating its large American competitors and 
diversifying widely. As for Michelin and l'Air Liquide, they remain strongly 
attached to innovation in their own fields and to new applications of 
existing products, but do not venture outside what they know. These are 
firms which, in Peters and Waterman parlance, have resolutely, (stuck to 
their knitting' (1982; chapter 10). Perhaps, the roots of this commitment to 
a particular product area lie in the influence of strong 'family' 
management. While not precluding diversification, traditions which stretch 
back several generations are unlikely to stimulate it. And as Dyas and 
Thanheiser explain: 
"Personal commitment to a particular product area can be 
particularly strong if the industry involved is located within a 
particular region in which the founding family has associations 
and responsibilities" (1976; 203). 
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All four companies have had considerable success abroad - less common in 
France than elsewhere because of its tradition of economic protectionism 
lasting up to 1958. By virtue of their own records, these companies coul d 
afford to denounce French faint-heartedness abroad. Two quotes typify this 
widespread feel i ng: 
"Le Francai s repugne prof ondement a sIexpatrier, c'est-ä-di re a 
aller vivre longtempts a lletranger. I1 s1habitue aussi mal a la 
langue q u'aux usages et aux mani eres de vivres locales. " (Franýoi s 
Dalle in Priouret; 113) 
(Frenchmen hate to expatriate themselves, that is.. to go and 1 ive 
abroad for a long spell. They can't get used to the language any 
more than they can to the local customs and habits). 
"I1 faut bi en connattre ses clients, l es voir et l es revoir 
jusqu'au jour ou il s vous invitent chez eux. Rien ä voi r avec les 
Francai s qui font troi s petits tours et il s s'en vont. " (Edouard 
de Royere; 1'Expansi on; p. 65). 
(You have to know your (foreign) customers, see them over and over 
again until the day they invite you home. A far cry from the 
French who look around a while and then go home). 
At Michelin and Carrefour too, they were scathing about French impatience 
when faced with a new market, in contrast to the more methodical approach of 
the Japanese or even the West Germans. As a returning French expatriate put 
i t: 
"Les Francas s ont conserve 1'esprit 'colon': il s ne partent a 
l'stranger que bardes dfassurances, celle surtout de faire du 
f ri c". 
(The French still have a 'colonial' mentality: they only go abroad 
when loaded with insurance cover, and not unless they are 
guaranteed a killing). 
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Management recru zmnenc is not generalised. Each company tended to favour 
particular sources - specific engineering grandes ecol es in the case of 
Michelin and Mir Liquide, and Instituts Universi tai res de Technologie for 
Carrefour. Only 110real was more or less indifferent to provenance. The 
graduate market is highly segmented and companies buy talent which matches 
their standing and their educational tradition - often mirroring the head's 
own background. One can tell a great deal about a company's relative 
standing from where it does its fishing. Starting salaries are less of an 
indication of prestige since career-minded graduates will seek first and 
foremost, a company where they can "faire leurs armes" (gain their wings) 
and obtain a useful "carte de visi te" (track record) for future empl oyers. 
Another unifying feature was the so-called "droit ä 1'erreur" (right to foul 
up). It may be that this was a product rather than a factor of success. 
However, if the claim is founded, then it is unusual in a country where, 
according to one cadre, "un echec vous poursui t" (a failure follows you) and 
'bn en tient longtemps compte" (it is held against you for ages). It is also 
worth pointing out that Peters and Waterman refer to the tolerance for 
failure (p. 223) as a central tenet in their recipe for corporate success. 
Finally, the companies examined bear the hallmark of Parisian 
centralisation. With the exception of Michelin which remains staunchly 
provincial, each company had its headquarters in Paris and its production 
plants in provinces. This may be a legacy from Napoleon who, for reasons of 
stability, tried to turn Paris into an administrative rather than an 
industrial city (distancing the workers to take the revolutionary sting out 
of Paris). This has produced two distinct populations whose preoccupations, 
ambitions and lifestyles are totally different. In a way, the provinces have 
become the corporate equivalent of non-league football, where young hopefuls 
on their way up to first division Paris, cross 'has-beens' on their way out. 
It is interesting to note that a number of the features highlighted by 
Peters and Waterman as critical to organisational success actually manifest 
themselves in the four French companies scrutinised. However, it would be 
simplistic to assume-that the success of these companies stems from their 
adherence to the Peters and Waterman blueprint. The companies examined al so 
possessed several distinctive traits which were far removed from the 
informal processes and intuitive aspects preached by those gurus - it is 
equally plausible to speculate that it was these which were responsible for 
their international success. 
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It would be wrong to suggest that the preceeding examples are representtive 
of French corporate cultures in general. However, they do display a number 
of distinctive characteristics which have survived in spite of the 
increasing internationalisation of these particular firms. In theory, what 
goes for these large, successful companies, which have been exposed to 
the sterilising influence of international competition, should apply to even 
greater degree among smaller French companies. 
It seems reasonable therefore, to posit that these common features as part 
of a broader national corporate culture which taints all French companies to 
some extent. 
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EXHIBIT 11 
Publicity surrounding introduction of condom vending machines 
at Carrefour. 
Preservatifs daps 
les hppers : 
Carrefour tire 
le premier 
D fif. s'y attradre. La 
veaje des pr'esetratifs daps 
ºes wades surf aces vs. 
com. escer. Cest k magasio 
Carrrfoer d'Ivey, en 
bat parisieaot, qW 
annoect It premier xs 
iotestioas en la mauere. Des 
samedi procbaia, il mettrs l 
is disposition de sa clienIHe 
na distributeur automatique- 
de presmatifs instatk daps 
It r2T" parfumerie-hygiene. 
La bojte de 6 sera vend us 
10 trau. Un petit prix auz 
grades consequences. 
Le Matin de Paris - 20/02/87 
Prýserva tifs 'en libre service 
Les hypers continuent leur offensive sur les 
products de sante. Mammouth adopte Is methode 
douce : le referendum i propos des preservatifs. 
Le supermarche qui d'habitude ecrase les pnx 
pose a ses clients - par voix de presse et telephone 
- quatre questions : pensez-vous que les 
preser, atifs soient encore un sujet tabou I Parmi 
les reucences a I'achat, quelles sont. de . otre point 
de 'ue, les plus importantes ? Uric maniere de 
tester les reactions de ses clients avant de lancer la 
'ente des capotes en libre service. 
Le magasin Carrefour d1vry-sur-Seine est plus 
Le Journal du Dimanche 
« hard >º : depuis vendredi, un distributeur 
automatique permet I ses clients de metire une 
boite de preservatifs daps lour caddy. En touts 
discretion. line simple piece de 10 francs et la 
boite (de six) cst a sous. Pratique. rapide et 
discret : il n'y a pas a presenter ('article a la caisse. 
Des le mots prochain. deux cents autres 
machines devratent ctre installees. Delicate atten- 
tion : sur le distnbuteur automatique. on peut 
lire :« L'hygiene et la protecrion sont une prcuve 
d'amour. » 
Les preservatifs ne se cachent plus 
OBJECTIF 
- 22/02/87 
Le Parisien Libere - 21/02/87 
FAIRE « CAPOTER » LE SIDA Une premiere en region 
parisienne... Depuis hier, 
le magasin Carrefour 
d'lvry (94) met e la 
disposition de ses clients 
des distributeurs de 
preservatifs. 
QA ressemble 9 uo distributeur de 
conAseries... Mals rtes a voir ! 
Deux dlstrtbuteurs de prtserva- 
tifs ont ett Installts. hier aprt 
midi. dass le magasin Carrefour 
d'ivry. Le premier a ett Installe dann 
l es toilettes publiques et le second - 
c est plus onginal - en pleln milieu du rayon forme et sanft ou cohabitent 
savons. sbampooings et produlta de 
beautt. 
Ce nouveau prodult rfpond au norn 
de 4 PrEpbarma P. il vous surrt de 
glisser une piece de dlx francs dann la 
machine pour faire I'acqulsltlon 
dune bou de six prtservatlfa. " Cc 
prodult. dtl9 propose chez noun en 
Iibre-service. expllque un des respoo- 
sables du magasin. ne 1'etalt pas 
encore en dlstrºbuteur. Ces machines 
om nt des garantles d'anonymat aux 
consommateurs et respectent leur 
pudeur.. 
Its clients. certes Uli peu surprls 
par I'Intruslon de ces dlstnbuteurn. 
n ont pas manifestt de facon Intem- 
pesttve. 
En revanche. une bande desslnte. 
d7KUsle dann Pille-et-Vllalne. le Val- 
d'OUe et Le Bas-Rhin. dans le cadre 
dune campagne d'Informatlon sur 
les maladies sexuellement transmis- 
sible,. a provoque la colere des pa- 
rents et des associations. Intltulbe 
4 le Dernier des tabous s. cette bro- 
chure. tdItbe i trente rnllle exem- 
plalres. a ett jugfe tour I tour . trop 
crue P. . choquante i, . antirell- 
gleuie ". 
Face A cette Ievt6e de boucllen. la 
Dlrgctlon gtnerale de la samt a 
demands jux prefetu de suspendre la 
dlstributloa de cette B. D. Iltlgleuse 
qul i'avatt pas retu I'aval du mini . 
ttre de Ia Samt. 
Rin" MIVROZ 
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EXHIBIT 12 
Pen portraits of Carrefour career successes. 
7 
From the company publication "Notre Entreprise - Carrefour" (Bilan 
et social 85) - p. 9 ; 
L'avenir 
" PhiNpps Jelly, 36 ans. 
- 1972 : entre en qualit6 
de stagiaire aux Comptoirs 
Modernes, y passe huit ans 
pendant lesquels il sera 
adjoint au directeur, puis 
directeur de trois magasins 
successifs. 
- 1980: debute chez Car- 
refour, A Nantes, comma 
chef de secteur epicene. 
- 1982: Nantes toujours, 
mais chef du secteur pro- 
duits frais. 
- 1984: nommb directeur 
du magasin de Rennes. 
" Dipldme : baccalaureat. 
Passe ensuite deux annees A 
Paris-Dauphine pour appren- 
dre w la gestion d'une 
entreprise ». 
Chez Carrefour, on peut 
progresser. 
Bon nombre de directeurs 
regionaux et de directeurs 
de magasins sont entres 
dans la sociötö dix ou 
quinze ans plus tOt 
comme employes ou 
stagiaires. 
Trois exemples le 
prouvent : 
  Marc Devaux, 37 ans. 
- 1971 : dßbute 6 Carre- 
four Villiers-en-Biere, en tant 
que stagiaire au rayon Bis- 
ques, livres et papeterie. 
- 1974: devient chef de 
rayon menage, maison et 
vaisselle, puls chef des sec- 
teurs bazar et textile, ä Vil- 
liers toujours. 
- 19 75: mute. sur sa 
demande ä Dijon, oü il est 
chef de secteur non 
alimentaires. 
- 1977 : directeur adjoint 
A Carrefour Portet. 
- 1979: directeur du 
magasin de Pau. 
- 1982 : inaugure le cen- 
tre commercial de Labsge 
(Toulouse). 
- 1983 : passe ä la direc- 
tion executive, au service de 
la direction des relations 
sociales, ou il assure les 
fonctions de directeur de Is 
formation Carrefour France. 
Est nommb an 1986, direc- 
teur du magasin d'Ecully. 
" Diplome : brevet supb- 
rieur d'btudes commerciales. 
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  Noel A/magiacchi, 
36 ans. 
1969: entre A Sainte- 
Genevieve-des-Bois en qua- 
lite d'employß libre service, 
secteur bazar. 
1971-72 : service militaire. 
1973 : retrouve le magasin 
de Sainte-Genevieve ou il 
devient gestionnaire de 
stock. 
1974: nommb responsable 
de rayon. 
1975 : mute ä Villiers-en- 
Biere. Est successivement 
chef du rayon matenaux, 
libraine-papetene et quincail- 
lerie at responsable, pendant 
3 ans, de la formation 
progressive. 
1981 : passe chef de sec- 
teur, au bazar puis au pro- 
duits frail, 6 Villiers toulours. 
Egalement chef de file du 
bazar. 
1985 : directeur de Carre- 
four Moulins. 
i Z. A 51DEW AYS LOOK AT LABOUR RELATIONS 
"Entre un patronat qui passe pour le plus retrograde de 1a 
communaut6 europeene et des syndicats consideres, dans de nombreux 
pays, comme des suppots de Brejnev, on se demande comment la 
France a put mal gre tout, remporter quelques beaux succes 
i ndustri el s. " (Anonymous Eurocrat; Freydet; 399). 
(On the one hand France is credited with the most reactionary 
employers in the EEC, and on the other hand, its unions are widely 
regarded as Brej nev's 1 ackies. Under Lhese circumstances, it's a 
wonder that France has had any industrial successes at all). 
Labour relations have an inevitable impact on managerial attitudes and 
behaviour. Therefore, for sake of completeness, the subject warrants a 
chapter in this characterisation of French management. The aim, however, is 
not to provide an exhaustive account of French industrial relations, which 
is worthy of a thesis ini tsel f, but to shed some 11 gh ton the way they are 
viewed by management practitioners. The testimonies of three company chiefs 
from the observation sample have been selected to convey the main 
preoccupations in this area. Not only does this make better use of the first 
hand research; it al so provides a more realistic picture, albeit partial and 
idiosyncratic, of French labour relations. 
This brief descriptive section sets out to fill in the salient 
characteristics for readers unfamiliar with the French system of industrial 
relations. The French unions are divided along political, ideological and 
religious lines. The biggest union is the Communist dominated Confederation 
Generale du Travail (CGT). Its main rival is the Confederation Franpi se 
Democratique du Travail (CFDT) which has socialist sympathies and formerly 
had Catholic affiliations). Third comes Force Ouvriere whose more moderate 
stance seems to be paying dividends and winning new members in the, 
for 
France, novel entrpreneurial culture of the 1980s. Of the smaller 
bodies, 
the most important is probably the white-collar Confederation 
Generale des 
Cadres which officially launched the term "cadre" 
(see chapter on "The 
French manager"). 
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Social progress in French industry has been a fairly painstaking process, 
with real breakthroughs achieved only after historic conflicts (1936,1945, 
1968). One notable example is the belated acknowledgement of the right of 
shop stewards to do union work in the firm's time, to have their own offices 
inside factories and to do canvassing or other such work on the premises. 
These activities had long been commonplace in Britain for instance, but were 
only accorded in France after the uprising of May 1968. Part of the reason 
for the weak status of shop stewards is that there are other channels of 
appeal and these will be examined at the end of this chapter. 
Company is family firm, based In. 
-4 communist municipality, JA Paris 
A first clue as to the thrust of the chief's industrial relations 
preoccupations came from a cursory glance at the bookshelf behind his desk. 
Two books stood out from the conventional managerial fodder of 'guru' 
literature. They were "Les finances du PCF" (the funding of the French 
Communist Party) and "Les secrets de 1a banque sovi6tique en France" (the 
secrets of the soviet bank in France - both written by Jean Montaldo). The 
PDG in question considered these essential reading for the rather convoluted 
reason that the Soviets funded the French Communist Party, which controlled 
France's main worker union, the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) 
which in turn dictated the actions of local CGT leaders. As the chief puts 
it, 'Les representants de la CGT utilisent un langage et suivent des ordres 
qui n'ont rien a voir avec l es i nterets de la maison" (the local CGT's 
rhetoric and the instructions it obeys are far removed from the interests of 
the company). 
A few examples may give some idea of the way in which this perception of the 
unions affected his behaviour in practice: 
- He saw conflicts as falling into two categories: political ones, as when 
the workers rise up out of solidarity for "leurs copains du Chili" (their 
mates from Chile); and real conflicts, but even the latter are motivated by 
factors other than the financial ones put forward. 
- The soundproofing of his office door and the anti-tapping 
device on his 
telephone were both attributed to the red threat - "pour ne pas faciliter 
la 
tache aux cocos" (so as not to make things any easier for the communists). 
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- He subscribed to 1'Humani te, the Communist daily newspaper, to know what 
might be afoot. He explained that anyone in a "point chaud" (i e. Communist 
stronghold), must keep abreast of the national policies which sooner or 
later will manifest themselves at grass-roots level, since the CGT leaves 
little scope for local iniatives - again because local initiatives are 
dictated by national policy. He makes the ironic point that if "l'Huma" were 
to lose its employer readership, the paper would go bankrupt. He also 
reckons, tongue-i n-cheek, that it is a sign of "bonne condui te" 
(irreproachable behaviour) to be criticised by "l'Huma'l. 
- The chief was on the committees of several employers' bodies and saw 
himself as something of a local spokesman against the union stranglehold 
over companies. His charisma and readiness to be opi nionated ("de cracher 
dans l es micros" - to talk to the media) made him a favourite with local 
journalists. Indeed, he regularly contributed a column to a journal 
generally condemning the antics of the CGT - and making the most of the 
opportunity to 'have a go' at some of his favourite targets: 
'Uemandez aux journal istes de 1'Hum anite par exemple, s? il n'y a 
pas de patrons a 'l'Huma'I II (surtout ä ceux qui viennent d'etre 
1 1cenci es pour rai sons economiquesII1). " 
(Just go and ask the journalists at 1'Humanite if they don't have 
any bosses!!! - especially the victims of the economic l ay- 
offs! I! ). 
- In a 'phone conversation with one of his management colleagues, a head of 
division, the chief remembers that he has heard that a neighbour's son is 
looking for a job, and the ? candidate' has the sort of professional skills 
they happen to be looking for - and what is more, "il a des idees proches 
des notres" (his ideas are akin to ours). The chief then spells it out, 
"crest un Polack q ui ne peu pas senti r1 es Co sacks - il pourra nous 
etre 
util e" (he's from Polish stock and he ca n't stand Ruski es - he may be abl e 
to help us). 
- He actively 'encouraged' cadres to join the Confederation Generale 
des 
Cadres (management union) to ensure cadre representation among the Works 
Stewards ("del egues du personnel ") and on the works' council (descri bed at 
the end of this chapter). If there were no cadre candidate on 
these 
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compulsory commissions, the way would be open for the CGT to name one of its 
own members instead. As the chief explains "j'ai horreur du vide" (I hate to 
see a void). 
The chief was clearly hypersensitive to communist 'Plotting'. His 
MaCartyite reactions were to some extent justified insofar as the 
municipality in which the plant is located was a Communist stronghold which 
meant he could expect few favours from the local mayor. There was a feeling, 
however, that he devoted a little too much importance to the communist 
threat, to the detriment of his other activities. As one cadre put it: 
"Certains patrons voient rouge partout et accordent trop 
dlampleur aux syndi cats. " 
(Some bosses see red everywhere and give the unions more 
attention than they deserve). 
The personnel manager from this same firm confirmed the fact that the CGT 
had once been a force to be reckoned with, but since around 1979 it had lost 
its way (both within the firm and at national level). Its membership no 
longer consi sted of professional French workers, who were to some extent 
di si ll usi one d by the rhetoric - "I I analyse si mpl i ste ne l eur pa rl e pl us 
vraiment" (the simplistic analysis has lost its appeal) - partly because of 
the changing attitude towards capitalism and because of a greater 
understanding of economic interdependencies. This was posited as an 
explanation for the shift within the firm towards the reformist union Force 
Ouv ri ere, which like the Confederation Generale des Cadres, showed awareness 
of the fact that the company had to be in a healthy position in order to get 
anything out of it. 
With its traditional core melting, the CGT had been reduced to recruiting 
among the immigrant labour - the company's CGT representatives were a 
Portuguese and a Tunisian. This has had a profound influence on the 
'culture' of the CGT since its immigrant followers are less influenced by 
the communist ideology - they vote for the CGT but tend not to pay thei r 
dues. The head of personnel explained to the researcher that the immigrants 
were more demanding in their material expectations, and would simply switch 
allegiances if they were poorly represented on that front. 
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The changing demands of the grass roots supporters with their lesser 
commitment to communist ideology, has led to occasional divergences between 
national policy and local practice. According to the personnel manager, at 
national level the CGT had not signed an industry-wide agreement for five 
years. Yet at company level the local CGT had been forced to put thei r 
signature to wage settlements because their new followers would not have 
tolerated a refusal - which would be construed as misrepresentation rather 
than sticking to principles. Thus, using the pretext of "solidarity" with 
the other unions, or some other face-saving "clause de style" vis-a-vis the 
outside, the CGT would "collaborate with capitalism". 
Company Z -- large provincial plant (mass production, consumer goods) 
The problem of paying too much attention to the unions was a contri butory 
factor in the concerns of the plant manager in this company too. He had 
recently taken over from a man who had been in the job 19 years and 
considered himself something of a "union specialist" - who li ked acting 
tough and revelled in show-downs. This predecessor had helped to fuel a 
problem which was actually dying. He had exaggerated the disruptive 
potential of the unions and had set himself up vis-a-vis head office as the 
only person capable of dealing with them - on the principle of the "pompier 
pyromane" (pyromaniac fireman). As the new boss explained: 
'tes syndicats ont 1 'importance qulon leur accorde. " 
(The unions are as important as you allow them to be). 
The new plant manager had been brought in to stop the rot - and his main 
probl em now was how to reval on se the foremen who had been spectators in the 
industrial rel ati ons process for 19 years. His predecessor had 
systematically dealt directly with the union delegates - which meant that 
the foremen "avai ent le, cul entre deux chaises" (fell between two stools) - 
they had lost all semblance-of authority and often had to ask the union 
representatives what was going on. This had provoked a loss of morale 
Me 
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malaise de la, mattrise*) and a certain indifference among the foremen. As 
the boss explained, "il s ne voul aient plus se mouil l er" (they'd washed their 
hands ofp onsibility). res From their point of view, why should they take 
awkward decisions when these could be reversed if the personnel 
representative went to see the head of personnel. 
The new boss decided that this situation was unacceptable. And in his own 
tidied up version of events he proceeded to explain how they had reinforced 
the 'natural' (organisational) hierarchy, at the expense of the 'parallel' 
(union) hierarchy. 
The first stage was to give the foremen the desire to manage and to take on 
responsibility since "il s avaient baisse les bras" (they had given up). To 
do this, he sent everyone (from himself down to the supervisors) on a three 
day training course destined to reinforce the "natural hierarchy". Over the 
three days, they explored their hierarchic relations and expectations. They 
compared for instance, the qualities they looked for in their immediate 
superior, with those they felt their subordinates expected. 
Next, he tried to "responsabil i ser la mattrise" (make the foremen more 
responsi bl e) by letti ng them award bonuses, organise and manage their teams, 
so that a worker with a problem would get used to approaching his hierarchic 
boss rather than the union representative. As he saw it, he was turning them 
into "mini-PDGs". Indeed, he thought he could detect the change of attitude 
in their language - saying he had actually heard them explaining to the 
workers about sticking to budgets. 
In some cases, these attempts to enpower the foreman had backfired. For 
instance, there had been indiscreti ons on the part of som e foremen regarding 
the granting of attendance bonuses and the authorisation of time off. 'III y 
a eu du l aisser-aller" (there was abuse of the system) which had prompted 
the chief to clamp down on certain aspects of the system and put them in the 
hands of the personnel department. 
*- The foreman's mal at se, as ill ustr'ated in this smal 1 case study, seems 
to be a fai rly constant feature of French industry. It is probably more 
justified than the malaise of the cadre (see chapter on "The French 
manager") because the foreman does not benefit from the social consideration 
allotted to the cadre. 
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This merely confirmed the boss' belief that a large proportion of the 
existing "mattrise" (foremen) were indelibly marked by the regime they had 
known previously and might never be able to assume responsibility properly. 
Another aspect of his conversion strategy was therefore to try to raise the 
status of the foremen by recruiting from outside - and not just among 
workers "issus du tas" (from the rank-and-file) as had previously been the 
case. Increasingly they were looking to take on people with a technical 
baccalaureat or even two years post-baccal aur6at education. 
However, raising the recruiting standards was not proving easy since foremen 
continue to suffer from low status in France. The well-qualified technicians 
they were looking for preferred office jobs "comme depanneur d'ordinateur 
avec voiture de fonction" (in computer maintenance with a company car) 
rather than work in dirty, noisy conditions. The plant manager conceded that 
the shop floor would never have the same prestige as an office job, but he 
also remarked that a post of foreman now had real responsi bil ity attached to 
it. As he put it: 
're nest pl us 1e marteau et 1 'encl ume. " 
(It's not the hammer and anvil anymore). 
A final means of diverting power towards the normal chain of command and 
away from the unions was through enforcing the participative management 
legislation. For instance, the discussion groups (groupes d'expression) 
introduced by the Socialist government which came to power in 1981 and since 
revoked, had been maintained within the plant. The boss saw in them an 
excellent means of keeping people informed and of allowing them to vent 
their grievances in an informal setting - thereby outflanking the unions by 
depriving them of ammunition. 
SQMM C 3- -- 
large provincial plant (FMCG) 
Another manifestation of the move towards participative management has been 
the introduction of quality circles. The plant manager of the cosmetics 
plant explained how the company had gone along with the trend on the grounds 
that quality circles made economic and social sense. Unfortunately, the 
first attempt had floundered, but they were trying to get the circles off 
the ground again. 
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The plant manager nau aecided to hold a seminar together with the entire 
management group to discuss what had gone wrong the first time and to try to 
draw lessons for the second generation of circles. He had already listed a 
number of the lessons from the first abortive attempt and ran through them 
with the researcher. 
First of all, the launch of the quality circles took place in very different 
conditions from its subsequent expansion. The launch had identified a 
favourable group (a small, stable, autonomous unit), with a good team spirit 
and an enthusiastic "facilitator?. All the conditions had been united to 
ensure success - in the hope that this would provide the necessary publicity 
to encourage subsequent circles. Subsequent attempts had to contend with 
individuals who were neither convinced of the need for circles nor capable 
of organising them. 
The pilot group had also beni f ited from the psychological boost of being 
under general scrutiny. They were aware that they had been identified as the 
most likely candidates for success and derived pride from that fact*. The 
boss had regularly referred to them as pioneers - they felt invested with a 
mission. Under these ci rcumstances, it was hardly surprising that the pilot 
group made a promising start, but as the plant manager himself conceded, it 
was insufficient evidence on which to launch extend the experiment. 
It was only when the number of circles increased that the real resistance 
manifested itself. There were secret objections, for instance, to the fact 
that the circles upset the traditional flows of information and required 
managers to surrender information which they considered to be part of their 
power. And, this resistance was not confined to the managers - even one 
group of highly skilled workers had refused to operate the ci rcl es. They 
were involved in the finishing of costly components and were at the summit 
of the shopfloor hierarchy. Their opposition to the quality circles was on 
the grounds that it would force them to divulge tricks of the trade to 
lesser skilled workers and formalise their methods. A similar phenomenon was 
noted by Michel Crozier (1963), among maintenance men who declined to give 
explanations to workers and hid the repair manuals. . 
*- There is a close parallel with the First Relay Assembly Test Room 
in the 
famous Hawthorne experiments where the flattering attention received 
by the 
pilot group was posited as one of the main reasons for its 
high performance 
(see Roethl i sberger and Dickson; 1939). 
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Cl early then, the idea of group discussions in the French context was not 
universally welcomed, and appeared to clash with the prevailing pattern of 
work relations which tended to be hierarchic and distant. This was 
particularly the case in the staff functions where open meetings were not 
the norm - and the personnel seemed inhibited by the informality expected of 
them. What was more, there was a certain reluctance to adopt methods 
associated with production - and quality tended to be perceived in terms of 
product quality, not in a larger sense. 
As for the production-related areas, the meetings had proved difficult to 
hold during work hours and seemed at odds with production imperatives. The 
plant manager explained how, on the one hand, the production managers are 
asked to stick to deadlines and cut costs, and on the other, to hold 
meetings which cost both time and money. What was more, shutting down the 
production line for two hours for no reason was anathema to the production 
manager's thinking - as the plant manager explained to the researcher, "if 
production kick up a fuss about stopping the line for preventive 
maintenance, you can bet they don't take kindly to stopping it to hold a 
discussion ". 
There was a general view that the circles ran parallel to the normal 
management processes. This attitude was no doubt encouraged by the fact that 
efforts by individuals in relation to quality circles were not officially 
recognised within the appraisal framework. Indeed, this was perhaps the 
prime reason for the eventual demise of the pilot group. Those involved in 
the first circle had put in a great deal of personal effort and when it was 
not rewarded, their enthusiasm understandably flagged. 
Once this circle had lost its impetus the whole infrastructure collapsed 
very quickly. Yet, the idea of quality circles retained a great deal of 
intellectual appeal - hence the determination to re-launch the experiment. 
Jylns 
_Q the 
threads 
The preceding snapshots give a fairly accurate representation of the salient 
concerns on the French industrial relations scene - certainly through 
the 
eyes of a general manager. The ordering of the accounts is no accident - 
it 
is intended to reflect the evol ution in top management attitudes 
towards 
labour relations. 
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French management was long regarded as the most authoritarian in Europe. But 
the trauma of May 168 (euphemistically referred to as 'Iles evenements") 
sounded the death knell of the authoritarian attitude to labour relations. 
The number of old-style, confrontational bosses is dwindling. In the larger 
firms, at least, most managers today are intelligent enough to swim with the 
tide, for a variety of motives. Some may feel a genuine concern for their 
staff's well-being. Others have a main eye for profit, and believe that 
increased worker participation serves to raise productivity and reduce 
grievances, thus undercutting union influence. Several bi rds are 
expeditiously killed with one stone. As the plant manager of company 3 
explained with regard to quality circles: 
"Jly vois un moyen essentiel pour ameliorer non seulement 
l'ambi ance mais aussi l es r6sultats econom iques. " 
(I consider them a vital means of improving the work climate and 
the financial results). 
With these initiatives coming from the employers themselves there seems 
little incentive for the government to add to the existing consultation 
structures - which remain f ai rl y rudimentary. 
The foundations for worker participation in France were laid just after the 
war when de Gaulle set up obligatory "comites d'entreprise" (works councils) 
for companies with a staff of over fifty. This has encouraged many companies 
to curb their expansion so as not to cross that fateful threshold - the so- 
called 'forty-ni ners'. 
The council is chosen by the staff from candidates generally put forward by 
the unions, and has monthly meetings with management. By law, the members of 
the works council should be the first people informed of company changes - 
although they no longer have a right of veto (suppressed by the Socialist 
government, 1981-86). In theory, their advice may be sought, but in practice 
this rarely happens. In terms of actual activities, the council's mai n 
function is to supervise wel fare and social matters. At a works council 
meeting attended in company 1, the committee accounted for the previous 
year's budget. Three main activities emerged; these were the organisation of 
presents for Mothers' Day, and for all the children at Christmas, and a 
subsidised holiday in Austria. And this would seem fairly typical if we are 
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to believe Araagn: 
"'All the comites do is arrange the Christmas parties, ' is a jibe 
one often hears. " (1982; 95) 
All firms with over ten staff also have what are called "delegu4s du 
personnel" (works' stewards). This was a post established in 1936 to channel 
employee grievances about working conditions (safety, hygiene, wage rates, 
social security etc. ) to the management. In the 60s, de Gaulle made it clear 
that these two minor institutions (works' councils and works' stewards) were 
merely precursors to larger scale 'participation' - and in 1967, as a step 
towards it, a law was introduced obliging all firms with a staff of over 
fifty to distribute to them a small proportion of their profits in the form 
of sha res. 
However, de Gaul l e's grander plan of participation does not seem to have 
materialised - little has in fact been added to his framework. The only real 
socialist concession to increased participation have been the Auroux laws 
voted through in 1982. These introduced "groupes d'expressi on" (discussion 
groups) into many companies and extended shop steward power, making this a 
full time job. The idea backfired somewhat though with the union 
representatives tending to alienate themselves from the workforce, and the 
"groupes d'expressi on" serving as a useful forum for apolitical discussion. 
Indeed, although the "groupes d'expression" are no longer obligatory, many 
companies have kept them running. Therefore, measures intended to reinforce 
union power have ended up undermining it. 
As regards the unions then, their support has steadily declined since about 
1978. A number of causes lie behind this erosion of union power. Firstly, 
there is the greater sensitivity of top management to personnel matters, and 
the multiplication of opportunities for giving vent to those concerns. 
Secondly, there isa greater awareness of economic imperatives. The 
recently-acquired business culture has filtered through to the general 
public - workers are better informed on the economic matters and 
have a 
better grasp of the interdependencies. 
What is more, worker demands are now tempered by the sobering 
thought of 
unemployment. France is a nation that traditionally sets a high moral value 
on work and French workers are now thinking twice about 
the implications of 
stri king. 
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The unions, however, have not really adapted to the new mood. They are 
staunchly divided along ideological rather than trade lines as in Britain; 
and the largest union, the communist based CGT, remains doctrinally opposed 
to "collaboration with capitalism" on the German model. This tends to make 
effective joint action between the unions virtually impossible - and the 
rivalries between the unions are often exploited by management. On the other 
hand, it does mean that French industry is relatively free of the sort of 
demarcation disputes and workers' closed shops which plague British industry 
for instance - the result of the power and i ntransi geance of the rival craft 
unions. 
Restatement 
French labour relations have traditionally been fai rly conflictual. More 
recently however, they seem to have emerged from their former rigidity and 
mellowed. This seems to have been both a product of enlightened self- 
interest from top management and a more realistic approach by workers. The 
losers in the story have been the unions which have seen their power 1 imited 
and their appeal reduced. 
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13. BALANCE SHEET 
"Animals studied by Americans rush about frantically, with an 
incredible display of hustle and pep, and at last achieve the 
desired result by chance. Animals observed by Germans sit still 
and think, and at last evolve the solution out of their inner 
consciousness. " (Bertrand Russell, Philosophy, 1927). 
The aim of this chapter is to draw up some sort of evaluative summary of the 
distinctive features of French management. This may seem like a meaningless 
exercise since the bal ance sheet is more likely to reflect the researcher's 
inherent bias than the intrinsic merits of the entity assessed. However, 
bearing this objection in mind, the researcher will approximately retrace 
the layout of the thesis, and also look for hints as to what Britain can 
profitably learn from French management. 
Chinese philosophy maintains that in nature there are two complementary 
principles, yin (feminine) and yang (masculine), which eternally interact. 
Applying this view to French management, the researcher will try to avoid 
simplistic dichotomies, along the lines of the grandes 6coles being either 
good or bad. The aim instead is to evaluate particular characteristics in 
context. Thus, one might posit, as Ardagh does, that France's technocratic 
61 ite was the guiding force behind the country's economic miracle, 'Iles 
trentes gl orieuses" (1945-75), but now appears to be "a waning asset" (1982; 
82) - what was appropriate in the fifties and sixties is less suited to the 
upheaval of the seventies and eighties. 
French managers have an obvious advantage over their Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts in that. they wear a legal ly recogni sed badge, that of cadre. 
Managerial status in France is not something that is handed out 
indiscriminately - there are no unflattering associations with say, bar 
managers or floor managers, as in Britain. In France, cadre status is 
generally acquired with some difficulty and it bestows social as well as a 
professional consideration on its incumbent. 
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The soci al standing of cadres probably hel ps to account for the quality of 
candi dates which fi rms are able to attract - and a vi rtuous circle is 
establ i shed with the calibre of these recruits further enhancing the 
prestige of managerial careers. The only way to gain immediate cadre status 
is to graduate from one of the country's leading grandes ecol es. This 
endorses the strong belief in the val ue of education and the use of 
qualifications for entry and promotion. 
Firms generally deny that qualifications hold any water after initial entry; 
the reality is that the senior positions in French management are heavily 
dominated by graduates of the grandes ecol es - even though the grandes 
ecol es only account for about 5% of the population in higher education. 
The grandes ecol es are believed to have contributed a great deal to the 
growth of the French economy in the postwar period. They have ensured that 
people of the highest quality enter the civil service, business and 
government. Equally important, the products of the grandes ecoles are highly 
mobile between these three sectors. This creates a powerful elite and old 
boy network which some find objectionable. Yet every society has such 
groupings; at least this one has the advantage that busi ness, government, 
and civil service share the same values and knowledge of each other's 
problems - something which facilitates cross-sector mobility and dialogue, 
at least among the higher echelons. 
This is in marked contrast to to the situation in the UK where isolation 
continues in training, experience and career paths. What is more, the type 
of education imparted in the grandes ecol es (with emphasis on applied 
science, mathematics, engineering or commercial subjects) is broadly 
relevant to the subsequent careers of the French elites - unlike British 
educational high fliers who tend to be trained in the classics and other 
humanities subjects and therefore have a weaker grasp of the underlying 
needs of an industrial society. It is hardly surprising that once selected 
for top civil service posts, British civil servants rarely move into 
industry. 
Of course, the reliance on grandes ecol es as nurseries for would-be leaders 
raises questions about the rather premature and irreversible nature of 
managerial selection and the disillusionment it produces among those cast 
aside. But the system has concomitant advantages - not least, the fact that 
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it pumps a high proportion of the best brains from each generation into the 
most productive areas of the French economy. There is a close and 
longstanding relationship between education and business in France. When 
national deficiencies have been identified it has generally been left to the 
education system to provide a remedy. The tradition of specialist schools 
are a perfect example - Polytechnique was set up in the 1790s to train 
engineers for the armed forces; 1'ENA was founded in 1945 to turn out high 
level administrators and most recently 1'Ecol e Nationale de l'Exportation 
was created by the Socialist government (1981-86) in response to a balance 
of trade deficit. There was even talk, at the time of the "American 
challenge" (J- J. Servan-Sch rei ver) and France's alleged managerial lag, of 
setting up a business version of l'ENA. However, the idea was shelved and a 
co-ordinating body, the Fondation Nationale pour l tEnsei gnement de la 
Ge sti on des En tr ep ri ses (FNEGE) set up instead. 
Another virtue of the system is that it allows youngish men with modern 
ideas to reach positions of influence without dissipating a lot of useless 
energy in political gamesmanship. The grande ecole graduate is vi rtually 
guaranteed an illustrious career and can therefore concentrate on actually 
doing a good job without having to devote inordinate time to self-publicity. 
Grandes ecol es graduates form a very distinct 61 ite and are very conscious 
of the fact, self-confident and intellectual in outlook. 
If we turn to the nature of French work relations we note that they tend to 
be fairly structured and formalistic. French employees seem to shy away from 
the sort of workplace familiarity in which Anglo-Saxons indulge. The French 
do not appear to share the belief that openness in professional relations 
makes sound business sense. 
From aB ri ti sh standpoint, the deliberate restraint and rigmarole of French 
office life would make it quite unbearable. However, in the French mind this 
lesser investment of the 'self? is considered a means of preserving 
personal choice and independence - which are perceived as higher order needs 
than the desi re for enriched social contact. 
The French believe that friendship obliges, provides a lever for favours, 
exposes the 'friend' to manipulation, and makes him or her dependent. In 
other words, they regard informality in the workplace as something of a 
Trojan horse - outwardly appealing but inherently 
dangerous. 
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It is noticeable in France, that those companies which do try to impose a 
more informal style of work relations are often unpopul ar. There is a 
widespread belief that cordial relations merely serve as a means of 
extracting commitment from employees and of encouraging a certain freedom of 
expression which facilitates decision making - in other words, as a 
manipulative device which gives an illusion of freedom whil st actually 
reducing it. 
In order to get round this perceived dependence and manipulation, the French 
have therefore concocted a system of authority relations, based on ritual, 
which minimizes the personality input, the need for personal interaction. 
Rituals include such things as the form of address, use of first names and 
so forth. The rituals are a means of situating the participants and defining 
their respective roles, thereby leaving them in no doubt as to which one has 
the upper hand. These rituals serve to diffuse potential tension since they 
clearly identify the authority of each party - thereby reducing the need for 
political manoeuvering or personal involvement. As a result of the 
preliminary ritualistic power play (exchange of correspondence, business 
cards and greeting), the participants know exactly where they stand. In 
other words, the authority of each party stems from their position (as 
projected by assorted rituals) rather than from their personalities. 
Authority in France is vested in the röl e- it does not emanate from the 
individual . 
Clearly, these rituals are more than the trivial concerns for which they are 
often mistaken. Beneath their apparent banality, they reflect and reinforce 
essential traits of French management - notably the hierarchic and elitist 
tradi tions. 
In terms of managerial values, the French seem 
torn between their respect 
for traditional values and an infatuation with the more modern 
American 
values. On the one hand, the social and cultural norms 
of the pre- 
industrialised order seem to have had a pronounced effect on 
the development 
of business attitudes - and colour French views 
of money, authority, 
mobility and so on. On the other hand, the 
American managerial ethos based 
on openness, pragmaticism and results 
is also having an impact on French 
attitudes. 
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This state or zensi on uetween past and future is perhaps best 11 1 ustrated by 
the contrasting attitudes of French corporate leaders. At one extreme there 
is the older style of family management, usually authoritarian, wary of 
expansion and innovation; and at the other there is the 'new wave' of 
dynamic young entrepreneurs, such as Bernard Tapie, more or less self-made 
men who, without any elite training, have built up small firms to achieve 
spectacular results. 
When it comes to big business though, the majority of heads are products of 
the grandes ecoles and are parachuted into firms. French companies rely to a 
large extent on individuals who are alien to the firm, and sometimes even to 
the private sector. This goes against traditions in the UK, US and 
especially Japan which all tend to favour established insiders. There are 
signs however, that France may be something of a trendsetter in this area. 
Richard Vancil, a professor at the Harvard Business School recently 
published a book about succession at the top called "Passing the baton" in 
which he says that in the late 1960s fewer than 10% of American chief 
executives were outsiders. By the early 1980s the figure was 25%. 
One good reason for preferring an outsider to an insider is that when a 
company needs to make big changes, outsiders are freer to deliver the 
necessary shocks. Insiders are too often lumbered with favours owed to 
others who have helped them on the way up. 
It is customary in Britain to oppose public and private companies. What is 
noticeable in the French set-up is that this traditional distinction between 
public and private sector is l ess clear-cut. Partly, this is the resul t of 
the common backgrounds of the heads. In France, a large number of private 
companies are run by former senior civil servants, two notable examples 
being the Peugeot-Citroen Group and Moet-Hennessy. This blurring of 
categories probably hel ps to account for the ease with which the likes of 
Pechi ney, Rhone-Poulenc and Saint-Gobain have made the transition from the 
private to nationalised sector and back again. 
It might be said that French companies have confided the task of identifying 
and training its future leaders to the state. This demonstrates a 
qualitatively different rela tionship between state and industry from that 
found in Britain or the US. Another manifestation of the positive 
(though 
perhaps overbearing) infl uence of the state on business 
is the legal 
obligation to spend one per cent of the payroll on training. 
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The distinctive features alluded to above might, taken in isolation, appear 
contrary to received (mostly American) wisdom regarding sound management 
practice. For instance, we might consider that French management is too 
stratified, that qualifications are accorded too much importance, that 
interpersonal relations are too remote, that corporate mentalities are 
archaic ... All these remarks are partly justified. However, we should not 
forget to look at the whole picture. 
To take an obvious example, it would be easy to criticise the education 
system for its rigidity and rather narrow focus. However, the education 
system produces what it is asked to produce. It is geared to suit the 
exigencies of the companies, which seek help in the pre-selection of an 
elite of potential top executives. This allows careers to be mapped out at 
the recruitment stage, based on qualifications. What is expected of the 
education system is not that it impart particular skills, but simply that it 
classify students via entry and finalist examinations. Certificates 
guarantee a career and the most prestigious guarantee the best careers. If 
the companies decided to recruit and promote, not on qualifications, but on 
efficiency in the field, creativity and teamwork, the education system would 
try to develop these q ual i ti es. As it i s, those q ual i ti es are more or l ess 
assumed to be the natural corollaries of high intellect. 
What is true for the French education system, also applies to the economic 
system, to career and salary structures, to organisational relations and to 
the corporate cultures of French companies. They are all attuned to one 
another. The jigsaw pieces may have wierd configurations but they still 
interlock neatly and are generally consistent with the industrial needs of 
the nation. 
So, whatever the perceived merits or shortcomings of French management it 
can not be isolated from the society which spawned it - compatibility is 
probably more important than adherence to an ideal in determining economic 
success. The acid test is whether or not it works and the evidence - not 
least France's economic performance since the war - suggests that it does. 
At the same time French society has more recently found the self-confidence 
to articulate particular criticisms of management and especially of 
competitiveness where this is the case. 
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y sus culture-bound: me thouahts 
By way of a conclusion.. it is worth returning to the universalist versus 
particularist views of management. The idea that management tends to 
submerge cultural differences is one which is particularly dear to the 
Americans with their enthusiasm to convert people and organisations to an 
ideal model. However, there are signs that the French do not cherish 
conformity in the way the Americans do. Lawrence Wylie makes a very acute 
observation on this matter: 
"When I was looking for an average French village to study, I had 
to use the expression "un village temoin". Everyone would react 
with hostility to being called "average" : Whereas, in America, one 
sees towns that advertise themselves as being "All-American". " 
(Santoni ; 61). 
A variation on this theme was observed earlier in the thesis (chapter on 
managerial ethos). It was noted that French cadres are relatively immobile - 
partly because they do not like to think of themselves as interchangeable in 
the way American managers do, since it evokes facelessness, a lack of 
individuality. 
Such fundamental differences in attitude raise serious doubts about the 
transferability of American management practi ces. This is not to say that 
those concepts are irrelevant, but nor are they automatically applicable to 
other cultures. The image which emerges is of several parallel tracks, 
rather than a single track with certain obligatory stops. To take an obvious 
example, the legitimisation of wealth creation and the pro-business cult 
seems to be a widespread phenomenon in Western cultures in the 1980s;, just 
as consumerism was in the 1960s. But that does not mean that each culture 
has reacted to it in the same way. In France for instance, the 
rehabilitation of profit seems to have taken place at an abstract level, but 
remains taboo at a personal level (see chapter on managament ethos). And it 
is doubtful that French culture will, ever replicate American candour in the 
matter. 
The universalistic theory derives its strength from the assumption that 
people will react to the same kinds of challenge in the same way. Yet the 
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foregoing chapters show that this is not the case. For instance, although 
the French adopted American-style management education in the late 1950s, 
they did not replicate American business schools. The American model did not 
generate clones, but grafted itself upon the existing infrastructure of 
grandes col es, thus preserving the essential characteristics of French 
higher education. In other words, the expected democratising influence of 
management education was countered by the elitist tradition of the grandes 
ecol es - although the curricula (substance) changed the character of French 
management education (form) did not. 
This is inevitably the case. American management practices are not filling a 
void - they are competing against longstanding practices. Management is 
certainly a source of change, but it is injected into an existing model 
whose broad outlines remain unchanged. 
We have inherited a view of management as having a kind of pure logic which 
will eventually erode all the negative (cultural) forces which stand in its 
way. As Sorge points out, (1987; 10) this idea of international convergence 
makes sense only as long as one is prepared to accept that industrialism is 
a homogeneous base, and that it is different in this from hunting, 
gathering, agriculture, herding or trading and transport. These activities 
also possess the magic ingredient of inherent logic - for instance, speed 
and safety in the case of transport or yields and consistency for 
agriculture. That has not prevented them from evolving in different ways, 
even in ostensibly similar environments. Marc Maurice (257) makes a similar 
analogy with regard to systems of production, claiming that there is no one 
best way to organise the construction of an automobile or a typewriter. 
The most sensible stance on the debate between universal and culture-bound 
theories is of course an intermediary one - and Arndt Sorge provides a neat 
summary of the researcher's own position: 
"The conclusion is that system organisation is never culture-free. 
If it were, it would be a natural phenomenon, which 
it is not. On 
the other hand, it would be wrong to propose a totally 
constructivist model of action, in which man can do more or 
less 
anything, and any organisational arrangement is possible" 
(Sorge; 
1986; 19). 
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Any audit of another nation's management is inevitably loaded with the 
researcher's own cultural preconceptions. But awareness of this bias is half 
of the battle in overcoming it. 
While certain parts of the French managerial model may seem archaic or 
idiosyncratic, the overall effect is one of coherence - the contradictions 
are complementary. This is reminiscent of the way we dismiss species in 
nature as parasitic or even repulsive while they serve to maintain the 
ecological equilibrium. Again, this view is the result of looking at 
elements out of context and according to myopic perceptions of what is 
useful, aesthetic and so forth. The aspects of French management can not be 
divorced from the society in which they thrive. 
Criticism of French management has largely been based on the American 
presumption of universality. One is tempted to respond using the French 
saying "ne prends pas ton cas pour une gbneral ite" (don't project your views 
onto others). 
On the other hand, we should not fall into the resi dual trap whereby any 
unexplainable differences observed are attributed to cultural factors. That 
too, is rather facile. 
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14. A FRENCH MALAISE? 
"On passe notre temps a croi re qu'on est mal ade, ä gratter nos 
pl ai es" - conversation with FranSoi s Del achaux (PDG Del achaux 
S. A. ). 
(We spend our time thinking we're ill and scratching our sores). 
The aim of this chapter is to round off the thesis by setting French 
management in a wider context - to try to give some idea of the change of 
mood in French society. 
The French have a long tradition of introspection and self-criticism. As 
Zeldin put it: 
"No nation has tried harder to find and express its identity, 
none has looked in the mirror so hard and argued so much about 
what it sees in it" (1983; 6). 
This theme has fascinated writers from Voltaire and de Tocqueville through 
Ernest Renan, Michel Crozier, Alain Peyref i tte and Franýoi s de Closets. 
Hardly a year passes by without some indictment of the shortcomings of 
French society - the favourite targets being the constitution of the 
nation's el ites or the psychological blocages within the society. And the 
French public seems to have a high tolerance for self-criticism since these 
books are almost guaranteed best-sellers. 
French people have a habit of putting themselves above the masses and 
criticising the nation. The criticism can be quite incisive and scathing but 
somehow remains impersonal with commentators cleverly detaching themselves 
from the population they are criticising. The architypal example is the 
regular publication of polemic books with titles such as "La mafia 
polytechnicienne", "L'Enarchie" or "L'Enaklatura" - usually written by ex- 
alumni, stricken with conscience at their own presence in this privileged 
upper-crust world (see section on intellectualism in chapter on work ethos). 
The critics give the impression they are somehow not part of it - rather in 
the way de Gaulle used to criticise the French as being ungovernable, when 
he himself was hardly the most accommodating politician in history. Inside 
every Frenchman is a miniature General who loves France, but hates the 
French. 
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Against this backdrop of criticism, France has recovered from decades of 
underachievement, defeat, occupation, war in Algeria and student riots - and 
has emerged as a rich and successful country. Given this essential 
contradiction, are the French "malades i magi nai res" (hy pocondri acs)? 
France is reluctant to concede that it is no longer a 'superpower' - it 
harbours dreams of returning to the forefront of world affairs through 
prestigious science and technology projects and economic prosperity. The 
French tend to see their country as a great power 'len petit", on a somewhat 
smaller scale. 
Perhaps because of the lack of self-belief described above and the loss of 
say in world affairs, the French have looked to Europe for support. This may 
explain the enthusiasm with which France, and its business community in 
particul ar, has embraced the concept of a unified European market. The 
vision of removing all barriers, visible and invisible, physical and 
technical,, and all obstacles to the internal circulation of people, goods, 
services and capital has really captured the French imagination. 
1992 And all that 
It is no accident that the idea of 1992 as an annus mirabil is coincides with 
a rather dour and introspective domestic debate about national decline, as 
witnessed by articles along the lines: "La France est-elle encore une Brande 
puissance? " (Is France still a superpower? - L'Express; 2/2/84; 24). To a 
France worried about its faltering economic performance and lack of clear 
national direction, the challenge of 1992 offers both a fresh goal (to fire 
up enthusiasm) and a vital lever for implementing internal structural 
change. 
As expl ai ned in Le Point: 
Tans une France encore morose, 1 es themes mobil i sateurs se font 
rares" (15/06/88; 56). 
(In a down-hearted France, rallying calls are hard to come by). 
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Confirmation tnat a united Europe is "une i dee porteuse" (an inspirational 
theme) can be seen in the way the presidential candidates have seized upon 
the concept in the build-up to the recent elections (May 1988). As early as 
January 1987, Francoi s Mitterrand made a speech to the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in London, in which he repeatedly stated, 'ta France 
est ma patrie mais 1'Europe est mon avenir" (France is my country, but 
Europe is my future). Not to be outdone, Jacques Chirac decided to 
incorporate the idea of Europe into his electoral slogan: "Gagner en 1988 
pour reussi r en 1992" (Winning in 1988 to succeed in 1992). Indeed, 1992 
cropped up so frequently in speeches by the two front-runners that each 
seemed to be vying to make the issue his own. 
France's vision of a united Europe is a long-standing one. Whil st Britain 
has wavered and dragged its feet, France has remained staunchly committed to 
the idea of Europe. It has also led the way in terms of providing a common 
vision as to the direction and distance in which the European member states 
should travel together. When he was Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou (1969- 
74) once said that France had to play the role of Europe, given the absence 
of a common European will. There is more than a grain of truth in this 
statement. One could not imagine, say.. Britain emulating France and staging 
a conference with the purely academic aim of defining a common European 
identity (Financial Times; 26/1/88; 19). 
Recently, French faith in the idea of a united Europe has been reinforced by 
two particular concerns: firstly, the loss of national impact on world 
affairs; and secondly, the need to revitalise certain sectors of French 
industry. 
There is a strong national i sti c element in French 1 if e. French people buy 
French cars, eat French food, go on holiday in France. France shows 
determination to 'remain herself', to preserve distinctiveness, and to 
pursue a national ambition. But, there is a clear discrepancy between these 
goals and the resources at her disposal. The French have realised that, 
in 
order to be heard, they must use the European amplifier - unlike Britai n 
which benefits f rom privileged relations w ith the US. Thus, from a French 
viewpoint, Europe isa means of achieving national goals and conserving a 
central role on the world stage. France has tried, not without success, 
to 
pursue a mix of independent, distinctive and autonomous actions wherever 
possible and of co-operative policies with its European neighbours - 
in 
short, to reap the benefits with a minimum of burdens. 
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Perhaps more importantly, in the context of this thesis, is the perspective 
of the single European market as a catalyst to activate French businesses. 
Some areas of French business are still backward and cloistered, and it is 
hoped that 1992 will help shock them into moderni sing - in much the same way 
that the prospect of increased competition accelerated French modernisation 
in 1957. The exaltation of 1992 may, therefore, amount to little more than a 
device to spur French industry to do faster what it needs to do anyway - 
become more self-reliant, internationally-minded and responsive to market 
forces. 
In France, with its history of protected and highly regulated markets, the 
deadline is adding psychological impetus to efforts to shake-up corporate 
thinking and the need to reach a 'critical size' to compete on a European 
scale - hence, the recent spate of take-overs. 
In fact, there seems to be little danger of the French underestimating the 
implications for companies of 1992, since everyone from the President down 
has been beating the drum. In his address to industrial leaders (Palais des 
Congres, 18/6/87), President Mitterrand evoked the negative scenario of 
France becoming a mere sub-contractor for other nations - instead of seeing 
French companies flourish on a global scale. Similarly, Edouard Balladur, 
the Treasury Minister has tried to instill a sense of urgency among the 
bosses by telling them : 
"Ci nq ans est un del ai extraordi nai rement court, compte tenu du 
redressement ä accomplir pour un pays affaibli depuis de 
nombreuses annees. " (Di ri geant; n umero special ; July 1987). 
(Five years is a very short lead time to redress a country which 
has grown weaker over several years). 
Not all political leaders are using these scare tactics. Some, like Jacques 
Del ors are emphasi sing the potential gains for French industry, suggesting 
that the unified market can pave the way for "a second French economic 
miracle" (L'Usi ne nouvelle; 19/3/87; 10 ). His optimism was echoed by 
Philippe W il l aume, President of the Centre des Jeunes Di ri geants (CJD), who 
believed that 1992 represented "une chance historique" for French companies. 
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It would seem that the message has not fallen upon deaf ears. Perhaps 
stirred by memories of the inspirational years of post-war reconstruction, 
the whol e concept has struck a particularly loud chord in French business 
ci rcl es. 
At every level one can see initiatives to raise national consciousness 
regarding 1992. These efforts have ranged from high profile extravaganzas 
like the the invitation of 2800 political and industrial leaders (including 
Frangoi s Mitterrand and Jacques Del ors) to attend a colloquium entitled, 
"Europe-entreprise: obj ecti f 1992", to the setting up of hundreds of working 
groups and task forces across industry destined to prepare for the challenge 
of a Europe without frontiers. Since the start of 1987, virtually every 
trade association, chamber of commerce (see Exhibit 13) or professional body 
has turned its attention to the theme of a united Europe. Even the small 
companies have jumped on the bandwagon. In June 1987, they held a national 
1992 awareness day. Further support has come from the business journals all 
of which have focused heavily on 'European? articles knowing that there is a 
guaranteed readership eager to be informed. 
As a result of this frenetic activity, corporate awareness is high. 
Assuring sharehol ders that the company is ready for 1992 has become an 
almost obligatory feature of the PDG's statement. Of course, the way in 
which companies view the single market is dependent upon their exi si ti ng 
commitment to Europe. There are those companies for which international 
competition is no novelty, and others which have never yet been exposed to 
i t. 
Among the former, one finds all the major corporations in industrial and 
service sectors which have a European perspective at the heart of their 
strategy. Within these companies there is a faintly pleasurable sense of 
expectation which is highly revealing. Only a few years ago, the prospect of 
a freer European market would have been viewed in France as the prelude to 
an invasion by West German industry. Today it is tal ked of as an 
invigorating challenge and an opportunity for expansion. One tell-tale sign 
regarding French optimism, is the way French companies are looking at the 
Channel Tunnel. They clearly have thei r eyes set on the British market. 
Tangible proof of this lies in a brochure from a small company in Northern 
France. The brochure has a map showing the distance not only from Paris but 
also from London. 
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More surprisingly, practical preparations for 1992 have kept in step with 
the official rhetoric (something commented upon in the chapter on management 
ethos). French companies are preparing rapidly and in detail, incorporating 
the expected changes into their plans. All the companies visited had a plan 
already drawn up or in the offing. Even more striking evidence of 
preparation was visible in recent take-over wave which saw virtually every 
merger or acquisition being cloaked in the colours of Europe. 
Whilst they are more apprehensive, small firms are not burying their heads 
in the sand. They too, are giving considerable thought to the changes which 
the lifting of barriers will foist upon them. The small manufacturing 
companies visited were particularly preoccupied by the likely shift in 
engineering norms from the French system towards the more exacting West 
German standards. Notwithstanding this sense of foreboding, the companies 
knew the likely direction of the changes because they were genned up on the 
nature of the voting process whereby each country was al l oted a coefficient 
from 1 to 3. It would seem that the effectiveness of the propaganda has been 
such that the small firms are as well informed as their large counterparts. 
The researcher's informal findings were corroborated by survey results 
recently published in the Times (2/3/88; 26). These showed that French 
companies were well-informed across the board in contrast to the UK (and 
Germany) where awareness among smaller firms is significantly lower. The 
survey also revealed that the proportion of British firms with a strategy to 
take advantage of the internal market is less than half that in France. In 
France, 60% of the companies had already drawn up a strategic plan either to 
protect existing markets or to exploit new opportunities, compared to 30% in 
the UK. The idea that French companies are already in the starting blocks 
was further supported by a recent survey of members of the Paris Chamber of 
Commerce (Director; Feb. 1988; 58) which showed that a full quarter of 
respondents felt they al ready had enough information and were equipped for 
the advent of the internal market. 
How ever, the most striking feature of the French reaction to 1992 is the 
grass roots interest it has elicited. For instance, in the companies 
visited, interviewees would spontaneously refer to the target date. The 
event has clearly gripped the public imaginations with middle managers 
enthusing about the prospect of a united Europe and conscious of 
the urgency 
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of the situation. ns one production manager explained to the researcher: 
"1992, c'est pas dem ai n, c'est ce soi r". 
(1992 is not tommorow but toni ght). 
What is more, the information does not stop at management level ; primed by 
corporate chiefs and professional bodies, the middle managers are organi sing 
their own seminars and making sure that the rest of the workforce knows what 
is afoot. In the course of the fiel dw ork, the researcher attended one i n- 
house seminar on the theme of Europe, came across several invitations to 
1992 forums, and witnessed the passing on of numerous tit-bits concerning 
the unified market in everyday meeti ngs. 
The volubility of the 1992 debate in France, is all the more surprising in 
view of the comparative silence of France's neighbours. Some of the senior 
managers who regularly travelled abroad, commented on the relative 
indifference of their European counterparts from business contacts with 
them. This leads one to wonder if French paranoia in this matter is a 
reflection of backwardness - perhaps the lack of fuss elsewhere is a sign 
that preparations for 1992 started a long time ago, by dropping 
protectionist measures and by internationalising operations. 
That is probably true. In some respects, the challenge of 1992 seems to have 
appeared at a singularly opportune moment, for France at least. The date has 
become synonymous with the challenge of restructuring industry and improving 
its efficiency in the face of international competition. However, something 
more fundamental seems to lie behind the enthusiasm over 1992. It is 
difficult to substantiate, but the French appear to respond very positively 
to grand designs - as seen in post-war rebuilding and on a smaller scale in 
projects 1 ike Concorde and the nuclear energy programme. Apparently, the 
idea of a single European market has locked into a basic French desire to be 
involved in an epic production. 
At the moment then, France has become the yardstick against which other 
member states gauge their efforts. Taking a frozen snapshot of progress may 
seem pointless since the differences in preparation will no doubt be effaced 
as the countdown progresses. However, there are good grounds for doing so. 
Firstly, because the difference in initial response reflects a qualitatively 
different attitude to Europe - the French are effectively broadcasting thei r 
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commitment to Europe. Secondly, and more importantly, the differences in 
response which manifest themselves clearly at this stage may serve as 
explanatory factors when it comes to assessing which member states have most 
benefited from the levelling of the barriers. 
Five or ten years ago, it perhaps made sense to talk of a French disease, of 
local failure to adapt quickly enough to a new world economic climate, and 
of antipathy towards business. Today, both right and left have roughly 
similar aims. Socialists call it democracy, the right calls it liberalism. 
The country is stable and properous, and the business community has been 
revitalised by the idea of a single European market - which is being invoked 
as a reason to strip away archaic thinking. The French seem to have come to 
terms with the loss of French grandeur - and are looking to Europe to 
replenish it. 
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Invitation to attend a conference on 1992. 
N 
ý$ 
, ýL X989 
CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE ET D' INDUSTRIE DE L' ASNE 
le President 
1G 
1 
. 170 
Cher Monsieur, 
" Saint-Quentin, le 24 Juillet 1987 
Lors de 1'Assemblee Generale des delegues consulaires du 15 juin dernier et des 
differentes reunions preparatoires, j'avais informe 1'ensemble des participants qu'une 
reunion de travail se tiendrait, le vendredi 18 septembre 1987 ä la Chambre de 
commerce et d'industrie de 1'Aisne en presence de M. Georges CHAVANES, `Knistre 
du commerce, de 1'artisanat et des services. 
Monsieur le Ministre vient de me faire savoir que pour des raisons imperatives, 11 se 
trouve daps 1'impossibil; te de se deplacer le 18 septembre. 
Compte tenu de 1'interet qu'il porte a nos travaux, il m'a propose d'etre parmi nous : 
le jeudi 17 septembre 1987 
Cette importante reunion sera placee sous le theme : "Ies entreprises de I'Aisne face 
au Marche unique de 1992". L'ordre du jour vous parviendra ult6rieurement par 'L; -. 
prochain courrier. 
Je souhaiterai tres vivement que vous puissiez etre present a cette reunion qua Se 
tiendra : 
au siege de la Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de 1'Aiszºe 
83 boulevard Jean Bouin a Saint-Quentin 
a 14 heures 30. 
Je vous prie de bien vouloir agreer, Cher Monsieur, l'expression de mes sentiments 
distingues. 
/ 
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